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Abstract
ABSTRACT
Activities like text-editing, watching movies, or managing personal finances are all accom-
plished with web-based solutions nowadays. The providers need to ensure security and pri-
vacy of user data. To that end, passwords are still the most common authentication method
on the web. They are inexpensive and easy to implement. Users are largely accustomed to
this kind of authentication but passwords represent a considerable nuisance, because they are
tedious to create, remember, and maintain. In many cases, usability issues turn into secu-
rity problems, because users try to work around the challenges and create easily predictable
credentials. Often, they reuse their passwords for many purposes, which aggravates the risk
of identity theft. There have been numerous attempts to remove the root of the problem and
replace passwords, e.g., through biometrics. However, no other authentication strategy can
fully replace them, so passwords will probably stay a go-to authentication method for the
foreseeable future.
Researchers and practitioners have thus aimed to improve users’ situation in various ways.
There are two main lines of research on helping users create both usable and secure pass-
words. On the one hand, password policies have a notable impact on password practices,
because they enforce certain characteristics. However, enforcement reduces users’ auton-
omy and often causes frustration if the requirements are poorly communicated or overly
complex. On the other hand, user-centered designs have been proposed: Assistance and per-
suasion are typically more user-friendly but their influence is often limited. In this thesis,
we explore potential reasons for the inefficacy of certain persuasion strategies. From the
gained knowledge, we derive novel persuasive design elements to support users in password
authentication.
The exploration of contextual factors in password practices is based on four projects that re-
veal both psychological aspects and real-world constraints. Here, we investigate how mental
models of password strength and password managers can provide important pointers towards
the design of persuasive interventions. Moreover, the associations between personality traits
and password practices are evaluated in three user studies. A meticulous audit of real-world
password policies shows the constraints for selection and reuse practices.
Based on the review of context factors, we then extend the design space of persuasive pass-
word support with three projects. We first depict the explicit and implicit user needs in
password support. Second, we craft and evaluate a choice architecture that illustrates how a
phenomenon from marketing psychology can provide new insights into the design of nudg-
ing strategies. Third, we tried to empower users to create memorable passwords with emojis.
The results show the challenges and potentials of emoji-passwords on different platforms.
Finally, the thesis presents a framework for the persuasive design of password support. It
aims to structure the required activities during the entire process. This enables researchers
and practitioners to craft novel systems that go beyond traditional paradigms, which is illus-
trated by a design exercise.
iii
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Heutzutage ist es möglich, mit web-basierten Lösungen Texte zu editieren, Filme anzusehen,
oder seine persönlichen Finanzen zu verwalten. Die Anbieter müssen hierbei Sicherheit und
Vertraulichkeit von Nutzerdaten sicherstellen. Dazu sind Passwörter weiterhin die geläu-
figste Authentifizierungsmethode im Internet. Sie sind kostengünstig und einfach zu imple-
mentieren. NutzerInnen sind bereits im Umgang mit diesem Verfahren vertraut jedoch stel-
len Passwörter ein beträchtliches Ärgernis dar, weil sie mühsam zu erstellen, einzuprägen,
und verwalten sind. Oft werden Usabilityfragen zu Sicherheitsproblemen, weil NutzerIn-
nen Herausforderungen umschiffen und sich einfach zu erratende Zugangsdaten ausdenken.
Daneben verwenden sie Passwörter für viele Zwecke wieder, was das Risiko eines Identitäts-
diebstals weiter erhöht. Es gibt zahlreiche Versuche die Wurzel des Problems zu beseitigen
und Passwörter zu ersetzen, z.B. mit Biometrie. Jedoch kann bisher kein anderes Verfahren
sie vollkommen ersetzen, so dass Passwörter wohl für absehbare Zeit die Hauptauthentifi-
zierungsmethode bleiben werden.
ExpertInnen aus Forschung und Industrie haben sich deshalb zum Ziel gefasst, die Situation
der NutzerInnen auf verschiedene Wege zu verbessern. Es existieren zwei Forschungsstränge
darüber wie man NutzerInnen bei der Erstellung von sicheren und benutzbaren Passwörtern
helfen kann. Auf der einen Seite haben Regeln bei der Passworterstellung deutliche Aus-
wirkungen auf Passwortpraktiken, weil sie bestimmte Charakteristiken durchsetzen. Jedoch
reduziert diese Durchsetzung die Autonomie der NutzerInnen und verursacht Frustration,
wenn die Anforderungen schlecht kommuniziert oder übermäßig komplex sind. Auf der an-
deren Seite stehen nutzerzentrierte Designs: Hilfestellung und Überzeugungsarbeit sind typi-
scherweise nutzerfreundlicher wobei ihr Einfluss begrenzt ist. In dieser Arbeit erkunden wir
die potenziellen Gründe für die Ineffektivität bestimmter Überzeugungsstrategien. Von dem
hierbei gewonnenen Wissen leiten wir neue persuasive Designelemente für Hilfestellung bei
der Passwortauthentifizierung ab.
Die Exploration von Kontextfaktoren im Umgang mit Passwörtern basiert auf vier Projekten,
die sowohl psychologische Aspekte als auch Einschränkungen in der Praxis aufdecken. Hier-
bei untersuchen wir inwiefern Mental Modelle von Passwortstärke und -managern wichtige
Hinweise auf das Design von persuasiven Interventionen liefern. Darüber hinaus werden die
Zusammenhänge zwischen Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen und Passwortpraktiken in drei Nut-
zerstudien untersucht. Eine gründliche Überprüfung von Passwortregeln in der Praxis zeigt
die Einschränkungen für Passwortselektion und -wiederverwendung.
Basierend auf der Durchleuchtung der Kontextfaktoren erweitern wir hierauf den Design-
Raum von persuasiver Passworthilfestellung mit drei Projekten. Zuerst schildern wir die
expliziten und impliziten Bedürfnisse in punkto Hilfestellung. Daraufhin erstellen und eva-
luieren wir eine Entscheidungsarchitektur, welche veranschaulicht wie ein Phänomen aus der
Marketingpsychologie neue Einsichten in das Design von Nudging-Strategien liefern kann.
Im Schlussgang versuchen wir NutzerInnen dabei zu stärken, gut merkbare Passwörter mit
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Zusammenfassung
Hilfe von Emojis zu erstellen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen die Herausforderungen und Potenziale
von Emoji-Passwörtern auf verschiedenen Plattformen.
Zuletzt präsentiert diese Arbeit ein Rahmenkonzept für das persuasive Design von Passwort-
hilfestellungen. Es soll die benötigten Aktivitäten während des gesamten Prozesses struk-
turieren. Dies erlaubt ExpertInnen neuartige Systeme zu entwickeln, die über traditionelle
Ansätze hinausgehen, was durch eine Designstudie veranschaulicht wird.
v
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Disclaimer
Personal Contribution Statement
In this thesis, I discuss projects that I carried out in collaboration with several students and
colleagues. Most of them were accomplished as part of the bachelor or master theses of
talented students that I was lucky to have supervised. In the following, I declare my personal
contribution to each of these projects.
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Manuel Hartmann, Jakob Pfab, and Samuel Souque. In regular meetings, each step was
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dataset. The work was published as an extended abstract at the ACM CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’17) [288] with Manuel, Jakob, and Samuel as
co-authors. I reworked their initial draft several times and revised the paper based on the
reviewers’ feedback.
Chapter 7 reports on three studies that were carried out as part of the bachelor theses of
three students: Timo Erdelt [101], Paul Huber [168], and Aline Neumann [241]. I developed
the idea to study personality in the domain of password authentication. In regular meetings,
we discussed each step. However, I provided guidance and was responsible for the key
decisions about the study design, execution, and evaluations. For statistical analyses, we
also consulted the LMU’s internal statistic consultancy (StabLab), as well as Clemens Stachl
from the psychology department. I validated and analyzed the data set independently from
the students.
Chapter 8 is based on a project that was part of Martin Prinz’ Master thesis [256]. I devel-
oped the research questions, project roadmap, and methodology. Martin then carried out the
interviews and created a large part of the mental model structure, whereas I connected the
dots in broader analyses. We met regularly to discuss the progress. The results were pub-
lished as an extended abstract at the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS
’17) [257]. I revised Martin’s draft in several iterations and redacted the paper based on the
reviewers’ feedback.
Chapter 9 encompasses two projects from the bachelor theses of Caroline Olsienkiewicz
[248] and Katharina Schwarz [284]. For both projects, I developed the initial ideas, pro-
vided guidance, and made the key decisions about the scope, methodology, and analyses.
The specifics were always jointly discussed and agreed upon. Both Caroline and Katharina
crafted wireframes, implemented prototypes, and executed the studies. I analyzed the data
independently and derived broader concepts and paradigms.
Chapter 10 is partially based on Stefanie Meitner’s bachelor thesis [231]. I had already de-
veloped the concepts and especially the choice architectures (in part with Isabel Schönewald)
before Stefanie joined the project. I provided guidance, and defined the project scope and
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I performed the data analyses. The results have been published at the European Workshop
on Usable Security (EuroUSEC ’16) with Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Stefanie Meitner, and
Heinrich Hußmann as co-authors. I wrote the main corpus of the paper and revised the sub-
mission based on the feedback from the reviewers, especially our shepherd Karen Renaud.
Chapter 11 is based on Florian Mathis’ bachelor thesis [118]. I developed the original
idea, provided guidance through the project, and made the key decisions. Specific aspects
were always jointly discussed and agreed upon. Florian implemented the prototype and I
performed source code reviews. He also was the experimenter and I shadowed him in user
sessions. Each of us independently coded qualitative aspects and created the codebook. I
also performed further quantitative analyses with the dataset. The results have been pub-
lished at the Australian Conference on Human-Computer Interaction (OzCHI ’17) with Flo-
rian Mathis and Heinrich Hußmann as co-authors. I wrote the paper and revised it based on
feedback from my co-authors before and from the reviewers after the submission. Moreover,
I redacted the paper for the final submission.
Chapter 12 includes a design exercise that was carried out together with Magdalena Sifer-
linger and Martin Prinz as part of their theses [256, 306]. I developed the idea for the
exercise and defined the goals and scope of the project. I provided guidance and discussed
all steps with them in weekly meetings. The students executed the interviews and created
the prototypes, while I independently analyzed the data and drew inferences from it.
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1
Introduction
We have become accustomed to using multiple passwords every day: We enter a four-digit
PIN to unlock our phone to check incoming messages even before breakfast. Paywalls shield
the news of the day, so they force us to log into our favorite news website before we can read
them during our commute. Once arrived at work, our fingers automatically type the password
to unlock the computer. A colleague requests access to a client’s platform, so we write
down the credentials or share them via a password manager that itself is password protected.
When we come home, we find the kids have used the family’s tablet to log into their social
media accounts, so we need to re-authenticate if we want to check our own. Interacting with
systems relying on password authentication has become ubiquitous, and we merely carry
out the task. Passwords are the de facto standard when it comes to controlling access to
resources on the Internet. While it may seem straightforward to deal with passwords because
we are so acquainted with them, there is a wide range of problems they entail: The phone
requests the PIN whenever we take it out of our pocket, so we spend considerable time per
day authenticating [155]. The news website informs us that our password has expired, so we
need to pick a new one that is not part of the ones we had used before. The work PC requires
not only our credentials but also a one-time password that our phone generates for us every
sixty seconds. At one point, the colleague leaves the company, so we have to request a new
set of credentials from the client to maintain confidentiality. And the kids used the tablet at
home to shop online because we had stored the password in the browser for convenience.
So, we delete the stored password but fail to recall it a week later, because we had not typed
it for a very long time. These and other situations lead to users feeling a considerable burden
generated by password authentication.
1.1 The State of the World
In a wide sense, password authentication encompasses digit-only personal identification
numbers (PINs), graphical schemes like the Android screen lock pattern (see Section 2.5.1),
and alphanumeric passwords consisting of letters and digits. Throughout this thesis, how-
ever, we focus on the latter because they still are the go-to method on the Internet: In 2007,
users had around 25 accounts and roughly six distinct passwords on average [111], while
more recent numbers suggest that users keep twelve unique passwords for different pur-
poses [363]. With the growing number of accounts the issues around passwords amplify:
users pick weak passwords, write them down in unprotected locations, reuse many of them,
forget the exotic ones, and share credentials with other people [316]. These behaviors are
referred to as password coping strategies.
Combating the risks entailed by these issues, researchers and practitioners have developed
numerous approaches to support users in password authentication. Four central themes have
emerged in their efforts: education, enforcement, assistance, and persuasion.
Education
Weak password practices were attributed to a lack of understanding of the consequences for
the longest time [276]. Thus, first approaches to mitigate the situation leaned on educat-
ing users through trainings, and textual instructions [162]. Explaining all risks and defense
strategies to users in lengthy prose is doomed to fail, because password security is a sec-
ondary goal that is dominated by a primary task, e.g., reading emails [371]. Nevertheless,
carefully crafted advice and explanations may be a viable strategy for those who actively
seek information [277, 341].
Enforcement
Since the inception of passwords in the 1960s, users have tried to create memorable pass-
words that are often based on simple dictionary words. To combat low complexity, enforc-
ing password rules through policies is commonplace. Passwords must then meet length and
complexity requirements, e.g., a certain number of uppercase letters, digits, or symbols. The
choice of a specific policy is not trivial for service providers, and many organizations make
poor tradeoffs [112, 295]. The plethora of policies even fosters insecure password prac-
tices, because users try to find easy ways to comply with the rules, which they do in very
predictable ways [172, 200, 345].
Assistance
Users have to deal with a high number of passwords that also interfere with each other,
so people reuse passwords and write them down on paper or digital files. To lower the
risks entailed by these coping strategies, assistive tools like password managers (PWMs)
and password generators automate certain interactions to boost both security and usability.
However, they come at a price, e.g., lock-in effects to a particular vendor that make it difficult
to move to a different tool in the future. Thus, many users rationally refrain from adopting
them [64].
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Persuasion
Finally, the youngest strategy to support users in password authentication is based on prin-
ciples of persuasive technology. Fogg defined this paradigm as “any interactive computing
system designed to change people’s attitudes and behaviors” [120, p. 1]. While assistive sys-
tems also often meet that particular goal, persuasive technology tries to create sustainable
impact even when the assistive trigger is absent. Therefore, such interventions often come
as behavior-change support systems [246]. In the realm of authentication, password meters
are the most representative form of persuasive interventions. Those user interface (UI) ele-
ments often appear on registration pages of web services, and give feedback on the strength
of a user-selected password. They often implement various nudges, i.e. small transparent at-
tempts to change behaviors [332, p. 4], to convince the user to pick a more suitable password.
The user stays in control and is free to move on without following the advice. Overcoming
inertia is perhaps the biggest challenge in the design of persuasive password support. So
far, the use of nudges has shown mixed results in empirical research [99, 267, 341], and the
spectrum of persuasive interventions in the wild is fairly narrow.
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Objectives
Password-related challenges and risks for the users are at the heart of this dissertation. The
balance between usability and security, especially for passwords, has been under investiga-
tion for several decades. This allows us to observe tectonic shifts in the hassles that users
have to bear. The notion of the inconsiderate user, who is the “weakest link” in the authen-
tication chain and notoriously refuses security measures, has started to crumble: There is
considerable evidence that many users want more control over their security and that they
are willing to give up usability for it [192]. This sacrifice might not even be necessary, nor
lie in their best interest, which I illustrate below.
1.2.1 Balancing the Costs
Changing the status quo of the authentication world can be seen as a game-theoretic problem
[35]. It involves risks and opportunities that need to be balanced in terms of their costs for
different “players”.
Maintaining Usable Password Practices
Fortunately, the costs of being attacked remain hypothetical for many users [164]. However,
there is a growing number of people who have experienced an attack with all its conse-
quences to resolve the damage and recover from it [45]. First, usable but risky password
practices, like excessive reuse and obvious password choices, can cause financial losses for
end-users. For instance, an attacker who manages to impersonate a user might be able to
3
withdraw money from bank accounts. At the moment, attacks on digital wallets contain-
ing cryptocurrency are highly lucrative, so protecting these assets with strong passwords is
vital1. Herley et al. noted that “money is the most obvious loss, but time, frustration and rep-
utation are also at stake” [165], let alone the emotional distress [296]. Accounts that have a
weak password are more likely to be hijacked [358], and it often takes victims painful effort
to recover from identity theft2. Although social engineering, where an attacker lures peo-
ple into forfeiting their credentials, is a central threat for companies, the employees’ overall
password practices still generate considerable financial losses3.
Striving for Stronger Password Practices
Solving the problems raised by passwords, we also need to consider the other end of the
security-usability spectrum. Moving to strong password practices often inflates usability
challenges for users that are largely neglected by security experts. For instance, typing an
overly complex password takes long and is error prone [299]. Such passwords are especially
tedious to enter on mobile phones or devices that were not originally designed for text input,
e.g., smart TV sets [232]. Moreover, most people are incapable of creating and memorizing a
strong, unique password for every single account on their own. So, it is unrealistic to expect
that they will do so without the use of external aids like handwritten notes or password
managers. The cost of using such methods is a dependency on the tools that users did not
ask for in the first place. In any case, strong passwords are no panacea in boosting online
security. They do not stand a chance in fending off social engineering attacks where the
victim unwillingly surrenders the password in plain text. In an effort to alleviate the risks of
unknowingly forfeited credentials, service providers often require users to reset passwords
after a given period. Such expiration policies are rather ineffective [53] and responsible for
many support desk calls whose resolutions are costly [3, 277].
1.2.2 The Challenge: Improving an Innately Annoying Interac-
tion
Passwords are annoying for users, and as we can see above, there is no easy solution to
alleviate this situation. It is impossible to remove all usability pain points [34]. Yet, no
alternative can fully replace passwords, either (see Section 2.5). Thus, Herley and Van
Oorschot point out that “supporting passwords better is a vast opportunity for improvement”
[165], because making even a small change can have an impact on so many users.
1 https://blog.dashlane.com/cryptocurrency-exchange-password-power-rankings-2018/
(last accessed 24.03.2018)
2 https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151006006149/en/Latest-Data-Breach-
Spotlights-Identity-Restoration (last accessed 11.01.2018)
3 https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/09/19/infosec-weakest-links/ (last accessed
09.04.2018)
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Up until now, persuasive strategies have produced mixed results regarding their efficacy in
supporting users with passwords. This could be due to several issues: Mental models and
coping strategies evolve over time [316, 352], which has seen little attention in the design of
persuasive interventions. Much of the past research dealt with one-shot triggers in isolation,
but many context factors and costs for different stakeholders were left out. In an analogy
to the design principle “form follows function”, a better understanding of the functions of
user support can help design assistive and persuasive solutions (the form). Moreover, many
highly effective nudges from other domains have not been adapted for password support,
so we simply may not have discovered the best intervention, yet. However, since nudg-
ing strategies are nuanced, we need a structured exploration of how we can bring them to
password authentication to remove its most important pain points.
1.2.3 Research Questions
In this thesis, I take a holistic approach to address the problem of providing users with the
right support in their password practices. To accomplish this, the research presented here
tries to answer the following questions:
RQ1 What is the role of psychological factors and mental models for password selection
and coping strategies?
RQ2 How can password authentication be simplified for users?
RQ3 How can we design persuasive strategies to support users in any password-related
tasks?
1.3 Main Contributions
As highlighted above, several aspects of password support have been left out in the literature,
although there are many reasons to consider their importance. First and foremost, a broader
understanding of contextual factors that contribute to the formation of specific coping strate-
gies is necessary to improve password support. The primary goal of this thesis is to provide
this understanding on a fundamental level by exploring existing factors and addressing them
with persuasive designs. The solutions include new paradigms for the design of persuasive
interventions.
Insights into Context Factors of Password Practices
Researchers seem to have reached consensus that the context in which a password goes
through its life-cycle [316] is an explanatory variable for users’ practices. However, con-
textual factors have merely been addressed in the discussions of empirical findings. Only
a few studies specifically correlated users’ backgrounds to their password practices (e.g.
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[192, 226]) and they mostly focused on demographic factors. We contribute several insights
that enrich the understanding of a wide range of context factors. Specifically, we address
how users’ mental models are associated with their password practices. We do this through
a novel method to study mental models in-the wild with the aid of a game. Moreover,
we are the first to thoroughly investigate the interconnection between personality traits and
password authentication. The insights gathered in three online studies revealed interesting
associations between personality, attitudes, and behaviors regarding passwords. Lastly, we
performed an extensive audit of the real-world constraints that form the context for password
reuse. All these insights shape our understanding of the problem space as the foundation for
persuasive interventions.
Investigation of Persuasive Strategies
With the context factors in mind, we extended the range of persuasive design strategies.
As a starting point, we investigated users’ explicit and implicit needs in password feedback.
From this exploration, we contribute the “show-explain-help-empower” paradigm that serves
as a heuristic for persuasive password assistance. We followed this up with two studies that
were carried out both in the lab and in the field: The first study was the first of its kind
to evaluate the Decoy effect for choice architectures in password authentication. Here we
learned important lessons about the interplay between feedback and feedforward, and about
the role of simplification in persuasion. The second study was focused on empowerment.
We evaluated different dimensions of usability of emojis inside text-based passwords. The
study delivers timely insights, because an increasing number of web-services enable users to
pick such emoji-passwords and there are some issues that need attention from the very start.
A Structured Process for the Persuasive Design of Password Support
Finally, the exploration of the context factors, and the design studies on persuasive assistance
in password authentication are synthesized into a framework for structuring future design
processes in this domain. I contribute the Persuasive Design for Password Support (P4P)
framework. It respects the dynamism of the status quo and aids in both finding the right
interventions and implementing them successfully. To that end, we go through a design
exercise that demonstrates how the P4P framework can be used in practice.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This dissertation encompasses four major parts that unravel the different aspects of persua-
sive password support. I chose to structure the content with fourteen self-contained chapters.
Although they do follow a narrative, it is possible to read them in any order by following
the provided cross-references for the necessary background information. Part I is an exhaus-
tive overview over the related work that serves as the basis for all the discussions in later
parts. In Part II, I report on empirical research that explores the various contextual factors
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of password selection and coping strategies. Part III then shows how these factors helped
to craft novel persuasive design strategies. Lastly, Part IV establishes a research and design
framework, and concludes with a reflection on the gained insights and future work. In the
following, I highlight the contents of the individual chapters with the questions they try to
answer.
Part I: Foundations of Usable Authentication
Chapter 2: Foundations This chapter provides an overview of password-based authenti-
cation from a system-perspective. Questions answered:
• How has password authentication evolved over time?
• What benefits, drawbacks, and threats do passwords entail?
• What is a strong, what is a weak password?
• Why do we still need passwords when there are more advanced schemes?
Chapter 3: Human Factors I describe the method space to study passwords, before dis-
cussing findings about users’ password practices. The chapter also highlights the central
approaches that have been implemented to mitigate security risks on the user side. Ques-
tions answered:
• How do we conduct valid research on passwords with humans and ethics in mind?
• How do users cope with passwords? What makes their practices particularly risky?
• What can we do to steer people away from risky behavior?
Chapter 4: Related Work Summary This chapter describes the status quo of password
authentication and highlights ill-defined aspects that warrant further research.
Part II: Exploring the Context Factors
Chapter 5: Mental Models of Password Strength We present a novel approach to study
the perception of password strength: PASDJO, the password game. A longitudinal field
study aimed to quantify common misconceptions about the benefits of password complexity,
which are an underlying context factor for password practices. Questions answered:
• How well can users gauge password strength?
• Do we have to update our views on users’ capabilities?
• Is a game suitable to collect the necessary data?
• How effective is the game to educate users?
Chapter 6: Policies and Reuse This chapter reports on a thorough audit of the password
policies of the most-visited websites in Germany. It explains external context factors that
shape password reuse in the real world. Questions answered:
• How consistent are password policies in the wild?
• Is it possible to find a password that meets all requirements at once?
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Chapter 7: Personality in Password Practices This chapter presents three empirical
studies about the role of personality traits in password practices. In particular, we shed light
on the psychometric context factors for the usability of policies, mental models of password
strength, and password selection behavior. Questions answered:
• Is personality associated with password practices, attitudes, and behaviors?
• How well can we model such associations?
• What are the specific implications on the design of personalized password support?
Chapter 8: Mental Models of Password Managers We present a qualitative user study
eliciting the users’ motivations to either adopt or dismiss password managers. A fine-grained
mental model is established to depict biases as context factors. Questions answered:
• Why are people (not) using password managers?
• How do they make sense of their functionality?
Part III: Persuasive Design Strategies
Chapter 9: Feedback Requirements This chapter presents two studies on users’ explicit
and implicit expectations around password feedback. We derive a paradigm for persuasive
password support. Questions answered:
• What are users’ needs in persuasive feedback?
• How would they design a feedback system?
Chapter 10: The Decoy Effect We carefully craft a choice-architecture for password sup-
port and explore a marketing phenomenon as nudging strategy. The chapter reports on an
online study and highlights the interconnection between feedback and feedforward. Ques-
tions answered:
• Does the decoy effect work to make stronger passwords more attractive?
• How effective is feed-forward in combination with feedback?
Chapter 11: Emoji-passwords This chapter presents emoji-passwords as an approach to
simplify memorization in persuasive ways. We investigate different facets of usability and
report on a mixed-methods study. Questions answered:
• How usable are emoji-passwords?
• What are the risks and potentials of emoji-passwords?
• How do platform-dependent differences affect memorability?
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Part IV: Synthesis
Chapter 12: P4P Framework This chapter synthesizes the insights from the first three
parts to establish a new framework for the design of persuasive password support. Through
a design exercise, I show how it can be applied to develop a novel password manager. Ques-
tions answered:
• How can we design persuasive password support in a structured way?
• How do we practically apply the framework?
Chapter 13: Summary In this chapter, I reflect on the presented research and draw con-
clusions. The contributions are summarized, and contrasted by the limitations of the method-
ology. I provide eight meta recommendations for future design work. Questions answered:
• What have we learned?
• What are the implications and limitations?
• What do we need to consider in the future?
Chapter 14: The End In the final chapter of this thesis I present open research topics and
show their potentials. The dissertation concludes with a reflection on the role of password-
authentication in the present and the future. Questions answered:
• What research topics have been opened up by this thesis?
• What still needs to change to make users’ authentication practices easier?
1.5 Style Choices
Singular They: Throughout this dissertation pronouns are used in the plural although
speaking about an individual, e.g. “the user” is mostly referred to as “they” instead of “he”
or “she”, to avoid discrimination of certain demographic groups.
Plurals: As is common in HCI literature, the author utilizes “We” instead of “I” to ac-
knowledge the work of collaborators. In later more opinionated parts, the explicit usage of
“I” intends to communicate the subjective nature of thoughts and interpretations.
Footnotes: Throughout the thesis, footnotes are excessively used to link to web content.
Publications in scientific archives appear in the list of references at the end of the thesis.
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Foundations
Passwords are but one puzzle piece in the realm of cyber security. They are part of the access
control paradigm, which is commonly divided into three steps: identification, authentication,
and authorization [268]. Identifying a user is usually done with a prompt for a user name, so
the system first tries to answer the question “who are you?”. Authentication is about proving
that a user – or more broadly an entity – is who they claim to be, i.e. authentication is about
verification of an entity. In other words, the system asks “How can you prove that you are
who you claim to be?”. This verification process can be based on three central elements,
namely something that you know (any kind of secret), something that you are (any kind of
property), or something that you have (any kind of secret token). One could argue that the
second category could be extended by “something that you do”, e.g. provide your individual
signature. However, authentication does not necessarily require identification as a first step.
It is well possible to authenticate entities even if they are anonymous. One everyday example
are passwords for WiFi networks: Most of the time, the access point does not require a user
name; the password, or pre-shared key, in the WPA protocol is enough to join the network.
Last, authorization is the decision over which resources an authenticated entity is allowed to
use, or an answer to “can the user access this?”.
For this thesis, authentication remains the center of attention. In this chapter, we take a
look at various forms of authentication and establish an argument as to why “something that
you know” is still the most prevalent and significant authentication paradigm to date.
2.1 A Brief History of Passwords
The idea of protecting resources with “something that you know” is hundreds of years old.
Think about the magic words “open, Sesame!” that Ali Baba spoke to enter a den used as
treasury by forty thieves1. The story already illustrates password misuse, because Ali Baba
1 Ali Baba is a fictional character in a story from “Thousand and One Nights” as recorded by Antoine Galland
in the early 18th century. http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/alibaba.html (last accessed 16.12.2017)
was not the rightful owner of the den and he impersonated the thieves. Nonetheless, this
authentication paradigm was brought to the digital world in the early 1960s by the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)2. Researchers had built a mainframe computer that
was programmable by multiple users. At the time, one of the most valuable resources beside
the physical device was the time granted to use the machine. Thus, the Compatible Time
Sharing System (CTSS) was conceived to give every user a certain quota of hours to operate
the computer. The quota was enforced with the aid of dedicated user accounts that were
password protected. The interaction very much resembled what we still use today: after
typing the user name, the password is requested and hidden from the screen during entry to
prevent others from observing the credentials.
Shortly afterwards, the flaws of the system started to become evident when Alan Scherr be-
came the first “hacker”3. He desired more usage time, so he needed to impersonate other
users of the computer and use their quota. The list of passwords on the system was not well
protected, which allowed him to access the credentials and carry out what was probably the
first password exploit in computer history. Scherr benefited from the fact that passwords
were kept in plain text and could be accessed with a special punch card. Interestingly the
attack was not detected immediately. Morris and Thompson mention strange behavior in
their 1979 paper and blame the issue on a “software design error” [237], while in fact it
was Scherr who was responsible for it4. With the rise of the UNIX operating system in
the 1970s, encrypted passwords became standard. One of the cornerstones was the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) which was developed by IBM and propagated by the US Na-
tional Bureau of Standards (today called the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
NIST) [25]. This algorithm was widely used until the late 1990s when computing power
was sufficient to efficiently carry out attacks, which rendered DES infeasible. At the time,
the Advanced Encryption Standard had already been proposed and was able to replace DES
in a straightforward manner, so the issue was resolved quickly.
2 https://www.wired.com/2012/01/computer-password/, (last accessed 16.12.2017)
3 https://www.slideshare.net/CAinc/history-of-the-password/7-In_1962_a_software_bug
(last accessed 16.12.2017)
4 https://www.wired.com/2012/01/computer-password/ (last accessed 05.03.2018)
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Table 2.1: Benefits and Drawbacks for different stakeholders in a password-based authentica-
tion. SPs = service providers.
Stakes Benefits Drawbacks
SPs Low costs Large number of attack vectors
Easy to implement Anomaly detection costly
Replaceable when compromised Attacks are simple to carry out
Revocable by administrator Attack automation simple
Enforceable policies Attacks can have severe consequences
Users Fast entry on desktops Memory overload from too many passwords
Most users already familiarized Suboptimal coping strategies
Easy to learn Stronger passwords difficult to memorize
Sharable with others Entry on mobile devices difficult
High degree of control / freedom Mastery difficult
Disliked by many users / perceived as burden
Misc Independent of identification Weak passwords are a risk for users and SPs
Adjustable security level
Around 50 years after CTSS, one of its creators, Fernando Corbató, said in an interview with
the Wall Street Journal that password-based authentication has “become kind of a nightmare
with the World Wide Web”5. The surge of the Web has led to many services requiring
authentication. Alphanumeric passwords were the go-to solution because the system is easy
to implement and has almost no set-up costs other than a database. This has led to passwords
becoming the de-facto standard for authenticating users on the Web.
However, passwords do have shortcomings for all the stakeholders involved in the authen-
tication process, e.g. users who struggle with remembering a multitude of passwords, or
service providers who need to deal with leaked passwords (see Table 2.1). Consequently,
there have been many attempts to replace passwords as a whole to either minimize secu-
rity risks, make things easier for the users, or – ideally – both at the same time. Until now,
though, no alternative authentication mechanism has been able to fully replace alphanumeric
passwords on the web, which we investigate in detail in Section 2.5. Put short, the benefits
provided by passwords outweigh the drawbacks most of the time.
2.2 Attacks on Passwords
As mentioned above, computer passwords were attacked shortly after their inception. At-
tacks have since become more sophisticated and manifold (see Figure 2.1). In the first attack
on passwords, Scherr benefited from very weak protection and was able to simply print the
5 http://on.wsj.com/1sVQOIv, (last accessed 18.12.2017)
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passwords and hack into the system. Nowadays, an attacker, or “the bad guy” as Morris and
Thompson used to call them [237], has a number of ways to obtain a user’s password(s). The
following sections depict how the attacks work, what the countermeasures look like, and if
changing one’s password behavior serves as effective countermeasure.
      
Interception
Passwords can be 
intercepted as they are 
transmitted over a network.
Shoulder Surfing
Observing someone typing  
their password.
Key Logging
An installed keylogger 
intercepts passwords  
as they are typed. 
Blacklist the most 
common password 
choices 
Use account 
lockout, throttling 
or monitoring to 
help prevent brute 
force attacks 
Monitor failed login 
attempts…  train 
users to report 
suspicious activity
Prioritise administrator  
and remote user 
accounts Change all default vendor 
supplied passwords before 
devices or software  
are deployed 
Searching
IT infrastructure can be 
searched for electronically 
stored password information.
Brute Force
Automated guessing of 
billions of passwords until  
the correct one is found. 
Manual Guessing 
Personal information, such 
as name and date of birth 
can be used to guess 
common passwords.
Social 
Engineering
Attackers use social 
engineering techniques to 
trick people into revealing 
passwords.
***** Help users cope with  ‘password overload’
•  Only use passwords where they are really needed. 
•  Use technical solutions to reduce the burden on users.
•  Allow users to securely record and store their passwords.
•  Only ask users to change their passwords on indication  
of suspicion of compromise. 
•  Allow users to reset password easily, quickly and cheaply. 
Help users generate  
appropriate passwords
•  Put technical defences in place so that simpler  
passwords can be used. 
•  Steer users away from predictable passwords  
– and ban the most common. 
•  Encourage users to never re-use passwords  
between work and home. 
•  Train staff to help them avoid creating passwords  
that are easy to guess. 
•  Be aware of the limitations of password strength meters. 
Password security
...and how to improve your system securityHow passwords are cracked...
Attackers use a variety of techniques to discover passwords, including using powerful tools 
freely available on the internet. The following advice makes password security easier for your 
users – improving your system security as a result. 
Stealing 
Passwords
Insecurely stored passwords 
can be stolen – this includes 
handwritten passwords 
hidden close to a device.
Don’t store passwords 
in plain text format.
Average number of  
UK citizen’s online  
passwords 
Average number of 
websites users access 
using the same password
UPDATE
www.ncsc.gov.uk        @ncscFor more information go to 
Figure 2.1: Overview of attacks and high-level mitigations. Image courtesy of the National
Cyber Security Centre, UK https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/password-collection
(last accessed 21.12.2017)
Online Guessing An adversary tries to impersonate the user by trying different combina-
tions of user names and passwords, which are sent to the authenticating service directly. If
successful, the attacker can log in without the user noticing and steal personal information,
act on their behalf, and try to use the credentials on other services as well. This attack, which
is commonly known as an “online attack”, is in many cases thwarted by throttling the num-
ber of unsuccessful login attempts per account. The service provider can lock down a user
account entirely after a given number of failed login attempts. Afterwards, the user either
has to manually reset their password, or they need to wait a certain time until the account is
unlocked and new login attempts can be made. In the latter scenario, a strategy to hamper
attacks is to implement a backoff algorithm6 like, e.g., in the Ethernet protocol [328, p. 285].
The idea behind this scheme is to (exponentially) increase the time a user (or attacker) has
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to wait until they can log in again after the account was locked down. Brostoff and Sasse
suggest allowing ten attempts until the account is locked [40]. This should give users enough
trials to go through their list of passwords which is usually shorter than ten [111]. Though
this kind of countermeasure may seem like the best option, for system providers it comes
at a higher price than for users: A malicious party could easily lock out a large number of
users with a denial-of-service attack. For example, if a lockout policy is in place that inval-
idates passwords after ten failed login attempts, an attacker would only need to take a list
of email addresses (readily available on the Internet) and run ten or more guesses per user.
This would lock all of them out at once and the financial damage for the service provider
to respond to user requests and/or reactivate accounts manually is probably large. There are
defense strategies for this kind of threat, too, but their success cannot be guaranteed [112].
Perhaps, online guessing to access user accounts might only be feasible for determined
attackers who target specific victims, but this type of attack is not entirely uncommon
[113, 116, 164, 358]. It is sometimes argued that such an attacker might automate up to
one million guesses until the attack becomes profitless because it would simply take too
long [35, 115]. However, if login attempts are not throttled whatsoever, attackers have rea-
sonable chances for payoff. This situation can lead to massive attacks, like the largest attack
on WordPress to date in December 20177. Florêncio et al. argue that users are well ad-
vised to pick passwords that can at least withstand this type of attack, because they stand a
reasonable chance to fight them off. On the other hand, it becomes too difficult to protect
themselves against offline guessing [115, 116, 117].
Stealing / Oﬄine Guessing Since online attacks are often impractical due to time con-
sumption, offline attacks have proliferated in recent years8. In this scenario an attacker
breaks into the server of a service provider, usually by exploiting security holes. If this goes
unnoticed, the intruder can often access the entire database containing the user account data.
He or she downloads the data to their own machine, which allows them to use cracking tools
like John the Ripper9, hashcat10, or PassFault [250]. These sophisticated tools use dictionar-
ies, mangling rules and brute force to calculate password hashes which are then compared
to the entry in the database. If the hashes match, the password was cracked and its plain
text version is written to a file. Ideally, the passwords in the database are cryptographically
hardened through salting and a slow hash function like bcrypt [259], which drastically re-
duces an attacker’s chances to crack the password. At the other side of the attack surface, the
passwords could be stored in plain text, which would not require any cracking automation at
6 https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/implementing-the-exponential-backoff-
algorithm-to-thwart-dictionary-attacks (last accessed 20.12.2017)
7 https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2017/12/aggressive-brute-force-wordpress-attack/
(last accessed 21.12.2017)
8 http://breachlevelindex.com/ (last accessed 20.12.2017)
9 http://www.openwall.com/john/ (last accessed 20.12.2017)
10 https://hashcat.net/hashcat/ (last accessed 20.12.2017)
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all. Unfortunately, some of the most famous data leaks revealed that data was stored in plain
text. The RockYou breach in 2009 contained 32 Million user accounts for its gaming website
with plain-text passwords [32, 365]. At the time, RockYou developed games for MySpace
and Facebook and the database also contained credentials for these sites11, which made the
leak even more severe. Strong passwords would not have helped at all to avoid losing per-
sonal data. Perhaps RockYou’s loose policy (five characters or more, no further restrictions)
helped in safeguarding other accounts where more complex policies were in place, because
users were not able to reuse their RockYou password there. In other instances of stolen pass-
word databases, the passwords were indeed hashed, e.g. the infamous LinkedIn breaches12
– again with millions of rows of user data [169]. Users are challenged to find a password
that withstands this kind of attack. The large issue is that attackers are basically only limited
by the time and money they want to spend on calculating password hashes [27]. On mod-
ern machines with a single GPU, thousands of hashes can be calculated per second even for
slow algorithms13. Using a cloud instance with multiple CPUs can speed up this process
even further14. Perhaps, this is why Florêncio et al. argue that it is futile to encourage users
to pick a password that would withstand such an attack [115, 117].
Phishing / Social Engineering Social engineering has become one of the biggest threats
for a user’s passwords with a growing number of incidents and fierce financial damage [45].
Former criminal hacker Kevin D. Mitnick, who calls himself a social engineer, defines the
term like this:
“Social Engineering uses influence and persuasion to deceive people by con-
vincing them that the social engineer is someone he is not, or by manipulation.
As a result, the social engineer is able to take advantage of people to obtain
information with or without the use of technology.” [236, Frontmatter]
Put simply, an attacker fools a victim into revealing certain kinds of information, including
passwords. The most common social engineering attack on passwords is phishing, which
typically involves two components: a fraudulent website that mimics another service and an
email that lures the user onto this website [85, 301]. The email usually utilizes persuasive
techniques like scaring (“we noticed someone logged into your bank account and you need
to reset your password”) or time pressure (“you need to act now to avoid further damage”).
If the website looks just like the original (like the web pages in Figure 2.2), users might
11 https://techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-facebook-
passwords/ (last accessed 20.12.2017)
12 http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/linkedin-data-breach-email-password/ (last accessed
20.12.2017)
13 https://gist.github.com/epixoip/9d9b943fd580ff6bfa80e48a0e77520d (last accessed
20.12.2017)
14 https://linuxundich.de/gnu-linux/erfolgreicher-brute-force-angriff-auf-pwdhash/
(last accessed 07.01.2018)
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Figure 2.2: Actual phishing websites targeting Facebook and Paypal (online and accessible on
21.12.2017). The URLs contain “fb” (short for Facebook) and keywords like “secure” “paypal”
which contribute to falsely trusting the authenticity of the sites.
fall for it and enter their password to log in. In that case, it does not matter whether it is
a strong, complex password or simply 12345 – the attacker knows the username/password
combination from that point on [329]. If this tuple is used on other services, the attacker
immediately gains access to those as well.
It is very challenging for users to validate the authenticity of a given webpage [85, 121].
Usually, the URL is the best indicator. Dhamjia et al. among others argue that it is unre-
alistic to keep an eye on the URL at all times. Since the URL and padlock-icons are often
ineffective, much research has been dedicated to help users in this validation and prevent
phishing attacks. For example, Lin et al. found that domain highlighting in the URL bar
only has a small effect on the effectiveness of phishing attacks, even after their participants
were explicitly instructed to take note of the URL [212]. Wu et al. showed that browser
toolbars do not really help users, either [378]. Dhamija et al. proposed a trusted path be-
tween the user and the legitimate service [84]. In this system, users are supposed to verify
the authenticity of a given website by comparing visual patterns in a trusted window and
on the website. Together with Max-Emanuel Maurer and Alexander De Luca, I created a
browser extension to visualize the usage of different types of SSL certificates [225]. The
extension makes the SSL state more obtrusive by coloring the entire frame of the browser
window, e.g., in green if all communication is securely encrypted. The user then does not
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Figure 2.3: Chrome v63’s warning on a phishing website. The user is urged to leave the site but
still has the chance to visit it by clicking on “Details”.
have to look for a small padlock icon or the “https://” URL prefix. We deployed it publicly
and launched a feedback survey, which indicated that changing the browser skins is obtru-
sive enough to raise awareness and makes users more confident while browsing the Web.
Until the recent change of platform APIs15 and resulting incompatibility problems, the ex-
tension named “SSLPersonas” had seen 47000 downloads, which is an indicator of both the
necessity and the success of our solution.
However, ideally the browser would detect phishing websites and users from visiting them
in the first place. Current versions of the major browsers try to do this and urge the user to
leave the site, as is shown in Figure 2.3. This gives attackers only a short time-frame until
the webpage has been classified as phishing, which takes 15 hours on average according to a
recent Webroot report [134]. Older sources report a bit longer lifespans between 20 hours16
and 54 hours17.
15 https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2017/11/20/extensions-in-firefox-58/ (last accessed
21.12.2017)
16 https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/05/16/how-quickly-are-phishing-websites-
taken-down/ (last accessed 21.12.2017)
17 https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2004/08/14/life_span_of_a_phishing_site_
averages_54_hours.html (last accessed 21.12.2017)
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Malware and Eavesdropping Secretly stealing plain-text passwords is also possible by
infiltrating the user’s system with malware, which is a term for malicious software [19].
One of most common attacks is to install a keylogger that sends all keyboard input to the
attacker. For the most part, this either happens as a “drive-by-download” when the user visits
an infected website or by opening a malicious email attachment [45]. In the former scenario,
the sole line of defense lies with the service provider who needs to make sure their website
is not infected. Wash identified that users are generally aware of this kind of threat, but
their mental model of malware is sub-par [362]. Hence, the countermeasures taken by the
users are often insufficient. As with the phishing scenario, a strong password is incapable
of preventing a malware attack. Ideally, users use an anti-virus solution, keep their software
updated at all times and refrain from opening suspicious email attachments.
Moreover, user credentials can be intercepted in transit, e.g. after the user submits them
through a web form. These so called man-in-the-middle attacks are tough to carry out, but
strong passwords do not prevent them either. One of the typical solutions to minimize the
risk is encrypting the traffic with a secure protocol like SSL/TLS [328, p. 853ff.], which
is based on a public/private key infrastructure. This makes it harder for an adversary to
act as the man in the middle, because they would require the private key of either party.
So, attackers must tamper with the certificates which usually causes browsers to show a
warning [225]. Users, however, do not necessarily understand such warnings, because their
understanding of the technical details is low [162, 371]. Consequently, the HCI community
has invested much effort to convey the essential messages in a clear and actionable way
[105, 107, 225, 309, 324].
Observation To obtain the password of a specific user, one can also simply watch them
enter it and figure out what the password was. This attack is typically referred to as “shoulder
surfing” because the person who is watching figuratively “surfs” on the user’s “shoulder” to
look at their screen [329]. Shoulder surfing is relatively easy and does not require technical
sophistication. But, although friends and family can carry out such an attack, it is safe to say
that it is more problematic in public spaces where unknown bystanders are present. Typical
interactions that take place in such environments can be found with PIN entry, e.g. on an
ATM, or entering any kind of password on a mobile device, e.g. on a bus in close vicinity to
other people. De Luca et al. dedicated some research to both scenarios. For instance, they
investigated contextual factors during ATM usage and the design space for alternative ATM
authentication mechanisms [78]. They developed the ColorPIN scheme, where numerical
input needs to match a previously enrolled color sequence [77]. Entering the ColorPIN is
done indirectly. The user needs to first identify the correct digit (e.g. “1”), and then type
a corresponding letter in the right color (e.g. a black “Q”). A shoulder-surfer is hereby
challenged by overwhelming their short-term memory [88].
Moreover, long alphanumeric passwords are a seldom-researched topic with regard to shoul-
der surfing. Shaub et al. looked into the effect of different designs of virtual keyboards on
shoulder surfing susceptibility [279]. Somewhat unsurprisingly, they found that keyboards
with more cumbersome access to special characters are less prone to shoulder surfing be-
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cause it is harder for an attacker to keep track of the keyboard switches. Moreover, we can
see in the ColorPIN example that PINs and graphical passwords are more likely to be under
attack. Users usually enter graphical passwords more slowly [329, 373, 265], which on the
one hand gives an attacker more time to observe, but on the other hand burdens the short-
term memory a bit more. Also, some visual authentication mechanisms require more screen
real estate than a username/password form and entry is often not masked [23]. Still, there
is not a lot of evidence that observation is a severe threat in the real world, other than for
ATM PINs and any kind of credentials of people of public interest. Herley and Pieters point
out that the attack is not scalable via algorithms [164]. Hence, Maguire and Renaud come
to the conclusion that “shoulder-surfing may well be a non-issue in authentication design”
[218]. Using desktops or laptops to authenticate on regular websites, observation is rarely
a major concern. Passwords are usually masked in the browser by replacing each character
with an asterisk or a bullet symbol. However, masking has recently been questioned because
it prevents proactive error checking on the user side [278].
Other attacks Apart from the attacks described above, there are other approaches that
should not go unmentioned (see Table 2.2). First, people in one’s own social circle, e.g.
friends and family, have considerable amounts of personal information and often physical
access to devices and passwords written onto post-it notes. Although the intent is often
not purely malicious, it can be easy for these people to have an informed guess of a user’s
credentials. Flechais et al. use the term “spouse attack” to describe this kind of threat [109],
Dunphy et al. call it a “friend attack”, while Sasse and Flechais framed it as “insider attack”
[277]. Ur et al. found that users underestimate its likelihood [342]. A strong, complex
password that is only memorable to the legitimate user might help in that scenario. Weirich
and Sasse, however, argue that choosing an overly complex secret could make the user appear
“paranoid” [368] and Flechais et al. see password sharing as an important sign of trust
[109, 110].
Finally, some credentials are shared unintentionally on the web. Software developers who
share open source code on the web are prone to this issue [59]. Recently, the node package
manager (npm) platform realized that many of its users published their passwords with the
packages18. An adversary could simply crawl public repositories on GitHub and collect the
passwords in plain text. The npmjs.org operators had to invalidate the credentials to secure
the accounts. One solution that reduces the severity of credential loss is using multi-factor
authentication (cf. Section 2.5.3).
Security-wise, the main objective of this thesis is combating online and offline attacks, i.e.,
algorithmic attacks, where password coping strategies really make a difference. A panacea
for all kinds of threats, each of which has warranted multiple PhD theses, is probably im-
possible to find.
18 http://blog.npmjs.org/post/161515829950/credentials-resets (last accessed 22.12.2017)
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Table 2.2: Threats on passwords and potential countermeasures for users and service providers
(SP). Other stakeholders are left out of this analysis.
Threat Countermeasures Responsible
Online Attack Throttling SP
Anomaly detection SP
Set-up Multi-factor authentication SP
Moderately complex password User
Enable Multi-factor authentication User
Offline attack Slow hash algorithm SP
Secure database design SP
Security audits, fix vulnerabilities SP
Complex, strong password User
Phishing Education and Warnings SP
Unique passwords User
Check security indicators User
Utilize spam filter User
Vigilance regarding emails User
Malware Anti-Virus software User
Caution on the web User
Observation Password masking SP
Awareness of surroundings User
2.3 What is Password Strength? Metrics and Statis-
tics
Bishop and Klein stated in 1995: “[a] good password is one that is easily remembered, yet
difficult to guess.” [25, p. 231]. The second part of this statement describes password
strength on a high level. But there are problems if we try to objectively measure the “guess-
ing difficulty” of a password: is it difficult for an attacker with nearly unlimited resources,
or only for an attacker that merely has one shot per day thanks to lock-out mechanisms? The
question is highly context dependent and there is unfortunately no single true answer.
Moreover, while “{X@T;cuXw[bJnUH” is a randomly generated password that seems difficult
to guess, it is not necessarily a strong password (see Section 2.4): if it was found in a
password database after a data breach, it is likely to be included among the first guesses in
subsequent dictionary attacks. The number of leaked passwords has steadily increased in
the past few years and thus has rendered many such strong passwords unsuitable19. In the
same vein, Yang et al. state: “[if] a strategy is widely used, then attackers may develop
strategy-specific methods which can efficiently guess the passwords” [381]. Economists call
this the “Tragedy of the Commons” [156]. For example, shifts in password practices imply
that if passphrases (cf. Section 3.3.3) do become commonplace, attackers will optimize their
19 http://breachlevelindex.com/ (last accessed 12.04.2018)
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attack strategy, rendering the well-intended efforts to strengthen passwords less effective.
Consequently, the challenge of considering such effects and realistically measuring password
strength has sparked some discussion, which has led to a small set of suitable models which
are discussed below.
2.3.1 Entropy
In 1951, Claude Shannon put forward an information-theoretical approach that describes
the encoding of English letters and words [292]. In it, he defines the term “entropy” as
“a statistical parameter, which measures [...] how much information is produced on the
average for each letter of text in the language. If the language is translated into binary
digits (0 or 1) in the most efficient way, the entropy H is the average number of binary digits
required per letter of the original language”. In other words, entropy represents the amount
of information of a given word in bits.
William (Bill) Burr and his colleagues at NIST took to this understanding and translated
it into a measure for password strength, which was officially published for the first time
in 2004 [47, Appendix A]. They define “guessing-entropy” as “an estimate of the average
amount of work required to guess the password of a selected user”. Apart from guessing a
single user’s password, the macro perspective defines the “min-entropy” as “a measure of
the difficulty of guessing the easiest single password to guess in the population”. Although
many citing publications (e.g. [32, 99]) do not sufficiently point it out, Burr et al. explicitly
acknowledge the limitation of using entropy as metric for user-selected passwords. They
base their estimate on frequency distributions, meaning more frequently used passwords are
guessed first and are thus lower in entropy.
For random passwords, the NIST guideline gives the following entropy calculation formula.
H = log2(bl)
b is the size of the alphabet, e.g. the 94 International Organization for Standardization (ISO)-
printable characters, and l is the length of the password. For an 8-character password this
would give an entropy of log2(948) ≈ 52 bits.
Most users do not use random passwords (for a detailed discussion see Section 3.2), therefore
this kind of entropy calculation is rarely realistic. In other words, the effective or practical
password space is much smaller than the theoretical password space. The original NIST
guideline tries to take this into account and gives another calculation approach based on user
behavior (see page 49f. in [47]). It lists a few entropy heuristics, e.g. the first character gives
4 bits of entropy, the next 7 characters add 2 bits of entropy each, while the 9th through
20th character only add 1.5 bits. Burr et al. do not provide a formal rationale as to why this
was chosen. But again, the publication specifically points out that this is still an inaccurate
approach because this would require “examining in detail the passwords that users actually
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select under the rules of the password system”. Moreover, they admitted that “NIST would
like to obtain more data on the passwords users actually choose, but, where they have the
data, system administrators are understandably reluctant to reveal password data to others”.
In the meantime, however, there have been many data leaks which fill this hole (see Table
3.1 in the following chapter).
2.3.2 Guess Numbers: Markov Models, PCFGs, and Neural Net-
works
Using such leaked data, Weir et al. developed a cracking method based on probabilistic
context free grammar (PCFG) in 2009 [366]. The idea behind PCFG is that passwords often
follow a rather predictable scheme (e.g. a word followed by a sequence of digits and an
exclamation mark, see Section 3.2). One can model such patterns with so-called mangling
rules. Weir et al.’s approach was to find a set of mangling rules that crack the most passwords
in a given data set. A mangling rule takes a certain password input and creates one or more
alternative versions of it, for instance the rule could be to replace all occurrences of the
letter “s” with the “$” symbol (password would become pa$$word). The ultimate goal is to
minimize the number of guesses to crack passwords. Mangling rules also are essential for
password cracking software like John the Ripper or Hashcat, but those tools primarily use
them to generate word-lists, and not for guessing-order optimization. Veras et al. [348], as
well as Komanduri extended Weir et al.’s PCFG approach afterwards [198].
A year later, Weir et al. evaluated the usage of the NIST entropy formulae against real-
world passwords and policies [365] to address the issues pointed out by Burr et al. For
the evaluation, they performed guessing attacks with PCFG on leaked password sets (most
notably RockYou). For comparison, they calculated the NIST entropy for each password and
correlated it with cracking success rates. Their analyses show that the calculated entropies
were not satisfyingly predictive of cracking success, and they concluded that “there is no
way to convert the notion of Shannon entropy into the guessing entropy of password creation
policies”. Weir et al. thus proposed “guessing probability” as a more accurate password
strength metric and the result of an analysis is a kind of lookup-table split into different
probability groups.
Since the computing power required to perform the PCFG attack was relatively high, Kelley
et al. tried to improve the algorithm by testing multiple training sets and variations of guess
algorithms [190]. They used the mTurk platform to collect new passwords created under
different policies (more on policies in Section 3.3.1) and tried to crack them. Tuning the right
parameters for cracking by exploiting a priori knowledge (e.g. password policy) led to much
more cost-efficient analyses, but the training still takes approximately 24 hours. However,
once the Markov-chain model is generated, one can simply pass in any kind of password and
retrieve its guess number. The higher the guess number, the stronger it is. After a certain
threshold, the password is considered unguessable – which is also one of the limitations of
the approach because given the time and resources virtually anything can be cracked. Kelley
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et al.’s approach soon became a gold standard to measure password strength, especially at
Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA) (CMU). Komanduri et al. were
probably the last ones in 2011 that still used entropy as strength metric [200]. Kelley et al.’s
guess numbers caught on and are still used today, perhaps because they directly represent the
“number of attempts that an attacker would need in order to guess it” [82] or as Carnavalet
put it “the amount of effort an adversary must employ to break the password” [48].
Almost simultaneously to Kelley et al., Bonneau developed his idea of efficient and effective
guessing, which has also generated a lot of impact since then [32]. He collected leaked
passwords and tried to attack them in different ways to find patterns in user behavior that
could be leveraged in real-world attacks. Fundamentally, the attacks differ in the choice of
dictionaries. He found that the success rates strongly depend on the dictionary that is used
for it. He aimed to translate his findings to a new entropy paradigm and concluded that 10
bits of entropy are probably enough to defend against online attacks, respectively 20 bits for
offline attacks.
Ur et al. took guessing to the next level by evaluating the most sophisticated approaches
to date against each other [346]. They compared the performance of John the Ripper,
Hashcat/oclHashcat, Markov chains/PCFG and professional password recovery companies.
Moreover, they tested several configurations of the tools and checked their guess success
rates for passwords created under different password policies. They concluded that a multi-
tiered approach is capable of giving the most conservative metric for password strength.
One of the major contributions of their work is the Password Guessability Service (PGS)
that they have begun offering to the community20. After successful registration, researchers
can upload a file containing plain-text passwords, e.g. after collecting them through a user
study (cf. Section 3.1). The user has to provide a few additional parameters, like the pol-
icy that was utilized, which enhances the guessing efficiency and reliability. Then a set of
cracking approaches are run in parallel and the analysis is sent back to the uploader. Al-
though this has become an established, state-of-the art tool which has already been used
in numerous publications (e.g., [142, 146, 230, 285, 341, 369]), it does not come without
caveats. First, passwords need to be uploaded in plain text. This entails a more careful han-
dling and storage if they originate from a user study, because participants might in fact have
provided their real-world passwords (see 3.1). Plain-text passwords also imply that users
disclosed them somehow and the mere act of disclosing might already reduce the strength
of passwords, which is not factored into the guess numbers. However, the team at CMU
counteracts this problem by deleting uploads after at most two weeks. Besides, the analyses
are time-consuming, and obtaining results can in fact take several weeks, because the system
is shared with other users. Moreover, if a study aims to compare multiple password policies,
each condition needs to be separately uploaded and subsequently analyzed. Finally, in per-
sonal conversations with the research team, they pointed out that certain unicode characters
are not supported. This makes it infeasible for passwords that were collected in countries
20 https://pgs.ece.cmu.edu/ (last accessed 27.12.2017)
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whose languages heavily use umlauts (ä,ö,ü). Nevertheless, it appears to be one of the best
strength proxies the community possesses at the moment.
A rather novel approach that has not been integrated into the PGS are cracking algorithms
based on neural networks. Melicher et al. demonstrated an opportunity to configure such
algorithms to perform better than former state-of-the-art techniques like PCFG and Markov
models [233]. They implemented neural networks based on Monte-Carlo simulations, i.e.
“smart sampling” (cf. [82]). A thorough evaluation against PCFG, Markov-models, and
word-list crackers showed that neural networks can outperform all of them if properly
trained. Moreover, Melicher et al. were also able to implement their approach in JavaScript.
This highlights one major advantage of using neural networks: once the model has been
trained, it can be packaged and shipped to browsers, which only requires a few hundred
kilobytes. They showed that this type of client-side strength estimation fares really well.
One caveat is that the solution does not work “out of the box”. Developers have to train their
models and this means that faulty configurations might lead to erroneous strength estima-
tions.
2.3.3 The zxcvbn Approach: Lightweight, Robust, Simple
Daniel Wheeler presented an approach towards password strength estimation by providing a
conservative expected guess-number [369]. Let us take a closer look at it, because it served
as a strength metric for much of the work in this thesis.
Similar to PCFG and mangling rules, the idea is based on pattern matching against dictio-
naries and leaked password corpora. The result is a calculation of the minimum rank over a
series of frequency ranked lists, i.e. a guess number. In other words, the approach is heuris-
tic instead of probabilistic, because the rank is based on searching through the patterns. The
pattern-ranks themselves are not necessarily based on likelihoods, but on a search sequence
that may lead to different prioritization of heuristics depending on the found patterns. The
implementation of the algorithm is called zxcvbn21. Wheeler showed that in an online at-
tack scenario [115] the algorithm estimates the number of guesses accurately within an order
of magnitude of 2 – consistently better than NIST guidelines to date and other lightweight
strength estimators. Beyond the online-attack threshold, the results are mixed, but adding
more tokens to the dictionary further improves robustness. Moreover, zxcvbn provides a
numerical password score from 0 to 4. The README describes the thresholds, which are
motivated through different attack scenarios (see Section 2.2):
0 too guessable: risky password – guess number < 103
1 very guessable: protection from throttled online attacks – guess number < 106
21 The name zxcvbn originates from the bottom row on a QWERTY keyboard. Many users mistakenly consider
the keyboard pattern approach secure because the resulting password looks fairly random.
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2 somewhat guessable: protection from unthrottled online attacks – guess number < 108
3 safely unguessable: moderate protection from offline slow-hash scenario – guess number
< 1010
4 very unguessable: strong protection from offline slow-hash scenario – guess number >=
1010
These steps are plausible and can be derived from academic literature, e.g. [32, 115,
346, 360]. One of the advantages of zxcvbn is that its implementation is fairly small (1.5
Megabytes in total). It comes with 100,000 tokens which allows zxcvbn to conservatively
estimate the guess numbers. Moreover, it can be extended with site-specific word-lists. Zx-
cvbn performs its calculations within milliseconds, which makes it suitable to run strength
analyses on the client. This is a major advantage, e.g., to provide users with real-time feed-
back on password strength. Moreover, it can also be easily used on the server to enforce
more advanced password policies, e.g. with NodeJS. Since zxcvbn is open-source, one can
modify and adapt it to meet context-dependent requirements. This makes it extremely useful
for user studies: One can strip sensitive information from the analysis and save zxcvbn’s
output straight to a database, which is ethically reasonable and speeds up further analyses.
Despite the benefits, one needs to be aware of zxcvbn’s drawbacks. Carnavalet compared
several real-world password strength estimators, one of which was zxcvbn v2.x [73]. Al-
though they concluded that zxcvbn was the best of the tested estimators, they see the major
limitation in the static dictionary size. Zxcvbn ships with index terms from the English
Wikipedia, English words from TV and movie subtitles, a list of roughly 47000 frequency-
ranked passwords, female and male first names, and surnames from English-speaking coun-
tries. Hence, all words that cannot be matched from these wordlists including mangling
rules, are seen as random strings. Zxcvbn goes on to assume these can only be cracked by
brute force, but real-world attackers possessing a priori knowledge of the target population
might find ways to guess these passwords more efficiently. However, Melicher et al.’s neu-
ral network suffers from similar limitations. For instance, Carnavalet and Mannan’s [48]
example “dolce&gabana” (an Italian luxury brand) receives a guess number 358000010000
≈ 1e11.5 from zxcvbn, and 2587762225797 ≈ 1e12.4 from Melicher et al.’s tool – so both
estimates are perhaps too optimistic. Finally, Carnavalet also critized that zxcvbn did not de-
tect reversed words, but this heuristic was later added in version 3.5.022. So although neural
networks are a viable alternative, zxcvbn is one of the best estimators currently available.
Zxcvbn’s usefulness is underlined by its impact during the first years of its existence. In the
industry, zxcvbn has become the standard password-checker on WordPress since version 3.7
[73], and for Dropbox (zxcvbn’s author works there). In academic literature it has received
praise from Ur et al. [341], Komanduri et al. [199], and Wang et al. [360]. It was also
actively utilized as strength proxy in by Groß et al. to measure associations between cogni-
tive depletion and password strength [142], by Yang et al. to study mnemonic phrase based
22 https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn/releases/tag/3.5.0 (last accessed 28.12.2017)
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passwords [381], by Lyastani et al. to study the impact of password managers on password
strength [217] and also recently by Al-Jaffan to build a new strength visualization [11].
All this made us confident to utilize zxcvbn in our own studies which are reported in later
sections.
2.3.4 Other strength proxies
Apart from entropy and guess numbers, not many strength metrics have succeeded enough
to become prevalent. For the sake of completeness, we briefly point out more related work
on the topic. Most notably, Bonneau combined two partial guessing metrics to go beyond
entropy and guess work [32]: From the β -success rate [38] and the α-work-factor [255],
he derived the α-guesswork metric. The former roughly describes the success rate of an
attacker that is limited to β guesses, while the α-work factor denotes the mimimum required
guesses to crack a desired proportion of α passwords. Yang et al. chose to solely rely on
β -success rates [381], although Bonneau discourages this in his PhD thesis [31].
Beside those metrics, Dell’Amico et al. investigated using a multi-level cracking approach
to find a cut-off threshold (as strength metric) when an attack becomes infeasible [81]. In
another paper, they use probabilities of succeeding with different cracking methods [82].
Finally, Li et al. incorporated personal information into PCFG and suggest a new metric
named “Coverage” [209]. Essentially, this proxy tells us how likely it is to crack a password
if we obtain personal information of the user.
In a sense, these additional strength metrics could be subsumed under “guesswork proxies”,
too. Until now, they have not seen significant attention in the community nor by the indus-
try. Perhaps their success is a bit hampered because they do not provide a straight-forward
interpretable calculation, respectively result, which makes other solutions like PGS, neural
networks, and zxcvbn more attractive to researchers in HCI.
2.4 What is a “Bad” Password?
Having looked at strength metrics, it is fair to ask what exactly a “bad” password is. Un-
fortunately, the question is more or less impossible to answer, especially without context.
The word “bad” is judgmental on its own and depends on whom is asked. A security expert
might call a password “bad” if it only contains lowercase letters because she knows how to
crack such passwords, but a regular mainstream user might call it “bad” because he cannot
type it quickly enough or keeps forgetting it. So, “bad” depends on one’s own standards,
knowledge, beliefs, preferences, and usage context [132, 154]. There is a fine difference be-
tween the adjective pairs “good”-”bad” and “strong”-“weak”. A weak password might still
be good, when it fits the purpose, i.e. when it is good enough. For example, four-digit PINs
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are widely used to authenticate at ATMs. Theoretically, there are only 10000 possible com-
binations, which could be brute-forced within milliseconds. Still, the second factor (banking
card) and lock-down mechanisms after a certain number of attempts effectively prevent such
attacks, so PINs are good enough for the purpose. As another example, a user might choose
a dictionary word like “spacetime” to sign up for an online forum. If they do not reuse this
password for a more important service like accessing emails, the seemingly weak password
might still be good enough for this purpose. Zhang-Kennedy et al. [389] as well as Florêncio
et al. [114, 115, 116, 117] seem to agree, and Herley and van Oorshot frame it nicely [165]:
“Fifth, when are offline attacks a threat? While dependent on implementation,
access to salted hashed passwords requires attacker effort; long gone are the
days when password hash files were by default world readable. A disgruntled
ex-sysadmin who steals hashed passwords is the often-conjectured foe in this at-
tack; yet, if untrusted individuals have had unfettered unaudited access to the au-
thentication server, a site’s problems go well beyond password strength. Sixth,
are there ways to protect against off-line attacks besides password strength?
Mandating password changes once hashes leak might be better than strong poli-
cies at all times. Only if a leak goes unnoticed (and a password change isn’t
forced) does strength potentially help. Of course, reliably detecting leaks or
break-ins itself remains difficult. Finally, how much strength is required to pro-
tect against offline attacks? The bar is clearly much higher than for online at-
tacks (assuming lockout or rate-limiting policies in place), but at what strength
are attacks effectively addressed?”
So, in that vein, if we invert Bishop and Klein’s definition, we would get “a bad password
is one that is hard to remember, yet easy to guess” [25]. Human capabilities must not be
neglected, which is why we discuss it in detail in Chapter 3. But neither humans nor contexts
are all equal, so the answer as to what a “bad” password is, remains a solid “it depends”.
Still, users sometimes seek guidance (cf. Section 3.3.2) and continue to ask this question.
Let us thus have a look at more practical answers rather than “it depends.” Burnett provides
a list of high-level heuristics that a user can decide to employ to figure out if their preferred
password choice is “bad” [46] (list is excerpted, but directly quoted):
1. If you typed your password in Google, would you get no results?
2. Are you the only person who knows the password?
3. If you have your password recorded somewhere, is it in a secure location?
4. Do you remember your password without having to look it up?
5. Can you type your password quickly without making mistakes?
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Bullets 1. - 3. are solely focused on security, while the remaining two are user-centered.
He provides more heuristics, however, they are questionnable because they are demanding
on the user’s cognitive abilities. From related work, we can also derive more questions that
generally aim at identifying inadequate passwords:
6. Is your password used by somebody else? [32]
7. Is your password short, that is, less than eight characters? [365]
8. Has your password leaked (check via https://haveibeenpwned.com/)? [369]
9. Does your password only consist of personal information that can be found on your
public social network profiles? [209]
On a more opinionated level, I personally argue that a “bad” password is one that you care
about, but do not sufficiently try to strengthen, although you are aware of the options to do
so.
2.5 Authentication beyond Passwords
The benefits and drawbacks of using passwords have been studied extensively. Some draw-
backs already become apparent when we recall Ali Baba’s story: Ali Baba overhears the
thieves saying the magic words and can immediately authenticate with them (a big secu-
rity issue). He also told the “password” to his brother, but he fails to recall it (the biggest
usability issue).
Table 2.1 shows a high-level summary of the benefits and drawbacks that come along with
password-based authentication. We can observe that the drawbacks constitute important
constraints and it is natural to try to remove such limitations by considering alternatives. To
give the reader a sense of the alternatives, this section briefly covers the most notable ap-
proaches to authenticate users without alphanumerical passwords or with additional security
measures.
2.5.1 Graphical Passwords & Visual Authentication Methods
In 1995, Blonder filed a patent with the name “Graphical Password” [29], which marked the
beginning of a range of new authentication schemes: Graphical (or visual) authentication.
The patent presented a mechanism that prompts the user to prove their identity through
correctly clicking a number of locations in an image. His goal was to find an alternative
to text-based passwords that is easier to remember, without losing security benefits [23,
265]. Studies in cognitive psychology have revealed that pictures are easier to remember
than words, which is often referred to as the picture superiority effect [251]. Grady et al.
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state that it works the best if there is an episode that serves as mnemonic device [139]. A
number of studies in HCI demonstrate the benefits of graphical authentication. For instance,
Chiasson et al. report on a lab study which showed that graphical passwords are easier
to remember and less error-prone in the short term [52]. In the long term, however, there
was no significant difference to textual passwords. Elizabeth Stobert, who dedicated a large
part of her PhD work to graphical passwords [318], also found memorability benefits [314].
Besides memorability benefits, there are other advantages like personalization and tailoring
schemes to specific user groups. Imran found that graphical passwords are easily understood
by children [171], while Carter presented a new effective system specifically designed for
older adults [49].
In the 20 years that followed the patent grant, three different approaches prevailed: search-
metric, locimetric, and drawmetric systems. In the following, we discuss them and provide
a few notable examples.
Searchmetric Systems The idea behind all searchmetric (also recognition-based) sys-
tems is to recognize objects or images in a “challenge set” [353], i.e., to search for the
correct image. The commercial Passfaces23 system is a paragon in this domain (see Figure
2.4). The user is challenged with identifying the picture of a person in a grid of nine pictures
of people. To increase security, this challenge is executed three times in a row24. The three
images the user needs to identify were chosen beforehand in the enrollment stage. Brostoff
and Sasse, found in a field study that users were able to log in with Passfaces even after a
long period of inactivity [41]. However, they also report that participants spoke unfavorably
of Passfaces, because of the increased authentication time. By random guessing, an attacker
would have a chance of 19 ∗ 19 ∗ 19 = 0.001, i.e., one in one thousand to find the user’s cho-
sen faces. Davis et al., however, found that user selection of Passfaces is predictable, thus
reducing the effective password space [70]. Dunphy et al. created a mechanism that is based
on photos [88]. In a two-week field trial they found that participants successfully authen-
ticated in 77% of attempts, and human attackers needed between 4.5 and 7.5 observations
to shoulder-surf the passwords. These numbers would need to be higher to justify more
widespread adoption.
Dhamija and Perrig created a similar mechanism called “Déjà Vu” [83], where the user
selects a number of random-art images instead of faces (see Figure 2.4a). Although partici-
pants in a lab study generally liked Déjà Vu, the system was never adopted on larger scope.
Another alternative solution to using faces is the visual identification protocol (VIP), which
is based on pictures of objects (see Figure 2.4d) [71, 72]. De Angeli et al. iteratively im-
proved the prototype, and found that recognizing six simple and concrete objects worked
best, but was still much slower than entering a PIN. Bicakci et al. also explored authenticat-
ing through clicking a sequence of icons as master password for a password manager (iP-
23 http://www.realuser.com/ (last accessed 29.12.2017)
24 The current implementation challenges the user three times, while the original proposal included four chal-
lenges.
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MAN) [22]. They found that some icons were more attractive than others and thus impaired
security. An icon-based mechanism that strongly focuses on mitigating shoulder-surfing is
Wiedenbeck et al.’s Convex-Hull-Click (CHC) system [373]. The challenge set consists of
icons which are randomly distributed in the grid. The idea behind CHC is that the user does
not click on their enrolled icons, but anywhere inside the convex-hull which is formed by the
icons. In other words, the user clicks a random icon within the virtual polygon that is formed
by the icons if they were connected by straight lines. Wiedenbeck et al. showed that CHC
has security benefits, but the large grid of icons negatively impacted authentication times.
Moreover, Golla et al., respectively Kraus et al. recently evaluated emojis instead of PINs
for mobile phones (see Figure 2.4b) [136, 203]. Contrary to traditional pins, the emojis are
randomly ordered in the grid, which makes their system a typical “searchmetric” approach.
The idea actually originates from “Emoji passcode”, a commercial solution from Intelligent
Environments25. Golla/Kraus et al. were the first to empirically evaluate the scheme and
found some selection bias but also user experience benefits.
Hayashi et al. went beyond mere image recognition and additionally burred images dur-
ing authentication in “Use Your Illusion” (see Figure 2.4e) [158]. Their hypothesis was
that only the legitimate user would be able to make sense of the distorted images and
recognize the original picture, while an attacker can only randomly guess. Across all
conditions of their user study, most participants were able to log in successfully even af-
ter four weeks. Only those who were given a system-assigned portfolio of images were
slightly more troubled. Although the system was never adopted in real-world authentica-
tion, it sparked further ideas to leverage people’s abilities to recognize distorted images [50,
http://arima.okoze.net/illusion/].
Locimetric Systems If the user needs to authenticate by clicking specific points in a chal-
lenge image (rather than a challenge set), the mechanism can be classified as locimetric
system, from Latin locus = place, position. Blonder’s patent application [29] is a classical
example. Wiedenbeck et al. evaluated PassPoints, which in essence is one possible im-
plementation of Blonder’s idea [372]. Security-wise there were benefits over alphanumeric
passwords, but usability results were mixed. Chiasson et al. combined the PassPoints and
Passfaces approaches with the Cued Click Point (CCP) scheme [54], and the Persuasive
Cued Click Point scheme [51] (CCP). To authenticate, the user has to click a specific point
inside an image (cf. PassPoints) for a sequence of images (cf. Passfaces). The PCCP ver-
sion tries to nudge the user to pick less predictable locations (one result of the CCP-study),
which is supposed to further increase the “strength” of the graphical password. Success rates
for log-ins were high, but there was no possibility to correct an error, so participants in the
lab study had to start over. Perhaps, this is a caveat in terms of real-world adoption. Since
alphanumerical passwords do have their advantages, Forget et al. later suggested allowing
the user to pick the authentication scheme that best fits their current context [125]. Object
Passtiles (OPT, another implementation variant of VIP) and PCCP were the two available
25 https://www.intelligentenvironments.com/now-you-can-log-into-your-bank-using-
emoji/ (last accessed 29.12.2017)
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(a) Déjà Vu [83] (b) EmojiAuth / Pictopass
[136, 203]
(c) PassFaces by RealUser (d) VIP 3 [72] (e) Use Your Illusion [158]
Figure 2.4: A selection of searchmetric graphical authentication schemes. The user authenti-
cates by searching their enrolled sequence of images.
graphical authentication schemes. Interestingly, after the study participants had tried out a
graphical scheme, they later switched back to text-based passwords.
Drawmetric Systems A third category of graphical authentication are drawmetric systems
(also known as recall-based systems). Here, the user has to either draw a shape configured
during enrollment, or perform a gesture as a kind of virtual drawing. At this point, this is by
far the most successful graphical authentication paradigm, because one such implementation
– “pattern unlock” – was added to the Android operating system already in its early days (see
Figure 2.5b) [15]. The idea of drawmetrics most likely has its origins in the Draw-a-Secret
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(DAS) scheme by Jermyn et al. [180]. The user is asked to create a secret drawing in a
grid of 16 cells (see Figure 2.5a). The system maps the drawing to simple (x,y) coordinate-
pair sequences, but the password space, as disseminated by Jermyn et al. is large enough to
provide sufficient protection of handheld devices. Dunphy et al. later aimed to improve the
memorability of the drawn shapes and extended Draw-A-Secret with translucent background
images [89]. In a small lab study they observed no striking memorability nor security bene-
fits. Sherman et al. removed the grid and let the user authenticate with free-form multi-touch
gestures, which required a more sophisticated matching process [302]. This may be part of
the reason the system had equal error rates (EERs) between 3.34 % and 15.97%. The latter
case means that a legitimate user would enter their gesture correctly and not be granted ac-
cess in 1˜6% of attempts, while an adversary would gain access just as likely. This makes the
approach rather unsuitable for usage outside the lab. Another hybrid approach that combines
drawmetric with searchmetric authentication is Schlöglhofer and Sametinger’s GesturePuz-
zle [280]. As the name indicates, the authentication is based on a puzzle: upon a challenge
set of images, from which the user has to recognize the ones from their portfolio, the user
enters a gesture that corresponds to combination of images. Solving this puzzle appears too
demanding on the user’s skills and patience to be adopted on larger scale.
(a) Draw A Secret [180] (b) Android pattern unlock (image:
Mike Dent)
Figure 2.5: Iconic drawmetric systems. The user’s password is a shape that they need to draw
to authenticate.
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However, once pattern unlock on Android had become a standard authentication technique
for millions of users, a number of formal evaluations were carried out by the academic com-
munity. Harbach et al. pointed out that participants in their longitudinal study spent around
2.8 minutes on average per day to unlock their phone [155]. Interestingly, patterns were
entered significantly faster than traditional PINs on average. Regarding their proneness to
attacks, it was recognized early that grid-based patterns on a touchscreen are also prone to
“smudge attacks” where attackers can restore the user’s pattern by looking at the oily residue
left on touchscreens after entering the pattern [15]. De Luca et al. conceived an approach
to authenticate on the back of smartphones and iterated the concept [79, 76]. Authenti-
cating on the back has the big advantage to be resilient against shoulder-surfing attacks.
Von Zezschwitz et al. also investigated which specific pattern types were most resilient to
shoulder-surfing even if the attacker can observe them directly [356]. Since the pattern un-
lock on Android cannot include a given dot multiple times, Colley et al. extended it that way
[58]. This approach effectively thwarts smudge attacks with a minimal change to the existing
system. Moreover, Uellenbeck et al. [340], as well as Von Zezschwitz et al. [357] quan-
tified the effective pattern space. They both concluded that user-chosen patterns are very
predictable, so the hypothesized security benefits of patterns over PINs are questionable. At
the same time, Von Zezschwitz et al. tried to nudge users to pick a less predictable start-
ing position with different types of background images [357]. Their approach resembled
Background-Draw-a-Secret (BDAS) [89] and Persuasive Cued Click Points (PCCP) [51].
When evaluating the concept through an online study, the effects on user selected patterns,
however, remained small.
Summary and Future Directions Apart from the pattern unlock for on Android, graphical
authentication systems have not been adopted widely. Text-passwords are still the preferred
option for many service providers and are still available as authentication method on mobile
devices. Maybe we need an improved understanding as to why the supposed advantages
of greater memorability and security have not been able to outweigh the disadvantages (au-
thentication times, shoulder surfing). As of now, little is known about the mental models of
graphical password security. A step in this direction was Katsini et al.’s recent work [187].
They explored mental models and strategies that users employ to create graphical passwords.
Thorpe et al. also found out that there are presentation effects that influence how people pick
graphical passwords [334].
For the future, we could narrow down the most feasible direction for visual authentication
[23]. To get there, Stobert and Biddle compared searchmetric, locimetric and drawmetric
systems in terms of password memorability [314]. All participants in their study were as-
signed a system-generated password to reduce biases. Unsurprisingly, recognition based
systems performed better than recall based systems (“recognition rather than recall is one
of the most important usability heuristics [242]). Nonetheless, this seems to be the most
feasible approach that might see new ideas in the near future. However, De Angeli and Re-
naud et al. doubt that visual authentication methods will prevail in the long run [72, 265].
They argue that the promise of more memorable passwords has not been fulfilled by the
approaches so far and that we should keep looking elsewhere. Potentially, we will rely on
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less knowledge-based authentication in the future, but more on biometric and multimodal
approaches. Those are discussed in the following section.
2.5.2 Biometrics and Multimodal Authentication
Recent market analyses indicate that over 70% of smartphones will ship with a fingerprint-
or other biometric sensors in 201826. Those sensors are most commonly used for user iden-
tification and authentication. In this section we take a brief look at the different features that
can be used in biometric authentication, the advantages of combining them, and where they
can fail.
For biometric authentication, there exist two common categories: Explicit and implicit au-
thentication. In an explicit authentication scheme, the user is prompted to provide the proof
of identity, e.g. the fingerprint. The idea behind implicit authentication, as Jakobsson et al.
describe it, is essentially to “authenticate mobile users based on actions they would carry
out anyway” [178]. For example, walking, typing, or simply using the device in a specific
environment.
Explicit Biometrics
Fingerprints are becoming27 the most common feature used in biometric authentication
nowadays, due to the widespread device-support (mobile phones, tablets, laptops) and ob-
vious usability benefits as perceived by the users [362]. On modern phones, after a short
enrollment, fingerprint recognition takes a fraction of a second and has low error rates under
normal circumstances [161]. Thus, fingerprint authentication is fairly usable and reasonably
secure. However, a wet surface, grease, or dirt can limit the functionality [21]. Moreover,
there are different kinds of attacks if the victim is not in the vicinity (like fingerprint spoofing
with a 2D/3D print). Such attacks are becoming easier to carry out, though they still require
decent effort [221]. But if, for example, the victim is asleep, it is enough to hold the finger
onto the sensor to gain access to the device (which can indeed cause relationship fights that
can force airplanes to land early28).
Recently, more systems are counting on iris and facial recognition to authenticate users.
Windows Hello is a framework for biometric authentication that includes not only fingerprint
support, but also authenticates users through their iris or face29. Mobile phones usually have
26 https://www.counterpointresearch.com/more-than-one-billion-smartphones-with-
fingerprint-sensors-will-be-shipped-in-2018/ (last accessed 02.01.2018)
27 https://www.deloitte.co.uk/mobileuk/#gold-finger-fingerprints-lead-biometric-
authentication (last accessed 02.01.2018)
28 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/08/qatar-airways-plane-forced-to-land-
after-wife-discovers-husbands-affair-midflight (last accessed 28.12.2017)
29 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/17215/windows-10-what-is-hello (last ac-
cessed 03.01.2018)
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a front-camera facing the user, so Android has included the “Face-Unlock” feature since
version 4 (2011), which was rebranded to “Trusted Face” in version 5 (2014)30. Moreover,
on the iPhone X (2017), Apple has removed the home button and with it the fingerprint
reader and the TouchID system in favor of FaceID31. With FaceID, the user simply picks up
the phone and looks at it to unlock it. The chance of another person unlocking the phone the
same way is 1 to 1 Million, according to Apple. However, it is possible to fool face-unlock
systems with different spoofing attacks like using a face mask32, or in some cases a simple
image of the legimitate user. All the aforementioned systems use a PIN/passcode as fallback
method that dominates the biometric schemes. De Luca et al. evaluated the reasons for (not)
using biometric authentication on mobile devices in an online survey [75]. They found that
users prioritize usability over security when deciding which unlock mechanism to use. The
respondents who had deactivated Face Unlock mostly did so for usability (read: interaction
times) and reliability reasons. Interestingly, most respondents were aware of the security
trade-off that face recognition entails.
Finally, a last example for explicit biometric authentication is voice recognition [10]. An-
droid and Google Home are among the few consumer-oriented systems that allow users to
authenticate through their voice. Hang et al. evaluated a password reset system that uses
voice recognition to verify the reset request [152]. They point out the importance of consid-
ering embarrassment in the design of natural voice interaction, e.g. in an office environment.
Moreover, “[b]oth face and voice recognition logins are extremely situational dependent; [...]
speaking into a microphone doesn’t always work in noisy environments”33, so it is important
to create systems that adapt to specific contexts [66].
Implicit Biometrics
Implicit authentication is done without prompting or challenging the user by continuously
verifying his or her identity [254]. One goal is to achieve a more natural interaction, similar
to human-human interaction. Greenstadt and Beal postulate a system that recognizes people
like humans do: “in most everyday interactions, we recognize people by who they are and
how they behave, rather than by the secrets that they know” [141]. Of course, this excludes
situations where two strangers need to authenticate one another, e.g. at a passport control at
the border. A specific key benefit of successful implicit authentication would be that users
do not have to spend time authenticating explicitly, which can save them a couple of minutes
per day [155].
30 https://www.androidcentral.com/smart-lock-screen-security-options-android-50-
lollipop (last accessed 03.01.2018)
31 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108 (last accessed 03.01.2018)
32 https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/13/16642690/bkav-iphone-x-faceid-mask (last accessed
03.01.2018)
33 https://www.inauth.com/blog/fingerprints-popular-biometric/ (last accessed 02.01.2018)
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The way a person walks is one of the features that can be used to recognize them, which hu-
mans also rely upon [65]. One of the early approaches to exploit gait patterns for authentica-
tion can be traced back to Ailisto et al. who equipped laptop computers with accelerometers
[7]. They successfully identified users this way with an EER of 6.5%. Tamviruzzaman et al.
implemented this approach for mobile phones that at the time (2009) had started to integrate
acceleration sensors and gyroscopes [327]. For their “ePet” system, they also combined gait
patterns with GPS-location traces, but did not report on a user study. Muaaz and Mayrhofer
tackled the issue of device orientation and achieved an EER of 7.05% in the same study
session, but only 18.96% across multiple sessions. As of now, gait recognition has not been
widely adopted, but Android allows the user to activate “on body detection”, which keeps
the device unlocked while it is in motion34. The documentation says that “some devices” can
learn the gait pattern and lock the device if they detect a different walking style. As shown
in Table 2.3, gait detection faces a number of problems which are difficult to overcome.
Another theme in implicit authentication is behavioral biometrics. For instance, the way
people use their mobile phones and in which contexts can be used to build a user model
[178]. Keystroke dynamics, i.e., characteristic typing patterns, can serve as feature. The first
algorithms were conceived for desktop environments [63], but Bouchoux and Clarke pro-
posed an early solution in 2008 that achieves authentication via keystrokes on smartphones
[44]. They state that explicitly enrolling users might be too bothersome for them, so it should
be possible to enroll a user implicitly. This in turn produces a risk of including data from
impostors, too. De Luca showed that users enter grid-based patterns in a unique way, which
can be leveraged for implicit authentication [74]. Their second user study focused on this
type of unlock mechanism and, with an average accuracy above 90%, they could decide
whether a correctly entered pattern was actually entered by the legitimate user. Interestingly,
at the time of writing this thesis, De Luca et al.’s paper is the most-cited CHI publication
in the past five years35, which highlights the impact and potential of this approach. What
is more, this is one of the few approaches that makes explicit authentication more secure
through a second, biometric layer. While the user models of the aforementioned approaches
are created and maintained on the devices, Nauman and Ali proposed a system architecture
that shifts keystroke analysis to a Trusted Third Party, which authenticates the user [240].
However, their approach requires more sophisticated hardware (trusted platform modules),
which renders it more costly.
Summary and Outlook
Since all biometric features, if considered independently, can be spoofed in some way (see
Table 2.3), approaches to combine multiple features have started to proliferate. Although the
idea of multimodal signals for authentication is not particularly new (some implementations
were done in the mid 1990s [43]), perhaps the computing power both on the clients and back-
34 https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/6093922?hl=en (last accessed 03.01.2018)
35 https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&vq=eng_humancomputerinteraction&view_
op=list_hcore&venue=6NNnGOq9_mAJ.2017 (last accessed 03.01.2018)
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ends is now large enough to handle the input streams. Bigun et al. developed a framework
that continues to learn from multiple signals [24], which requires such computing power.
Rybinicek et al. presented a roadmap with obstacles and opportunities [274] that can serve
the design of future multimodal biometric authentication schemes. Google, among other
companies, tries to incorporate the notion of such multimodal implicit authentication in their
Smart Lock solution36.
In summary, we can take away that biometric authentication provides many usability ben-
efits like reduced time spent on authentication and also security enhancements. Though
implicit authentication is unlikely to replace explicit authentication completely, it can still
make explicit schemes more secure as demonstrated by De Luca et al. [74]. In Section 2.5.4,
however, we discuss why biometrics are still dominated by knowledge based authentication
especially in situations where the system cannot make a final decision due to low certainty.
Feature CapturingMethod Implicit / Explicit Spoofing Threats Problems
Face & Iris Camera Both
Photographs of the
legitimate user
Lighting situation
and make-up
Fingerprint Fingerprint reader
Explicit. Implicit
imminent.
Play-Doh casts,
Scotch Tape,
2D/3D prints
Dirt, Water, Finger
injuries
Speech Microphone Both
Recordings of the
user’s voice
Sickness, natural
voice changes,
background noise
Gait
Camera or Ac-
celerometer
Both Imitation
Injuries, carrying
load, footwear,
ground surface,
being seated
Keystroke Hard/soft keyboard Primarily implicit Imitation
Enrollment, relia-
bility
Location
GPS or infrastruc-
ture calculated po-
sition
Primarily implicit
Forged GPS loca-
tions
limited places, pre-
cision
Network/File/App
Usage
Software protocol Implicit Imitation Precision
Table 2.3: Comparison of different biometric authentication methods. Adapted from [319]
2.5.3 Multi-Factor, Token-based and Federated Authentication
As a final aspect of authentication beyond passwords, let us take a look at systems that do not
necessarily aim to replace passwords, but to make them more user-friendly and/or secure.
36 https://get.google.com/smartlock/ (last accessed 03.01.2018)
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Two-Factor Authentication In multi-factor authentication, the user needs to present mul-
tiple credentials to the system in whichever form. For instance, the Google 2-step verification
mechanism combines the user-chosen password with a one-time password (OTP)37. If users
log into their Google account on a computer in an Internet café, they will receive an OTP
on a secondary device, usually inside a text message sent to their personal phone. If no
more than two separate channels (“out of band authentication”, OOBA) are involved, the
scheme is usually referred to as Two-factor authentication or 2FA for short. Multi-factor
authentication aims to prevent impersonation in case an attacker has obtained a victim’s pri-
mary credential, but not their secondary factor. There were hints to combining multiple such
levels to make authentication more robust already in the late 1970s. Morris and Thomp-
son mentioned that “some UNIX systems have instituted what is called an ‘external security
code’ that must be typed when dialing into the system, but before logging in. If this code
is changed periodically, then someone with an old password will likely be prevented from
using it [the system, author’s note]” [237]. Moreover, Haskett shared an idea about a second
level of authentication in 1984 [157]. With the Pass-Algorithms mechanism, the user first
authenticates with their regular credentials and then proves their identity by responding to a
random prompt by completing a pre-shared procedure. The algorithm is altered by the sys-
tem administrator and then shared with the legitimate users, who are supposed to memorize
the algorithm rather than a static password. For instance, the current algorithm could be to
use the subsequent letter in the alphabet based on the challenge: If the challenge is BEL,
the user enters CFM as second layer of authentication. The proposed benefit is that the al-
gorithm is easier to remember and can still be personalized. Multi-factor authentication has
since been widely adopted and more web services are following. Many banks have the users
confirm transactions by a transaction number (TAN) sent to their phones, although they are
already logged in with their banking password [224]. The primary benefit of multi-factor
authentication lies in the increased confidence of the legitimacy of account actions. In any
case, there is a small usability caveat, because adding more factors leads to longer interac-
tions, which is not recommendable for secondary tasks like authentication [3]. However,
the increased security might in turn improve user experience because it also reassures users
that they are interacting with the legitimate party. Attacks on multi-factor authentication are
possible38, but do not scale well [163].
Moreover, one-time passwords and “Magic Login Links”39 can also replace user-chosen
passwords. The user only provides their user name, and the system sends them a magic link
or a random one-time password to their verified email account or phone. So, in that sense,
accessing one’s personal email account is the primary authentication factor. After clicking
the link or logging in with the OTP, the link or OTP expires. If implemented at scale, this
could allow users to only memorize the credentials for their email account and log in to all
37 https://www.google.com/landing/2step/ (last accessed 04.01.2018)
38 https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/18/16328172/sms-two-factor-authentication-hack-
password-bitcoin (last accessed 04.01.2018)
39 https://www.sitepoint.com/lets-kill-the-password-magic-login-links-to-the-rescue/
(last accessed 04.01.2018)
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other systems by receiving magic links. However, the approach is only secure under the
assumption that the email account is well protected. It might be fair to assume that users
might underestimate the risk of relying on magic links. For low-value accounts, it seems
like a viable and promising solution, although trust issues on the user side need to be further
addressed [272].
Hardware Tokens and Proxies Hardware tokens are often a special flavor of multi-factor
authentication, but it is worthwhile to treat them separately, because in some cases they can
act as standalone replacement of passwords, too. In general, this solution uses a hardware
device to store user secrets [34]. In multi-factor environments, the RSA SecurID token40
displays a random numerical which is valid for at most 60 seconds, and the user has to enter
it as second factor. The YubiKey tokens41 are inserted into the USB port of the computer
or held against an NFC-equipped smartphone to prove the user’s identity (see Figure 2.6).
While the two devices improve account protection, the downside is that they are easily lost
or stolen, and have to be with the user when they need to authenticate.
To save users from entering PINs, patterns, or passwords to unlock their phones, Jakobsson
developed a bracelet that serves as a secure token [176], which is not as easily lost or stolen.
This idea is also embraced in commercial products. Smart watches and other wearables can
serve as authentication tokens: Google offers the “Trusted Device” feature since Android
version 5. If a trusted device, e.g. a smart watch or wireless headphones, is connected to
the phone via Bluetooth, the phone turns off the primary authentication method, e.g. pattern
unlock while the device is connected. If the phone has been inactive for four hours or had
been manually locked, the user needs to re-authenticate by providing the primary credential.
This can drastically reduce the number of authentication events, given phones are unlocked
between 27 and 86 times per day according to recent estimates[374, 311].
Other approaches leverage devices that the users carry with them anyhow as authentication
token or proxy. Aebisher et al. present the Pico Framework where the user has to scan a QR
code with a special app to pass-by manual authentication [6]. Some banks require the user to
scan special image codes as second factor during authentication42. A few popular websites
have already started to adopt the system. Roalter et al. presented a system that allowed users
to access shared rooms in a university by authenticating with their smartphone [270]. There
is some evidence that users generally appreciate this kind of interaction [272]. However,
using the phone as proxy or second factor has the disadvantage that batteries might be empty
or the phone might be out of reach.
Federated Single Sign-On The idea behind single sign-on (SSO) is to allow the user to
log into one service and other services can use this login state without requiring any more ex-
40 https://www.rsa.com/en-us/products/rsa-securid-suite/rsa-securid-access/securid-
hardware-tokens (last accessed 04.01.2018)
41 https://www.yubico.com/start/ (last accessed 04.01.2018)
42 http://www.wikibanking.net/onlinebanking/verfahren/phototan/ (last accessed 04.01.2018)
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Foundations
(a) The RSA SecurID token displays a one-time-
password every 30 to 60 seconds
(b) YubiKey uses NFC to authenticate users.
Figure 2.6: Commercially available hardware tokens. The RSA SecurID is more business-
oriented, while the YubiKeys can be used with consumer products like Gmail, Facebook, and
Dropbox, too.
plicit authentication actions. Thus, the user must only remember one set of credentials [91].
With federated single sign-on, websites can authenticate users by temporarily redirecting
them to a trusted third party [34]. The third party verifies the user’s identity. Afterwards it
signs the authentication request and returns a text-based token that the client needs to present
in future interactions. A historically successful example is Kerberos [197]. However, SSO
approaches did not receive widespread acceptance for about twenty years [322]. Currently,
the OpenID protocol is a state of the art approach, where user identities are verified in a
decentralized approach [263]. Any web server can act as identity provider, but it is most
feasible if trustworthy parties enable OpenID. Currently, Microsoft, Google and Oracle are
among the biggest OpenID identity providers. OAuth is a related protocol, but is not de-
signed as identity proof but to allow “relying parties” to use resources on other websites
[34]. For example, a web app can use OAuth to access profile information on Facebook or
publish Twitter messages on the user’s behalf. The web app can create another dedicated
user-account for its own purposes with the data it receives from the OAuth interfaces, and
automatically authenticate the user without further notice. Perhaps this is the reason OAuth
is often mistakenly seen as single sign-on mechanism.
Different analyses of the security and user experience of SSO mechanisms have yielded
mixed results. Ruoti et al. found that their participants ranked OpenID-like approaches
as the preferred way to authenticate [272]. Sun et al., however, found that their survey
respondents had often erroneous mental models about how single sign-on works [323]. For
instance, many people thought that their passwords are shared with relying parties and also
around 40% were concerned about privacy in this study. Contrarily, Egelman pointed out
that users who used Facebook Connect are fairly cognizant of the data that is shared with
relying parties [91]. Still, 15% of respondents expressed privacy concerns and refrained from
using such mechanisms. Bonneau et al. also criticize big companies as identity providers
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by noting that “Facebook Connect (a version of OAuth), incentivizes relying parties with
user data, mandating a central role for Facebook as the sole identity provider, which does
little for privacy” [35]. For users, leaving an identity provider like Facebook also entails
tedious account recovery on relying services like Spotify43. In summary, SSO theoretically
has the potential to drastically reduce the number passwords but it brings out a new range of
problems.
2.5.4 Passwords are Here to Stay
Bonneau et al. argue that passwords are an imperfect technology that is difficult to re-
place, and so they answer the question as to if we still need passwords with a differentiated
“yes”: “Passwords appear to be a Pareto equilibrium”44 [35]. The industry has found ways
to work around the drawbacks that passwords certainly entail. Thus, if passwords are not
going away, multi-factor and multi-modal systems may turn out to be the most promising
solution. The challenge is to establish a minimally privacy-invasive solution that embraces
user-centered design to a higher degree than previous multi-factor/-modal approaches. Aca-
demic research can, according to Bonneau et al., carry out those foundational experiments
whose costs would potentially have a detrimental effect on business successes. This might
help in pushing viable solutions forward when there is enough evidence for their business
merit. As Herley and van Oorshot point out: “[...] it is time to admit that passwords will be
with us for some time, and moreover, that in many instances they are the best-fit among cur-
rently known solutions” [165]. They propagate a more systematic approach to make users’
lives easier instead of trying to find the single panacea that replaces passwords entirely.
43 https://tobiasseitz.wordpress.com/2016/12/20/how-to-use-spotify-after-leaving-
facebook/ (last accessed 04.01.2018)
44 By equillibrium, the authors most likely mean a Pareto efficient state. From Wikipedia: “Pareto efficiency
or Pareto optimality is a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as
to make any one individual or preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or
preference criterion worse off.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency, last accessed
04.01.2018
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“his thoughts were so full of the great riches he should possess, that
he could not think of the word to make it open, but instead of ‘Sesame,’
said, ‘Open, Barley!’ and was much amazed to find that the door
remained fast shut. He named several sorts of grain, but still the
door would not open, and the more he endeavoured to remember the
word ‘Simsim,’ the more his memory was confounded, and he had as
much forgotten it as if he had never heard it mentioned.”
– Kasim’s predicament in Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves
Morris and Thompson were already concerned with user behavior regarding passwords in
1979 [237]. They identified that users choose predictable passwords and that this can be
leveraged for attacks. So, they suggested enforcing a certain minimum password length (six
characters). At the time, the users were mostly professionals who received training to op-
erate computers and could thus also have been trained to pick less predictable passwords
[218]. But as computers were introduced to a larger audience, more people were exposed
to password authentication. Naturally, this also induced a growing number of attacks, and
it is increasingly difficult for users to defend themselves against them (see. Section 2.2).
Nowadays, password policies are in place that require not only a typical minimum of eight
characters, but also mandate mixed-case letters, digits and special symbols to start with. The
HCI community noticed the users’ struggle in the 1990s and that we can – and should –
design authentication systems with usability in mind. Perhaps, one of the breaking points
where a new school of thought turned up in the literature was a paper by Adams and Sasse
in 1999 [3]. The central and novel theme in there was a shift from fixing the user to acknowl-
edging user behavior and designing for it. The paper managed to see over 1500 citations as
of writing this thesis.
This chapter looks at the literature that mostly came after this seminal work. It discusses
the users’ problems, solutions, feelings, and opinions about using passwords. An essential
goal is to give the reader an empathetic perspective and provide background information
to understand why it is challenging to come up with viable solutions to make users’ lives
less frustrating. To get there, we first take a brief look at conducting user research with
passwords. Hereafter we disseminate common coping strategies and solutions.
3.1 Methodology: Running Password Studies
Before we report on insights about user behavior regarding passwords, we take a look into
running studies that focus on passwords. There are two central aspects that make collecting
data particularly challenging: acting ethically and maintaining high ecological validity of
the data. In fact, these two goals create an area of tension that demands a critical selection
of methods. Komanduri et al. note that “ideally, password studies would be conducted by
collecting data on real passwords created by real users of a deployed system” [200]. But this
would mean that researchers obtain access to the user accounts that were under investigation.
This is ethically questionable [92]. Maybe the researchers themselves are benevolent, but
the data is precious and thus could bring attackers to the scene. Since absolute security can
barely be guaranteed, it is best to avoid that users disclose their actual credentials during a
user study to the researchers.
3.1.1 General Considerations for User Studies as Data Source
If we cannot collect the users’ real password in its original form, what is the best way to
measure, e.g., cause and effect of novel interventions? There are several alternatives.
Password Creation Tasks
First, one asks participants to create a new password during the user study and stores these
passwords as part of the dataset. This approach resolves the issue of real-world password
disclosure, but introduces a number of problems. Studies should be ethical and thus transpar-
ent for the most part. Hence, the study topic should be known to the participants. However,
if participants know that their passwords are studied, this could induce protective reactions
to prevent giving hints about their real passwords. In that case, the participants’ selection
strategy does not resemble their real-world behavior much and thus the ecological validity
of the data is low [297]. Although it appears trivial, Fahl et al. suggest that in this sce-
nario, asking the participants whether they had acted like they normally would is a suitable
indicator that helps in weighting the data [103]. It is also recommendable to give users
a specific scenario that allows them to immerse themselves in the task. Komanduri et al.
argue that having participants create passwords for fictional email accounts leads to more
authentic behavior [200]. Some users, however, are less protective and provide one of their
real passwords regardless of the instruction (e.g. 26.5% in Fahl et al.’s study [103]). The
result is the same as if the purpose of the study was concealed through an act of deception,
which is occasionally done in psychology studies (for a discussion see [326]). For exam-
ple, it can suffice to tell participants a convincing cover story, e.g. that the purpose of the
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study is to do a usability test of a social networking site, which also happens to involve an
account setup process (see [129]). The data would be ecologically valid because the cover
story removes observer-expectancy and other biases, but users might still pick a password
that is not representative for their usual practices. Thus, for the researchers, it is extremely
difficult to tell “real” passwords and “new” passwords apart. Phishing or man in the middle
attacks are sometimes carried out to collect realistic passwords. Haque et al. conducted a
laboratory study where they told participants a cover story to create new accounts for pop-
ular websites [154]. The websites, however, were re-created by the researchers and stored
the passwords on their own servers instead of performing actual registrations. Egelman et al.
used a proxy server to intercept traffic between the users and a real online portal [99]. They
also altered the websites to communicate their cover story that the password had expired.
This, however, creates an ethical conundrum, if the dataset is published along with the pa-
per. To allow others to verify that research is valid, reliable, and generalizable, a published
dataset is desirable, but in Egelman et al. or Haque et al.’s studies this would put real user
accounts at risk. Legal constraints like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
can prevent publishing data as well. Much in the same vein, sharing research about success-
fully attacking passwords produces a similar dilemma. For instance, one can put forward
new cracking approaches (e.g. [222, 239, 281, 366]) that potentially affect common strength
metrics (see Section 2.3) – but attackers also benefit from this kind of knowledge. From an
HCI perspective, one can also unfold how users select passwords, which allows optimizing
cracking efficiency [365, 369].
There are several methods to avoid acting unethically in studies where users are required
to create passwords. First of all, studies involving human subjects are assessed by an In-
stitutional Review Board (IRB), especially in the United States. This is done to ensure an
ethical study design that is unlikely to cause participants any harm. The IRB might mandate
a thorough debriefing of participants and meticulous documentation of the experiment. In
Europe, however, password studies are less commonly evaluated by an IRB (or authors fail
to mention the process in their papers – often there are remarks that universities do not have
such institutions like in [103]). Secondly, one can refrain from releasing the data set, even
if user names are removed. In fact, almost all publications on passwords collected during
a user study omit publishing the corresponding data set. Only the abstract analysis is pub-
lished and this is a widely-accepted standard practice, despite the questionable reliability.
A rather novel approach that reduces the likelihood of made-up data relies on the idea of
publishing differentially private data sets. Here, algorithmically generated noise, which is
indistinguishable from the orignal data, is added to the data set to preserve privacy of users.
For password frequency lists, passwords could be mangled and extended by generated pass-
words that resemble real ones. Adversaries lack information whether the data is usable as
signal or noise. This way, Blocki et al. managed to release a private frequency list of pass-
words at Yahoo that Bonneau had already anonymously analyzed [32]. Moreover, instead
of collecting newly generated passwords in plain text, it is possible to store a hashed ver-
sion. For instance, Wash et al. had participants install a browser extension that logged all
form submits that included a password field [363]. To study reused passwords, they hashed
and sent them over a secure connection to their servers. As long as a slow hash function
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and a strong salt are used, this approach is uncritical. However, it merely allows observ-
ing if the hashes match on several sites. Finally, as a last option to collect password data,
researchers can log meta-data about passwords. For instance, Von Zezschwitz et al. used
a “meta password” that described the participants’ actual passwords [354], but which was
insufficient to reconstruct the original. This description can include the number of charac-
ters, upper-/lowercase letters, digits, and even proactive strength estimations. To collect the
data, participants in von Zezschwitz et al.’s study were provided with an offline password
analysis tool. They entered their password into that and copy-pasted the result of the analysis
into the questionnaire form. If one does not want to examine the full range of a password’s
qualities, this approach is absolutely feasible. Florêncio and Herley used a similar approach
for the large-scale data collection with around 500,000 participants to avoid running into
privacy issues [111]. The information transmitted to the logging server was pseudonymized
and contained only meta features. The only downside is that one cannot run further analyses
on the passwords after the data is collected, which might be necessary, e.g., if a new strength
metric is established.
Retrospective Self Report
If one wants to refrain from having users create a new password, one can study their past
behavior in different ways. In its simplest form, participants are simply asked to describe
how they create passwords. Stobert & Biddle did this extensively to create the Password Life
Cycle model [316] (see Section 3.2). Ur et al. used interviews to find out what users do to
make their passwords stronger [345]. Das et al. found out through retrospective interviews
that social contacts have a strong impact on users’ security decisions [68]. Most commonly,
however, typical online surveys feature a number of questions about personal behavior and
attitudes, e.g. [4, 133, 206, 269, 298]. Questions about passwords are easy to implement in a
survey and respondents can always choose how much they want to share. However, one has
to stay aware that social desirability lowers the reliability of the data: since news articles also
do their part in shaming users for picking “bad” passwords (see Chapter 14), people may re-
spond dishonestly about their password behavior. Many people are uncomfortable admitting
their password is as simple as 12345. Another problem results from fading memories. Since
most users have more than one password, it might be difficult for them to recall the correct
past behavior and their motivation for it. Not only password studies suffer from this bias,
but any study involving self report in general.
Principles
From user research in Usable Security and Privacy (USEC) of the past decades, Krol et
al. derive a set of general principles that researchers ought to consider when conducting
experiments in security and privacy [205]. We can integrate password studies in there:
Primary Task Creating a password should not be the sole task in the study. Instead, par-
ticipants should achieve a primary task by authenticating with passwords, e.g. using a new
system for a period of time [41]. The reasoning behind this principle is that security tasks
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are secondary tasks and this constraint needs to be reflected in the experiment. However,
re-focusing on a separate primary task is not always possible, e.g. in surveys.
Realistic Risk Users should be able to realistically estimate the risk for secure interactions.
As mentioned above, Komanduri et al. suggest carefully selecting real-world scenarios to
achieve this [200].
No Priming Whenever human behavior is studied, experiments should avoid influencing
and biasing participants with certain information. This avoids unnatural behavior.
Double Blind Experiments If possible, the person carrying out the actual experiment
should not be involved in the planning and design of the study. Moreover, the participants
should not know the details of the study, either. On the experimenter side, unconscious bias
and influence is mitigated, and participants also do not know the “treatment” they receive
(if any). Although this is a desirable goal, there is little evidence that experiments typically
follow this principle.
Context Definition To increase internal validity, it is necessary to define the terms threat
model, security, privacy, usability, depending on which are relevant for the study. A precise
definition avoids misunderstanding and improves transparency, credibility, and trustworthi-
ness of the experiment.
These principles can serve as a rough quality assessment of presented research, although in
many instances, not all principles will be fully addressed.
3.1.2 Analyzing Password Leaks and (Semi-)Public Data
Instead of users creating new passwords, it is possible to make inferences about their behav-
ior from already existing data (for an overview see Table 3.1). Password frequency lists are
readily available on the Internet1. The sources can often be traced back to illegal attacks,
which makes the use of such data somewhat questionable. However, it is a widely accepted
method to contrast real-world practices and study behavior. The data set that has probably
been studied the most originates from a breach at RockYou, a software development firm
specialized at games for social networks. In 2009, an attacker used an SQL injection to
download around 32 Million plain-text passwords. For instance, Veras et al. visualized se-
mantic properties of passwords in this dataset and highlight the high occurrence of dates in
there [349]. Wheeler relied on it to build the zxcvbn password strength estimation system
[369]. More often, though, these data sets serve as training data for password guessability
benchmarks. Weir et al. took the RockYou passwords to train their PCFG which served
as a demonstration that entropy is not a feasible strength metric for user-chosen passwords.
Afterwards, it was integrated into the training set of PGS. PGS is mostly used to gauge pass-
words collected through a user study, e.g. under different policies [295] or interventions
[341]. In conclusion, publicly leaked data sets can often serve as ground truth for studies
that aim to provide new insights.
1 An example repository containing a wide range of leaked passwords is available under https://github.
com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Passwords (last accessed 09.01.2018)
49
Table 3.1: Example password leaks of the past five years (data source: https://
haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites). Some of the data served security researchers to an-
alyze user behavior and create more effective strength estimation algorithms. *multiple leaks
from different years
Data Source # PWs Year Usage Examples
MySpace 360 M 2008* [73, 67, 81, 209, 226, 295, 343, 348, 369, 366]
RockYou 32 M 2009 [17, 26, 30, 37, 73, 82, 194, 99, 177, 200, 233, 295, 348, 361, 365]
Dropbox 68 M 2012 [27, 129, 250]
Yahoo 0.5 M 2012* [27, 67, 145, 170, 194, 226, 295, 346, 359, 369]
LinkedIn 164 M 2016* [73, 115, 175, 198, 213, 348]
3.1.3 User Study Methods in Password Research
Research in USEC takes advantage of the toolbelt of HCI research in general. In the follow-
ing, the most common methods for password studies are portrayed.
Laboratory studies To gain the greatest control over experimental parameters, laboratory
studies are the go-to method. Both qualitative and quantitative studies are carried out in
the lab, with a slight surplus of qualitative studies. Among the most common methods, one
finds (semi-)structured interviews ([4, 133, 316, 345, 368]) and usability testing ([99, 123,
125, 142, 171, 228, 230, 272, 382, 355]). Password memorability can be studied in the lab
([99, 103, 122, 230, 380]). Studying short-term recall usually follows a mental-rotation task
(e.g. [203, 382]). Long-term memorability studies in the lab are less common, because they
require participants to return to the lab, which may be too bothersome for many. However,
this may be the only option to evaluate alternative authentication schemes that are not yet
mature enough to be distributed.
Although technically it is not a “lab” environment, café studies sometimes are closely related
to lab studies. Von Zezschwitz et al. collected qualitative and quantitative data on partici-
pants’ past password behavior by inviting customers in a café to join them for a free coffee
[354]. The experimenter has almost as much control as in a lab to answer certain research
questions. Only the surroundings may distract somewhat. Other methods like participatory
design / co-creation ([61, 262]) and focus groups ([90, 151, 155, 308]) are possible, but less
frequently reported than interviews and usability tests. A common drawback of lab studies
lies in the high costs, time consumption to carry them out, smaller sample sizes, and reduced
ecological validity.
Field-Studies Field studies for password research come in many flavors. Online surveys
are among the most common methods used in the field ([132, 148, 154, 169, 206, 226, 269,
351]), due to their lower cost and comparatively easy implementation. Other advantages
like increased sample size and more diversity in the data speak in favor of online surveys.
Survey tools like surveymonkey.com come in handy, but usually lack seamless integration
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of interactive prototypes. If a prototype should be evaluated through a survey, however,
one has to either implement the entire survey structure or redirect participants from the sur-
vey platform to the prototype and back. Surveys are also the weapon of choice if there is
an opportune moment that is worth studying. Mazurek et al. took the opportunity to dis-
tribute online questionnaires after a new password policy was introduced at CMU [226].
Fahl et al. profited from a similar situation at Leibniz-University Hannover, and Renaud et
al. could even distribute surveys on the same topic across multiple years in this way [267].
Interestingly, there does not seem to be a special, standardized survey construct to measure
the usability, respectively user experience, of password systems. Other Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) sub-fields more frequently use, for example, the NASA-TLX, Positive Af-
fect and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) or AttrakDiff constructs to establish comparability
with other studies. Notable exceptions were reported by Kraus et al., who used AttrakDiff
to evaluate emoji-based authentication [203]. The NASA-TLX was used by Fraune et al.,
[128], Sherman et al. [302], and Yang et al. [382]. Lately, the Security Behavior Intentions
Scale (SeBIS) gains more attention, because it serves as a self-assessment that can help the
interpretation of actions taken during a user study [97, 94, 363, 364].
A special kind of online studies that has been extensively used and propagated by CMU re-
searchers leverage crowd-sourcing platforms like the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk)2.
Survey respondents are recruited by paying each one a small amount of money for a valid re-
sponse. This way, increasing the sample size is straight-forward, if many users have already
signed up on the platform and are eligible for the Human Intelligence Task (HIT). Work-
ers (known as “turkers”) form an increasingly diverse population [271], which is another
benefit. In password research, for instance, Kelley et al.’s high-impact work on password
guessability collected around 12000 passwords using mTurk [191]. Ur et al. had partici-
pants rate the strength and memorability of a given set of passwords, which allowed them
to identify certain misconceptions [342]. Mazurek et al. compared features of passwords
created by turkers to real passwords of students and staff at their university [226]. They
take the large similarities of the two data sets as evidence that passwords created during an
mTurk study are a reliable and valid data source, so there is no urgent need to analyze pass-
words of a deployed system. Shay wrote a PhD thesis specifically about evaluating password
policies with crowd-sourced data [293]. In many cases, e.g. [299, 295, 341], the primary
task is to create a fictional account or merely a password under certain constraints, which
apparently violates Krol et al.’s study principles [205]. It is especially interesting that most
studies are announced as some kind of password study, probably mandated by IRBs . But
Mazurek et al.’s work demonstrates that this limitation is bearable. Moreover, studying the
long-term memorability of passwords is facilitated, because participants can be invited to
return through an internal, anonymous messaging system. It is also possible to create more
complex study designs with mTurk, e.g. if multiple device types should be used by the turk-
ers to create passwords [232]. Despite the wide range of advantages, there are shortcomings
of crowd-sourced approaches as with any study method. First, turkers are incentivized to
complete as many HITs as possible on the platform to earn money. Thus, completing a
2 https://www.mturk.com/ (last accessed 10.01.2018)
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survey by providing quick answers without reading the questions could lead to unreliable
data. Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMCs) and attention check questions (ACQs) can
mitigate this problem [249, 253]. Turkers are only paid if the commissioner accepts the HIT
as valid, thus IMCs and attention checks are useful indicators here. Moreover, as of now,
the mTurk platform can only be used in certain countries, e.g. the USA or UK. European
alternatives exist, but are not yet par in terms of user base, response times, and feature set
[253].
Aside from surveys, diary studies about passwords have proven feasible in the past. In-
glesant and Sasse found out through a diary study that employees struggle with frequent
password changes, which might not have become evident using other study means [172].
Hayashi and Hong used this method to analyze password re-use across different comput-
ers, services, and organizations [159]. Since password authentication is a secondary task,
keeping a diary of authentication events helps participants provide reliable behavioral data.
However, it requires much effort to continuously stay aware of one’s actions and log them.
To avoid that participants forget logging and other self-reporting bias [364], it can be worth-
while to ask them small questions in situ. This method, known as Experience Sampling
Method (ESM), requests short responses either in predefined intervals or when the system
detects a relevant event. ESM has not seen much attention in password studies on the web
(Lyastani et al. provide one exception [217]), but mobile authentication has been studied
with this method [155]. Users carry their personal mobile with them almost all the time, so
there is a high chance of successfully receiving the experience sample. ESM was also found
useful for studies about security warnings in browsers [8, 106].
Perhaps, ESM is underused for password studies because it can be substituted well with dif-
ferent, less costly methods. It is possible to automatically detect relevant events and survey
the participants before and/or after the automatic data collection. Florêncio and Herley
conducted one of the largest studies to date on password habits with this method [111].
Their intention was to find out among other things A) how often people type passwords,
B) how many sites share a password C) how many distinct passwords a user has, and D)
how the strong the passwords are. Working at Microsoft, they were granted to utilize the
Windows Live Toolbar for Internet Explorer to collect in-the-wild data from up to 500,000
users during three months of running the collection. They conceived the method of protected
password lists (PPL) to avoid intruding into people’s privacy – a kind of meta description of
passwords which is sent to the logging server instead of the original password. It was thus
not possible to trace the incoming data back to a specific user. However, there are a number
of limitations this method. The authors point out that the anonymity of the incoming data-
stream might have resulted in over-counting of entries. Also, it was not measured how long
the actual password entries takes. If users only used regular dictionary words without any
modification as their passwords, the key logging module of the toolbar would have recorded
a password reuse event (PRE) every time the user entered that word – also in regular on-
line communication. Nevertheless, the fact that users are typically focused on their primary
tasks, background logging helps to collect unbiased data with high ecological validity.
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A final option to study passwords in the field is to collect and analyze them in an already
deployed system (in-situ evaluation), which would be the ideal data source, according to
Komanduri et al. [200]. Brostoff and Sasse utilized a coursework system to evaluate Pass-
faces as alternative to passwords [41]. Similarly, Renaud et al. used a coursework tool to
evaluate the effectiveness of different password nudges [267]. Mazurek et al. gained access
to passwords of their University’s Single-Sign On (SSO) and were able to break down differ-
ences in password selection behavior by departments. As one of the few exceptions from the
industry, Bonneau analyzed a private password data set at Yahoo [32] and Amazon [37]. The
data is highly ecologically valid and diverse if it originates from a real product or service.
However, if interventions are implemented as part of a password experiment, this might have
negative consequences for both the service provider and the users. For instance, in an A/B
setting one intervention to influence password selection might in fact lead to weaker pass-
words and put users at risk. Each user is a critical potential source of revenue for service
providers, so tampering with the sign-up procedure might lead to higher bounce rates and
consequently financial damage. High stakes like this make it difficult for researchers to con-
vince stakeholders to cooperate on a study. In conclusion, it is unsurprising to see only rare
instances of password studies carried out with deployed systems in public environments,
although the insights gained might be invaluable.
3.1.4 The Bottom Line: Emerging Good Practices and Tools
Using one of the study methods above is the first step to get closer to answering the research
methods. However, to get the full picture of the studied phenomenon, a triangulated ap-
proach appears to be the only option. For example, Wash et al. combined a survey with log
analyses to study password reuse and self-report issues [363]. A multi-tiered approach like
in Von Zezschwitz et al.’s study helps to identify themes first (formative stage) and quantify
them later (summative stage) [355]. Similarly, Huh et al. were able to refine their concept of
system-initiated user-replaceable passwords through triangulation [170]. Adams and Sasse
conducted qualitative interviews to follow up web survey results [3]. If constraints allow
for only one method, it is recommendable to consider how to collect both quantitative and
qualitative data points. For instance, in online surveys that evaluate a novel password in-
tervention, it is always feasible to collect quantitative metrics (e.g. usability and password
strength) and qualitative data (reasoning, explanations, feedback) to put study results into
context [3]. Those eager to find additional starting points for USEC experiments probably
find essential aspects in Krol et al.’s principles for experimental design [205]. The methods
described above can be drawn on to fulfill those principles, which we try to achieve in Part
II and III of this thesis.
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3.2 Password Coping Strategies and Risky Behav-
iors
Passwords are the cornerstone of knowledge-based authentication. And although “knowl-
edge” can be stored inside and retrieved from computers, it is still a human capability to
learn things and hereafter “know” them. So, humans are a large factor in the equation of
knowledge-based authentication. Their actions and behavior to gain knowledge on pass-
words deserve to be studied in detail.
Some cybersecurity researchers started blaming system failures and vulnerabilities on users.
For instance, Feldmeier et al. stated in 1990: “The main weakness in any password sys-
tem is that users often choose easily guessable passwords: English words, names, trivial
extensions to English words, etc., because they are easy to remember” [104]. It quickly
became a dictum that users were the “weakest link” in the figurative authentication chain
[276]. However, since the late 1990s, HCI advocates that systems take into account user
capabilities and not the other way around [277]. Adams and Sasse postulated in 1999 that
service providers acknowledge that “users are not the enemy”, which is one of the most in-
fluential position papers on the topic [3]. In that paper, they provide four central challenges
in password authentication that users face: 1) Users have to deal with multiple passwords,
2) users do not intuitively create strong passwords 3) password procedures and work prac-
tices might conflict and 4) users develop a sub-par understanding of organizational security
issues. Those challenges are often too hard to come by in everyday password authentication
[87]. As a consequence, users develop coping strategies to reduce their task load. This early
framework has since been fed with numerous research studies and is still valid today.
Stobert and Biddle formalized user challenges and behavior in the “Password Life Cycle”
(see Figure 3.1), which they arrived at through qualitative interviews and coding the par-
ticipants’ responses [316]. It starts out with the challenge to choose a password. Coping
strategies at this point revolve around reducing effort, e.g. to memorize the password. In-
cluding personal or personally meaningful information comes natural to users. Others in-
clude pointers to the time they created it, or word-associations about the website-content.
Mnemonics are found with some users, especially those aiming to secure their account. In
essence, however, users often memorize their coping strategy, to recall their password. Con-
sistent strategies reduce the effort effectively. Even if complex policies mandate a change
to the first-choice password, users have a go-to strategy to deal with this situation, e.g. by
appending a preferred symbol. When people create passwords, the most common action
is to reuse an old password. This is not always possible, so users need to maintain and
commit to a number of passwords. Hayashi et al. observed in a diary study that users cate-
gorize accounts [159] in different ways. There is also a mix of different password retrieval
methods at the commitment stage. A survey in 2017 from Pew Research Center with N=926
participants found that the vast majority commits to their passwords by memorizing them in
their heads (preferred strategy for 65% of the respondents) or by noting down the password
(49% do this, and it is the preferred strategy for 18%) [247]. Some respondents also either
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saved passwords in their browser (18%) or used a dedicated password manager (12%), but
this appears to be a negligible go-to strategy (5% of the respondents). Once the user has
committed to a password, they live with it, even if it produces difficulties in certain situa-
tions. For instance, the question “when is it time to change the password?” falls into that
stage of the cycle. Finally, if passwords are not actively used on a regular basis, or were
recently changed, it is very foreseeable that users forget their passwords. The password
reset mechanism helps users cope with this situation. The two options at this point are either
to create a completely new password (which increases the likelihood of forgetting it), or to
reuse one (which potentially reduces the number of unique passwords). Then the cycle starts
over. In the following we shed light on the actions and consequences at the different stages.
Forget Your 
Password
Choose Your 
Password
Commit Your 
Password
Live with 
Your 
Password
Reuse Your 
Password
Figure 3.1: Stobert and Biddle’s “Password Life Cycle” [316] models typical stages of password
behavior.
3.2.1 Weak Passwords
Why do users select weak passwords? First of all, selecting a strong password is hard for
most people. Picking up the definition of a strong password (“something that is easy to re-
member, but difficult to guess” [25]), users do not struggle with the first part of the sentence,
but the latter. Users do not intuitively know what makes a password difficult to guess [177],
and not even security researchers have reached ultimate consensus on that matter.
Let us look at the first part: something that is easy to remember. Numerous studies have
looked at what people do to make their passwords easy to remember. For instance, personal
information is very memorable (“TobiasSeitz”), as is that of close ones (“LenaSeitz”)
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and pets (“Fonsi&Alois”) [42, 209]. Veras et al. found that dates are very commonly found
in passwords [349]. Looking at the top 25 most-used passwords3, a list published after each
public data leak, we can easily spot more patterns. One group consists of “keyboard pat-
terns” (qwerty, qazwsx) and “number sequences” (12345, 123456, 1234567489, 1234567,
123123). The remainder fall into the “likings” (football, monkey, iloveyou, starwars, dragon)
and “password thematic” (Password, letmein, admin, welcome, login, passw0rd, master,
hello, trustno1) categories. Figure 3.2 shows additional selection techniques. All of these
passwords are particularly easy to remember, which was quantified by Chiasson et al. [52],
but extremely predictable. However, they are often still allowed at many websites [288]. In-
terestingly, such password lists differ marginally across countries [351, 359]. Consequently,
users’ desire to create memorable passwords naturally leads to more obvious selections.
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Figure 3.2: Password selection techniques [186]
Another reason for the prevalence of weak passwords lies in incorrect mental models. Men-
tal models are descriptions of how humans make sense of functions and system states [352].
Some users who aim to create stronger passwords still fail because their strategies to accom-
plish the task are predictable. Gaw et al. found that mangling is predictable [132]. Ur et al.
pointed out that users understand a great deal of password security, but their modification
behavior of existing passwords is sub-par [345]. Moreover, they provide evidence that users
succeed to identify strong passwords, but certain characteristics are misleading [342]. For in-
stance, including digits yielded significantly higher subjective strength ratings, but does not
always effectively improve strength. What is more is that participants in their study showed
a skewed understanding of password attacks. For instance, 34% of respondents thought that
a strong password needs to withstand at least 50 guesses by an attacker. Therefore, trying
to fend off a dictionary attack might be futile if users do not know that attackers attempt to
crack the password trillions of times. Ur et al. conclude that feedback should thus inform
users about attack scenarios which helps them assess the risk more realistically. Although
it is sometimes argued that passphrases, i.e. a combination of multiple dictionary words,
are often as secure as passwords from a richer character set [297], users fail to create strong
passphrases, too. Bonneau studied the linguistic properties of passphrases at Amazon and
3 SplashData publishes such a list each year, for 2017: http://fortune.com/2017/12/19/the-25-
most-used-hackable-passwords-2017-star-wars-freedom/ (last accessed 12.01.2018)
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noted that an attacker could easily model user behavior to effectively crack passphrases [37].
So, in other words, the mental model “passphrase = secure” is also wrong and problematic.
Finally, mental models also play a role for risk assessment in organizations. In many cases,
employees underestimate the security threat that companies face day to day, which leads to
insecure password practices [3, 368]. To summarize this point, users fail to create strong
passwords, because in many cases erroneous mental models stand in the way.
What reports and news articles on password security often call “laziness” and “stupidity”
[352] may in fact be the rational rejection of password security. Riley pointed out that users
are well aware of “better” behavior, but they often ignore it by choice [269]. Florêncio et
al. argue that this behavior is absolutely rational, because some accounts do not require
strong protection and it would be impossible for users to follow all security advice given by
experts [116, 264]. A case example of an account that may be valuable for some, but not
for others is LinkedIn. The social-media platform which is focused on business connections
suffered a severe data breach in 2012, but only became aware of a much larger leakage in
2016. Many hashed passwords had leaked and thus the affected users were prompted to
reset their passwords. Huh et al. investigated the reasons (not) to reset the password and
in many instances, people said that they do not use the service very often, did not want
to, or were not really concerned about the risks [169]. Ur et al.’s results also indicate that
users do know in theory what makes a strong password [342]. A survey commissioned by
LastPass reported that one group of users often do not care about their accounts if they are not
meaningful to them [208], while the other group is overly careful, but there does not appear
to be a “just fine” area of behavior. The first group may believe that stronger passwords do
not accomplish protection anyhow [114]. Herley and Pieters argue that it is also difficult to
objectively falsify claims about security precautions, which would help to debunk unjustified
security advice [164]. So, in essence, users choose weak passwords because they think the
account is unimportant and therefore it is fine to ignore security advice.
Lastly, the literature lists a few other reasons that lead to weak passwords. Groß et al. looked
at the association between cognitive depletion and selection behavior [143]. They reach the
conclusion that if cognitively challenging tasks precede password selection, the resulting
passwords tend to get weaker. Von Zezschwitz et al. point out that a user’s first passwords
are created probably in teenage years when security precautions might be much less evident
to people [354]. For important accounts, these early passwords are modified, but still persist
for many years after they were first committed to. Mobile phones are another factor that
steadily gains more importance. Under lab conditions, Yang et al. found that participants in-
cluded more lowercase letters in passwords, if they created them on a smartphone [382]. Von
Zezschwitz et al. corroborate the findings and argue that passwords created on smartphones
are much less diverse than their desktop-counterparts, because they are shorter and contain
mostly lowercase letters [355]. Two years later, Melicher et al. studied the interoperability
of passwords on different platforms [232]. Interestingly, the passwords created on mobiles
were only marginally weaker than those created on a desktop, but had more potential to lead
to user frustration, especially if requirements were too bothersome. The individual keyboard
on a mobile influences frustration levels, too [153]. In summary, contextual factors like
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cognitive depletion and the device used during password creation have a notable impact on
password strength.
We thus identify four main themes from related work that cause weak passwords: 1) Weak
passwords are more memorable. 2) Hard-to-change mental models prevent the creation of
stronger passwords. 3) In many situations, users rationally reject the effort to create a strong
password. 4) Contextual factors notably influence selection strategies. In the following,
we dissect another coping strategy, which is potentially even riskier than selecting weak
passwords: password reuse.
3.2.2 Password Reuse
The primary reason for password reuse is the mere fact that users create new accounts on a
regular basis, and it is logical to make sure to be able to log in later by choosing a secret they
already know. “Password overload” essentially frames the problem [381]. “Memory inter-
ference” postulates reuse as a coping strategy [52]. In 2007, Florêncio and Herley conducted
a large-scale study that empirically showed the challenges and coping strategies regarding
this overload [111]: Users of the Windows Live Toolbar had 6.5 distinct passwords, each of
which was used for 3.9 different websites. During the data collection period, users logged
into 25 accounts on a regular basis, and typed around 8 passwords per day. Although keep-
ing track of the multitude of username-password combinations is a tough challenge, most
users still rely on their memory instead of other tools [247]. Users realize the challenge
is hard, but Woods et al. argue that users underestimate their capabilities when it comes
to memorizing passwords [377]. Consequently, many people do not try to create a richer
portfolio of passwords than the numbers from the 2007 study showed. More recent numbers
show that between 39% [247] and 76% [64] of users rely on reuse as coping strategy. Since
social desirability bias could lead to dishonest survey responses, the “dark figure” might
even be higher, because, as Inglesant and Sasse put it, “Users see ‘good’ passwords (that are
memorable and conform to the policy) as a ‘resource’, which they continue to use for new
applications even if the original use is no longer allowed.” [172]. What is more is that the
user name is part of the authentication process, and users pick different aliases, pseudonyms,
emails for different accounts [159].
All this is consequential for the overall online security of an individual. The more a user
relies on reuse passwords, the more severe phishing attacks and data breaches become. The
metaphorical “Domino Effect” describes the situation after a breach: When an attacker ob-
tains a password from one user’s account, all the other accounts might fall with it [173]. It is
enough to know even only one low-value password to crack a large part of high-value pass-
words via predictable mangling rules [67, 154]. Still, password reuse is difficult to mitigate,
so Ives argues to look into understanding the specific approaches better [173].
One such approach is to categorize passwords by different criteria. Here, we can borrow the
“Mental Accounting” theory from Behavioral Economics to describe users’ risk assessments
[320, 330]. Users put their passwords into mental accounts that help them recall them later.
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Wash et al. argues that frequently entered credentials are reused more likely than seldom
used ones [363]. However, interviewees in Stobert and Biddle’s study reported the opposite
behavior [316]. Florêncio and Herley noticed that strong passwords (in terms of entropy)
are less frequently reused than weak passwords [111]. Here again, Wash et al. observed the
opposite: participants in their study prioritized stronger passwords as reuse candidates [363].
If the latter is true, then this is another indicator for problematic mental models regarding
risk assessment: users try to follow security advice and prefer strength over uniqueness
which is typically also advised. Nonetheless, strategies (or at least results) appear to fluctuate
throughout the years. Many users cluster their secrets regarding the usage purpose [154], e.g.
banking, social media, communication, shopping, etc. [245, 315]. Bailey et al. argue that
users do not really respect the usage purpose, but the value, importance, and meaningfulness
of the account [17]. In that sense, users do not appear to care if the password ought to protect
financial information if the website does not mean much to them. Radke et al. found users
in their diary study tended to create unique passwords for important accounts, and reuse
passwords for less important ones [260]. Still, probably all users have a “go-to password”
that is tried first for an account whose value is uncertain in the beginning [316]. If password
requirements disallow the preferred choice, the go-to password might not work anymore.
Typically, users either pick another password from their portfolio in that situation, or they
mangle their first choice until all requirements are met. As we show in Chapter 6, neither
strategy is necessary if the go-to-password already shows certain features. But in case the
policy mandates a change, Gaw and Felten have laid out that user-chosen mangling strategies
are predictable, too [133]. Besides, policies might not be the only reason for password
modifications. Over time, users sometimes are exposed to new security advice or other
realizations that their previous password strategy is generally considered weak [354]. Taking
the current (already memorized) credentials, and applying the recommendations to them is
an obvious choice.
Florêncio et al. described reuse, categorization, memorable passwords, and mangling as “fi-
nite effort” [116]. They meticulously lay out that these strategies are not only common, but
inevitable and necessary. Even experts in cybersecurity show similar patterns [216, 317].
The major difference between mainstream users and experts is that the latter are more artic-
ulate and considerate about their coping strategies.
In conclusion, we can hang on to the idea that password reuse is a necessary coping strategy.
Zhang-Kennedy et al. motivate that it is not even “bad” or “risky” per se [389]. The challenge
is to do it “right”. However, motivating users to alter this particular aspect is comparable to
motivating a smoker to quit their guilty pleasure: Abandoning reuse does not show a visible
immediate pay-off (nor does quitting smoking). In many cases, it does not cause harm, even
though 16% of US-Americans have experiences someone else taking over their accounts
[247] (a similar percentage of active smokers develop lung cancer4).
4 https://www.verywell.com/what-percentage-of-smokers-get-lung-cancer-2248868 (last
accessed 13.01.2018)
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3.2.3 External Storage
To avoid memory interference, many users resort to writing down their passwords. In its
simplest form, a sheet of paper that holds user name and password suffices. Roughly half
the users reportedly do this [247]. Many users also use a dedicated note-book that keeps their
passwords in one place [202]. Interestingly, some manufacturers offer “password-logbooks”
to help users organize their credentials. Kothari et al. collected customer reviews about the
ten most reviewed logbooks and analyzed their content to derive a mental model of password
security [202]. They were surprised how many people apparently use one of those logbooks
and what their motivations are. For instance, customers often loved the inconspicuousness
of the books and gave them away as presents. Age-related memorability challenges were
also a central theme. Many people acknowledged the security risks but were unsure if a
piece of software would be more secure than the book. Password logbooks can become a
single point-of-failure. Digital files on the computer are often almost as accessible to local
attackers (friends / spouses). In the workplace, writing passwords down on sticky notes [59]
leaves the credentials wide open to anyone passing by and enforcing different behavior is
difficult. Nevertheless, Herley and Van Oorschot generally advocate writing down as coping
strategy, as long as the notes are stored in a fairly secure location [165].
Using a password manager (PWM) is a more sophisticated way of “externalizing” pass-
words. In essence, a password manager is a digital representation of the “logbooks” de-
scribed above, but comes with many helpful extra features, like easy access, encryption
with a master password etc. A plethora of services and tools exist in different flavors (e.g.
built into browsers, third party programs, browser extensions, free vs. premium, cloud-
based vs. local). Notable representatives include LastPass (freemium/subscription), 1Pass-
word (premium/subscription), KeePassX (free, one-off payment for apps), and Dashlane
(freemium/subscription). Arias-Cabarcos et al. evaluated popular PWMs and suggest that
Dashlane provides the the most feasible usability/security trade-off [12]. However, surveys
have often revealed the low adoption rate of password managers [247], mostly because users
feel secure enough with their current management habits, or due to financial hurdles and
distrust [64, 102].
Lyastani et al. recently investigated the impact of using a PWM on password strength and
reuse [217]. Those PWMs which included a generator had a positive effect on overall pass-
word strength and diversity in the large sample studied in-situ. But existing user strategies
thwarted a boost in security, e.g. if a built-in PWM is solely used to store reused passwords.
Users often benefit from automatically filled login-forms and do not have to type their pass-
words anymore, which is a huge usability plus. Autofill moreover mitigates most phishing
attacks, because the PWM verifies the domain before filling the password field. As with
analog notepads, PWMs are a single point of failure, especially in case the master password
is weak. This is one of the few instances in which a strong password is recommended with-
out restrictions. Password managers constitute a honey pot for attackers, who, e.g., exploit
security vulnerabilities of the software to gain access to user passwords [34]. The situation is
aggravated if passwords are synced to the manufacturer’s cloud storage, although this is rec-
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ommended by Yee to enable seamless availability [384]. To summarize, password managers
are a feasible solution for many users, but adoption rates are still fairly low.
3.2.4 Fallback Methods
Coping with a forgotten password shows more particularities of user behavior. If offered by
service providers, the easiest way to handle the situation is to obtain a password reset link
via email and create a new password. In the past, password resets had been responsible for a
large portion of helpdesk calls [276], but self-service procedures have successfully mitigated
the issue. Users tend to reuse passwords or mangle an old password when they forget and
reset their credentials [316]. In some cases, however, password reset links are replaced
by personal knowledge questions [33]. These often present a great risk to user accounts
because of the statistical probability involved (e.g. “what was the make of your first car” has
a predictable distribution), or the information is discoverable on social networks (e.g. “what
is your city of birth”). Consequently, a strong primary password can be dominated by a weak
fallback question and voids user efforts to secure their account. Perhaps the only strategy
to maximize security within this scheme is to provide bogus answers to secret questions to
fend-off statistical attacks5.
3.2.5 Account Sharing
Users often share their accounts, e.g. with close-ones, relatives, or co-workers [188, 298].
Security advice generally discourages sharing passwords because it increases the likelihood
of leaked credentials. However, Singh et al. point out that this behavior is absolutely in-
tentional, and does not originate from lack of understanding of the risks involved [308].
Password managers also integrate sharing features to give others quick and easy access to
a set of passwords [210]. Account sharing plays a role in the overall security strategy, but
personal passwords are usually less influenced by sharing considerations.
3.2.6 Summary
We can identify themes in coping strategies at each stage of the Password Life Cycle [316].
Coping is a natural reaction to “impossible demands” arising from Password overload [277].
All strategies can be justified from an economic point of view [116], although each of them
generates security risks of varying severity. Password reuse is arguably the most severe
problem, followed by selecting too obvious and weak passwords. It is critical to be consistent
with one’s own reuse strategy and pick strong passwords in a select number of cases, e.g.
5 https://lifehacker.com/use-fake-answers-to-online-security-questions-1821628011
(last accessed 14.01.2018)
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master passwords for PWMs or central hubs like email accounts. In the following, we discuss
how research has tried to influence risky behavior and support users in safe behaviors.
3.3 Guiding and Aiding Users
Since secure behavior does not come natural to users, there have been many attempts to
make it more accessible to them and relieve the tensions between usability and security at
the same time. Although systems can be changed in many ways, it is difficult to change
the user. If the user needs to be kept in the loop, e.g. because constraints dictate so, we
need to support them well and make careful decisions about how to support them [62]. In
the following, we highlight approaches not only to make systems more usable, but also to
influence user behavior regarding passwords.
3.3.1 Password Composition Policies
In terms of guiding users, combating weak passwords has received the most attention from
research and practice. The idea of enforcing certain password requriments dates back to the
1970s, i.e. the early days of cybersecurity. Morris and Thompson acknowledged password
authentication is inherently flawed in terms of usability. They suggested to make users either
choose longer passwords, or systematically assign passwords to them to [237]. At the time,
guessing attacks were not as powerful as they are today and it was obvious to shift responsi-
bility to users [104]. When the Electronic Authentication guideline was published by NIST,
password composition policies became the de-facto standard in attempting to make users
select stronger passwords. The NIST guideline suggested passwords be at least eight char-
acters long, include at least one upper case letter, one lower case letter, one digit, and one
special symbol [47]. Moreover, passwords may not be taken from a dictionary with common
words and not be permutations of the username. By looking at entropy estimates, it was ar-
gued that the resulting passwords would achieve at least 30 bits of entropy. Interestingly, this
was not the only specification for policies. The guideline specifically says that passwords
could also be graded with some other metric and be rejected based on their estimated en-
tropy. At the time, there was not much evidence that user-selected passwords created under
the NIST-policy were in fact strong, which set off a number of research studies, and made
password composition policies one of the most studied topics in password security.
Proctor et al. found in 2002 that certain “proactive password restrictions” lead to stronger
passwords [258]. In two laboratory experiments, they had participants create a new pass-
word for a university account. The policies differed in the required minimum length (five
and eight) and complexity requirements like upper-/lowercase letters and digits. Requiring
more complexity was comparable to increasing the minimum required length in terms of
successfully cracked passwords. Interestingly, they concluded “Perhaps the most important
message of this study is that restrictions on user-generated passwords may not accomplish
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their intended goals.” Proctor et al.’s early hypothesis that strict policies are more or less in-
effective is particularly surprising because in the fifteen years that followed, many research
papers were written about such restrictions and many of them ultimately came to similar
conclusions. In the following, some of the most influential works are summarized.
Inglesant and Sasse report on a diary study of password policies in corporate contexts [172].
They reached the disillusioning conclusion that password policies reduce employees’ pro-
ductivity. Once the participants found a password that fulfilled the company’s policy, they
used it as a resource to turn to when creating additional accounts. Similarly, Komanduri
et al. found that users barely go beyond the minimum requirements of policies [200], but
some policies yield better results than others. Weir et al. categorize policies into “explicit”
and “implicit” policies [365]. Explicit policies have predefined rules about the password
structure like the NIST guideline, which is explicitly based on lowercase, uppercase, digits,
symbols (LUDS) [369]. On the other hand, implicit policies focus on strength estimation
and are somewhat more volatile and intransparent to the users. For instance, if the policy
uses a blacklist of forbidden words, the list is usually not displayed to users up front. The
blacklist only becomes visible after the first attempt is made. Moreover, Weir et al. used
subsets of the RockYou data set that fulfilled the NIST policy. Here, they provided early
pointers that many of the seemingly complex passwords can be easily cracked, too.
Thus, the logical next step was to find replacements for the NIST policy with better usability
and security. First attempts to find it were of theoretical nature. Blocki et al. modeled
an “optimal” policy as algorithmically solvable challenge [28], which had been proposed
by Shay [294]. However, while theoretically sound, empirical evidence was necessary to
quantify the effects on user behavior.
During the last few years, Shay et al. have established a taxonomy for policies [200, 295,
299]: Basic policies that only mandate a certain length (e.g. basic12), character-class cen-
tric policies that require between 2 and 4 different character classes and a given length (e.g.
3class12), policies requiring phrase-like syntax and a given length (e.g. 2word16), and com-
plex policies that have more than 4 specific requirements (comp8). Table 3.2 illustrates the
specific differences as found in the taxonomy. In multiple studies they compared the guess-
ability of passwords under different variants. They found that a 3class16 policy produced the
least guessable passwords, while basic12 yielded the highest cracking success rates. For a
limited attacker, who can make up to 106 guesses, basic16 and basic20 performed poorly, but
they fared well at the cut-off threshold of 1014. The NIST-policy (comp8) performed well up
to 106 guesses, but almost as many passwords had been cracked after 1014 guesses as for the
basic12 policy. This refutes the postulation that character diversity automatically leads to
stronger passwords when users select them. Shay et al. point out that 28% of participants in
the comp8 condition only fulfilled the criteria by adding an exclamation mark “!” at the end,
which was later corroborated by Ur et al. [345]. So, as hypothesized, policies significantly
influence the strength of user-generated passwords. In terms of usability, there are signficant
differences, too. Shay et al. examined typical usability metrics and participants’ subjective
assessments. Basic12 passwords were the easiest to create, fastest to type and easiest to
remember. Interestingly, the 3class12 policy was comparable in all dimensions. All in all,
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Figure 3.3: Guess number graph for passwords created under different password composition
policies. A higher percentage of cracked passwords (larger y-values) indicates that passwords
were weaker. In this case, passwords adhering to a basic12 policy were the weakest, while
3class16 produced the strongest passwords.
basic16, 3class12, and 2word16 seem like the “winners” in terms of security and usability,
but 2word16 passwords have high beta guess rates [299]. To combat this, Shay et al. suggest
blacklisting specific sub-strings [295].
Both in the industry and public institutions, password expiration policies are commonplace
[172, 53]. Forcing users to reset their users in predefined intervals was argued to mitigate
threats arising from data breaches. If password leaks go unnoticed, at least the credentials ex-
pire at regular points. For users, an expiration policy drastically increases password overload
and memory interference, for which the typical coping strategies (see Section 3.2) prevail:
an expired “password1” quickly is reset to “password2” and so forth [388]. Thus, it has
been argued that expiration is ineffective and causes users too much effort without graspable
security benefits. Chiasson et al. set out to quantify the benefits of expiration and their math-
ematical model strongly indicated that the benefits are “marginal at best” [53]. If expiration
is not enforced, security experts often advise users to manually change their password often.
Zhang-Kennedy et al. reframe this rule to “change your password well” [389], i.e. users
ought to change it once they suspect (or find out) a service had been compromised.
Looking at real-world policies, Wang et al. also found inconsistencies, i.e. not all web
sites requiring the same password characteristics [361]. Users can get confused if multiple
sites mandate different features for “security reasons”, because they might wonder who is
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Table 3.2: Example policies from CMU taxonomy.
Policy The password needs to ... Example passwords
basic8 (1class8) be at least 8 characters long password
monkey123
qwerasdf
3class12 be at least 12 characters long and include three
different character classes (upper, lower, digits,
symbol)
Password1234
2MonkeysBite
NfJidl2kdils
2word16 be at least 16 characters long and include at least
two letter sequences that are separated by a non-
letter sequence.
password.unlocks
1-Monkey-Bites
qwer.asdf.zxcvb.1234
comp8 bet at least 8 characters long, include at least one
character from each character class, and not in-
clude a dictionary word
P@ssw0rd
!M0nkey1
LGtjj{Rd;w1u/
right. Florêncio and Herley compared policies of high-traffic websites and public institu-
tions, mostly universities [112]. Surprisingly, the most influential companies enforced some
of the loosest policies. The researchers argue that decisions in these companies are not only
influenced by security officers (who evangelize password strength and expiration) but also by
user experience experts (who point out the usability issues). In public institutions, security
advisors outnumber human-factors experts, which is why policies represent an “overshoot”
of security there, imposing considerable nuisance at marginal security benefits.
To summarize, policies have the power to influence password behavior. However, this influ-
ence arises from coercion and thus risks reduced usability. Users often cope by picking the
easiest possible password that still fulfills the rules. This is why Florêncio et al. argue that
we should not try to fix the user, but to fix the system first (in this case the password policies)
[115]. Especially, service providers should be careful not to impose strict requirements and
nonsensical policies6. However, if service providers feel the need to move to a stricter policy
(and expire passwords at the time of policy change), Shay et al. at least provide evidence
that users feel better protected afterwards, even though their password changes are well pre-
dictable [298]. Finally, NIST recently recognized that errors were made in the Electronic
Authentication guideline and released an updated version7. William Burr, who was the lead
author of the original policy recommendation, was recently quoted to regret his contribution.
He told the Wall Street Journal “It just drives people bananas and they don’t pick good pass-
words no matter what you do”8. Shay et al.’s results, however, somewhat relieve Burr from
his remorse, because some policies do help people pick “good passwords”.
6 An amusing collection of nonsensical policies is collected on https://twitter.com/PWTooStrong (last
accessed 14.01.2018)
7 https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/ (last accessed 16.04.2018)
8 http://fortune.com/2017/08/07/password-recommendation-special-characters/ (last ac-
cessed 14.01.2018)
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3.3.2 User Education and Guidelines
Policies can be considered a means to “enforce recommendations”. Giving advice to users to
educate them about password security is a softer approach. A Google search for “password
recommendations” yields≈ 113,000,000 results, some very brief9, others very elaborate and
authoritative10. We summarized common advice and the characteristics of “bad passwords”
in Section 2.4. The original NIST guideline also read more like a “how to” than a dictum for
policies, although it was translated into policies after all. Sasse et al. expressed doubts about
the effectiveness of user education, because it “will only work if users are motivated” [276].
We know by now that security is a secondary goal, and thus it is unlikely that people are
motivated to educate themselves about it. Therefore, we have to focus on the restriction “if
users are motivated” and present advice effectively in this opportune moment. Security can
become the primary task, or on-par with the primary task. For instance, the moment users
adopt a password manager and have to set-up their master password, they not only want to
simplify password management, but also ensure that their central hub is safeguarded against
attacks. Some web-accounts are of great value and users are potentially open to receive
support to secure those.
We can identify four central problems with password advice. 1) There is no consensus
about adequate password strength, because it always depends on the attack model. Thus,
any guideline should differentiate between threat models and brief the users about them.
However, this is rarely done in practice and most advice is opinionated [164]. Besides,
password advice becomes outdated if new threat models prevail. 2) Reading a guide does not
necessarily translate into action. Herley says users are rational in rejecting advice if it entails
too much effort [162]. Forget et al. empirically showed that advice can lead to insecure
behavior, too [123]. 3) Users misread password advice. Ur et al. argue that users misconstrue
a statement like “adding digits, upper-case letters, lower-case letters and symbols add to the
strength of the passwords” to “all passwords with digits, upper and lower case letters, and
symbols are strong” [342]. Heterogeneous composition policies, and feedback can influence
mental models, too. Forget et al. argue that one needs to understand users’ mental models
of authentication first, before they can be effectively instructed [123]. 4) Lastly, if password
advice achieves to change user behavior on a larger scale, password guessing attacks will be
modeled around the recommendations, too [165]. Thus, in the long run, advice needs to be
revised because attacks become too efficient.
To conclude, one needs to stay realistic about what can be achieved with password advice
[117]. Zhang-Kennedy et al. provide one such realistic view on advice [389]. They re-
vised the “character diversity” recommendation and suggest not using common passwords,
predictable substitutions, or dictionary words. However, we still face the problem of com-
9 https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SS42VS_7.2.7/com.ibm.qradar.doc/c_
qradar_niap_password_recommendations.html (last accessed 15.01.2018)
10 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/helping-end-users-manage-their-passwords (last ac-
cessed 22.12.2017)
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municating to users what “common” passwords and “predictable substitutions” are. Zhang-
Kennedy et al. propose users should come up with original mnemonics, which is a special
kind of advice discussed in the following section.
3.3.3 Password Selection Algorithms & Memorization Tech-
niques
Many researchers have proposed techniques and algorithms to help users create memorable
and strong passwords. We have already discussed Haskett’s PassAlgorithms [157], where
the user remembered how to respond to a challenge rather than a static password. Let us
take a look at more such approaches.
Mnemonics and Training Barton and Barton were likely the first to propose mangling
strategies in this context [18]. For instance, they suggested to use sentence-based mnemonics
and mentally connect passwords to different cities. For instance, a sentence like “I love Paris
in the Springtime” would translate into “IlPitS”. This work was seminal and some of its
techniques persist in password recommendations today. Yan et al. empirically showed that
there are benefits in terms of memorability and security of the resulting passwords [380].
However, Forget et al. observed that telling participants to generate phrase-based passwords
can be misinterpreted and more guidance is necessary to achieve benefits [123]. Maqbali
[220] and McEvoy [230] recommend using contextual or site-specific cues on websites as
mnemonics.
Memorization by repetitive training has also been suggested. Bonneau and Schechter put
forward a solution that is supposed to help users memorize “56 bit secrets” (for comparison,
the original NIST guideline demanded 30 bit) [36]. Users first pick a self-selected password.
Their system then displays a random code (or words) for each user at login-time which needs
to be typed correctly into a separate field. The code becomes part of the password and was
displayed with increasing delays. But participants could skip the delay by entering the code
from memory. After a median of 36 log-ins 96% of participants had memorized a 56 bit
secret. Despite the high success rates, it is questionable if this type of support is in the users’
interest, especially if it is deployed by more than one service. In a similar vein, Kroeze and
Olivier proposed using gamification to make the training more enjoyable [204].
In terms of the security flaws, mnemonic passwords are predictably based on common
phrases from movies, literature, songs, etc., but still stronger than regular passwords [206].
Nevertheless, Yang et al. demonstrate that even mnemonic phrase-based passwords can be
attacked easily [381]. Thus, like Zhang-Kennedy, they highlight the importance of original,
personal phrases and show how users can be instructed effectively.
Passphrases Another technique proposed to create strong, memorable passwords is to
create passphrases. Rather than creating an acronym of a phrase, we understand them as a
combination of words, e.g. the paragon “CorrectHorseBatteryStaple”. Passphrases are
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usually longer than traditional passwords and thus increase password strength. Paradoxi-
cally, passphrases sometimes exceed character limits for passwords on certain websites [48].
The PGP system embraces the strength benefits and uses passphrases to encrypt private keys
on the clients. Keith et al. showed that passphrases are more memorable than more com-
plex passwords, especially if they include punctuation symbols [189]. However, participants
in their study made significantly more errors, which is the biggest usability caveat of long
passphrases. On devices where text-entry is cumbersome (e.g. on mobiles or smart TVs),
refraining from masking entry can mitigate this problem [232].
Moreover, Bonneau showed that user-selected passphrases are predictable [37]. To mitigate
predictable word combinations, system-assigned passphrases have been evaluated. Shay et
al. conclude that this boosts strength, but users dislike them [297]. Similarly, passphrase-
centric policies (e.g. 2word16) lead to passwords with high guess numbers, but users strug-
gle to create them [299]. The Diceware approach is often mentioned as a means to randomize
word selection11. The user rolls a die five times and notes down the resulting numbers. Af-
terwards, they look up the word with the corresponding number from the Diceware wordlist.
The process should be repeated at least twice to create a passphrase. Unfortunately, the
process requires some dedication, time, and a dice. Nonetheless, passphrases usually do
not require a change to the provider’s system, which makes them a viable, memorable and
secure option, e.g. if they are mostly entered with a physical keyboard.
3.3.4 Password Managers and Generators
Many of the problems around password security originate from the predictability of user
choices and preferences. Therefore, systems that remove much of the decision-making pro-
cess seem to remove weak passwords. Password generators can create (pseudo-) random
strong passwords for the users and thus the element of human bias vanishes. There are
two paradigms to generate passwords for users: easily memorable passwords, or passwords
requiring external storage (see Section 3.2.3). In the first paradigm, the generator creates
pseudo-random strings resembling user-selected passwords. Pronounceable password gen-
erators do not yield random characters but random phonetic segments [131]. This allows
users to repeat passwords in their head or saying them aloud to memorize them. How-
ever, generating passwords that are consistently pronounceable is challenging [370, 135].
Passphrases can also be generated in the same way [207]. Generators implementing the sec-
ond paradigm yield truly random character strings taken from an alphabet large enough to
mitigate most guessing attacks (see example in Figure 3.4). Huh et al. propose letting users
replace a certain number of characters to create a more memorable version of the random
password [170]. However, memorization of random strings is still exceptionally arduous for
most users, as is typing them. Therefore, such passwords need to be either be written down
or stored inside a password manager. Most password managers (see Section 3.2.3), offer to
generate passwords. Moreover, the Safari browser suggests a randomly generated password
11 http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.html (last accessed 16.01.2018)
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Figure 3.4: On macOS, the Keychain application manages passwords for the user. If a new
entry is manually created by the user, the password assistant can be used to generate different
kinds of passwords: Random (image on the left), letters and numbers, numbers only, memorable
(image on the right), and FIPS-181 compliant
to users and stores it into Apple’s cloud storage Keychain. Relying on a password manager
gives users a number of usability benefits [384]. As mentioned above, auto-fill reduces in-
teraction times and recall problems. If passwords are generated on the fly, the effort to create
passwords is removed. It is easy to generate unique passwords for each account and thwart
phishing attacks, so the PWM scales with the number of accounts. Some PWMs give the
users feedback to assess their overall protection level. On the downside, users become de-
pendent on the PWM, which makes it difficult to roam and use other devices. Even if users
do not generate passwords, they lose muscle memory with auto-fill, so it is cognitively more
challenging to log in manually.
HCI researchers have tried to solve these problems. Stobert and Biddle proposed VersiPass
[315]. It uses graphical authentication and hints to avoid losing muscle memory, but it has
not been empirically evaluated. Tapas is a decentralized password manager based on two-
factor authentication, which was well received in two user studies [227, 228]. Yee’s PassPet
is a browser extension that lets users pick a “pet name” (label) for each website they have
signed up for [384]. The label is part of the password hashing and aims to increase both
the security and memorability of the scheme, similar to the Password Multiplier system by
Halderman et al. [147]. Fagan et al. investigated the reasons for (not) adopting a password
manager [102]. They found that users more prominently appreciate usability benefits. Those
who do not use a PWM distrusted the security, potentially due to a sub-par mental model.
We can also hypothesize that many users want to stay independent and not give away control
to a third party.
In summary, password managers aid users in password selection, and scaling the increasing
number of accounts. Generated passwords are mostly a go-to method for more proficient,
security-aware users who actively seek to strengthen their passwords as much as possible.
While the academic research community has not been able to create PWM solutions with
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widespread adoption, many commercial solutions exist. However, the adoption rates indicate
that current systems have not been fully adapted to the masses.
3.4 Persuasive Interventions
Persuading users to behave differently is the last line of defense we shall discuss in this
part. Using technology to persuade users can be traced back to Fogg’s seminal work on
“captology”, which was later recoined under the umbrella term persuasive technology [120].
He defines it as “interactive computing system designed to change people’s attitudes or be-
haviors”. Persuasion itself is seen as “an attempt to change attitudes or behaviors or both
(without using coercion or deception)”. The latter part further distinguishes persuasion from
manipulation, where people are not aware of the manipulator’s intentions. Password compo-
sition policies exert authority and coerce users to follow the rules. The need for autonomy as
part of the Self-Determination Theory [273] is thus undermined by policies. User education
is voluntary and often misses its goal because users seldom decide to educate themselves on
password security. Therefore, persuasion could fill the gap of providing transparent educa-
tion by making alternative behavior more salient [124]. In the context of this thesis, we thus
understand persuasive technology as an enabling technology that adequately supports users
while respecting their preferences. Persuasion in HCI has become an essential topic with
numerous papers published at top-tier conferences. Hekler already highlighted the rising in-
terest already in 2013 [160]. What is more, persuasion is one of the central topics among the
top-5 most cited CHI-papers of the past five years12. Consequently, we regard it as highly
promising direction for password research.
3.4.1 Background
In the following, we explore how to use persuasion to create “soft paternalistic interventions
that nudge users toward more beneficial choices” [1].
Terminology in Persuasion and Behavioral Economics
In the design of persuasive technology, we often encounter the concept of “nudging” people,
i.e. figuratively giving them a small push to act in a certain way [332]. The “choice architect”
decides on the direction of the push [333]. For instance, by setting clever defaults, people
are relieved of making an active decision and can just accept the default. Nudging strategies
as part of “soft paternalism” or “libertarian paternalism” stem from the field of behavioral
economics, which studies “how individual, social, cognitive, and emotional biases influence
12 https://scholar.google.com/citations?&view_op=list_hcore&venue=6NNnGOq9_mAJ.2017
(last accessed 17.01.2018)
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economic decisions” [2]. In other words, behavioral economists embrace the idea that peo-
ple sometimes act irrationally when making economic decisions. For example, people are
significantly more likely to purchase a glass of jam, if there are only six options instead of
24 – the so-called “choice paradox” [174]. As we have seen in Section 3.2, password coping
strategies ultimately involve such economic decisions: Given a risk, one needs to assess the
severity, likelihood, costs of mitigating the risk, and the effectiveness of the protective mea-
sure [283]. Thus, theories from behavioral economics are a useful resource that can explain
user behavior.
Referring to the dual process theory, Kahneman argues that many sub-optimal decisions
originate from System 1 which is responsible for intuitive and automatic thinking processes
[184]. System 2, on the other hand, is the rational and effortful part in our thinking pro-
cesses. He explains that most of our thinking is carried out by System 1, because it would
be impossible to put the same amount of effort into every decision that we make (e.g. it is
unnecessary to weigh the pro’s and con’s in answering “should I brush my teeth today?”).
In password selection, both systems are involved, but depending on the context, one or the
other is primarily responsible for the decision. For instance, users who have formed the
habit to reuse one password for all accounts will do the same for the next account they cre-
ate, thus the automatic System 1 is at play. However, if the composition policy forces the
user to modify their password, the cognitive challenge rises and activates System 2. Per-
suasive technology aims to either facilitate decision-making (i.e. supporting System 1), or
block automatic processes to help the user adopt a different behavior (i.e. activating System
2). For instance, intentionally introducing delays during password authentication [219] or in
browser warnings [95] lead to users spending more time on the task and act more securely,
probably because the interruption was enough to activate System 2.
Cognitive Illusions, Biases, and Heuristics
Irrational decision-making, according to behavioral economics, shows patterns around cog-
nitive illusions (also “cognitive distortions”) and biases [214]. Acquisiti et al. describe them
as “systematic, and therefore predictable deviations from rational choice theory” [1]. The
resulting behavior is neither erratic, nor irrational, but may strongly influence judgment un-
der uncertainty [338]. To still be able to make decisions under uncertainty, people utilize
heuristics, or mental shortcuts in decision-making. Bounded rationality explains the use of
heuristics with the impracticality of assessing all possible options and outcomes. In other
words, heuristics allow making good decisions under the circumstances [182]. Thus, like
biases, heuristics are not necessarily bad, but even necessary to get through life [57]. The
lack of certainty is prevalent in decisions in cybersecurity, especially for mainstream users.
For example, it is hard for users to assess the risk of threats online, and make a decision on
the required protection level. Therefore, heuristics in this domain have been investigated to
better understand user behavior. The list of cognitive fallacies is long, Wikipedia mentions
109 decision-making biases alone13 (see Figure 3.5). Let us discuss notable examples that
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases (last accessed 17.01.2018)
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Figure 3.5: Categorization and visualization of cognitive biases. CC-BY-SA Buster Benson,
John Manoogian III
directly relate to cybersecurity14. To stay on topic, we explain the theories with “password
phenomena”, although the scenarios have not necessarily been empirically substantiated.
The sunk costs fallacy describes the situation when people have made an investment under
uncertainty in the past and continue to stand by it, even if circumstances have changed and
it would be better to abandon the commitment [331]: Imagine someone bought a (nonre-
fundable) ticket to watch a movie at a theater. They dislike it from the start and after 25
minutes, they feel the movie is not going to get better. Due to the sunk costs of the ticket and
unrecoverable effort to go to the theater, it is likely that they stick around instead of simply
leaving the show. Herley et al. hint a similar scenario for replacing password authentication
[165]. In their point of view, service providers have invested into passwords and are now
14 Please refer to Acquisiti et al. [1] for an in-depth and highly valuable discussion of biases in privacy and
security
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reluctant to move away to alternative schemes, although they might improve system security
(see Section 2.5). Similarly, users who have committed to a password and reused it many
times, might see the time spent as sunk cost. Thus, they do not switch to a more secure
alternative even if they know there are plenty. Arguably, the Status Quo bias plays a role
in both examples, too: people tend to favor a pre-existing state of affairs over potentially
uncertain changes.
The availability heuristic is observed when people over- or underestimate the likelihood
of events after being exposed to salient information. For instance, users might estimate the
likelihood of being hacked as higher after someone in their social circle reports such an
incident: the possibility has become more salient and available, thus future occurrences are
seen as more probable. Das et al. partially confirmed such behavior through user interviews
[68]. Certainly, recency illusions amplify the availability heuristic, i.e. a user who just
found out about the “hacking threat” might think that this threat had just emerged.
The anchoring bias creates reference points (or baselines) for decisions, especially compar-
isons [124]. After a password breach, media reports typically mention some of the most-used
passwords. A news article can anchor the reader on the strength of obvious passwords like
12345. In many cases, their own password(s) seem much stronger by comparison, but might
not be seen as strong if assessed separately. Similarly, if many people show insecure pass-
word behavior, this may reinforce an individual’s practices through the bandwagon effect:
“if so many people behave insecurely, why would I act differently?” [5].
People can also be biased by the way information is presented, which is known as framing
effect [350]. The wording is key here and can generate preference reversal and other in-
consistencies [167]. For password authentication, framing can be found in educating users
about passwords. Zakaria et al. [387] suggest instructing users through real-world security
comparisons. Framing consequences for users around losses may trigger loss aversion – a
tendency to perceive losses as more valuable than equivalent gains [13]. Garg and Camp
argue that security is currently framed as a definite loss for end users, while “the risk of not
investing in security is a probable”, thus uncertain loss [130]. Cialidini shows the importance
of crafting normative messages, that refrain from emphasizing that a socially unacceptable
behavior is still widespread [56]. For instance, a normative message after a policy rejects
the user’s first-chosen password might explain: “The password is weak, because it is easily
guessable for hackers” (emphasis on the adversary) rather than “..., because it is something
many people would choose” (emphasis on the social in-group). If normative messages are
framed badly, this can lead to the backfire effect, i.e. people behaving in the opposite way
as intended. Thus, Weirich and Sasse see framing the attacker effectively as important op-
portunity for persuasive password education [368, 367].
As a final example of behavioral biases, it has been observed that people’s motivation in-
creases as they get closer to finishing a task. Hull coined this behavior the “goal-gradient
hypothesis” [195]. Behavioral economists have found it to induce irrational behavior:
Kivetz et al. handed out two different designs of “coffee cards”, that customers can fill up
with each purchase [195]. Once the card is full, they can redeem it for a free coffee. One of
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the designs had ten stamp-fields, while the other had twelve fields, two of which were already
stamped. So, in both cases, customers received a free coffee after ten purchases. Surpris-
ingly, more cards with twelve fields were redeemed after the trial period. People (wrongly)
thought to be closer to goal, and thus were more motivated to achieve it. This “goal distance
model” is sometimes used by password meters, i.e. a visualization of password strength (we
discuss them in great detail in Section 3.4.3). Password strength visualization can give the
user a “head start” to motivate them to fill up the entire bar and achieve a “strong password”,
i.e. a full loyalty card.
3.4.2 Persuasive Design Patterns in Usable Security and Privacy
Phenomena involving biases and heuristics are often directly translated into a persuasive
strategy. It is interesting that apparently the lines are blurred between the two concepts.
Anders Toxboe collected a number of persuasive design patterns on his website15, which
highlights this blend of psychology and persuasion. There is, however, no such list for
patterns specifically for interventions in usable security and privacy. Therefore, we start
with the discussion of general frameworks and put them into the context of security and
passwords.
General Frameworks
Persuasive Design (PD) has been tried to formalize in several frameworks. Fogg’s Behavior
Model posits that three elements must converge to achieve a target Behavior: motivation,
ability, and triggers (B=mat) [119]. For passwords, this implies that people need to be mo-
tivated to protect themselves, at the same time they need to know how to achieve protection
and be exposed to a trigger. Triggers work best when presented at the opportune moment
(or kairos) [215]. Lockton et al. proposed the “Design with Intent” framework as a toolkit
for persuasive interventions [215]. Jameson et al. show how to pick strategies from various
toolkits to create a persuasive choice architecture [179]. Cialdini’s generic “six weapons
of influence” have been used in the design of persuasive technology [57]. He lists author-
ity, scarcity, liking, social proof, commitment & consistency, and reciprocity as the princi-
ples of persuasion. Let us walk through their potential usage in password authentication.
The authority principle says that people are likely to follow the instructions of an authority,
which explains why the NIST guidelines have been widely adopted despite their downsides.
Scarcity drives motivation to act quickly to avoid losing an opportunity (see loss aversion),
and framing effects are used to communicate the scarcity of a resource. For instance, the
“419 scam” tactic in phishing emails frames time as a scarce resource: “your account has
been intruded, if you don’t log in now, you lose access to it permanently” [312]. In this case,
persuasion is used for malicious purposes. People prefer to comply if they like their counter-
part. In theory, this would make password requirements less bothersome if used on a website
15 http://ui-patterns.com/patterns (last accessed 21.01.2018)
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that users like, or in a more aesthetically pleasing way. Although there is no empirical evi-
dence that the principle works for registration forms specifically, other HCI research points
in this direction [121, 336]. The social proof strategy makes other people’s behavior more
available because in decision-making people tend to copy others’ decisions. For instance, it
might help to point out that millions of users are already using a password manager in a news
article about a new password leak. We can also apply Fogg’s behavior model here: Reading
about a password leak motivates users to protect themselves, the social proof strategy acts
as a trigger, and mentioning the ease-of-use of password managers gives users confidence
about their ability to adopt a PWM. The commitment & consistency principle is an immedi-
ate part of the Password Life Cycle [316]. People try to be consistent with their past behavior
and their past values. Thus, a small step towards breaking an insecure habit might, in fact,
induce more secure behavior afterward. If a policy forced a user to stop using a common
password, the effort to commit to the new password might spread over to other accounts, too.
Stobert found that cybersecurity experts show higher signs of consistency [317]. Thus, if a
persuasive strategy achieves that users commit to a new password selection scheme, their
behavior might become more consistent and thus be elevated to the expert level. Finally,
reciprocity describes the desire to return a favor. To use it as a persuasive design strategy,
one has to do something favorable for the users first. Thus, offering users to store their pass-
words in a secure place and automatically logging them in is a good foundation to ask them
later to turn on 2-factor authentication to help secure their account.
The Persuasive Authentication Framework (PAF) by Forget et al.
Forget et al. embraced persuasion as technique to help users act more securely in password
authentication [124]. In 2007, they put forward the Persuasive Authentication Framework
(PAF) (see Figure 3.6), which breaks down the dimensions of persuasive design specifically
for password support systems. In the following, we describe it on a high level and illustrate
its components with results from empirical studies.
The simplification principle posits to reduce the number of tasks to achieve an overall goal.
Thus, the hypothetical distance between the start state and the goal is shorter, and goal-
gradient effects become visible. Password managers usually simplify authentication by re-
ducing the best-case interaction from “recall-enter-submit” to “submit”. Fagan et al. showed
that simplification is the primary reason to adopt a password manager [102]. But even with-
out a PWM, both the “recall” and the “enter” sub-tasks can be simplified. Recall is facilitated
with consistent personal password strategies. Entering is easier, if the primary password is
replaced by a less complex one-time password.
Personalization, as understood in the PAF, encompasses tailoring the experience to an indi-
vidual user, or to suggest actions. A recently emerged design pattern spreads out the log-in
process across two separate steps for username and password, rather than having the two
input fields visible at once. After submitting the username, the page is tailored to the user by
showing them their profile picture and/or another piece of non-critical personal information.
At the same time, this establishes a light-weight trusted path [383]. Wilkinson et al. suggest
personalizing privacy by design by giving users different levels of control to depending on
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Figure 3.6: Elements of the persuasive authentication framework [124]
their privacy profile [376]. Besides, this is a good example of the paternalism in persua-
sive interventions, because the designer suggests what option is “better” for the individual
user. Similarly, it is conceivable to personalize password policies depending on the user’s
“password profile” (I elaborate on this idea in Section 14.1.2). Moreover, personality con-
structs have been investigated to tailor user experiences, which perhaps exceeds the original
proposition in the PAF. Recently, Egelman and Peer advocated the use of psychometric cues
to contextualize privacy or security messaging, which they call the “next frontier in privacy
and security research” [98]. Jeske et al. investigated user profiles for the susceptibility to
security nudges [181]. In their experiment, they used salience to steer users away from in-
secure wireless networks. They found that participants with low impulse control were more
susceptible to nudges. The finding can be interpreted that nudges directed at System 1 seem
more effective. There is also preliminary evidence that susceptibility to phishing, i.e. a so-
cial nudge, is also related to personality [148]. It stands to reason that password selection is
related to personality, too (see Chapter 7). If this were the case, a new spectrum of person-
alization strategies arises. Haque et al. have already proposed a psychometric construct to
identify such associations [153]. Forget et al. list suggestion as part of the personalization
dimension, because suggestions might be based on a personal context factors. They provided
a number of cases studies on suggestive password alterations [122, 126, 127]. The “per-
suasive text passwords” (PTP) system takes a user’s password and either randomly inserts
characters or replaces existing characters to increase strength. The high resemblance to the
original password is supposed to maintain memorability [122]. Shay et al. later re-evaluated
this personalization approach in an mTurk study, which yielded mixed results [300].
Arguably, looking over users’ shoulder while they authenticate increases the chances that
they comply to security policies, given that users are aware of being observed. Monitoring,
however, can entail reduced user experience (cf. need for autonomy [273]). Nevertheless, if
used adequately, it can serve as authoritative strategy (cf. Cialdini’s six weapons of influence
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[57]). Google’s password alert16 is a moderate approach to secure users’ Google accounts. It
is a browser extension that alerts the user if they type the password of their Google account
on unrelated web pages. Hence, the idea is to make sure users use a unique password for their
Google account, which is a central hub for various services. To work properly, the browser
extension needs to access every keystroke. Some users might distrust it because, although
it is open source, it is hard for them to tell if their private data is collected. Prospect theory
tells us that in this judgment under uncertainty, losing private data is attributed a higher value
than the potential security gain. A less privacy-invasive design element that might help in
relieving uncertainty is self-monitoring. Self-monitoring through feedback-loops – another
design pattern [211] – allows users to reflect on their past actions and derive alternatives to
attain their goal. Some PWMs create a “security score” for each user and persuade them to
improve it.
Users rarely develop habits to act securely. Thus, Forget et al. argue to use various forms
of reinforcement to persuade people to develop such habits. Rewarding users for secure
password behavior serves to condition them. Google Drive, for instance, offered users more
cloud storage quota if they completed a two-minute security check-up17. Positive feedback
during password selection can condition users, too. Other rewards, e.g. longer session
expiration or faster system response, have not seen significant uptake.
Lastly, the PAF includes social interactions as persuasive design strategy. Forget et al.
posit that authentication systems mimick, e.g., the users’ language to convey “team spirit”
[127]. Weirich and Sasse [368], respectively Sasse and Flechais [277], similarly describe
authentication as socio-technical system that follows a social protocol. DiGioia and Dourish
formulated the social navigation pattern [86]. To perceive the system as capable commu-
nication partner, signs of previous interactions inspire trust. Egelman et al. tried to nudge
users during password selection through the social proof strategy [99]. A visualization in-
formed the study participants how well their password fared compared to other users, e.g.
“your password is stronger than that of 85% of our users”. They did not find evidence that
this persuasive strategy influenced people, but maybe the approach could have been more
focused on the proof aspect, rather than competition. The normative message can be read
as “other people’s passwords are bad, but many people act this way”. This could actually
evoke backfire effects through social proof: although users see their password is stronger,
they believe that the social norm is to pick weaker passwords, which makes them conform
to the social norm. In fact, Weirich and Sasse have provided empirical evidence for such
behavior [368]. Social interactions are perhaps one of the most powerful design elements
to persuade users: Das et al. reported that radical behavior changes often occurred due to
social processes [68]. They argue that it is critical for users to observe experts in their so-
cial circle to raise their awareness and motivation for cybersecurity. Thus, persuasive design
could make expert behavior of known peers more visible
16 https://github.com/google/password-alert (last accessed 20.01.2018)
17 https://twitter.com/googledrive/status/697104410296455168 (last accessed 20.01.2018)
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In a number of ways, some ideas from the Persuasive Authentication Framework were rather
optimistic. From today’s point of view they appear questionable (e.g. conditioning users like
animals). Much evidence from the ten years that followed its publication shows that per-
suasion does not always work as intended, so maybe a few suggestions were a bit naive.
Renaud et al. evaluated eight nudges that were supposed to make students create stronger
passwords [267]. They reached the disheartening conclusion that none of them work. Nev-
ertheless, certain aspects have caught on and are actively used, like Google’s Password Alert
which is a direct implementation of Forget et al.’s ideas. We can conclude that the PAF has
matured over time, with certain components receiving more weight through empirical evi-
dence, and others becoming obsolete. Thus, a revision could incorporate our newly gained
understanding of persuasive authentication.
Dark Patterns
At the outset of this chapter, we discussed ethics as critical factor in password studies. Us-
ing persuasion inherently becomes ethically problematic if the intention of the influencer is
concealed, either by poor design or by choice. Persuasive techniques are used to manipu-
late, too. Many social engineering scams on malicious websites use persuasion techniques.
Muscanell et al. investigated the misuse of Cialdini’s weapons of influence in cyber scams
[238]. They found that scammers exploit all of them in social engineering attacks. Mus-
canell et al. also propose mitigation strategies, but do not lay them out in detail. Attacks that
take advantage of “scarcity” as persuasive strategy often rely on fear appeals, e.g. “Your
computer is infected, download this software now to remove all threats”. Xu et al. proposed
using similar fear appeals to nudge users towards anti-spyware measures [379], and Vance
et al. utilized the “time to crack” as fear appeal during password selection [347]. There are
a number of such “dark patterns”, which Nodder dismantles in his book “Evil by Design”
[243]. Some of them are relatively benign, others are highly manipulative. DarkPatterns.org
summarizes them briefly, e.g. misdirection - where the design aims to focus the user’s atten-
tion on a decoy to plant something on them18. However, Sasse strongly urges to resist them
in the design of password persuasion because they wear off over time and often exaggerate
the risks [275]. Hence, dark patterns most likely turn out counterproductive.
3.4.3 Password Meters: Persuasion at Play
The most prominent and widespread persuasive strategy directed at passwords are password
strength meters (PSMs). Most commonly, they proactively estimate the strength of a pass-
word at entry time and visualize it. Often, verbal feedback accompanies the visualization.
They have been used on a multitude of websites, in password managers, and as standalone
tools. When they are used on a website or in a PWM, there are a number of persuasive
patterns at play:
18 https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern (last accessed 20.01.2017)
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Feedback and self monitoring: Users are enabled to make an informed decision regarding
the security of the password. Kairos: Meters are presented at the opportune moment of pro-
tecting an account. Goal-gradient effect: The closer users get to a password that is deemed
strong the more motivated they become to achieve the strong rating. Simplification: A vi-
sual strength bar is universally understandable. Personalization: The dynamic visualization
is user-dependent. Suggestion: Some meters suggest alterations if they detect weak pass-
words. Reinforcement: positive feedback about the user’s password can reinforce secure
behavior. Authority: If the service provider is a trustworthy entity, their feedback is more
likely to influence the selection. Social interaction: Verbal feedback can speak the user’s
own language and open a dialog. Loss aversion and scarcity: The strength estimation is
only shown during password entry – an opportunity to learn about one’s own abilities which
should not be missed. Availability and salience: The strength estimation makes weaknesses
more salient and threats more available. Framing: verbal feedback and color coding allow
framing the strength in a subtle manner.
Balancing all those strategies in a particular design has received much attention in HCI and
security research. It is hard to trace back their origins, but proactive password checks have
been part of policies since the late 1980s [369]. Bishop and Klein developed the pwcheck
command-line tool that was used to give terminal-users feedback on their password selection
[25]. A core challenge is the strength estimation proxy. Websites cannot implement a full-
fledged cracking infrastructure just for the sake of password feedback. Thus, proxies and
estimators are the go-to method.
Effective or not?
A number of studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of password meters. Ur et al.
explored 14 different designs, respectively settings, of password meters [343]: different vari-
ations of the “bar” visualization, different stringency parameters, suggestions, and nudges.
They were able to identify significant differences in passwords strength depending on the
meter. Very stringent meters led to stronger passwords. Any kind of visual meter resulted
in longer passwords, so text-only feedback is less persuasive. Many participants in their
mTurk study added another character at the end to receive a higher rating from the meter.
Qualitative feedback and usability ratings showed that the stringent meters were unpleasant
for many participants, reducing their persuasive power. Egelman et al. investigated context
factors in the effectiveness of meters [99]. They found that password meters seemed to have
a greater positive effect on strength, if they were displayed on a site with higher perceived
value. Participants in that study did not “need” the password meter, but receiving feedback
on highly values websites made their importance more available. At the same time they
concluded, that the design of the meter plays an insignificant role and that social nudges do
not affect strength either. Moreover, both Ur et al.’s and Egelman et al.’s study showed that
memorability was not affected by the meters, which is a positive finding. The meter with
the highest reported effects was recently presented by Ur et al. [341]. After carefully eval-
uating the design space for rhetorical framing of strength feedback [90], they isolated the
components of password meters and compared their effectiveness. They found that textual
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Figure 3.7: Ur et al.’s data driven password meter. In combines textual and visual strength
feedback, explanations, and personalized suggestions.
feedback is recommendable to create more persuasive meters. The underlying policy also
has an effect on the persuasiveness of the meter. Their final design (see Figure 3.7) uses a
number of persuasive elements: A visual bar to simplify communicating password strength;
text feedback about the strength; explanations about the scoring with clear calls to action
(tunneling strategy); and lastly, a personalized suggestion of an alternative password.
Beyond colorful bars
Visualizing strength is not the only way to design a password meter. Komanduri et al. crafted
a sly prototype to tell users that their passwords are predictable: their Telepathwords system
predicts the next character the user is about to type [199]. The rationale of the system is
that users do not mindlessly enter a weak password anymore, i.e. that the feedback should
activate System 2 thinking processes. Furthermore, realizing that the next character can be
automatically guessed might evoke fear appeal and steer people away from predictable pass-
words. Komanduri et al. evaluated Telepathwords with an mTurk-study using a role-playing
scenario. They found that password created in the Telepathwords groups outperformed tradi-
tional password policies in regard to strength and memorability. However, participants were
significantly more annoyed by Telepathwords, perhaps because of the inconvenient truth
and fear appeal. Communicating password strength with background information is another
technique to persuade users. For example, Yee et al. displayed the estimated time-to-crack
when users selected a master password for the PassPet password manager [384]. For users,
it is a better call-to-action than a numeric score like “3/5”. Vance et al. found that such fear-
appeal strategies persuade users to read password advice and modify weak passwords [347].
Khern-am-nuai et al. also measured the persuasiveness of context-based warning messages
as part of the password meter [194]. They found that participants in their mTurk-study made
significantly more changes to their initial choice when a warning was present, e.g. “Weak.
We estimate that the password you chose is among the 30,000 weakest passwords”. How-
ever, the study suffered from a few important limitations (e.g. removing all data from users
who were unable to log-in after 30 to 60 minutes). Kroeze and Olivier proposed evolving a
Pokemon figure as users type to visualize the growth in strength [204]. Furnell and Esmael
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evaluated feedback through emojis and found positive effects on the length of user-selected
passwords [129]. Afjan et al. allowed users to interactively explore the visualization they
had received from the password meter [11]. Ur et al. report that an animated dancing bunny
that speeds up with increasing strength was unable to nudge users more effectively than less
exciting meters [343]. Shay et al. tried to help users select a stronger password through
a wizard that explained mnemonic phrase-based passwords [300]. Besides, they compared
this strategy to the insertion approach we saw in Forget et al.’s persuasive text passwords
(PTP) [126]. Both approaches were generally disliked by the participants.
Apart from pure strength visualization and persuasive messages, real-time feedback can ac-
company a password policy. The user sees a list of requirements and as they enter their pass-
word, they get feedback on the aspects that have already been fulfilled, which was originally
proposed by Proctor et al. [258]. Although we know by now that the resulting passwords are
not necessarily strong, Shay et al. found that this kind of checklist can reduce user frustration
with policies in general [300]. Feedback is crucial if the policy utilizes blacklists to ban too
easily guessed passwords [299]. Habib et al. evaluated Ur et al.’s data driven password me-
ter for situations where blacklists are present [146]. They found that text feedback mitigates
insecure selection especially for those users who intended to use a blacklisted password.
Light and Shadow
Evidence about the effectiveness of password meters is mixed, but Ur et al.’s strategy might
be one of the most persuasive ones, because it combines many techniques that have proven
successful in different areas of persuasion [341]. So, in certain contexts, password meters
can definitely nudge users towards more secure behavior.
However, where there is light, there is also shadow. Meters influence users’ mental models
of password strength in similar ways as policies. However, as with policies, it is nearly
impossible to reach consensus on all parameters of pro-active measures and metrics for all
contexts. De Carné de Carnavalet and Mannan showed that the estimation algorithms in
real-world password meters largely differ, which is a result of the natural constraints of pro-
active checks [73]. Such inconsistencies, which were also observed by Ur et al. [343],
have big potential to confuse users: if their password is rated “strong” on one site, and
“weak” on another, a lot of explanation is going to be necessary to let the users find out
why the ratings differ. Persuasive interventions probably fail at that moment. The authors
suggest zxcvbn as the most robust password meter for websites and the KeePass meter as an
alternative for offline tools. Others have addressed the shortcomings of industry password
meters. Wang et al. developed fuzzyPSM based on an optimized version of PCFG [360].
Melicher et al. implemented their neural network strength estimation in password meters, too
[233]. Tupsamudre et al. demonstrated that a sudden surge of n-gram scores can be used to
proactively detect modifications of common passwords [337]. Improvements will continue
to surface, but in recent years we can at least observe a trend towards more homogeneous
strength estimation due to the gained knowledge about guessing attacks.
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3.4.4 Summary
Persuasive interventions help to shape user behavior and facilitate decision-making pro-
cesses. Many influence strategies have been empirically shown to persuade people across
a variety of domains [150]. Thus, I believe in its feasibility for the design of secure and sys-
tems. Naturally, not all interventions work in the same ways for all users. Still, persuasive
technology asserts the claim to be in the users “best interest” and wants to enable them to
make “better” decisions. Thus, before any intervention, we have to be sure to do the right
thing, if changing user behavior and attitudes is the ultimate goal. I follow Acquisiti et al.’s
definition, and find that good decisions “minimize adverse outcomes or are less likely to be
regretted” [1]. With this goal in mind, we can set out to better understand the constraints and
create novel persuasive strategies which are the focus of this thesis.
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Related Work Summary
Main Take-Aways
The current landscape of password research deals with both technical (Chapter 2) and human
factors (Chapter 3). From a system-design perspective, we can take away the following state
of the world:
1. There have been numerous attempts to replace passwords, but none of them are a
panacea, because they entail a number of disadvantages that thwart their adoption. Any
authentication scheme needs to withstand a plethora of attacks, but passwords seem
to offer the best trade-off regarding usability, deployability and security compared to
other schemes. Single-Sign On, multi-factor, as well as biometric authentication have
gained importance and are likely to be further adopted in the future. Especially implicit
biometric approaches can complement password-based authentication.
2. Entropy as a password strength proxy only works for system generated passwords.
Thus, the results of a number of studies would need to be reassessed or replicated
through new studies. As of now, the most reliable metric is performing actual guessing
attacks on passwords. Configuring attacks is not trivial but crucial for the results.
Currently, the () is seen as the most robust tool. If cracking is impossible to determine
password strength (e.g. for proactive password checks), the best proxy is to estimate
a guess number for skillful, informed, and resourceful attackers. Neural networks and
zxcvbn are among the most useful strength proxies at this point, but it is worthwhile
to triangulate to obtain the full picture.
3. Password strength is difficult to agree upon and highly context dependent. This makes
it hard to give homogeneous, consistent advice to users.
The technical aspects are contrasted and complemented by these human factors:
1. Users need to manage many password-protected accounts, which is one of the drivers
to come up with individual coping strategies. Although these strategies are often in-
tuitively developed, they show commonalities among larger user groups. Passwords
go through a life-cycle no matter what strategy is used. A large part of the users’
password practices can be classified as risky, but in many ways they remain rational.
2. Users tend to select predictable passwords, reuse them often, and write them down in
physical or digital notes. While there are many hypotheses to explain user behavior,
the problem is probably too nuanced to reach a final consensus regarding its origins.
It appears to be an assessment we need to make on a per-user level.
3. Many solutions have been proposed to guide and support users. Policies enforce re-
quirements on users to mitigate strength issues. However, the design space of pass-
word policies is large and the best parameters are context dependent. Policies do not
guarantee “better” passwords, but real time feedback can make the restrictions more
bearable. Password managers can take some responsibility from users which had been
shifted to them in previous years. Explicit user education was once seen as primary
tool to combat risky behavior, but users continued to dismiss it, which has led to the
understanding that education alone does not solve all problems.
4. Persuasive design has been a well-studied area in password authentication to aid user
education. It leverages cognitive biases and heuristics to achieve more secure user
behavior. Password meters encompass many persuasive strategies at once and offer
an interesting design space to influence password selection. However, their real-world
implementations have brought inconsistencies to light, which reduced their persuasive
power.
5. Studying passwords has a multitude of facets and the method toolkit is large. Most
studies rely on online-surveys (especially through mTurk), usability tests in the lab,
or qualitative interviews. Several principles for the design of valid studies in usable
security and privacy have emerged in the past two decades.
Open Questions
Based on the review of the related literature we can identify a number of questions that have
not been answered to their full extent.
1. Since results regarding user behavior and knowledge about password strength are
mixed, we still have not uncovered all context-factors and exploratory variables for
password selection. However, we need to have this kind of understanding if we aim
to design better support systems to either reinforce or break certain habits. Since
user education has been going on since decades, we ask: What have users learned
about password security in the meantime? What are their mental models of password
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strength and how do they change over time? Can we trace back certain behavior to
failed mitigations, or are psychological factors more decisive?
2. The design space for persuasive interventions has not been fully exhausted. The ef-
fectiveness of persuasion is still somewhat low. What are novel, radical approaches
to steer users towards stronger passwords? How do we find them? Which cognitive
biases might be most suitable for the design of persuasive password interventions?
Can we find new horizons to empower users to create stronger passwords that are still
memorable? What would a holistic solution look like?
3. Password reuse is rampant and still a great risk for users, primarily in the form of
identity theft following social engineering attacks. However, this aspect has not been
addressed by the design of password policies. If policies cannot always effectively
combat weak passwords, do they prevent password reuse? Can persuasive design aid
the secure reuse of passwords?
I try to answer these questions with empirical data and reasoning in the remainder of this
thesis.
85
86
II
EXPLORING THE CONTEXT
FACTORS
87

5
Mental Models of Password Strength
We start our discussion of empirical research with an investigation of psychological context
factors to explain the prevalence of weak passwords. The number of extremely incautious
passwords in breached databases is alarming [366]. It could be interpreted such that users
might not realize that their passwords are insufficient to protect accounts. I challenge this
notion in this chapter. If users are able to judge the strength of a given password, it is fair to
assume they can select an appropriately strong one depending on the situation. There is first
empirical evidence that users can assess passwords more accurately than one might think:
Ur et al. showed that, with a few exceptions, users are able to gauge the strength of a given
password [342]. In this chapter, we follow up this result by extending the range of password
topologies, i.e. the composition and types of passwords. Understanding the users’ mental
models of password strength allows us to craft feedback more persuasively, because it can
take into account what users already know about the strength of their own passwords. In
particular, we address the following research questions:
RQ1: How well can users identify weak and strong passwords?
RQ2: What types of password topologies lead to inaccurate perceptions?
Beside the results, this chapter presents a novel method to answer our research questions.
In the following, we discuss the background of the research and provide new insights into
mental models of password strength.
Publication Statement
Some insights of this project have been previously published at OzCHI 2017, with Hein-
rich Hußmann as co-author [289]. The paper builds the foundation of this chapter.
However, the chapter extends the publication in three important aspects:
• We show another design iteration for the password game that introduced a new study
condition and improvements of the password generation algorithm.
• The dataset reported in the extended analysis is 85% larger than the one in the OzCHI
publication.
• We perform new analyses, provide new insights, and dive deeper into the discussions
of the findings.
5.1 Background and Context
Users create passwords on a regular basis. As discussed in Chapter 3, previous research
indicates that users most commonly resort to weak passwords that are easy to remember. In
case the account value is higher, however, it is suspected that users invest more effort into
creating a stronger password. Password meters are helpful in this context [99]. Yet, even
strong passwords are often ineffective against sophisticated guessing attacks, so it stands to
reason that users have a subpar mental model of what makes a strong password. This has
been a commonly accepted assumption [35] but it oversimplifies the state of affairs.
Mental models change over time – both on a micro- and a macro-scale. At micro-scale, it is
evident that people select their first passwords in their teenage years and without much care
for security [354]. Over time, users are exposed to password advice and educational nudges:
popular news portals regularly publish new articles that report on data breaches or warn
about risky online behavior. Furthermore, incidents in one’s own social network [316] raise
awareness about the topic and can spark plans to behave differently in the future. Moreover,
by creating many accounts, users encounter different password policies and feedback tools.
Users need to make sense of these constraints and might reflect on their password choice.
Consequently, an individual’s mental model of password strength is impacted if feedback and
policy instructions are well-designed [300, 341]. The literature already has some evidence
that, overall, password behavior has positively changed in the past few decades [269, 282].
Zooming out to the macro level, efforts to educate users may have already paid off. In the
early days of research in Usable Security, often the user was seen as the “weakest link” in
a secure system [4, 277]. When Florêncio and Herley conducted their large-scale study in
2006/2007, they noticed that the entropy of the passwords was generally low, but high-value
accounts were protected a bit better. In 2015, Ur et al. found that users’ mental models had
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become more accurate which allowed them to create stronger and memorable passwords
[345]. A year later, they presented an in-depth analysis of the perceptions of password
strength [342]. They found that for the most part, participants in their online-study were
capable of identifying the factors that add to password strength. Shay et al. already used
“perceived strength” as a proxy metric [300], and it seems this is a better approach than one
might think. For a few notable exceptions, though, certain password characteristics fooled
participants. Ur et al. argue that errors in mental models about strength arise from false
understandings of attackers. Consequently, it would be necessary to shift the focus in user
education from password strength towards attack models, because users already have a fairly
accurate understanding of strength.
Florêncio et al. put forward a formal model as to why users behave insecurely. Their cen-
tral argument is that it is inevitable to choose weak passwords for some accounts and that
users are well aware of their behavior. Yet, if users have a faulty understanding of password
strength then the selection process is biased. If users also show the overconfidence bias,
where people are subjectively more confident in their abilities and judgments than the objec-
tive accuracy of the judgments [307], this could indeed lead to considerable risks. Password
meters could counteract these biases, but only if they achieve to inform – and potentially
disrupt – the user’s mental model of password strength.
In summary, having a clear mental model of what makes for a strong password is essential to
make the decision whether to expend the effort and create one or not. While there are initial
results, the perceptions of these factors are still understudied to this point.
5.2 Approach: PASDJO - The Password Game
To evaluate (in)accuracies in mental models about password strength, I chose to have users
rate passwords similarly to the study task in Ur et al.’s study [342]. In their presentation
at CHI 2016, they challenged the audience to assess the strength of a couple of passwords
on the slides. This sparked the idea of making a game out of this study topic. The game is
called PASDJO (pronounced “Pass Joe”1). To open the game to a large audience, I decided
to implement it as a web-application that runs in any web browser on various platform.
5.2.1 Game Mechanics and Design Elements
The game is relatively simple: Players judge how strong or weak a given password is. They
receive points by accurately estimating the strength of a given password on a scale from 1
(weak) to 5 (strong). The game follows similar design strategies for the password topologies
as Ur et al.’s online study, but passwords are either randomly taken from large dictionaries
1 The name PASDJO was inspired by the Bavarian “passt scho”, which translates as “it’s alright”. Players
need to provide an assessment if the given password is alright.
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Figure 5.1: Screenshot of PASDJO during gameplay. The user clicks the stars to rate the pass-
word. One star = weak, five stars = strong.
or generated on the fly. To induce intuitive estimations, a time-limit is enforced while a
“highscore” acts as incentive to estimate as accurately as possible. To reach higher scores,
one has to judge as many passwords as possible in 60 seconds.
Scoring and Metrics
A crucial point of the game is how the passwords are rated objectively. Here, we rely on
the zxcvbn library2 (described in detail in Section 2.3) because it is highly reliable and
straightforward to use on a web page. It also comes with a number of word lists that are
helpful to implement different scenarios, respectively conditions. Beside the guess-number
metric, zxcvbn also scores passwords on a scale from zero (weak) to four (strong). We
translate this scale to one star (weak) to five stars (strong) in the game.
For a correct estimation, i.e. a match between the zxcvbn score and the player’s rating, a
player is awarded 100 points. The difference between the user’s rating and the zxcvbn score
is the deviation (D). A player’s rating can deviate by at most four stars, e.g. if they rate a
five-star password with a score of one and vice versa. In that case, the player should not get
any points, but in all other cases, the player is still awarded a few points. For each integral
deviation in either direction there is a penalty of 25 minus-points (maximum of 100 points,
at most 4 errors, which leads to 100/4 = 25). The points of all estimations are summed up
and build the achieved score (A). As an overall accuracy measure, at the end of the game
we calculate the ratio of achieved and possible points and display it as percentage (P). The
game thus implements the following scoring function, where U is the user’s estimation on a
scale from 1 to 5, Z is the zxcvbn score on the same scale, and n is the number of passwords
a user has rated within the time limit.
2 https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn
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The scoring function takes an array of user ratings and zxcvbn scores for n passwords and
returns a vector consisting of the achieved points A and accuracy metric P.
f ([(U |Z)1, ...,(U |Z)n]) = (A|P)
For each estimation the deviation from the zxcvbn score is calculated.
Dk =Uk−Zk
The total achieved points are the sum of the achieved points per round. Each round takes the
25 point penalty into account. If |Dk|= 0, the player gets the full 100 points per round.
A =
n
∑
k
100− (|Dk| ∗25)
Finally, the accuracy is the fraction of achieved and possible points.
P =
A
n∗100
The score and accuracy are displayed to the users once the game is finished, see Figure 5.2.
Persuasive Design Elements
We used a number of persuasive techniques (see Section 3.4) in the design of the game.
Most of them relate to the Persuasive Authentication Framework [124]. First of all, we
lower the barrier to play the game through simplification: the task is immediately clear and
does not require special skills. Since one round only takes sixty seconds, it is easier for
users to commit to finish the game. The feedback screen uses positive language to create the
notion of a social interaction, which also serves self-monitoring. Also, feedback and points
serve as reinforcement for correct ratings, i.e. a subtle form of conditioning. Moreover, the
user interface is tailored to the user, as they can see their own previous scores. Players can
also create an account through Google-federated SSO. If they log in, their profile picture
and a personal greeting personalize their experience. Through the player’s eyes, the game’s
strength ratings are “right”, which can be attributed to the authority principle. Finally, the
game leverages the goal-gradient effect by giving the player small amounts of points even
for inaccurate estimations. At the end, the player receives a score that seems improvable
through playing another round.
5.2.2 Password Generation and Study Conditions
PASDJO initially had four different password types that act as levels of the independent
variable: Common passwords, mangled passwords, passphrases, and random passwords.
During gameplay, the condition for the next password is selected at random. The following
paragraphs depict the conditions in detail.
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Figure 5.2: Feedback screen. The player can review their performance after the time is up. Each
assessment is contrasted with zxcvbn’s score.
Common passwords: We take the word lists that come with the zxcvbn library. One of
these lists contains 47023 leaked passwords ordered by frequency, from which we randomly
pick one for this condition. The data stems from breaches of user databases at RockYou,
Yahoo and Xato [369]. All passwords are lower-case and can be considered weak, because
they are usually amongst the first attempts in a guessing attack [346] unless the adversary
launches a targeted attack where personal information plays a more important role. Zxcvbn
rates the top 1000 passwords with a score of one (e.g. “12345”, “password”, “monkey”),
and the remaining passwords are scored with two stars (e.g. “iloveyou2”, “skywalker”,
“apollo13”). It is worth noting that many of these passwords would not be accepted any-
more by websites as common policies demand at least 8 characters (see Chapter 6), which
RockYou and Xato did not enforce at the time.
Mangled passwords: For the mangled password condition, we take the same list of
the top 47023 passwords, but we algorithmically substitute certain characters. The substi-
tutions look like “leet” / “l33t” speak, which is a typical way to try to increase password
strength [67, 226]. For instance, an “a” is replaced by an “@”, or an “s” is substituted with
the dollar sign “$”. Also, random characters are transformed to uppercase. To allow rec-
ognizing the original word, we only mangle up to 30% of the characters of the password.
Since we only use substitutions that zxcvbn recognizes, mangled passwords mostly receive
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a score of two. However, in rare occasions, they get higher or lower scores depending on the
specific character constellation, e.g., “p@ssw0rd” (1), “b0n3he@d” (2), “fireFI9hter” (3),
“123qaz456w$x” (4), “123Q@z4s6w$x” (5).
Random passwords: We implemented a simple string generation algorithm to create
random passwords. They are lowercase alphanumeric passwords containing letters from the
German alphabet, i.e. [a-z0-9äöü]. Zxcvbn consistently gives them a score of four, which
makes them easy to rate. In a real-world attack they can only be brute-forced [115, 369].
Passphrases: We combine two entries from the English Wikipedia index to create a
passphrase (also shipped with zxcvbn). The words were required to be between 4 and 11
characters long. This restriction leads to a dictionary size of 27202 entries. Thus, there
are 272022 ≈ 109 possible combinations, which is unpredictable enough to withstand online
guessing attacks. This is reflected by the rather high scores: zxcvbn gives passphrases mostly
a score of three or four, e.g. “armedtamils” (3), “boostedeuros” (4). If the words appear in
other dictionaries, e.g. the “TV subtitles” word list, they are more likely to result in a score
of three. However, for a user it is not straight-forward to tell whether a passphrase scores
three or four points, which makes this condition harder to get right. The game is expected
to benefit from this element of unpredictability, which is one of the eight cornerstones of
gamification according to Chou [55].
For the remainder of the chapter we refer to these four condition as “Common”, “Mangled”,
“Random”, and “Passphrase” (mind the capitalization later).
5.2.3 Benefits and Shortcomings of the Game-based Approach
Since the game was deployed publicly, the method can be denoted as an unsupervised in-
the-wild study. Ur et al.’s study is closely linked to ours, but they used an online survey
and recruited participants through mTurk. In comparison to an online survey, our approach
features certain benefits and shortcomings as discussed in the following.
Benefits of the Game-based Approach
Easy collection of multiple data points per user The game can be played over and over. A
survey could also be taken multiple times, but this is usually impractical because there is a
fixed set of options, and reassessing the same passwords is unnecessary. Besides, if people
could repeatedly participate via MTurk this would mean that they would be paid for each
completion, which drives costs.
Possibility to provide feedback After the game, the players can review their ratings and find
out how they performed. Implementing such a feedback loop is much more complicated and
often impossible with current survey tools. Survey usually debrief participants about the
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general purpose of study, but it is difficult to tailor the debrief to the individual participant,
i.e. tell them how they performed.
Randomization and password space Ur et al.’s study was well-designed because it tested
a wide range of password characteristics and there were multiple options per condition.
However, the options were predefined by the researchers and limited in that sense. In our
case, we can pick passwords from much larger word-lists at random and use algorithms to
randomly adjust certain characteristics. This allows for higher internal validity of the data
collection.
Intrinsic Motivation Participants in an online survey often receive an incentive to partic-
ipate. In an mTurk-study each participant receives a small amount of money. Contrarily,
there is no extrinsic incentive to play PASDJO and we can leverage the players’ intrinsic
motivation.
Intuition The game uses time pressure to induce intuitive responses. Thus, if playing fast
enough, we expect to measure System 1’s responses instead of System 2 [183]. This is vital
because password selection is often a System 1 process, i.e. intuitive and automatic. In an
online survey, the participants can take as much time as they’d like to reason about their
response. However, this is a hypothetic benefit that needs further empirical evidence.
Drawbacks of the Game-based Approach
The game approach towards collecting password strength perceptions naturally entails draw-
backs, too. First and foremost, we do not collect demographic data. In a survey, it is com-
mon practice to include questions about basic demographic information. If we included
such questions as part of our game, we might have scared off users and damaged persuasive
strategies. Thus, the collected data stems from an unknown population, which is a limitation.
In the future, we might address this issue by iterating on designs that ask people to provide
some basic demographic information, e.g. after playing three times.
Furthermore, the lack of demographic data also makes it hard to track usage across multiple
devices. The same player could first get in touch on a desktop and then later decide to keep
playing on their mobile. Allowing users to log in and synchronize their game history can
mitigate this problem to some degree.
Last, ethically running password studies (see Section 3.1) demands that participants be de-
briefed appropriately. In our case, we provide a separate “About” page that is accessible
from anywhere in the app. The information on the about page points out that users should
refrain from using the generated passwords as their own and that our strength estimation is
only an estimate. Nevertheless, it requires that users seek this kind of information, which –
realistically – only few people might do. Therefore, as a small encouragement to read it, we
require users to confirm a consent-dialog that also points them to the about page. So far, we
have no data on how many people looked at this page, but this is an easy fix for the future,
e.g. by adding an analytics library.
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(a) Welcome screen for
anonymous users. The game
is briefly explained and
the users can try the rating
interface (stars).
(b) Users can browse through
past games. The updated ver-
sion visualizes the scores in a
line chart (not displayed).
Figure 5.3: Key screens in the user interface.
5.2.4 Implementation
For the implementation, we used modern web technologies to create a state-of-the-art user
experience. The front-end uses the polymer library3. Custom elements, which were recently
added to the WebComponents standard4, serve to separate concerns through encapsulation.
On the back-end, we rely on the Firebase platform5. It allows setting up an easy and secure
authentication, respectively authorization, workflow. Moreover, the data is stored in a real-
time-database that uses fast web-socket connections to synchronize data between client and
servers.
We leveraged user experience heuristics to design the game for a large audience. Among
others, we based our solution on the Progressive Web-App heuristics6, which we hoped
3 https://www.polymer-project.org/ (last accessed 22.01.2018)
4 https://www.webcomponents.org/specs (last accessed 22.11.2018)
5 https://firebase.google.com/ (last accessed 22.01.2018)
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would lower the barrier to engage with the game. Since we expected many people from
Germany would play the game, the interface is fully localized. Depending on the browser
language, it automatically picks the preferred language. Moreover, the interface is responsive
to different screen sizes to provide a seamless experience. We chose a short URL pasdjo.de
to facilitate visiting the website from mobile devices where typing is cumbersome. Upon
visiting the web page, a welcome screen briefly explains the rules (see Figure 5.3a). As
part of our onboarding process, we give users the opportunity to try out the rating interface,
so they can get comfortable even before they play for the first time. For mobile users, we
had to ensure that the game loads quickly. This is challenging, because we have to transfer
a number of word lists to generate the passwords randomly. Therefore, we used a lazy-
loading design pattern to render the UI first and load data in the background. At the same
time, we minimize and compress the source files to reduce data transfers. The first page load
consumes 1.6 MB of data. To ensure subsequent visits are faster and do not stress the user’s
mobile quota, a service-worker caches resources in the background. It intercepts requests
to the remote server in the future and instead serves local resources7. This strategy reduces
the transfer size for subsequent requests to a mere 10.3 KB, which are mostly consumed by
authentication and incremental synchronization.
5.3 Log Analysis
We deployed the game and made it publicly accessible. We ran the first analyses after four
months and a second analysis after one year of public deployment. The first sample served
as the basis for the full-paper at OzCHI [289], while the second has not been previously
published.
5.3.1 First Sample
Data collection started in December 2016 and the first data dump was created in March 2017.
The game was first presented to the public at an open lab day in our research group. We set
up a booth and invited visitors to play the game on their own devices, although we also
had two iPads that used a shared, known account. Posters at our institution kept advertising
the game, and it was later shown at student orientation days. Thus, it is very likely that
the sample stems from a group of mostly younger adults who are interested in technical
innovation. After removing log data from the known demo accounts, 115 users remained in
the data set who had played at least one game on a device unknown to us. Only two users
chose to log in to keep their history synchronized across devices.
6 https://developers.google.com/web/progressive-web-apps/checklist (last accessed
22.01.2018)
7 This is an erratum in our original publication, where we reported using IndexedDBs
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Score Distribution
The 115 users played 242 full games in total. Thus, on average, a user played 2.1 full games
(SD=2.3, Min=1, Max=16). The time pressure motivated users to rate as many passwords
as possible. We found that an average of 24.44 passwords (SD=10.39) were rated per game,
which amounts to 5915 passwords rated. Users spent ≈ 2.45 seconds per estimation on
average. The zxcvbn strength estimates were fairly consistent within each condition (see
Figure 5.4). Random passwords consistently received a zxcvbn score of 4 out of 5 stars.
Common passwords were either rated with 1 or 2. Passwords in the Mangled condition filled
the full spectrum of ratings, but the majority had a score of 2. Interestingly, passphrases were
the least predictable condition. From n = 1414 passphrases, 25.03% received a score of 3,
and 74.54% a score of 4. The remaining eight passphrases were deemed weaker with a score
of 2, e.g. soilwithin or augsburgtime, but it is not clear why this was the case (perhaps
because one of the words had a very low guess number). However, the vast majority of
passphrase-scores are explicable with the number of characters. For the users, the length of
the passphrase is then the only criterion to decide between a score of 3 and 4.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of zxcvbn scores for N=5915 passwords collected in the first four
months of deployment (1 = weak, 5 = strong). Random passwords were the most stable condition
with consistent score of 4. Mangled passwords show a range of 1 to 5, but passphrases were least
predictable.
Moreover, the distribution in Figure 5.4 shows that in most cases, the maximum deviation
Dmax was less than 4: Dmax = 3 in 5420 cases, and Dmax = 2 in 410 cases. In other words,
the user’s estimate deviates by at most 3 score points in 98.56% of cases. At the same time,
it is difficult to underestimate passwords that had already received a low score. This narrows
the interval of the expectancy value for common and mangled passwords, i.e. users are more
likely to overestimate these – if at all. These two findings motivate taking the absolute value
of the deviation and create an overall accuracy score for each game played, just like we did.
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Figure 5.5: Average user ratings in each of the four conditions, plotted alongside mean zxcvbn
scores. Users’ estimations were least accurate for passphrases, which they had rated 1.4 points
lower than zxcvbn. (N=111)
“First Game” Statistics
A player’s first game is vital for the assessment of their pre-existing strength perceptions in
different conditions. After the first game, learning effects induced by our feedback are likely
to change their subsequent judgments. Therefore, the first game is the most valuable indica-
tor of mental models of password strength. In their first game, players achieved an average
score of 2010 points (SD=653.16, Min=350, Max=3675), which translated to an average
accuracy of 74.58 % of the achievable points. Moreover, players rated 27.21 passwords in
their first game (SD=8.34), which is more than in subsequent games, albeit not significantly
(t32(2) = 1.13, p> 0.1,95%−CI = [−2.04;7.12]).The first games consisted of 6.9 Common
(25.3%), 6.8 Mangled (25%), 7.2 Random passwrods (26.5%), and 6.3 Passphrases (23.2%).
The conditions were thus evenly distributed (F3 = 2.36, p > 0.05).
As a next step, we can evaluate the achieved accuracy for each player in each condition.
Since randomization led to four users not rating at least two passwords in each condition, we
remove their data and maintain a sample of N=111 users. Non-parametric tests are used to
account for the coarse password ratings (1 through 5).
In their first game, players showed fairly consistent inaccuracies (see Figure 5.5). There was
no notable correlation between the number of passwords rated during a game and the result-
ing accuracy (ρ =−0.1, p > 0.1). In other words, fast players were about as accurate as slow
players. Mangled passwords were the only condition that was overestimated (estimated me-
dian deviation Md = 0.5). Interestingly, common passwords were underestimated slightly,
although there was little room for underestimation (Md = −0.5). Random passwords were
also underestimated by about half a point (Md = −0.5). The users in this data set rated
passphrases exceptionally low (Md =−1.6). A Friedman rank-sum test showed significant
differences for the deviations across the four conditions (F3 = 187.84, p < 0.001). We fol-
lowed up this finding with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests, i.e. αBon f = 0.008. Wilcoxon
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Figure 5.6: Achieved percentage (accuracy) evolution depending on the number of games
played. Each dot represents a full game of a user, the size of the dot indicates how many pass-
words were rated in that particular game. Although a linear model works, we used a locally
weighted polynomial regression (LOESS) to fit a line through the data points. Users clearly
become better the more they play.
paired sample tests revealed significantly different deviations between all pairs of conditions,
except for the common/random pair. In other words, common and random passwords were
equally inaccurately assessed by the users.
Score Development
From the 115 users who completed a full round of PASDJO, 33 kept on playing for at least
one more game. We tried to model their progress through a linear regression with gameIn-
dex as predictor and achieved percentage as dependent variable. To account for the fact
that some users played more rounds per game, we weighted the percentage with the num-
ber of passwords rated in that game. The model shows that players were able to improve
their accuracy by playing multiple times (F(1)=49.37, p < 0.001, β = 0.54, R2ad j = 0.23).
The increased accuracy is mostly due to more accurate estimation of passphrases: perform-
ing linear regressions with average deviation of each condition as dependent variable, with
gameIndex as predictor, we observed that only passphrases have a non-trivial model fit (R2ad j
= 0.19). For all other dependents, gameIndex had virtually no effect on the tendency. Play-
ers therefore primarily learned to estimate passphrases. Figure 5.6 visualizes the progress of
users who played at least twice. In there, it is also evident that the slope is not stringent, i.e.
an individual user’s accuracy does not necessarily increase steadily. We attribute this to the
element of randomness in the game, which makes it more difficult in some cases to rate the
passwords, while it might be easier in a subsequent game.
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Figure 5.7: The game was played on 90 distinct days (days with 0 games are not shown in the
graph). There were four major drivers for the adoption (see annotations), that indicate that the
sample mostly consists of students, their peers, and other academics.
5.3.2 Extended Sample and Results
On the 23rd of January 2018, I created a new data dump and re-ran the analyses to see
whether there were any differences to the first publication. The data set at this point consisted
of 10,965 played rounds from 342 games played by 190 users on 90 distinct days (see Figure
5.7). Thus, there was an increase in 41.32% in terms of games, and 85.38% of played rounds.
Before we look at the logs, I briefly present the changes introduced in PASDJO version 2,
which was deployed on November 7th 2017 (i.e. prior to the OzCHI conference, where the
game was demoed).
Version 2
After publishing the first results, I had iterated the design and implementation of the game.
There were a number of changes that might affect the players’ performance. Splitting the
data between version 1 and version 2 allows us to compare the players’ performance before
and after the adjustments to measure their effectiveness.
New Condition: Predictable The mangled passwords were algorithmically altered ver-
sions of common passwords. This often made it hard to figure out the original password.
Perhaps, the mangled passwords sometimes seemed more like random passwords which is
why they were the only overestimated condition in the first sample. The new condition “Pre-
dictable” mimicks the most predictable user alterations. The resulting passwords consist of
a capitalized dictionary word with a predictable suffix, e.g. ‘123’ or ‘!’. There were 12
predefined suffixes, and they were randomly appended to the dictionary word.
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Tuning Password Generation After realizing that virtually no passwords had received a
score of 5 in the first sample, I fine-tuned the generation of passphrases and random pass-
words. Passphrases were now either two or three words. Separators (e.g. a dash “-”) were
inserted in between the words. Random passwords used to be ten characters long in version
1. In version two their length is also randomized between 7 and 15 characters. This leads to
a higher variety of zxcvbn scores. The resulting passwords sometimes resemble the mangled
condition, which is a greater challenge for the players. Moreover, I increased the likelihood
of common passwords from the top 100 by a factor of two. All measures resulted in a much
more diverse spectrum of scores as shown in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Zxcvbn scores in version 2. The scores within the conditions had become much
more diverse, which should make it more difficult for players to judge individual passwords.
Scoring and Feedback The players’ achieved score (A) did not entirely reflect their per-
formance. For instance, if a player rated as many passwords as possible without spending
much thought on the strength, they still achieved a high score, albeit not a high accuracy.
Therefore, the accuracy is now used as a “penalty” by multiplying the achieved score with
the accuracy (e.g. 3000A ∗ 0.5P = 1500 final score), which represents the performance
much more adequately. Furthermore, the players had to figure out why their ratings deviated
from the zxcvbn scores on their own. Now, the feedback screen contains a small indication
as to how the score was calculated (see Figure 5.9). This enables players to improve their
score in the next game.
Figure 5.9: Updated feedback in version 2 informs the player about the password category and
provides pointers to the origin of the objective rating.
Leaderboard and History Finally, we introduced a new game-design element, namely
leaderboards. Players can pick an alias and submit their score after each game. The main
purpose of the leaderboard is to encourage competition, which is another persuasive design
strategy.
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Figure 5.10: Performance development during the first 13 months of public deployment (5.10a).
In November 2017 version 2 was released, which roughly shows a similar learning curve.
Among the players who played at least two games, the overall score development has not
changed visibly (see Figure 5.10a), with no notable differences in the regression model
(F1 = 67.12, p < 0.001 β = 0.53, R2ad j = 0.23). However, if we look at the players who
played version 2, we can observe a slight decrease in the model fit (F1 = 8.83, p < 0.01
β = 0.43, R2ad j = 0.20): There were 12 players who played version 2 more than once
(M = 2.9,SD = 2.29). Their progress is shown in Figure 5.10b. The decrease can be ex-
plained by the fact that only one player played more than three times in this reduced data
set.
Strength Perception in the First Game
We also re-calculated the users’ average accuracy in each condition, again only using the
players that had generated data in all conditions in their first game (see Figure 5.11). As be-
fore, the deviations from the zxcvbn scores differed significantly across conditions in version
1 (F3 = 316.4, p < 0.001). The same goes for version 2 of the game (F4 = 108.7, p < 0.001).
All post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed significant differences p < 0.008 for version 1.
For version 2, the situation is not as clear, because the sample is smaller (724 observations).
The significantly different pairs were Mangled-{Common|Passphrase|Predictable|Random},
and Passphrase-{Common|Predictable|Random} (p < 0.005). The lack of significant pair-
wise comparisons is also visible in Figure 5.11b: The users’ ratings did not deviate much
from the zxcvbn score in both the Common and the Random condition, which explains this
result. In other words, mangled and predictable passwords, as well as passphrases caused
the players the most trouble, so their accuracy in these three conditions differed significantly.
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Figure 5.11: Users’ average ratings, for PASDJO version 1 on the left and version 2 on the right.
The version switch appears to boost accuracy for common and random passwords, but not for
mangled passwords and passphrases.
5.4 Discussion
In the following, the results are put into context, which also allows us to derive implications
for future support during password authentication.
5.4.1 Players’ Overall Performance
Overall, we can attest players a fairly good performance. This assessment resounds to Ur et
al.’s results [342]. Players performed best in the “Common” condition, i.e. they can identify
commonly used passwords with high certainty. Algorithmically mangled – but common! –
passwords caused a bit more trouble. The fact that this was the only condition where people
judged strength as too high reveals the users’ mental model: if one substitutes individual
letters with digits and symbols, the password must become stronger. The additional data
for version 1 helped narrow down the confidence intervals and moving closer to the “actual
truth”. After about one year, the average rating for mangled passwords had moved closer to
the zxcvbn score (compare Figures 5.5 and 5.11a). Perhaps this means that the players that
followed (∆(n)= 70) had a better mental model of the implications of character substitutions.
However, since none of the other average ratings changed significantly, the shift might be
due to chance.
5.4.2 Strength Perception vs. Selection
Users rarely rate the strength of passwords. The only notable instance where this happens
is when users see passwords that are shared with them. There is growing evidence that
shared passwords are typically weak [154, 298, 308, 351, 368, 389]: Sharing passwords is
easier if it is a regular dictionary word, with predictable suffixes, like Ferrari123. It would
be extremely cumbersome to dictate a password like 8zJ,uwD’dXBTUVub over the phone,
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especially if the other person needs it urgently. As a consequence, passwords shared among
users might have affected players’ strength ratings. We did not observe this in our data: The
conditions that contained regular words were deemed weak. Ur et al.’s findings point in the
same direction.
We can safely assume that users in our sample know that common passwords are weak,
and that they are misguided by character substitutions. We believe that this has immediate
implications on their selection behavior: it can be hypothesized that users intentionally pick
weak passwords – as data breaches reveal time and time again. If they think a stronger
password is necessary, they mangle weak passwords and overestimate the security benefits.
Therefore, there is a lesson we can learn here: users do not need feedback on obviously
weak passwords. They do need feedback if they select a predictably altered password. Ur
et al. mention this already in their recent work on password meters [341]. However, many
password meters and feedback mechanisms do not yet discourage predictable mangling.
5.4.3 Intuition or Deliberation?
PASDJO players spent 2.45 seconds on average to rate the strength of each password. Which
kind of thinking processes were responsible here? Is it probable that users acted intuitively
(System 1) or did they ponder enough to activate System 2 processes (see Section 3.4.1)?
We can find evidence for both. In their first game, fast players were about as accurate as slow
players. For those players who played multiple games, we used the number of passwords
they managed to rate as weight in regression models. We did this for validity reasons, but,
in fact, the effect was negligible: We ran the tests without the weight and model fit did not
change notably. All this is interesting because fast players were most likely to use heuristics,
or as Acquisiti et al. calls them: mental shortcuts to come to an assessment. Otherwise they
would have been less accurate or slower. This is one piece of evidence that the time pressure
can induce System 1 thinking processes. The slower players on the other hand obviously had
to think harder to estimate password strength; System 2 had to be activated. In PASDJO v2,
zxcvbn scores for passphrases and random passwords were much more diverse (see Figure
5.8). So, if a fast player wanted to be accurate in these cases, they needed to rely on two
heuristics: are there dictionary words or does it look random? and how many characters
are in the password? Only then does one have a chance to assess strength correctly. For
the length-heuristic, it is even necessary to count the characters. We can safely assume that
2.45 seconds are not enough to make the distinction between a 17 character (average score
= 3.9) and a 19 character passphrase (average score: 5.0). For random passwords, it could
be feasible to count characters, because scores are much more predictable (length(7,8)→ 3,
length(9,10)→ 4, length(>10)→ 5). Nonetheless, we maintain the assumption that rough
heuristics helped more than analyzing all features.
We can only wonder if the speed of password perception is also associated with selection
time – are skilled PASDJO-players capable of choosing a password quickly? If users take
less time to sign up to a given service, they might be using mental shortcuts to accomplish
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the tasks. There is much evidence that contextual cues, the preferred password, or the com-
position policy are indeed used as mental shortcuts. Investigating perception speed with
selection speed poses new research questions that have not been addressed in the literature
as such.
5.4.4 Changing users’ mental models with PASDJO
The learning curves in Figures 5.6 and 5.10 clearly indicate that players learned assess-
ing password strength after playing PASDJO. Most notably, players learned to estimate
passphrases. Thus, if the authority principle succeeded as a persuasive strategy, this might
have influenced the users’ mental model around passphrases. More generally, this finding
confirms that mental models of password strength are not static. Therefore, PASDJO could
be actively utilized to educate users about password strength, especially passphrases. Persua-
sive interventions could challenge users to rate the strength of a passphrase in the opportune
moment and then debrief users to correct their mental model. We created such an interven-
tion with our studies on the Decoy effect (see Chapter 10), which indeed show the predicted
influence on mental models.
5.4.5 Limitations
We discussed the most important limitations regarding the methodology in Section 5.2.3.
Therefore, we focus on the limitations in the data and test results in this section.
From Figure 5.7, it is evident that most games were played at special events at the university
or at conferences. Therefore, we can safely assume that our sample consists mostly of stu-
dents, their peers, and academics. Thus, we must be careful not to expect the same strength
assessment from other user groups or larger populations. Nonetheless, many players in our
one-year trial might not have a background in cybersecurity and thus, we are confident that
the sample still represents a useful cross-section of a diverse enough population.
Moreover, version 2 introduced a number of improvements that would have been nice-to-
have already in the earlier version. Still, in the first version, the different conditions were
easier to tell apart. Thus, causal effects are easier to isolate.
Finally, the strength ratings in PASDJO are solely based on zxcbn scores. While it is a state-
of-the-art metric (see Section 2.3.3), other metrics might model real-world attacks better in
some situations. For instance, we could have chosen Melicher’s JavaScript implementation
of neural network strength estimation [233]. However, it is more challenging to integrate
and also does not map password strength to a scale from 1 to 5, but to a guess number. The
same goes for other estimators. Therefore, it is also not immediately possible to conduct
secondary analyses because players’ coarse ratings are hard to map to fine-grained guess
numbers. Nonetheless, zxcvbn’s assessments correlate strongly with the output from PGS.
Therefore, we are confident that zxcvbn is the best tool for the constraints of our game. In
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the future, it might be worthwhile to explore useful solutions to include multiple strength
metrics to obtain a more differentiated strength assessment.
5.5 Summary
In this project, we explored password strength perceptions in a novel approach. Earlier sur-
veys had shown that users do not always have an accurate understanding of what contributes
to the strength of a password. Rather than conducting a survey, we implemented a novel
password game, which allows for better randomization of the measurements. Moreover, the
game has unique potential to measure learning effects of the players. The source code of
PASDJO is openly available8, so other researchers can adjust the parameters to their own
needs. For instance, PASDJO was customized for a competition as part of a Google-internal
event in October 2017.
We contribute insights from a longitudinal field study. Our sample comprises more than ten
thousand strength estimations, which allows for precise analyses. PASDJO players accu-
rately recognized the strength of commonly used passwords (RQ1). Furthermore, players
largely underestimated the strength of multi-word passphrases, so this was the most error-
prone password topology (RQ2). However, if they went on to play multiple games, they
adjusted their mental model and rated such passphrases higher. This clearly demonstrates
learning effects induced by playing PASDJO. Users were also misled by leet (l33t) sub-
stitutions in otherwise predictable passwords, so they slightly overestimated their strength.
However, all in all, players performed better than anticipated which might be due to the con-
stellation of the sample. On the other hand, educational efforts from the past decades might
have somewhat paid off, which brings us back to our initial motivation and research objec-
tives: The folk model of a “naive” user seems wrong. Current password meters and similar
feedback systems thus might fail to persuade users because the information they provide is
redundant or well-known. Therefore, we posit that feedback on password accomodate the
fact that people often act deliberately and rationally. For instance, if service providers aim to
persuade users to create a unique passphrase, the benefits need to be more salient and made
available. Passphrases are a feasible alternative for master passwords in password managers,
therefore we believe that persuasive techniques are viable for them.
Future Work
The game presented in this chapter can be used as-is to answer additional research questions.
For example, it would be very interesting to measure how much playing PASDJO influences
actual password selection. To measure this, participants could be invited to a user study in
the lab with a cover story. Once arrived, they are asked to sit in the waiting area until the
experimenter picks them up again. PASDJO is installed as a demo in the waiting area and
8 https://github.com/TobiasSeitz/pasdjo (last accessed 24.01.2018)
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there could be a monetary incentive to “beat the highscore”. Afterwards, they complete a
usability test where the focus is steered away from the sign-up form. In such a study setting,
it should be possible to measure password selection under PASDJO’s short term influence.
To study the influence in the wild, the feature set of the game could be reduced and made
part of an oboarding process to a password manager. If necessary, one could think of another
cover story, e.g. please wait while we set up your system, you can distract yourself with this
tiny game while you wait.
The game can also evolve in the near future. For instance, players could be taken through
a few trial passwords to make sure everyone has the same understanding of the task. To
incentivize participation, additional game elements like challenges and quests are thinkable.
Allowing players to set up profiles serves the personalization principle and also could be
used to collect basic demographic information.
Take Aways
• Users can identify weak passwords, but overestimate the
strength of mangled passwords.
• Passphrases are seen as weak, but it is possible to influence
users’ mental models with persuasive design.
• A game-based approach is feasible to collect data about psy-
chological context factors inexpensively.
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Password Policies and Reuse
In the previous chapter, we reached the conclusion that users’ mental models of password
strength are fairly accurate with some exceptions. We can thus expect that users at least try
to create strong passwords if they deem the account worth protecting. However, this is only
one side of the coin: Even if users succeed in creating a very strong password, they still have
to manage a multitude of accounts. Therefore, password reuse is rampant. Although it is
necessary to some degree [116, 389], it remains hard to defend against. At the same time,
password reuse might expose users to an even greater risk than weak passwords. In case an
attacker obtains a user’s plain text password, they gain access to all accounts that share this
strong password. Studies have shown that users tend to underestimate the risks generated by
password reuse [186]. In fact, password reuse can render the security advantages of picking
a very strong password void, which is not immediately understood by users.
As explained in Section 3.3.1, password composition policies are one of the interventions tar-
geted at weak passwords. However, in many cases users fulfill requirements in predictable
ways, so policies often fail their primary goal. If password policies do not always bene-
fit password strength, could they at least prevent password reuse? Heterogeneous policies
across different web sites with mutually exclusive requirements could effectively disallow
users to reuse passwords like they tend to do. In this chapter, we investigate password
policies of one hundred of the most-visited web-services in Germany. This extensive audit
should answer our research question “Do password policies prevent password reuse?” We
shed light on the findings and discuss them in the context of supporting password authenti-
cation.
Publication Statement
The dataset and the analysis have been previously published at CHI 2017 together with
Manuel Hartman, Jakob Pfab, and Samuel Souque [288]. For the most part, the chapter
picks up the content of that paper and puts it into the larger context of this thesis.
6.1 Background and Context
Password reuse is a major threat because it is easy for attackers to compromise many ac-
counts at once. Even if users try to slightly modify their base password, attackers are still
able to crack a large portion of the resulting passwords [67, 175]. There is mixed evidence
about the subset of passwords that are reused more often, but generally one can identify a
“go-to password” for regular sites, “high-value passwords” for important sites, and a “don’t
care” password for the rest [17, 111, 154, 316, 317, 345, 363].
Password policies were originally designed to combat weak passwords, but some of them
try to steer users away from reused passwords. Usually, this is done through black lists that
block passwords that have already been exposed after a data breach. If a user tried to reuse a
password which has been leaked, the system can detect this and enforce the creation of a new
one. However, Habib et al. showed that users perform predictable alterations to circumvent
the black-list filter [146]. In total, they identified 13 modification techniques. For instance,
participants in the study added digits, symbols, words or letters. Habib et al. conclude that
blacklists are only useful, if a user’s password modifications are not obviously based on a
blacklisted word. Segreti et al. evaluated a different approach to combat reuse, known as
the “Popularity is Everything” system [285]. Here, a password becomes blacklisted after a
certain number of users have used the same password. Reuse in this case means reused by
many users, instead of a single individual reusing the credentials multiple times.
In most cases, it is impossible to display the full list of blacklisted words in the user interface,
so many service providers cannot do this. Thus, reverse engineering by testing different pass-
words is required to draw conclusions on a provider’s policy. Florêncio and Herley audited
policies of public institutions and high-traffic website this way [112]. They found that on-
line retailers have much looser password policies than government or university sites. Wang
and Wang similarly checked the policies of 50 representative websites [361] to estimate the
resulting entropy of the passwords. They took passwords from leaked datasets and picked
16 passwords with varying hypothetical strength. Unlike us, they did not aim to identify
black-lists or special forbidden character types. Carnavalet and Mannan managed to auto-
mate dictionary checks by leveraging keep-alive connections [48]. However, they focused
on server-side strength estimations rather than blacklists per se.
Reverse engineering password policies is tedious and might even violate the terms and con-
ditions of a website. Thus, it would be favorable to compile a repository that contains all
policies. This way, double efforts can be avoided, and service providers could be more trans-
parent by specifying their own policies. The “policy-repository” would also be useful for a
password generator that takes the site’s policy into account to avoid rejected passwords. In
an effort to create such a repository, Steves et al. proposed to crowd-source the data and
defined a formal language (based on XML) to describe policies [313]. The idea was later
picked up and extended by Horsch et al. [166].
In summary, we conclude that certain policies based on blacklists can help in mitigating
password reuse to some degree. However, blacklists entail usability issues because users
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have no way of finding out which passwords are actually on the blacklist of a given website.
For our project, this lack of transparency makes it hard to find out and compare policies of
different websites, which demands a careful development of a suitable methodology.
6.2 Method: Reverse-Engineering Password Policies
To create a rich useful data set for studying password policies, we need to address two
central aspects: selecting representative web sites and determining appropriate passwords.
The first part is relatively straight-forward. We took Alexa.com rankings as indicator for
the popularity of a website. To accomplish the analysis in a reasonable time frame, we took
the 100 most visited web sites in Germany, which is 100% more than Wang and Wang,
and 33% more than Florêncio and Herley. As of May 2016, out of these 100 services, 83
allowed public online registrations. The remaining 17 sites were banks, mobile carriers, or
pay-tv providers who require offline registration and verification as a security measure. The
websites and their policies are listed in Table 14.1 (Appendix). Although we took the most-
visited websites in Germany, the results have implications for an international audience,
because many of the audited sites operate globally.
The second challenge is finding suitable passwords to reverse-engineer password require-
ments. We approached this task in two separate stages to find a good candidate set.
First Stage: Identification of Suitable Passwords
Similar to Wang and Wang, we crafted 15 passwords showing typical password characteris-
tics. The passwords followed common policy categories as proposed by Shay et al. [295].
For instance, some passwords met a 3class12 policy by including three different character
classes (lower-/uppercase letters, digits) and a minimum length of 12. Next, we tried to reg-
ister new accounts with all of these 15 passwords at all 83 websites. In case the site rejected
the password, we investigated the reasons and modified the password until the policy was
fulfilled, e.g. by adding or removing characters. This new password was then added to our
test set. During this stage, a number of sites revealed blacklisted symbols. If this was the
case, we intentionally crafted a password with the blacklisted characters and added it to our
set, so that we could see if other websites implicitly utilize the same blacklist. Similarly, if
there were maximum length enforcements, we added a password longer than that to our list.
This process resulted in a test set of 46 diverse passwords (see Figure 14.4, Appendix). The
list was structured by the following criteria:
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length minimum and maximum length restrictions
character classes the presence of enforced character classes, i.e. mandatory, forbid-
den, and allowed characters
complexity the most stringent policy that the password would fulfill, as clas-
sified by Shay et al. [295]. The categories were basic, 2class,
3class, and complex
dictionary the presence of a pro-active dictionary check, including common
passwords.
additional requirements black-/whitelisted symbols instead of a whole character class, ad-
ditional requirements like large enough edit-distance from user-
name
Second Stage: Re-Evaluation with Extended Test Set
After identifying suitable passwords, we tried to use all of them on each website, i.e. we
performed a total of 46 ∗ 83 = 3813 checks. To avoid re-creating accounts with new email
addresses, we tried to reset passwords wherever this was offered. We treat top-level do-
mains that implement a Single-Sign On scheme (e.g. live.com, msn.com, microsoft.com) as
separate services, because users might not know that the accounts belong together.
6.3 Results
We found it was possible to create passwords that would meet 82 of the 83 policies
(~98.88%). In the following, we illustrate why this is possible.
6.3.1 Complexity
Most policies fell into the “basic” category. This means that their sole requirement was a
minimum (or maximum) length. As shown in Figure 6.1, around three quarters of the sites
used a basic policy1. Eleven web sites (13.3%) specifically require at least two different
character types (2class). However, ikea.de requires letters and digits, but would not count
a symbol towards the two character classes. We still opted to categorize this as a 2class
policy (see remark in footnote 1). Complex policies in the wild have further restrictions, e.g.
dictionary checks or special rules. 23 websites (27.7%) used a dictionary check. Bahn.de
demanded three different characters, i.e. a password like annnna would be rejected, but
banana would not. Paypal.com disallowed using the same character three times in a row,
which rejects a couple of German compounds like Schifffahrt. Nevertheless, it is easy to
find a password that fulfills the complexity requirements of all 83 websites: “D.ssertation18”
is a 4class password that would pass all complexity requirements.
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of minimum complexity of the policies. Most sites only require a given
length.
Length requirements
The length requirements and restrictions were fairly inconsistent in the test set. The av-
erage minimum required length was M = 6.3 (SD = 1.9, see Figure 6.2). No website
had a minimum length greater than nine characters. Among the top 10 most-visited sites,
facebook.com, amazon.de, ebay.de allowed six-character passwords. Security-wise, this is
alarming, because even system-generated 6-character passwords can be brute-forced in a
matter of hours in an offline attack2. Wikipedia.org, which is also in the top 10, had a min-
imum length of one character. Interestingly, two tech-oriented websites allowed the same
(heise.de and chip.de). Perhaps the service providers expect their technical audience to create
stronger passwords anyhow, and they also do not store much personal information. We were
surprised that 40 sites (48.2%) imposed a maximum length restriction, which is counterpro-
ductive in terms of password security. The average maximum length was M = 43 characters
(SD = 32). Ten websites rejected passwords longer than 20 characters, so a considerable
number of passphrases would be excluded (length(correcthorsebatterystaple)=25).
In order to effectively prevent password re-use, the maximum length on one site would
need to be lower than the minimum length of another site. This was not the case in any
permutation of policy pairs. The closest difference was the maximum length at ikea.de (10
characters) and the minimum length at yahoo.com (9 characters). Thus, only a nine or ten
character password can be reused on all the tested websites.
Character Sets
Although the websites at the top of the table, i.e. Google, Facebook, Amazon, all use a basic
policy, there is still a high chance that they reject passwords containing certain characters.
We found it was common to disallow non-ASCII symbols (see Table 6.1). For instance,
Google rejected any passwords with non-ASCII characters. So, even dictionary words that
include letters from non-English alphabets, e.g. the German umlauts ä,ö, and ü, will be
1 In the CHI publication, we reported slightly different numbers: 57 basic, 11 2class, 3 3class, 1 complex, 10
other. It is in fact possible to put the other policies in the remaining found categories, which explains the
updated distribution
2 https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/25-gpu-cluster-cracks-
every-standard-windows-password-in-6-hours/ (last accessed 27.01.2018)
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Figure 6.2: Density distribution of password length rules. We excluded maximum lengths
beyond 245 characters, which explains the hard cut-off in the bottom plot.
rejected in this case. Some sites already provide a list of characters that are either allowed or
disallowed at registration time. In the case of mobile.de, the list of allowed symbols is even
smaller. On the positive side of the spectrum, twitter.com accepted even extended Unicode
characters like emojis.
A few websites did not reveal the list of allowed non-ASCII characters; some of our pass-
words were blocked if they contained certain characters. Thus, we had to remove character
by character to find out which of them was blacklisted. For regular users, this process would
be exceptionally tedious if their password contained a character from an unknown blacklist.
Our audit shows that spaces and the tilde character ‘~’ are the most likely culprits in this sit-
uation, which was the case at netflix.com, spiegel.de or welt.de. Finally, there were mutually
exclusive policies: Lidl.de proactively shows a list of symbols from which the user has to
choose at least one to create an account. However, all those symbols were disallowed on at
least one other website. In that sense, if a user’s go-to password is immediately accepted at
lidl.de, chances are that it is rejected at a couple of other websites. So, the policy at lidl.de
prevents password reuse, but perhaps at the cost of frustrating users with an exotic rule.
6.4 Discussion and Implications
In the following, we shed light on what the results mean in terms of password reuse.
6.4.1 Policies are Mostly Homogenous
Overall we can state that in-the-wild policies are largely similar. However, the devil lies in
the details. It is not quite clear why almost half the websites enforce a maximum length
restriction, albeit a high one in most cases. Shorter passwords are easier to guess in an
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Web site Whitelisted symbols Blacklisted symbols
ebay.de !@#$%^*-_+=
web.de !#$%&()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_{|}~§ÄäÖöÜüß
gmx.net !#$%&()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_{|}~§ÄäÖöÜüß
t-online.de !#$%&()*+,-./<=>?@[\]_{|}~
live.com @#$%^*-_+=
mobile.de !$%&?-_+#
pornhub.com /_
1und1.de @#$%^*-_+=
chefkoch.de äöüÄÖÜß, _, -, !?&.
zeit.de äöüÄÖÜß ,.!?:;#&* ()_+=/<>-
lidl.de @#$%^&+=.:-!?
spiegel.de ‘space’ ‘new line’
outbrain.com ‘space’
welt.de ‘space’
netflix.com ~
Table 6.1: Many websites only allow ASCII characters. This table shows the sites that restrict
the ASCII set even further. Some sites are mutually exclusive regarding the usage of certain
symbols only by looking at a small subset of the tested sites, e.g. netflix.com and t-online.de.
The full rules can be found in Appendix 14.1
offline attack. It is therefore almost necessary to lock out users after a number of failed login
attempts to at least mitigate targeted online-guessing (see Section 2.2). Blocking non-ASCII
characters further impedes users’ password selection. Although the reasons for doing so are
anything but obvious – allowing more characters increases the theoretical password space
and thus potentially security – we interpret this restriction as a usability precaution. ASCII
characters are part of virtually all physical keyboard layouts, but extended alphabets are
not. For instance, if a German user’s email password were “DieÄrzte123”, they would be
troubled to log into their account from a PC while abroad, because the umlauts are missing
on the keyboard. Of course, there are ways to enter such characters, but they require much
more effort under these circumstances. The user experience of the entire login process would
suffer, which is the reason for blocking the characters in the first place. However, with the
increasing number of personal mobile devices that also work abroad, the motivation to block
non-ASCII characters crumbles. Artificially blocking non-alphanumeric ASCII symbols,
like $ or ;, in any case creates unnecessary burden for users. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, users attribute password strength to such symbols and forbidding those can lead to
confusion and erroneous mental models. Perhaps the restriction was introduced to prevent
site vulnerabilities, e.g. SQL injections. But this is a prime example for a misguided security
approach that shifts effort to millions of users rather than to a couple of security engineers.
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6.4.2 Policies do not Prevent Password-reuse
Neither length, nor complexity requirements were heterogeneous enough to prevent pass-
word reuse. In the end, only artificial character-class restrictions narrowed down the list of
passwords that can be used everywhere. We found that a nine or ten character password that
includes at least one uppercase letter, one lowercase letter, and one digit would have been
accepted by 82 of the 83 tested web sites. To circumvent dictionary checks, it is recom-
mendable to intersperse digits in the middle. Thus, if users pick a password like s1lverPWD,
current in-the-wild policies do not stand in their way. With an edit distance of 1, many re-
jected passwords can be turned into an accepted password if the rejection was caused by a
special character. Hence, the criteria for the most-reusable password (what we paraphrase
with “golden password”) are very well-defined and narrow. Any password that does not
meet these criteria will generate usability issues for users, e.g. if they try to use longer pass-
words or ones with a richer character set. Automatic password generation is hampered in
many cases by length limitations. In that sense, policies help to prevent re-use of “extreme”
passwords that are either exceptionally weak or stronger than average. Reuse of “normal”
passwords that work everywhere is not prevented.
As a consequence, a policy could be adjusted dynamically if the user signs up with a “golden
password”. It is very likely that a password showing the above described characteristics is
reused across many web sites. As Florêncio et al. pointed out, this is not necessarily a bad
thing [116]. However, if a high-value password is reused for an unimportant account, this
interference could lead to problems. Stobert showed that experts are less prone to this threat
[317], but regular users cannot always estimate the importance of an account up front. As
a consequence, dynamically adjusting the policy could be a solution. Alternatively, it might
be feasible to more prominently warn users about reuse and explain the implications. As
shown by Ur et al., displaying specific solutions can help in this situation [341].
6.4.3 Smarter Password Generation
Our data clearly shows that using software to generate random passwords can become trou-
blesome for users who opt for this kind of selection support: many policies restrict the length
and allowed characters. Although many password generators enable the users to adjust some
parameters of password creation (like Apple’s system shown in Figure 3.4), more effort is
required to find the right parameters. Thus, a system designed to take away cognitive effort
becomes effortful once more. A better solution is to use contextual information for pass-
word generation. Typically, password managers have built-in generators. To avoid that users
have to adjust parameters, a password manager could automatically retrieve the policy for a
given website (context) and generate a strong password that fulfills it. As a proof of concept,
we built a web-based prototype that demonstrates how contextual policy information can be
used for password generation3 (see Figure 6.3).
3 http://jakob-p.github.io/goldenpassword/ (last accessed 26.01.2018)
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Figure 6.3: We built a small web app to demonstrate how contextual policy information can be
used to a) generate suitable passwords and b) find out which web sites accept a given password.
6.4.4 Limitations
Although the data can be very useful for password generators and for the design of future
composition policies, it is limited in some ways. First, the list of web sites is not comprehen-
sive, we merely observed a tiny snapshot of the high-traffic websites, which already required
days of work for the entire team. We also could have investigated the top websites in dif-
ferent categories to get an even more representative sample. However, the current dataset
already depicts the state of affairs in reasonable detail, and is comparable to similar publi-
cations [112, 361]. Furthermore, the longest password in our test set had a length of 246
characters. We concluded that there is no length restriction if this password was accepted
by a given website, but there might just be a higher restriction. Nevertheless, since only a
fraction of users use passwords this long, this limitation has almost no consequences.
Moreover, for several reasons we did not include emojis in all our tests although they are in
fact part of the unicode character set. First, emojis break some input fields, because most of
them are encoded with 4 bytes instead of 2. This means that they show up as two characters
in the input field, which distorts length requirements. Furthermore, not all websites were
encoded in the extended UTF32 standard and hence failed to submit the data.
Lastly, password policies change over time. Since carrying out our research in May 2016,
we found changes in several of the assessed policies when we randomly re-sampled them.
For instance, idealo.de used to enforce a complex policy, but they have switched to a basic6
as of January 2018. Therefore, our data has a limited lifespan. The big players on the list,
like Facebook, Google, or Amazon, are slower to enforce new polices due to the even larger
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user base and business impact. An automated process similar to the one from Carnavalet and
Mannan [48] could help continually validate the data in the future.
6.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we extensively audited password policies of the top 100 web sites in Ger-
many. The data set is published for further analysis on GitHub4. 83 of the websites offered
public registration, and we could reuse a single password on 82 of them. Hence, we were
able to answer our main research question “Do password policies prevent password reuse?”
with a resounding “no”. Thus, we further question the use of strict password policies as a
means to influence password selection. It has been shown that they do not necessarily lead
to stronger passwords. Now we have shown that they also do not prevent reuse. As a con-
sequence, it would be easier for users if restrictions on password selection were loosened.
Restrictions enforcing a maximum length or a certain set of symbols should be abolished to
ensure universal password generators integrate with the websites. A basic8 policy appears
to work for the major players, so more service providers can follow them. To account for the
potential security vulnerabilities, blacklisted common passwords and adaptive blacklists are
promising solutions [146, 285]. Future research should thus evaluate the specific blacklists
and user support to help them find alternatives in case their password was blacklisted.
Take Aways
• Most password policies in the wild used a basic policy with length as the only
requirement.
• About half of the policies enforced a maximum length, which appears counter-
productive in terms of both usability and security.
• It was possible to reuse a nine or ten character password that includes uppercase
and lowercase letters, and at least one digit on 98% of websites in the test set.
• Only the requirement of particular symbols generated conflicts between policies.
• The above characteristics also tell us that any user with a different selection strat-
egy faces a usability backlash. Acting more securely by generating passwords
automatically is hampered because some policies reject such passwords.
• All bullets above support the demand for simplified password policies to remove
important pain points of password authentication.
4 https://github.com/mimuc/password-policy-dataset (last accessed 25.01.2018)
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Understanding Password Practices through
the Lens of Personality Traits
Although there are certain general patterns, password selection is a task that each individual
handles in their own way. We have shown in Chapter 5 that password strength is subjectively
evaluated depending on certain characteristics whose benefits users interpret in different
ways. Again, while there was an overall tendency, we were unable to break down the strength
ratings by such individual differences: was there a special user group who performed better
than others in the game? What characterizes this user group? Moreover, our previous chapter
shed light on password policies in the wild. In a few notable cases, the rules were challenging
and reject a substantial part of passwords. Users have developed strategies to cope with
rejected passwords, but it would be interesting to know the exact factors that contribute to
their behavior in these circumstances. Egelman and Peer make a strong argument that there
is no “average user” so it is necessary to look at individual differences to understand user
behavior [98].
Demographic background is one of the external factors that influences password selection
[226, 351, 359]. Personality traits have been brought into the discussion to explain user
preferences, actions, and behaviors in security questions [42, 143, 304, 387]. Especially
in research about phishing susceptibility we find evidence that personality traits have the
potential to explain behavior [148, 149, 252, 339]. Empirical results from password stud-
ies have been discussed and explained with different personality traits, too [153, 368]. It
is evident that a user’s personality shines through when they select a word with personal
meaning. Petrie classified users in distinct password personalities: family-oriented, fans,
fantasists, and cryptics1. A LastPass report more roughly divides password usage into two
groups [208]: Type A users want to stay in control and are driven to act securely, so they
developed an elaborate system that they perceive as suitable. Type B users do not believe
that their accounts are valuable to attackers, so they do not prioritize security over usability.
1 The original survey is not available online anymore. In a personal inquiry with Ms Petrie, she said that
the original data is with the firm who commissioned the survey. The aggregated statistics are available at
http://passwordresearch.com/stats/statistic130.html, (last accessed 29.01.2018)
Those two taxonomies stem from analysis of user-selected passwords, i.e. a retrospective
evaluation. However, predictive approaches are under-explored. For instance, if a user is
generally an emotional person, does this impact their password selection strategies? If a user
is diligent in real life, do they invest effort to diligently craft passwords, too?
In a series of user studies we explored the associations between personality traits and pass-
words. If such associations exist, they open a new range of support systems that are tailored
to a user’s personality. Current one-fits-all approaches could be re-designed radically. The
research was carried out in cooperation with three students. In each separate project we fo-
cused on a different stage of the password life-cycle. Timo Erdelt investigated personality as
predictor for the usability of composition policies [101]. Paul Huber explored correlations
between strength perceptions and personality traits [168]. Finally, Aline Neumann examined
personality factors in password selection [241]. In total, 440 individuals participated in three
separate online studies. In the following sections, the projects are put into context and their
findings are discussed on a bigger picture.
Research Objectives
Our primary goal was to find ways to predict password behavior from personality traits. At
this point, the discourse about risky passwords included personality factors as hypothetical
explanatory variables. However, only few empirical studies had been carried out to challenge
the assumptions. We aimed to provide such empirical data and a discussion of the implica-
tions on the design of password policies and password authentication systems. For instance,
adjusting requirements of password policies depending on the user’s personality promises
to reduce frustration of password selection. Thus, our over-arching research question can
be framed as “Does personality influence a user’s mental models of password strength and
consequently selection and coping strategies?”.
7.1 Background and Related Work
In this section we give a brief overview about the characteristics of strong passwords and
how users go about creating them. Moreover, we portray projects in usable security and
privacy research in which the users’ psyche has been the focus.
7.1.1 Sociodemographic and Cognitive Factors
Apart from such conscious behavior, there may be other preconditions that make some users
pick stronger passwords than others. In a large field study, Mazurek et al. found that com-
puter science and engineering students created passwords that were less guessable than those
from business or politics students [226]. Beyond demographic background, context factors
like the emotional state during password selection have also been investigated. Gulenko
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examined the effect of presenting positive textual messages and icons during password se-
lection and found benefits for the adoption of passphrases [144]. In contrast, putting users
in a state of cognitive distress or depletion made participants choose weaker passwords in a
large lab study [143]. Social pressure as another type of psychological leverage was inves-
tigated by Egelman et al. [99]. While they argue that account value plays a superior role
for the effectiveness of password meters, others have shown that the design of a password
meter does have a measurable impact on the effort users put into creating a password [343].
In summary, the literature shows that password selection depends on context factors beyond
education and experience.
7.1.2 Personality Factors in Cyber Security
In our work, we are interested in context factors of password strength originating from psy-
chological variables like personality. One of the most commonly used models to character-
ize personality are the Big-Five traits (B5), also known as the five-factor model. Costa and
McCrae [60] refer to the personality traits as openness to experience, conscientiousness, ex-
traversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (OCEAN). The traits can be described with these
exemplary adjectives [229]: Openness: imaginative, creative, curious, independent, liberal
Conscientiousness: careful, reliable, ambitious, scrupulous, neat, punctual Extraversion:
sociable, talkative, passionate, warm Agreeableness: selfless, helpful, forgiving, cheerful,
humble Neuroticism: worrying, emotional, insecure, impatient, vulnerable, subjective
Most frequently, the influence of these personality traits have been explored for privacy-
concerns, where the openness trait was associated with privacy attitudes [96, 235]. Other
inquiries have shown that personality traits like neuroticism [148] or openness [339] might
be associated with the response to phishing attacks. The likelihood of employees adhering
to security policies is potentially influenced by the manifestation of agreeableness and con-
scientiousness [304, 305]. These investigations show that personality models are a consider-
able factor in security and privacy. Yet, our understanding of the influence of personality on
password perception and consequently password selection is still low. Our work tries to im-
prove our understanding about the origin of the differences in users’ judgments of password
strength.
7.2 Study 1: Policies
We start out with the exploration of psychological factors for the design of password policies.
We were motivated by the fact that, at this point, policies are a one-fits-all solution that
evidently does not work in the same ways for all users: Shay et al. observed that subjective
usability ratings for policies differed among participants [297, 299]. For instance, about
40% of their participants found it difficult to create a password under a “3class16” policy,
but another 40% found it easy [299]. Following the general discourse and related results
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from privacy research, we hypothesized that an individual’s personality might be responsible
for their attitudes towards one policy or another. Therefore, our goal in this project was to
explore such associations between personality traits and policy preference. At this point, we
leave out analyses on password strength.
7.2.1 Method
Our study was completely exploratory, because the literature did not allow us to derive nar-
row hypotheses. Since personality traits are nuanced, we opted for an online survey to collect
a large sample. Personality was assessed based on the Five-Factor Model. We opted for the
very reliable BFI-K construct by Rammstedt and John [261], which is also freely available in
German. Moreover, with its 21 items, the time to fill out the questionnaire is kept reasonably
low. Participants were asked to create several passwords in a row, i.e. the study followed a
within-groups protocol. Here, we evaluated three different password policies: a traditional
(3class12), an uncommon (2word12), and a novel policy (emoji12) that required the selec-
tion of at least one emoji through a graphical user interface (more on emojis in Chapter 11).
The reason for this choice was that the policies are different enough to serve as characteristic
levels of the independent variable “policy”. Also, creating passwords that exceed the length
requirements of typical policies (see Chapter 6) is more difficult, so we could better measure
the differences of perceived difficulty. Participants assessed the “difficulty to create” of a
password for each policy. Moreover, we had them rank the policies by their personal pref-
erence, so the distinctiveness of 3class12, 2word12, and emoji12 would help them spot and
judge the differences easily, which makes the data more reliable.
Structure and Tasks
The study was divided into 3 overall parts. In the first part, participants were briefed about
privacy details of the study and they provided demographic background information. Then
they proceeded to the personality questionnaire before they were asked to perform three
experimental tasks. Each consisted of creating a password and assessing the difficulty with
agreement levels on the three items “It was difficult to create a password that meets the
requirements”, “I found the password requirements bothersome”, and “It was easy to create
a new password”. Agreement was measured on a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly
disagree” to “Strongly agree”. Inversely keying the items as well double encoding makes
the data more robust against implausible responses. The resulting difficulty-to-create score
thus ranges from 3 to 15 (3 = very easy, 15 = very difficult).
The order of the policies was counterbalanced during the experiment to mitigate order ef-
fects. For each participant, we recorded the resulting order as a control variable. We chose
an online-banking scenario for all three selection tasks. The first prompt was to create a pass-
word to protect an online banking account. Secondly, participants were told that someone
had gained access to their account and the bank locked them out. As a security precaution,
they had to reset their first password. The last task description explained that their password
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had expired after one year and they need to reset it again. This storyline was designed to
fulfill the realistic threat principle proposed by Krol et al. (see Section 3.1.1) [205].
We used SosciSurvey, a standard survey tool, to collect the responses. The dynamic parts
involving password selection were embedded in iframes. To match the data from the survey
tool and the iframe we used URL query parameters containing the response ID. We asked
participants to only use a desktop browser to avoid styling glitches and unexpected behavior
from the prototypes.
Recruiting and Demographic Background
We recruited participants through posts on social networks and by sending out the invita-
tion link in a university-wide newsletter (more than 5000 recipients), which was due to time
and budget constraints. To incentivize participation, we announced a raffle of five shopping
vouchers with a value of 20C each. At this point, 222 people had started participation. After
drop-out and plausibility checks, the remaining sample size was N = 164. As expected, the
age distribution was narrow: our sample consisted mostly of students in their mid-twenties
(average age 24 (SD=5). 79 respondents were female, 83 male, and 2 preferred not to an-
swer. In the background screener, 65 people (40%) indicated to possess formal training in
computer science or information technology. We also requested self-reported assessments
on password practices. Here we found that 40% reuse passwords without modification, 32%
reuse them with modifications or with a mnemnoic technique. 17% often create new pass-
words. In terms of management strategy, the majority (53%) tries to memorize passwords.
11% use a password manager or generator. Written cues served as aid for 10% of respon-
dents, and 16% write passwords down on analog media, while 21% use electronic files.
Statistical Analyses
For statistical analyses, we consulted the StabLab2 to identify suitable methods. After a re-
vision of the collected data and the necessary assumption checks, we analyzed associations
by fitting generalized additive models (GAMs) to the dataset. Their advantage over linear
regression is that they are more flexible for non-linear associations3. The mgcv package
for R was used to calculate the models. GAMs can be primarily interpreted through resid-
ual/smooth plots – the steeper the fitted regression line, the stronger the association (The box
in the results section (7.2.2) explains how to read GAM plots in great detail.)
Scores on the Big-Five sub-dimensions served as independent variables, i.e. the predictors in
the regression models. Openness is coded with five items, while the remaining four dimen-
sions were assessed with four items each. The agreement level for every item was mapped
to numeric values from 1 to 5. The score on each sub-dimension is the sum of agreement
levels. To better estimate effect sizes, we control for gender, age and IT proficiency in the
regression models.
2 http://www.stablab.stat.uni-muenchen.de/ (last accessed 30.01.2018)
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Additive_model (last accessed 30.01.2018)
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Method Limitations
The method, albeit carefully executed, faces a few limitations regarding the interpretability
of the data. First, the sample was fairly homogeneous, because participants were mostly
between 20 and 28 years old and have an academic background. This might reduce statisti-
cal power in detecting effects on personality [310], but on the other hand, this constellation
resolves age-related confounding effects. Moreover, our study was strongly focused on in-
dividual preferences and usability perceptions of different policies, so only a within-groups
design was feasible. However, in real-life password selection, users rarely select three pass-
words in a row. The choice of our storyline still makes us confident about the ecological
validity [103]. The repeated measures design did not allow us to measure the policies’ influ-
ence on password memorability, which we have to postpone to another study. At this stage,
the subjective preference was more valuable for our exploration than memorability effects.
Besides, we briefed participants to fill out the survey on a desktop PC or a similar device.
Since it is always possible to circumvent user-agent detection by requesting the desktop ver-
sion, we cannot guarantee that all participants followed this instruction, which might have
had an effect on their password selection [232].
Finally, we unfortunately made a mistake in the deployment of the emoji-based policy. In-
stead of 12 characters, it required participants to select 16 characters beside the emoji. We
realized this fact by looking at descriptive statistics during the course of the study, because
the policy performed significantly worse than the other two. We re-deployed the emoji-based
policy immediately after we had realized the error. Consequently, we had to remove the data
for the creation difficulty and ranking in cases 1-61, reducing the overall sample size to 103.
Nonetheless, the sample size is sufficiently large to investigate medium to strong effects.
7.2.2 Results
Overall, associations between personality and policies were moderate. In the following, we
only describe non-trivial and interesting associations.
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Figure 7.1: Confidence Intervals for a) Difficulty to create and b) time to create passwords in
each condition. The traditional policy (3class12) was the easiest and fastest overall, but not
on a statistically significant level (also visible in the charts due to the overlapping confidence
intervals)
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Descriptives and Independent Variables
Users rated the difficulty to create a password very similarly in all conditions (averages
of scores in range [3;15]: 3class12 = 7.18, 2word12 = 8.02, emoji12 = 7.88). A linear
mixed model ANOVA did not show significant differences (F2+2 = 5.28, p > 0.1). Figure
7.1 shows the confidence intervals for these two usability metrics “difficulty to create” and
“time to create”. Observing no significant differences overall is interesting because it means
that individual ratings could be explained by personality traits.
Creation Difficulty Models
The general additive models showed associations between the predictors and creation diffi-
culty scores (see Table 7.1).
emoji12 2word12 3class12
(Intercept) 9.99 7.04 6.26
Predictor β σn β σn β σn
Age 0.02 0.06 −0.05 0.06
Gender (female) 0.91 0.58 1.35 0.66 −0.46 0.61
No IT Background −0.10 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.21 0.63
Extraversion −0.05 0.08 −0.01 0.08
Conscientiounsness 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.10
Neuroticism −0.22 0.09 0.05 0.09
emoji12 Position 2 0.52 0.65
emoji12 Position 3 0.23 0.63
2word12 Position 2 −0.38 0.74
2word12 Position 3 −0.07 0.73
3class12 Position 2 1.19 0.66
3class12 Position 3 0.77 0.69
Explained Deviance 0.15 0.21 0.10
Num. Observations. 119 119 119
Num. Smooth terms 2 6 2
Description:
β = Correlation coefficient
σn = standard error
edf = estimated degrees of freedom by non-linear effects
(„estimated degrees of freedom“)
Smooth terms = non-linear effects in the model
Table 7.1: Additive regression models for the difficulty to create passwords under the three
policies.
Control Variables The GAM allowed us to model associations linearly for the control
variables (example for emoj12 in Figure 7.2). Although we have to be careful not to gen-
eralize too strongly with our sample, linear associations at least enable us to use correlation
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Figure 7.2: Associations between predictors and difficulty to create a password under the
emoji12 policy. Charts visualize the functions derived from the Generalized Additive Mod-
els (GAMs). Neuroticism was significantly negatively associated with difficulty (highlighted in
blue), i.e. it was easier to create emoji-passwords if participants scored high on neuroticism.
coefficients B as basis for discussion. Female participants assessed it slightly more difficult
to create passwords under the emoji12 (B= 0.91) and 2word12 (B= 1.35, p< 0.05) policies
than male participants. For 3class12, the correlation was smaller (B = −0.46) and pointed
in the opposite direction. Having a background in IT positively showed medium correla-
tions with difficulty in the 2word12 policy, too (B = 0.61). This policy, albeit alphanumeric,
is uncommon in the wild and ignores the verdict of high complexity – IT people might be
skeptical about the “words” requirement, while others are less concerned about it. The task
order also showed medium-strong influence on creation difficulty. If emoji12 or 3class12
were part of the second task, creation was seen as more difficult (Bemoi j12−pos2 = 0.52),
(B3class12−pos2 = 1.19).
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How to Read Smoothed Regression Plots
Figure 7.2 shows the first example of regression plots that will be used throughout the
thesis where appropriate. There is a separate plot for each marginal association with a
given predictor. The solid curve/line represents the estimated regression curve. If it is a
straight line, the association can be modeled linearly (e.g. neuroticism in Figure 7.2). If it
is a “wiggly” curve, the association is modeled with polynomial terms of different degrees
(e.g. Agreeableness in Figure 7.2). The model intercept is at y= 0. In many cases, residuals
are plotted at their respective (x,y) position to give a sense of clusters. At the bottom border
of the plots, we often add “rugs” to show the number of observations/residuals along the
x-axis.
Interpreting the effect size and significant contribution to the model fit is visible in two
ways. First, the slope of the fitted line shows estimated strength of associations. Second,
there are two dashed curves surrounding the fitted curve/line that visualize 95% confidence
intervals. Both curves are entirely above, respectively entirely below, the intersection be-
tween the fitted curve and the intercept at y = 0, the association is significant at the 0.05
alpha level.
In Figure 7.2, we highlighted this for the neuroticism plot. Left to the point of intersection,
both dashed lines are above the intercept (in pink color); analogously, the dashed lines
are below the intercept on the right-hand side, indicating a significant contribution to the
model.
Personality Traits Contrarily to the modeling functions for control variables, we mostly
observed non-linear associations between trait scores and creation difficulty (see Figure 7.2).
One exception is the weak linear association in the emoji12 (B = −0.22) condition. It tells
us that it was slightly easier to create emoji-passwords for people with higher neuroticism
scores. The neuroticism trait is also referred to as “emotional stability” [60], i.e. neurotic
people are usually more emotional. Expressing emotions with emojis in passwords seems to
support this trait and come easier to users scoring high on neuroticism.
In the models for the 2word12 policy, all associations were non-linear and thus inconclusive
at this point. For the 3class12 policy, associations were linear but trivial for the extraversion,
conscientiousness, and neuroticism factors. In summary, scores of the “Creation Difficulty”
scale are difficult to explain with personality traits, but control variables appear to have
stronger influence. Only neuroticism is associated notably with difficulty to create an emoji-
password.
Policy Preference
Table 7.2 shows the overall preference for the three policies. It is evident that participants
generally preferred the 3class12 policy (68%). The emoji policy was best ranked by 18
participants, and 2word12 by 12 participants. Using logistic additive regression, we can
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Table 7.2: Distribution of binary rankings of the three available policies. Evidently, 3class12
was ranked best in most cases.
emoji12 2word12 3class12
1st rank 18 12 67
other rank 80 85 31
n 98 98 98
determine the factors that contribute to these preferences. In essence, the model gives us
the likelihood of voting a given policy to the top, which is a binary decision (1 = pre-
ferred, 0 = not preferred). Including demographic control variables as predictors, we ob-
served strong effects for IT-background. The probability of putting emoji12 at the top is
exp(Bemo ji− IT ) = 9.87 for participants without technical background, so around ten times
higher. Only one respondent with an IT background ranked emoji12 on the top. The order
in which policies were displayed also produced a notable effect. If emoji12 was part of the
second exp(Bemo ji−pos2) = 0.27 or third task exp(Bemoi j−pos3) = 0.76, the likelihood to rate
it the best policy slightly decreases. Other task orders, as well as age-related preferences,
were inconclusive.
As with creation difficulty, rank-associations with personality traits were generally
weak. The likelihood to prefer 2word12 decreased with higher extraversion scores
exp(B2word12−E) = 0.82. High agreeableness scores entailed higher chances to vote for
emoji12 exp(Bemo ji12−A) = 1.28. Interestingly, only very high neuroticism scores (>17)
caused a stark increase in favoring the emoji policy. However, the sample is thin in this
area so the model is more unstable at this boundary. Other associations were negligible or
inconclusive.
Time to Create Passwords
The second usability metric was the time the participants took to create passwords. It can
also be interpreted as effort put into the task. The most interesting associations were vis-
ible for the 3class12 policy, where all personality traits could be modeled as linear pre-
dictors (see Figure 7.3), and all showed medium-strong correlations (details in the Ap-
pendix, Table 14.3). One might have suspected that conscientious people would invest
more time, because one of their common attributes is diligence. However, this was not
the case: conscientiousness was negatively associated with creation time for all policies
(Bemoi j12−C = −3.58,B2word12−C = −3.4,B3class12−C = −2.09). Neuroticism was signifi-
cantly negatively associated with creation time, while agreeableness was marginally pos-
itively associated in 3class12. Demographic control factors indicated that, on average,
women spent more time creating passwords in all conditions (W = 1166, p < 0.01). The
biggest effects were visible for task number as predictor: our participants took significantly
less time to select passwords for the second and third tasks (example shown in 7.4). Most
likely, this is a learning effect or due to people modifying their previous passwords.
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Figure 7.3: Associations between personality traits and time to create a 3class12 password. All
traits could be modeled as linear predictors.
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Figure 7.4: Associations between control variables and time to create a 2word12 password.
Especially the task number and gender were showed strong associations.
7.2.3 Finding Summary
Overall, the usability metrics were comparable for all policies and the ranking was fairly
homogeneous. So, any deviance from the mean could potentially be explained by personal-
ity traits and other confounding factors. In terms of personality, the most important finding
was that scores on the neuroticism dimension seem to be positively associated with the us-
ability of the emoji policy. As indicated above, emojis in passwords appear to fulfill their
purpose in that they help some people express their emotions. Participants who did not have
a background in IT were much more likely to prefer the emoji policy, and their neuroticism
score played a subordinate role. Perhaps, a lack of expertise does not allow those partici-
pants to consider the switch from keyboard to mouse and vice versa (homing). Moreover, the
3class12 policy received the most votes which might be due to the status quo bias or famil-
iarity bias. 3class12 is the only commonplace policy among the tested ones, so participants
were already used to it and voted it first. The timings were mostly affected by the task order
– participants spent less time on the second and third creation task. So although personality
traits serve as predictors for timings, these effects were weaker by comparison.
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In summary, control factors had a greater effect on password usability and approval of poli-
cies than personality traits. Nonetheless, medium to strong effects are more likely to be
detected with our sample size to begin with. So, the fact that we even observed small as-
sociations indicates that personality is a contributing factor to the perception of password
policies. At this stage of the research we were not able to look into the selection behavior
because the repeated measures design stood in the way. Thus, we designed and conducted
two further studies to investigate the effect of personality on password strength perception
and selection.
7.3 Study 2: Strength Perceptions
With an observational online study, we explored the associations between psychological
variables and password strength perception. As outlined in Chapter 5, we regard the percep-
tion of strength as an implicit driver for behavior, which is more difficult to observe. Hence,
we explored associations between subjective password strength ratings and scores on well-
established psychometric scales. The task resembled the PASDJO game: participants were
shown a password, and they had to rate it on a seven-point scale. We chose seven point scales
to make the approach more comparable to Ur et al. [342]. Moreover, we gave participants
two passwords, and they had to decide which one was stronger.
Before we ran the study, we pre-registered the experiment with the open-science framework
(OSF)4 and planned to conduct all analyses as predicted to mitigate confirmation bias. How-
ever, the envisioned statistical tests were not always applicable, which forced us to consider
more appropriate methods and move away from the pre-registration. Since we consider our
research efforts mostly exploratory, we approached the study without specific hypotheses
regarding the influence of certain personality traits on the perception of password strength.
7.3.1 Structure
The study was divided into six parts. Two parts were standard psychometric tests. We
describe all parts, to give the reader the full picture about the participants’ tasks. However,
we have to omit a few less important results for the sake of clarity. After a brief introduction
where the participants were informed about the background of the study, the first step was to
provide basic demographic information regarding gender, age, educational and professional
background.
Meta Password The second part elicited characteristics about the passwords that our par-
ticipants used on real online accounts. Here, we asked about typical password attributes, like
LUDS (lower-, uppercase, digits, symbols), length and the inclusion of dictionary words.
4 https://osf.io/, last accessed 11.09.2016
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The collection of such password descriptions is an ethically reasonable way to study actual
behavior that does not directly involve creating and disclosing an entire password [354]. Par-
ticipants could select from a list of accounts that they used on a regular basis, e.g. Facebook,
YouTube, Netflix, Google. If they did not have any of the selectable accounts they could
provide another. We call the description of a participant’s password on any of these sites
“meta password” in the remainder of the chapter. We included this part in the survey to
explore additional covariates for strength perception.
Table 7.3: Set of passwords that we divided into different length and strength categories (as
measured with zxcvbn). Features: U = uppercase, D = digits, S = symbols
Password
Categories
Features
guesses
Length Strength (log10)
hagrqqqqthhbbe Long Strong - 12.48
etuhcarap Short Weak - 4
AbWxCdYz Short Medium U 8
1qaz2wsx3edc Long Weak D 3
a6a4ba8a Short Medium D 8
ieatkale88 Short Medium D 10
thedzfhg123 Short Medium D 10
11Nd1sPPut8ble99 Long Strong U,D 16
bicycles-peaches-cold Long Strong S 13.69
AatIcs,ijayl-t Long Strong U,S 13.95
p@ssw0rd Short Weak D,S 0.95
ocean4 Size !beer Car Long Strong U,D,S 20.39
F@m1Ly07% Short Medium U,D,S 6.88
Standalone Strength Rating In the third part of the study, the rating part, the participants
assessed the strength of one password at a time in random order, similar to playing PASDJO.
The passwords had to be rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = very weak to 7 = very
strong. We picked a set that was comparable to related work [342] and that we carefully
designed around certain attributes. Table 7.3 shows the selected set of passwords and their
features. The “length” category distinguishes between short passwords with nine charac-
ters or less and long passwords with ten characters or more. The distinction is inspired by
real-world policies that most commonly require up to nine characters (see Chapter 6). The
“strength” category groups passwords on three levels by their guess number as determined
by zxcvbn. Weak passwords require less than 106 guessing attempts, strong passwords at
least 1012 guesses, and medium passwords anything in between. This classification is in
concordance with related work [115, 369] . To fully counterbalance all category combina-
tions, one would require 120 items, which we could not implement for the sake of brevity.
Hence, we kept the number of items small to mitigate fatigue during the study sessions. In
the chosen set of 13 passwords, there were at least three items for each distinct category,
i.e. three short, long, weak and strong passwords, and at least three passwords pertaining to
different LUDS policies (lowercase, uppercase, digits and symbols).
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Figure 7.5: Simplified item of the comparison task. The passwords differ in length, strength,
and the usage of uppercase letters and digits. Here would have scored the importance of length
and digits with +2 while the importance of strength and uppercase letters was scored with -2.
Comparison Following a similar procedure as Ur et al. [342], participants moved on to
compare the strength of passwords pairs (comparsion part). The 7-point scale ranged from
“<left password> is much stronger” to “<right password> is much stronger”. The pairs were
constructed such that the passwords differed, e.g., in the existence and positions of digits
and uppercase letters. Figure 7.5 illustrates our scoring schema.
If the passwords measurably differ in strength as in Figure 7.5, the ratings show if the partic-
ipants’ perceptions match reality. In total, ten comparisons had to be made in random order,
in which we permuted the combinations. For this task, we also added an attention check
where the passwords on both sides of the scale matched, allowing us to exclude responses
where the answer differed from “both passwords are equally strong”.
SeBIS Next, we requested self-assessment about security-related behavior using the Se-
curity Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) [97]. This scale comprises the dimensions secure-
ment, passwords, awareness, and updating. For each dimension, a score is calculated with
four items totaling up to 16 additional items in our study. However, in discussions after the
experiment we received hints that it would have been better to include a gap of a couple of
days before collecting the SeBIS data to ensure its validity. Doing so would mitigate priming
and social desirability biases. Since we failed to take this into account beforehand, we do
not report the results further, but it is important to mention that the questionnaire included
those 16 items.
Big Five The study concluded with two psychometric tests. In the Big-Five part, we uti-
lized a set of 50-items from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), which is a repre-
sentation of Costa and McCrae’s NEO-PI-R domains [60]5. In this personality test, partici-
pants rate how accurately a certain statement portraying a certain personality characteristic
describes themselves. Each item is a 5-point scale with the labels very inaccurate, mod-
erately inaccurate, neither accurate nor inaccurate, moderately accurate, very accurate.
Every personality trait is tested with five positively and five negatively keyed items. It was
shown that the 50-item version of the test shows high correlation with more exhaustive tests
(r > 0.75 in all dimensions) and is thus a sufficiently reliable test. We randomized the order
of the items.
5 All items of the personality test can be found here: http://ipip.ori.org/newNEODomainsKey.htm,
psychometric properties: http://ipip.ori.org/newNEO_DomainsTable.htm
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GDMS Egelman and Peer found that the general decision-making style had higher predic-
tive power than the Big-Five traits for privacy-related behavior [98]. Thus, we wanted to test
the feasibility of both psychometric tests and finished the study with the GDMS part. This
scale uses 25 positively keyed items to measure the five decision-making styles rational,
intuitive, dependent, avoidant and spontaneous.
7.3.2 Quantitative Analysis
Since at least three passwords showed a certain characteristic, e.g. uppercase letters, we
averaged the ratings for them accordingly and used them as dependent variables. Moreover,
in the psychometric tests we accounted for negatively keyed items, i.e. those items that were
phrased with negations like “I don’t talk a lot”. We inverted the ratings where necessary and
afterwards calculated the sum of agreement levels for each dimension (trait score).
As in Section 7.2, we repeatedly fit a GAM to our data, i.e. a more flexible and interpretable
form of regression6. Subjective password strength assessments, respectively comparisons,
serve as dependent/response variables. We calculate one score per participant and password
category by adding up the corresponding ratings. For instance, if they rated all eight pass-
words containing digits with seven points, their score for “G_Digits” (Group of passwords
with digits) is 56. We average participants’ ratings for models that require means instead of
total scores.
Psychometric scores on all several sub-dimensions served as independent variables (covari-
ates). We always control the regression models for gender, technical background and age to
contrast effects. Wherever possible, we model covariates as linear, if the GAM indicates that
smoothing is unnecessary. For this data-set, we also conducted principal component analy-
sis followed by factor analysis. The resulting factors are then used to fit additional models
for comparison. This allows us to evaluate the suitability of the Big Five inventory for our
exploration.
7.3.3 Qualitative Analysis
To better understand the reasoning behind the ratings and comparisons, we also inquired
how the respondents approached the rating task. They could enter free-text answers after
all ratings were done. The answers were then coded independently by two members of the
team. The first coding step was to find categories and propose the code book. Afterwards,
the proposed codes were handed over to the second coder, who sorted answers into the
categories and amended new ones where necessary. Interrater agreement between the two
coders was satisfactory (78%, Krippendorff’s α = 0.55) and the final the code book could
be created after discussing the discrepancies. We report how many participants mentioned a
particular theme in their response regarding their rating strategies.
6 https://multithreaded.stitchfix.com/assets/files/gam.pdf (last accessed 06.02.2018)
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7.3.4 Recruitment
We utilized the online research platform Prolific7 to administer our survey. Participants
received $2.65 upon successful completion, which took 20 minutes in average. This com-
pensation level is suggested as part of the ethical reward guidelines on the platform. Only
an English-speaking audience was eligible to participate. From the 178 people who started
the survey, 104 finished it. To prevent low quality answers, we introduced an attention check
during the comparison part of the experiment.
7.3.5 Ethical Considerations
There is no institutional review board for this kind of studies at our institution. However,
we designed the questionnaire to respect the participants’ privacy and did our best to mini-
mize the level of disclosure of sensitive data. The metrics we collected to characterize the
participants’ passwords are most likely insufficient to reconstruct the passwords in a straight-
forward way and can thus be considered ethically acceptable.
7.3.6 Limitations
Like most studies involving personality assessment, the result is only a rough model of a
person’s personality and does not include all facets. We chose a test with 50 items to assess
the Big-Five traits. While such psychometric tests exist with item counts between 10 [137]
and 240 items [60], the 50-item version has high internal reliability and does not fatigue
the respondents as much as more exhaustive tests. Additionally, with a sample size of 100
participants, power-analysis tells us, that only strong and medium interactions are likely
to be found for with our regression models (cf. [303] or [108, p. 223]). At this stage
of the exploration, however, this is what we aimed for. If we do find effects with such a
small sample, then they must be large enough to justify follow-up investigations with larger
samples. Moreover, statistical analyses can be done very differently. We traded off model
complexity and interpretability to draw first conclusions. Thus, the reported associations can
never be seen causal effects, because we would have to use different experimental setups,
and carry out the experiments many times on larger samples. In the scope of our personality
studies, we therefore provide pointers and possible explanations, but do not claim that the
results are highly generalizable. This is especially important, because the sample stems from
a technically savvy audience. Users registering for tools like Prolific or Amazon Mechanical
Turk may also have stronger financial motivation to do so than the rest of the population
[271].
Furthermore, the methodology relies on self-assessment and honest answers, which are dif-
ficult to control. We introduced an attention check to mitigate the problem, by asking people
7 https://prolific.ac, accessed 01.09.2016
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to compare two identical passwords. For the meta-password, we do not know whether it
was created on a mobile or desktop device. Passwords created on mobiles are usually less
complex than those created on desktops [232, 355].
Finally, the study set-up and procedure may also influence the interpretability of the out-
come. We decided not to randomize the order of the question blocks to maintain full control
over the general procedure. When we measure dependent variables, the order of questions
is still randomized in the question groups. This way, the potential fatigue effects are the
same for all participants at the different stages, while the important questions are in random
order. Moreover, the items for password pairs were not fully counterbalanced on all levels
to prevent fatigue when answering the entire questionnaire. A more exhaustive set of tested
passwords would increase the generalizability.
7.3.7 Results
In this section, we first describe the participants and meta password characteristics before
we proceed to the regression analyses. Since we created plenty of regression models, we
only report those who showed notable associations – mostly for “Overall” and “Digits” in
the rating part, and “Symbols” and “Digits” in the comparison part. We omit results from
other psychometric measures (GDMS, SeBIS) for the sake of stringency. The final part of
this section shows qualitative findings and a brief synthesis of the results.
Participants
We collected 104 complete samples. We had to remove three samples from respondents
who failed the attention check. Another response was removed because all responses on
point scales were answered with the same value. This procedure is proposed by the IPIP
project8. The resulting total N = 100 was divided into 42 female and 58 male participants.
Their average age was 28 years (StandardDeviation (SD) = 9, Minimum= 16, Maximum=
61, Median (Md) = 26). 44 responses came from students. The education level was high
with 59 participants reportedly having a bachelor’s (44) or master’s (15) degree. 29 par-
ticipants claimed to have a computer science or IT-related background. In summary, our
sample stems from a young, educated and fairly technically savvy population. This conve-
nience sample is not ideal, but we hope to deal with this skew by including demographics as
predictors in the regression models.
Ratings Descriptives
On average, the respondents correctly identified weak, medium and strong passwords in the
rating task, i.e. their perception matched reality. The average subjective scores were M =
3.60 (SD = 1.07) for weak, M = 4.25 (SD = 0.95) for medium and M = 4.71 (SD = 0.90)
8 http://ipip.ori.org/newValidity.htm accessed 02.09.2016
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for strong passwords. A Friedman rank test showed that these ratings differed significantly
(F(2) = 59.91, p < 0.001). Figure 7.6 shows all averages per group.
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Figure 7.6: Participants’ average assessments of different password topologies, e.g.
G_Uppercase groups all passwords that contained uppercase letters.
Standalone Strength Rating
Next, we analyze associations between personality and password perception. Internal con-
sistency of the scale was fair (Cronbach’s α = 0.72).
Model 1: Big-Five Scores with minimal REML smoothing For overall strength rating,
most covariates revealed linear associations (Table 14.4 in the Appendix lists the coeffi-
cients). In Figure 7.7, we see that participants who scored higher on the openness trait
generally judged passwords lower. This effect was flagged as significant in the model
(B = −0.36,β = −0.25). For agreeableness, we can see a slightly more positive trend, i.e.
participants tended to rate passwords higher, the higher they scored on the agreeableness
scale. The other traits did not show any conclusive association. Having a computer-science
background revealed slightly lower assessments (B=−2.92,β =−0.14), but the association
was not significant. The model fit was rather low with R2ad j = 0.06 and an explained deviance
of 14.7%. Associations and model fits were comparable for the “short password” and “weak
password” categories. The highest model fit was achieved for the “Passphrase” category
(R2ad j = 0.17, explained deviance 26.3%), suggesting that passphrases were largely respon-
sible for the overall strength rating model. In summary, personality did not explain much
of the participants’ assessment. Penalizing smoothing parameters in stronger ways achieved
higher model fits, however, the likelihood of overfitting the models increases. Therefore, we
explored different factor constellations to get closer to explaining strength perceptions.
Model 2: Extracted Factors as Predictors Although the IPIP scale showed good internal
consistency, we can try to break down the contributing factors. Usually, a Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) reduces the number of factors, but does not have to. In our case, we
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Figure 7.7: Visualization of generalized additive models for overall strength perceptions (i.e.
tendency to judge a password stronger) with Big-Five traits as covariates. There is a signifi-
cant negative association for openness: participants scoring higher on the openness trait judged
password strength lower.
would expect five distinct factors from the 50 items, but a PCA revealed that there might be
ten for our data set. We thus extracted those factors with a standard factor analysis using
varimax rotation and used these factors as predictors instead of the big-five trait scores. The
resulting model explained a larger portion of the deviance (20.1% vs. 14.7%) for overall as-
sessment, but the R-square value remained constant. Coefficients for Factor 3 were biggest
(B =−2.16,β =−0.21), and all items of the openness sub-scale loaded onto it. To a much
smaller degree, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and extraversion items also formed this
factor. As a consequence, marginal effects, i.e. caused by only one personality trait, can be
ruled out – it is a combination of trait scores that explains associations in our model. How-
ever, only a confirmatory study with a larger sample size can deliver final answers as to the
specific trait combinations. As of now, we hypothesize that participants showing particular
constellations of openness, conscientiousness and extraversion scores rated all passwords
lower than other participants.
Figure 7.8: A principal component analysis suggested there might be 10 explanatory factors
in our dataset for the personality construct, which we then extracted using varimax rotation.
Factor 3, which was mostly loaded with openness items, Factor 9 (mostly conscientiousness),
and Factor 10 (mostly extraversion) were associated with lower ratings.
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Model 3: Mixed Model – Password Characteristics and Big Five Traits Similar to the
evaluation of PASDJO strength ratings, we can take the different features of the passwords
as covariates, e.g. the number of digits or the total length. Figure 7.9 visualizes the ratings
for each password. We see that strength ratings take a broad score spectrum in many cases,
with the exception of those passwords that contained symbols. Using password features as
covariates allows us to identify their weight in the assessment.
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Figure 7.9: Participants’ subjective strength assessments of the 13 passwords in the study. Broad
interquartile ranges for indicate that participants largely disagreed on the strength.
First, we look at marginal associations between ratings and the number of lowercase, upper-
case, digits, and symbols (LUDS metric), which is basically a linear model. All coefficients
are positive (βL = 0.15, βU = 0.24,βD = 0.26,βS = 0.13) but weakly associated, and the
model fit is rather low (R2ad j = 0.12). Mixing it with the Big-Five traits as predictors im-
proves the fit slightly (R2ad j = 0.15). If we factor in password length as an interaction term
with the LUDS metrics, the fit improves further (R2ad j = 0.20). The correlation between the
number of digits and ratings becomes strong (βL = 0.84), i.e. more digits are perceived as
stronger. This, however, was surprisingly contradicted when we account for the fact that
two passwords had digits as substitutions for letters (p@ssw0rd and F@m1Ly07%). Thus,
the final model includes an interaction term digits∗ substitutions∗ symbols as covariate and
achieves the best model fit overall (R2ad j = 0.25). In Figure 7.10 we can see the result-
ing associations. Password length was the primary factor, while the influence of character
substitutions reversed the positive impression of symbols, digits and uppercase characters.
Personality traits on the other side, although statistically significant, were weak predictors.
However, removing them from the model entirely would have led to a notable decrease in
model fit (∆= 0.05).
Conclusion The mixed model is strongly influenced by interaction terms with predictable
character substitutions. In general, more digits, uppercase letters, and symbols led to higher
strength ratings, but this association was strongly reversed if digits or symbols acted as
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l33t substitutions. Thus, we conclude that respondents were skeptical about this password
creation strategy in the rating part. By and large, personality was a minor factor.
Figure 7.10: Top: Longer passwords were perceived as stronger. Correlations turned negative
if, substitutions were factored into the model. Bottom: Personality traits showed very small
associations.
Standalone ratings modeled with Meta password
Trying to understand if participants’ past behavior might have influenced their judgment,
we created GAMs analogously with metrics of their meta password. The only notable as-
sociation, which was conclusive across the board, was the reported number of uppercase
characters. We found that with increasing usage of uppercase letters, participants tended to
give lower ratings (β =−0.27).
Comparisons Between Two Passwords
We explored whether personality traits influence how participants decide between two given
passwords. We modeled the comparison on the 7-point scale such that 1 represents a vote
against a feature and 7 for a feature, e.g. more digits. Only conscientiousness was retained
as predictor in all models. The most interesting association was found when one of the two
passwords contained digits: Choosing the password with more digits positively correlated
with higher conscientiousness scores (β = 0.43). The opposite is true for participants scoring
high on the openness scale. They are more likely to vote for the longer password (non
linearly) than for the one containing digits (β = −0.17). Totaling up all character classes
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used in a password, we see that the more diverse it was, the more likely it was favored
by participants with high conscientiousness scores (β = 0.36). In this particular model,
there were weak associations between gender and character diversity. Male participants
were more likely to prefer the password consisting of more character classes (β = 0.23).
Having a computer-science background correlated with preference for the longer password
(β = 0.21).
In all the models, the predictive power was moderate and did not reach the levels from Model
3 in the rating task. However, the correlation coefficients were stronger for personality
trait. We find that the decision between two given passwords is mostly associated with the
conscientiousness and openness traits.
Qualitative Findings
Entering an elaborate response to justify judgments was not mandatory. Yet, all but one par-
ticipant (n=99) gave a brief and in most cases comprehensible explanation for their ratings.
The following numbers do not necessarily add up to n, because an answer could contain
multiple codes.
We identified four overall themes in how the participants approached rating passwords:
Character diversity, creation strategy, predictability and other. The character diversity
code consists of participants mentioning the importance of symbols (69), digits (52), upper-
/lowercase letters (45) and general variety of characters (16). Regarding the creation strategy,
many participants penalized passwords when they contained actual words (40) or personal
information (3). The predictability category was divided into answers referring to charac-
ter substitutions (10), patterns (17), guessability (12), randomness (20), length (25) and the
position of symbols/digits (6). The other themes were established from 8 participants us-
ing technical jargon (e.g. “attack” or “brute force”) and those who identified the obfuscated
passwords (2). These themes echo the quantitative ratings very well.
7.3.8 Finding Summary
We found that participants evaluate password strength by looking for specific patterns. Re-
gression models and qualitative analysis show that respondents mostly penalized lack of di-
versity and randomness which is consistent with related work [342]. Thus, the associations
originating from different personality traits were small in many cases, but not negligible.
Technical background and gender played a role in the comparison task, because male par-
ticipants were more likely influenced by character diversity. On aggregate, the predictive
power of the independent variables was higher in the comparison task than in the standalone
rating. Nonetheless, a fine-grained mixed model revealed interesting side effects for stan-
dalone ratings. These include the reversal of the correlation if a digit or symbol was used
to substitute a letter. The most important personality factors across both tasks were open-
ness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. The sample size might have been too small
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to yield narrow confidence intervals and impressive model fits. As exploratory stage, how-
ever, the data provides considerable evidence as to the feasibility of investigating “password
personality”.
7.4 Study 3: Password Selection and Coping
As a final step in our “password personality” exploration, we ran another online study. Hav-
ing investigated policies and the perception of passwords through the lens of personality
traits, the main goal of the third study was to evaluate potential associations between person-
ality and password selection. To overcome some of the limitations of the previous study, we
hoped to increase the sample size and reduce the number of items during the study. More-
over, further answers about the participants’ explanations and motivations were considered
to better understand the weight of personality factors. We determined the following research
questions: 1) Are there correlations between password features (topology) and personality
traits? 2) Do certain facets of personality shine through in password coping strategies, e.g.
the tendency to write down passwords?
7.4.1 Procedure and Tools
The study was designed to take no more than ten minutes to lower the friction for partic-
ipation. The briefing page informed participants about the purpose of the study and data
disclosure policies. After acknowledging the conditions of participation, respondents were
asked to create a password. To boost ecological validity, we provided a fictitious but realistic
scenario [200]. The task was to come up with a new password for a new email account that
they were going to use as their main address. Further, the instruction pointed out that the
incentive would only be paid of if the participants chose a password they could recall later
on. A basic8 policy was enforced, as it is one of the most representative policies in the wild
(see Chapter 6). This loose policy would also allow for both very complex and rather simple
passwords, which could be associated with personality traits. Having successfully confirmed
the password, respondents were taken to a questionnaire about demographics, just like in the
first two studies.
Next, participants completed the BFI-K questionnaire consisting of 21 items that have to be
rated on a 5-point scale. We opted not to use the 50-item inventory for the sake of saving
time. We added an item that served as an attention check. It asked to respond to this item
with “disagree”. Failure to follow this instruction allowed us to drop the response from the
dataset. The resulting 22 items were shuffled to avoid sequence effects.
Afterwards, we surveyed respondents about their password management behaviors and pref-
erences. We used multiple-choice and open responses to collect qualitative, self-reported
data. For instance, we wanted to know how they cope with multiple accounts or how they
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reuse passwords. Since the study was done as part of a bachelor thesis project, we were lim-
ited by the amount of time available. Therefore, we deemed the self-assessment sufficient to
gauge security behavior rather than taking more time to administer a SeBIS questionnaire.
The survey concluded with a recall task, where participants provided their initially chosen
password. They could try as often as they liked, and the number of attempts were recorded.
In case they were unable to recall their password, they could proceed anyhow and take part
in the lottery. If they chose to provide an email address in the final step, this data was stored
separately from the questionnaire data to avoid privacy issues.
7.4.2 Recruitment and Sample
Participants were invited via a university newsletter, and snowballing the link via personal
connections and posts on social networks. The questionnaire was in German and participants
were screened about their command of the German language. We instructed participants to
take the survey on a desktop. 184 people completed the survey, but we had to drop the
responses of 8 participants because their response timings were unrealistically fast (lower
than 2 * standard deviation). From the 176 remaining respondents, 89 were male, 86 fe-
male and 1 preferred not to answer. 116 were students, i.e. a rather high proportion (66%).
Consequently, the average age was 25 years (range [16;55], SD = 6, Md = 24). 67 (38%)
reportedly had an IT-background. 129 respondents chose to participate in the raffle for shop-
ping vouchers.
7.4.3 Limitations
Like most password-selection studies, our study is limited by the purposefulness of the task:
Participants knew they were only going to use the password in the study. To mitigate this,
we tried to give participants enough context information to immerse themselves into the
situation. Moreover, while the study was ongoing, we received 30 feedback emails asking
for clarification about the attention check questions. We had introduced an additional item
at a random position in the personality construct. This led to misunderstandings that we
failed to identify in the design and piloting of the survey. Some respondents thought that
this question was a measure of their personality, too, and indicated giving a wrong answer
on purpose. We therefore had to omit this sanity check entirely, because it did not feasibly
tell whether participants had read the questions carefully enough. Instead, we based the
decisions to drop responses on the timings.
7.4.4 Results
The resulting 176 passwords had a median-length of 10 characters (range [8;22]) – 130 par-
ticipants went beyond the minimum requirement of eight characters. Figure 7.11 visualizes
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additional metrics that show that passwords were also stronger than expected with a mean
guess number greater than 108. Passwords with guess numbers greater than 106 are expected
to withstand online attacks [115]. Moreover, overall internal consistency of the big-five con-
struct was at α = 0.65, thus slightly below the bar at 0.7. Subscales for each trait, however,
were more consistent and above the threshold. In the following, we try to fit generalized
additive models to the data using B5 trait scores as covariates.
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Figure 7.11: Zxcvbn metrics for user selected passwords.
Password Composition
First, we use zxcvbn metrics as response variables (see Figure 7.11), and explore marginal
associations with big five traits. As before, we include age, gender and IT-background as
control covariates. We found that only password length was (significantly) associated with
B5-traits: Participants with higher neuroticism scores tended to create longer passwords
(β = 0.21), using more lower-case letters as a side effect (β = 0.19). A second corollary
was that passwords from those participants also consisted of more word-chunks (β = 0.26).
However, it is hard to read this result, because even very long random passwords consist of
only one matching sequence (“bruteforce”), so more chunks does not imply greater strength.
Moreover, having an IT background was positively associated with password length (β =
0.21). A one-tailed Mann-Whitney test confirms this (W = 4204, p < 0.05). Consequently,
password guess numbers were higher if participants had an IT background (β = 0.19). None
of the models however, achieved exceptionally good fit: the maximum R-squared (adjusted)
value was R2ad j = 0.13 (for the number of symbols as target variable). We tried to achieve a
better fit by performing a principal component and factor analyses. This was not effective,
either. We conclude that password metrics are only very slightly predictable by personality
profiles.
Password Categories
We manually coded all passwords in two stages: first we tagged passwords with a cre-
ation strategy and afterwards we combined them to broader categories. The resulting codes
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for passwords and their respective frequencies were: simple (17), systematic (7), random
(16), mnemonic (8), passphrase (25), common-topology (56), and hardened-topology (47).
Simple passwords can be found in dictionaries, consist of only one word, only lowercase
letters or only digits. Systematic passwords are assembled with keyboard patterns. We did
not see any coherent approach in random passwords. Mnemonic passwords have upper- and
lower-case letters, digits and punctuation at predictable positions that indicate a sentence-like
structure as origin. Passphrases are combinations of dictionary words with or without sepa-
rators. The common-topology code describes passwords with more than one character class
that show typical password structures like “hello123” or “Banana1!”. Finally, hardened-
topology passwords use character substitutions and pseudo-random capitalization of letters,
but clearly come from a common-topology password.
As before, we created logistic additive models to fit personality to a password category. The
only notable associations we found was a stronger tendency to create a passphrase if partici-
pants had a background in IT (β = 1.97), while female participants were less likely to create
a random password (β = −2.8). Although some (smoothed) factors from the personality
dimensions were significant, they were not conclusively associated with the type of created
password.
Password Management Strategies
Respondents freely reported reusing passwords (88.4%), and 65.34% said to categorize their
passwords. Memorizing passwords was the preferred strategy for 109 participants, followed
by notes on paper or a file (n = 43). Using a password manager was generally the least
favored option (n = 24).
We created generalized additive logit models for every management strategy, i.e. binary
outcomes like “Using a password manager”: 1 (true) or 0 (false). Since the percentage of
participants reusing passwords is so high, influence by personality traits was unlikely to be
detected. Consequently, none of the associations was flagged as significant for reuse. How-
ever, older participants were more likely to reuse passwords as shown in Figure 7.12. Extro-
verted participants were significantly less likely to write passwords down on paper or into a
digital file (β =−1.54). Participants with an IT background showed fewer signs of password
reuse (β =−1.97). Instead, they more likely used a password manager (β = 2.1). Since hav-
ing an IT background was significantly correlated with being male (χ2 = 14.32, p < 0.001),
males were also more inclined to use a PWM. We can observe another interesting aspect
in Figure 7.12 which depicts associations between all tested coping strategies and openness
scores, respectively age. Age and openness show an inverse tendency towards using a pass-
word manager: while older participants seem to be more likely to use a PWM (β = 0.77),
the opposite is the case for participants with higher openness scores (β =−2.06). Similarly,
memorizing passwords was less likely for older, but more likely for “open” participants.
Generally, memorizing passwords seems to be the only unfavorable coping strategy for older
participants.
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Figure 7.12: Age and Openness model plots for all coping tested coping strategies. Openness
and Age show inverse associations regarding password managers and memorization.
Memorability
Only 18 out of 176 participants (10%) failed to recall the newly created password at the end
of the survey. Thus, associations with personality traits were unlikely. However, it was clear
even with only 18 passwords being forgotten that the length of the password significantly
contributed to failure rates (β = 2.25, R2ad j = 0.19, 25% of explained deviance). The R-
squared value drops significantly if we remove the Big-Five traits as predictors (R2ad j = 0.07,
8% of explained deviance, p < 0.05). Thus, password memorability was associated with
personality, but we are not able to tell exactly in which way.
7.4.5 Summary and Interpretation
We observed that password length was marginally associated with neuroticism, but none of
the other personality traits. Higher neuroticism scores can be paraphrased as lower emotional
stability. Losing access to an account might lead to stronger emotional reactions. So, possi-
bly, participants showing this trait want to make sure that this scenario does not happen by
choosing a longer and stronger password. Participants working in or studying an IT-related
field, were also more likely to pick longer passwords, but achieved significantly higher guess
numbers. This corroborates findings from Mazurek et al. conclusively [226]. Fitting gener-
alized additive models to data of 176 participants did not show sufficiently strong model fits
to warrant definite inferences about the influence of personality traits on password metrics.
To a higher degree of certainty, however, we can state that personality must not be ruled
out for password selection, which is an unprecedented result. This finding was particularly
evident when we dropped the big five scores as predictors for memorizing the password.
Regarding the retrospective data, we also found salient associations. Although the overall
sample shows that using a password manager is unattractive, a deeper analysis revealed that
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Table 7.4: Overview of significant associations between Big-Five traits, control factors, and
different metrics across three studies. Arrows indicate direction of the associations, col-
ors also highlight significance levels (red/ocher: p < 0.05/0.1 negative assoc., greens: p <
0.001/0.01/0.05/0.1 positive assoc.) Openness and Conscientiousness are the most important
factors from the Big-Five model, and having an IT background was an indispensable control
factor.
Metric Type Study O C E A N Age Gender IT
Difficulty to create 2word12 PW Usability 1 (< .1)
Difficulty to create 1emoji12 PW Usability 1 (< .1) (< .05) (< .1)
Preference of 3class12 policy Attitude 1 (< .05)
Preference of 2word12 policy Attitude 1 (< .05)
Preference of 1emoji12 policy Attitude 1 (< .05) (< .1) (< .05)
Time to create PW Usability 1 (< .05) (< .1) (< .01)
Overall tendency to judge PWs Behavior 2 (< .05)
Comparing PWs based on complexity Behavior 2 (< .01) (< .05)
Comparing PWs based on digits Behavior 2 (< .05) (< .001)
Comparing PWs based on uppercase Behavior 2 (< .1) (< .1)
Comparing PWs based on length Behavior 2 (< .05) (< .05) (< .05)
Length of created PW Behavior 3 (< .05) (< .05)
Guess number of created PW Behavior 3 (< .05)
zxcvbn score of created PW Behavior 3 (< .1) (< .05)
Created PW is passphrase Behavior 3 (< .05)
Created PW is random Behavior 3 (< .05) (< .1)
Cope by memorizing PW Behavior 3 (< .1) (< .05) (< .1) (< .1) (< .05)
Cope by reusing PW Behavior 3 (< .1) (< .05)
Cope by using PWM Behavior 3 (< .05) (< .1) (< .05)
Cope by using paper / files Behavior 3 (< .05)
Number of significant associations (p < 0.05 [0.1] ) 4 [4] 4 [6] 3 [3] 2 [5] 2 [5] 0 [2] 3 [6] 9 [9]
the participants’ age and openness scores are linked to using a PWM, or to memorization ef-
forts. These predictors were inversely associated, which means that there could be a “sweet
spot” of openness scores and age. Consequently, this gives us the opportunity to segment tar-
get groups for password managers more effectively: Older users might be more receptive for
password support tools. Lower openness scores indicate that people are more conservative,
“down to earth”, and appreciate conventions [229]. These values also appear plausible for
older participants in the light of related research [310]. Thus, we conclude that the design of
future password support tools should be centered on different age groups. We will also see in
Chapters 8 and 12 that none of the current solutions are specifically tailored to different user
groups. Current one-size-fits-all solutions might hence explain to some degree why PWMs
are still underused.
7.5 Discussion and Implications
7.5.1 Overarching Themes and User Segments
Egelman and Peer highlighted the importance of the the question which psychographic seg-
ments should be targeted [in security and privacy mitigations]? While they focused on
their newly developed SeBIS scale and other psychometric constructs, we are able to give
new pointers for segmenting users based on their Big-Five traits in conjunction with de-
mographic factors. To approach the segmentation, we can look at the overall influences
148
Password Personality
of personality and demographic factors on different metrics. Table 7.4 lists all significant
marginal associations from all three studies.
Neuroticism In study 1, the primary observation was that neuroticism was associated with
difficulty to create an emoji password. Neuroticism was not associated with any perception
metric in study 2, but the third study revealed an interesting association between neuroticsm
and self-selected passwords. Metrics in the first and the third study revolve around password
creation: It appears to be both easier to find a password expressing emotions for participants
scoring high on neuroticism, and their passwords turned out significantly longer in the third
study. Thus, targeting neuroticism with persuasive interventions during password creation
might boost these positive associations. Nudges should thus focus on making emotional state
more salient and point out benefits of password length to positively reinforce this behavior.
Openness The usability of different composition policies was not associated with open-
ness, but the perception of password strength showed conclusive associations in that pass-
words were generally judged weaker with higher openness scores. Participants strongly
showing the openness trait were also more likely to base their decision on password length
rather than the number of digits. In study 3, we observed that coping strategies involv-
ing a password manager were less likely to be found with participants with high openness
scores. The significant associations, and absence thereof, tell a conclusive story if we look
at passphrases and mnemonic phrase-based passwords. Those types of passwords are strong
and often not overly complex [189, 206, 297]. Passphrases, for instance, are a technique
to facilitate memorization. They also easily exceed length requirements. If they consist of
uppercase and lowercase letters, and are separated with regular punctuation symbols, there
is no need to add digits to meet a three-class requirement: the passphrase is already complex
enough. All this is visible in the study behavior of participants scoring high on openness,
despite the absence of associations between openness and the type of created password in
study 3.
Conscientiousness Like openness, conscientiousness was a major factor in study 2.
There was evidence that participants, who strongly show this trait, tend to believe a more
complex password is better than a long password. We could explain this finding by looking
at the attributes that are usually found with conscientious people: diligence and neatness.
Following password rules requires these facets to ensure a strong outcome. The results in
study 1 (less time taken to create a password) and study 3 (slight tendency to refrain from
memorizing passwords) are harder to interpret. We could expect that crafting a strong mem-
orable password takes due diligence and more time, thus the shorter time spent by conscien-
tious participants is counterintuitive. Perhaps it is due to the measurement approach in our
study. We started taking the time as soon as the password field was focused and the timing
ended when the field lost focus (“blur” event). It is possible that conscientious participants
took their time to reflect on what they wanted to enter into the field, and only then started
the task. However, we do not have the data to support this argument.
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Agreeableness and Extraversion Table 7.4 shows that agreeableness only showed a con-
clusive result in study 1. A more demanding policy like 3class12 did not appeal to partic-
ipants scoring high on agreeableness, while they did favor the emoji-policy much more.
Cheerfulness, empathy and cooperation are often characteristics represented by this trait.
Participants might have favored cheerful emojis to cooperate on finding a suitable solution
together. Thus, password selection could have been more fun and thus more pleasing for
those participants. Since there was no sign of focusing on password strength, we hypothe-
size that memorability might be more important for them. Regarding extraversion, we found
that participants scoring high on this trait disliked a word-based policy and were more likely
to memorize passwords than writing them down. This is probably the most difficult result to
interpret, because extraversion is a more situationally dependent trait than the four others –
a phenomenon coined as “ambiversion” [140]. This could have become visible if our regres-
sion models had shown more curvilinear relationships, but those were not significantly more
likely for extraversion than for other traits. We therefore refrain from further discussion and
note that additional data would be necessary to evaluate the stability of this predictor.
Demographic Factors From Table 7.4, it is evident that associations with the chosen met-
rics are more likely to be found with demographic variables as predictors. This was espe-
cially true for study 3, where almost all outcomes were associated with having experience or
education in a computer-science related field. This is an unsurprising finding, because this
user group can better judge the implications of their behavior. Nevertheless, the additional
factors help us segment user groups in higher detail.
Deriving Segments: Password Personas
With the above themes and stories, we are able to derive a number of user segments that
can be targeted by security mitigations. Segmentation can inform upcoming research and
design directions. For instance, segments serve the generation of hypotheses and play a role
in the creation of new psychographic constructs. The “securing” dimension of the SeBIS
might be enriched by user archetypes to explain attitudes and behaviors rather than just
measuring them. Here, personas constitute a common design tool for segmentation. These
fictional users can be targeted in the design of persuasive interventions. From the data of
three studies on password personality, and backed up by related work, I created a set of four
“password personas” that inform design choices in Part III of this thesis. They are shown in
Figure 7.13. At this point, the personas still remain abstract to account for the early stage of
research about password personality. Personas should be “living” templates that are updated
based on new data [138].
7.5.2 Designing Feedback and Suggestions
Using our personas, it is possible to address personality facets in real-time feedback during
password creation. In the wild, we encounter password meters that estimate the strength of
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Password Personality
Frustration
Is easily frustrated by technology.
Expressiveness
Likes to express themselves and show personality 
in passwords.
Security and Distrust
Needs a reliable solution to securely cope with passwords, 
but thinks third party tools are not trustworthy.
Attitudes / Behaviors / Needs:
Usability of Input Modality
Ensure the (novel) sign-up and log-in process are fail-safe.
Emoji Passwords
Empower the user to show emotion and 
create a strong secret.
Positivity
Create positive reinforcement of secure behavior.
Opportunities for Persuasive Interventions
Jamey Jones
Strongest Trait(s): Demographic Factors:
Neuroticism Mainstream User Female | Male 
1
State of the Art
Listens to new data-driven recommendations to improve.
Confidence
Is able to guage adequate password strength, 
trusts in own memory. 
Memorization
Prefers to memorize passwords to avoid breaches.
Attitudes / Behaviors / Needs:
Background Info
Give background information on strength feedback. 
Mnemonic Phrase-Based Passwords
Highlight memorability and strength benefits.
Feedback
Frame feedback on recency of results. 
Opportunities for Persuasive Interventions
Frankie Fizz
Strongest Trait(s): Demographic Factors:
Openness Advanced User
30 - 40 y/o
Male | Female
2
Fine with complexity
Is happy to create strong passwords if necessary.
Concrete rules
Follows any policy as long as its specific and clear.
Organization
Likes to stay organized and in control. 
Attitudes / Behaviors / Needs:
Suggestions
Show examples of strong and complex passwords. 
Traditional policy
3class12 policy with real-time feedback to check off 
requirements.
Password Manager
Powerful categorization features, with detailed settings.
Opportunities for Persuasive Interventions
Taylor Tang
3 Strongest Trait(s): Demographic Factors:
Conscientiousness IT Background Female | Male
Paper notes
Currently writes down passwords to cope with them.
Simplicity
Dislikes complex rules, paternalism, and pressure.
Help
Appreciates any kind of help with passwords.
Attitudes / Behaviors / Needs:
Generated Passwords and Magic Links
Generate and store passwords or use one-time secrets.
Password Manager
Onboarding experience, simplification.
Emoji Passwords
Empower to choose a memorable and relatable secret.
Opportunities for Persuasive Interventions
Elliot Elis
4 Strongest Trait(s): Demographic Factors:
Agreeableness Extraversion Mainstream User
Older
Female | Male
Figure 7.13: Password Personas. These fictional user profiles can inform design choices for
password support strategies. Refining the details needs further research on password personality.
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the password and in some cases even provide verbal feedback about what the user can do to
improve the password (see [48, 369]). A simple approach tries to convince the user to pick a
stronger password by suggesting a new one or a modified version of the entered password
[126, 291, 300, 341].
Coming back to the finding that personality had a notable effect on how participants com-
pared two passwords, we suppose that it plays a role for real-time suggestions, too. How a
modified version or newly generated password is received likely depends on the user’s per-
sonality. On mobile devices, the user’s password might be visible in clear text while they
enter it [232]. Displaying an alternative password then resembles the comparison task from
our study, and they might wonder which one is stronger. Strength feedback facilitates an-
swering this question. It seems to be easier for conscientious people to assess the strength
of their password, if there is a clear list of requirements than can be “checked off”, to make
it superior to the suggested password (see the persona 3 “Taylor Tang” in Figure 7.13). At
the same time, users who strongly show the openness trait seem to benefit from data-driven
background information about the strength estimation algorithm. We conclude that Ur et
al.’s meter might be especially helpful for the persona 2 (Frankie Fizz). To make it work
for persona 1 (Jamey Jones), it needs to be more reassuring than it currently is: The version
presented at CHI 2017 constructively criticizes the user’s password and suggests alterations.
Adding a positive message might make persona 1 more receptive for this kind of suggestions.
Moreover, we found that demographic factors are useful to segment audiences. We found
that older participants in our third study were more likely to appreciate if they do not need
to memorize passwords, which was considered in persona 4 (Elliot Elis). They were more
likely to use a password manager, paper notes or reusing passwords to reduce cognitive
efforts. Thus, there is a great opportunity to suggest a coping strategy instead of a stronger
password. For instance, websites or browsers could extend sign-up forms with a prompt to
use a password manager. Pointing out the value of not having to memorize the newly created
password could speak to older users and drive adoption rates. It is very important that the
user journey from sign-up to password-manager set-up is simple enough to meet persona
4’s needs. During account creation, interventions can leverage the “opportune moment”:
Kairos, one of the persuasion principles presented in Section 3.4.2, likely possesses a higher
nudging power than, e.g. a news article recommending a password manager, because users
are experiencing the problem first-hand during account creation.
7.5.3 Assessing Personality Traits in Password Studies
In our studies, we explicitly measured personality through psychometric constructs. This
was straightforward, because online studies have become a reliable go-to method to study
passwords. However, in many cases, omnibus tests like ANOVAs fail to reveal significant
effects, and confounding variables could blur causality. Only few such covariates have been
considered beyond demographic information. Our studies highlight that personality is a
promising candidate to consider: for instance, average password strength perceptions were
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distributed normally. However, using general models, the underlying associations became
visible and were statistically significant. Thus, psychometrics should not be neglected, so
we can boost efficacy of security mitigations for different user segments [98].
Still, extending surveys with long psychometric constructs is probably unrealistic. In our
studies we used 50 and 21-item constructs. The latter already showed slightly reduced in-
ternal consistency. Thus, to keep studies short, to prevent participant fatigue, and to obtain
reliable data, we propose focusing on the openness and neuroticism personality traits. Their
associations were most stable in our studies and provided a coherent picture. They can be
measured with only a couple of items (between 9 and 20), so the corresponding study part is
finished within a few minutes. Nevertheless, the specific choice of the traits should be backed
up by confirmatory studies in the future, and may also depend on the research question.
Adding even a few more items to a questionnaire might be impossible due to study con-
straints like budget or timeliness of data elicitation. There are, however, promising solutions
to quickly and inexpensively obtain personality data on all dimensions from a user’s past
behavior. It is possible to infer personality facets from social media data, e.g. public in-
teractions on Facebook [386]. Youyou et al. found that such metrics can even outperform
psychometric questionnaires. Stachl et al., as well as De Montjoye et al. found conclusive
associations between smartphone usage and personality traits [80, 311]. We thus suggest
requesting permission to read either smartphone or social network data as part of the study.
Crowd-workers in a large-scale study by Bentley and Chen, for instance, showed little con-
cern to install software on smartphones for research purposes [20]. While we would not go
so far as to read all contacts, call and message history, we believe a differentially private9
approach can replace personality constructs.
7.5.4 Statistical Models
After consultation with statisticians, we opted for the use of generalized additive models
(GAMs). Their usefulness hinges on the interpretability of their corresponding regression
plots. Traditional indicators like (un-)standardized coefficients are limited in their contribu-
tion to gauge marginal associations and must be interpreted with special caution. In the case
of logistic regression, standardizing binary variables is not useful, but we reported beta val-
ues to describe the slopes in the plots. Especially in study 2, we tried to select the model with
the highest goodness of fit as indicated by the adjusted R-square value. We also considered
the models’ Akaike information criterion (AIC) to move forward. Here, increases and de-
creases of the AIC matched those of the R-square value. Interestingly, the models achieved
better fit than related work on personality in privacy behavior [98]. Thus, we advocate the
use of GAMs in future analyses.
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_privacy (last accessed 04.03.2018)
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7.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In three studies with a total of 440 participants, we broadly explored associations between
personality traits and password behavior. This effort was one of the first of its kind. We
focused on the relationship between the Big-Five model and password policies, strength
perceptions, password selection, and coping strategies, while controlling for demographic
factors. We found evidence for associations between (a) the usability of password policies
and the neuroticism trait; (b) password strength perceptions and openness, respectively con-
scientiousness; (c) password length and neuroticism; (d) coping strategies and extraversion;
and (e) IT-background and more secure behavior. Although the associations were not always
particularly strong, they are still useful to inform the design of persuasive interventions and
password policies. To that end, a set of four password personas was created to segment user
groups by behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic archetypes.
Future Work
Our work was of exploratory nature. Thus, the next step should be a focused study that
increases statistical power to confirm or refute the associations. We provided a user segmen-
tation in our personas to derive testable hypotheses. The refined knowledge about personality
traits can be used to personalize password feedback and make it more effective. As pointed
out by related work, some users overestimate the strength improvement of using digits in
passwords [342], which we also saw in studies 2 and 3. However, not all participants were
equally influenced by digits or different character classes inside passwords. Respecting the
psychographics in real-time feedback while carefully enforcing sensible policies could make
these messages more effective. Besides, personality traits can inform choice architectures
beyond passwords. For example, the Choose-Your-Own-Authentication approach [125] can
benefit from improved default settings depending on personality trait characteristics. The
collection and aggregation of the necessary information could be done implicitly on mobile
phones or social networks [80, 311, 386]. We see this a promising opportunity to improve the
user experience of authentication mechanisms, because off-the-shelf technology can already
achieve this goal. Finally, in light of some participants being more positive towards includ-
ing emoji in their passwords opens new possibilities for password authentication. Emoji
usage itself has been shown to be associated with personality [223], which is supported by
our research. Thus, it is important to investigate how personality traits might be exploited to
model password strength of emoji-passwords.
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Take Aways
• Personality was weakly associated with all the measured di-
mensions: strength perception, policy preference / usability,
password selection and coping strategies. Most notably open-
ness, conscientiousness and neuroticism showed the most con-
clusive associations.
• The models for the perception of passphrases achieved the
highest fit, suggesting a predictable association between per-
sonality and strength perception for this type of password.
Comparing two passwords was associated with the conscien-
tiousness traits. Mixed models that use both password features
and personality trait scores as covariates were the most feasible
approach to improve model fit.
• We can use “Password personas” to inform design decisions
of persuasive interventions in the future. For instance, older
users might be the best target group for password support tools,
because age was a good predictor of their usage. Suggesting
good tools during account creation might lead to higher adop-
tion. Nudges designed for neuroticism should make emotional
state more salient and positively reinforce the benefits of long
passwords.
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Mental Models of Password Managers
An important spillover of our previous exploration is that password managers are more likely
adopted the longer people had struggled with passwords: Older participants in the third per-
sonality study (Section 7.4) were more likely to use a PWM. We have already corroborated
market surveys that indicate a generally low adoption rate of password management soft-
ware. As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.4, it has been hypothesized that users do not
fully trust third parties with their credentials, so there seems to be an urge to stay in charge.
Consequently, most users still try to memorize their passwords. On the other hand, password
managers do provide many usability and security benefits, but why do users fail to see them?
To this end, we see a lack of understanding about how users make sense of password man-
agers. Our goal was to understand users’ mental models of password managers first and then
identify opportunities to improve them, which could increase adoption rates. We thus aimed
to answer the following research questions: (1) How do users think a password manager
works? (2) How does adopting a password manager change user attitudes and behaviors?
To answer these questions, Martin Prinz and I explored attitudes and understandings in semi-
structured qualitative user interviews. To get a more complete picture, we interviewed both
people who already use a PWM and also people who prefer other coping strategies.
Publication Statement
Parts of the outcome of this investigation have been published as an extended abstract
at SOUPS 2017 [257]. For the most part, the chapter picks up the content of that paper
and puts it into the larger context of this thesis. There are two significant additions:
• The chapter includes the detailed structure of the mental model
• The chapter elaborates on the design of a value proposition for password managers
that takes users’ mental models into account.
8.1 Background and Context
Password managers can be either built into web browsers or act as a standalone solution that
is independent of the password’s purpose. Dedicated password managers have existed since
the mid to late 1990s. Web Confidential1 was probably one of the first programs to facilitate
password management, when it first surfaced in 1998. Which of the browsers was first to add
password storage capabilities cannot be easily traced back, but all major browsers added this
feature in the early 2000s. Given the long history of supporting authentication with software
tools, adoption of password managers is still at only 12% [247]. Even security experts dis-
agree on the specific security benefits of different implementations2. If the auto-fill feature
is enabled, this can be used to create digital footprints for individuals3. Nevertheless, similar
attack vectors could easily target regular password entry, and are not limited to auto-fill.
There are different service architectures for handling passwords: offline password managers
keep a database of encrypted passwords locally on the user’s machine, while online managers
provide more portability because passwords are held on a server or a distributed storage so-
lution [228]. KeePass and Password Safe are notable representatives for the offline storage
paradigm, while the cloud-based approach is dominated by third-party solutions like Last-
Pass, 1Password, and Dashlane. Browser vendors have also transitioned to store passwords
in the cloud, e.g. Apple Keychain for Safari, or Google Smartlock for Chrome. On the one
hand, this provides consistent user experiences across multiple devices. On the other hand,
such architectures create lock-in effects and dependencies on the browser. To remove those
drawbacks, third party tools typically provide browser-extensions to automatically fill user-
name and password fields. This way, they can create similar experiences as built-in PWMs,
but the user remains locked into one solution most of the time.
Mental Models Norman suggests that exploring mental models provides predictive and
explanatory power for understanding an interaction [244]. Volkamer and Renaud meticu-
lously described different aspects and definitions of mental models, which are too elaborate
to discuss in this work [352]. As a takeaway, a mental model describes a user’s sense-making
of any system they interact with. Volkamer and Renaud highlight that mental models are not
necessarily static, but can be shaped with different cues to internal feedback loops (see Fig-
ure 8.1). For our purposes, we use a simpler definition provided by Young: Mental models
are “collections of the root reasons why a person is doing something” and “represent what a
person is trying to accomplish in larger context, no matter which tools are used” [385, p.11].
In our case, they describe the reasons for (not) using a password manager, as explained by
current actions to cope with authentication tasks.
1 http://www.web-confidential.com/ (last accessed 16.02.2018)
2 https://www.wired.com/2015/07/websites-please-stop-blocking-password-managers-
2015/ (last accessed 16.02.2018)
3 https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/12/27/no-boundaries-for-user-identities-web-
trackers-exploit-browser-login-managers/ (last accessed 16.02.2018)
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Figure 8.1: Volkamer and Renaud see the formation of mental models as loop involving differ-
ent plans, perceptions, system structures, and actions. Image from [352]
In Chapter 5, we took a quantitative approach to elicit data on the mental models. This was
useful because we tried to understand what contributed to password strength perceptions
and by how much. For password managers, related work on usage motivation is scarce, thus
we strove to answer why users perform certain actions and how these could be supported
by a password manager. Therefore, qualitative methods were more useful. Eliciting such
data to understand mental models, Bravo-Lillo et al. relied on open-ended one-on-one in-
terviews both with advanced and novice user groups [39]. They highlight the usefulness of
this approach to understand thought processes. Kang et al. relied on drawing tasks to elicit
additional data [185]. Participants were asked to sketch what they thought happens to their
personal data when they interact with different online services. During sketching, a con-
current think-aloud protocol was used to avoid misunderstandings. Once the data has been
collected, Young suggests the affinity diagramming method to derive themes and identify op-
portunities for supporting tasks [385]. In this research project, we combined interviewing,
drawing tasks, and affinity diagramming.
8.2 User Interviews
Our main objective was to understand how users make sense of password support tools,
in particular password managers. This would allow us to explore solutions that fit user
expectations better.
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8.2.1 Method and Protocol
We chose to conduct semi-structured open-ended interviews for the reasons mentioned
above. The sessions started with a thorough briefing about the study purpose and asking
for permission to audio-record the conversation. The main questions were (1) Why do you
need passwords? and (2) What is your strategy to manage multiple accounts?. From there,
the study followed up with more fine-grained questions to investigate the specifics of these
two aspects. Moreover, Bravo-Lillo et al. showed the benefits of drawing tasks to find struc-
tural patterns in beliefs [39], so we also asked participants to (3) sketch how a password
manager works. This required that participants were aware of PWMs. If they were not, they
were told that it is a “piece of software that stores a user’s password”, which was expected
to be vague enough to explore participants’ unbiased expectations of this kind of software.
The interviews took between five and 16 minutes.
Recruitment and Sample
We first approached random passers-by on a popular street in Munich to obtain a diverse
sample of participants. Six interviewees were recruited this way. However, these first six
interviews showed that participants were unable to provide sufficient detail in answers to
allow thorough analysis later. Thus, we changed the recruiting method and approached
employees of a design agency with which we had collaborated in the past. We also knew that
the agency’s policy required employees to utilize password managers. Moreover, the user
group was more likely capable of visually expressing mental constructs, allowing for the
envisioned analyses. Eight additional participants were interviewed in this sample, giving
a total of N=14 (6 male, 8 female). They worked as experience designers and concept
developers, and did not have formal training in computer science or engineering. The age of
all interviewees ranged from 20 to 41.
None of the interviewees in the first group had used a password manager before, so we
call this participant group the novices. Since the PWM was part of the company policy, all
interviewees in the second group had used one before, so we call them the actives. The
separation allowed us to detect a shift of expectations before and after adopting a password
manager.
Method Limitations
The recruiting and sampling methods are inherently limited. The novice user group was
asked at a public spot, so it was difficult to provide enough contextual information and
minimize distraction. On the plus side, we achieved diversity and the face-to-face set-up re-
assures trust, because it was clear that none of the information they gave us was going to be
used to access their online accounts. 5 of 6 novices were unable to describe what a password
manager was, before we gave them the above definition. Thus, their decision to refrain from
using a PWM was not made actively, but rather results from the lack of awareness. This
limits the analysis of attitudes and self-reported behavior. Finally, the second user group has
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a homogeneous background: design and communication. Moreover, they were all using the
same password manager due to the policy at their company. Finally, the size of the sample
might have been too small to achieve theoretical saturation, i.e. additional participants might
have brought up aspects that were not covered at all by the existing sample. All these limita-
tions demand that the results not be generalized to a larger population. Instead, they should
be seen as rough trends that help understand a first set of underlying mental models, rather
than the entire spectrum thereof.
8.2.2 Data Analysis and Results
Young proposed a design strategy to translate qualitative data into mental models [385].
The method is based on affinity diagramming. The resulting clusters and themes from the
diagram are then mapped to a hierarchical structure that consists of Mental Spaces, Task
Towers, Tasks, and Particular Tasks. Here, we focused on those Mental Spaces and Task
Towers that involve password managers. Table 8.1 shows the resulting model in this format.
In the following, we report the results that notably contributed to the formation of the model,
which is described in Section 8.3.
Selection and Coping Strategies
All interviewees reuse passwords to cope with the multitude of accounts. Participants often
developed coping strategies without deliberation: they were unaware of how they cope with
passwords until we specifically requested more details. Only then did they reflect and real-
ize how they behave. One such revelation was that they categorize passwords in different
ways. For instance, the context in which they created an account, e.g. the URL or policy of
the corresponding website, was factored into passwords and facilitated the decision-making
process which password to pick from their portfolio (see Figure 8.2 A). Similarly, the per-
ceived importance led to distinct categories, although the interviewees had not realized this.
Participants generally tried to justify their “insecure” behavior. Beside memory burden of
new secrets, time pressure was mentioned as reason for password reuse.
Furthermore, we also heard an interesting, deliberate strategy that seldom appears in the
literature: two participants mentioned memorizing a list, or a list of letters that are then
transformed into a new, quasi-unique password. This method is comparable to the Diceware
technique (details in Section 3.3.3). Instead of rolling a die to generate a random number
by which to look up a word from a list, those participants algorithmically select the order of
words/letters based on contextual cues (see Figure 8.2 B and C). Another participant said to
have memorized a randomly generated password and reusing it many times.
We also inquired situations when their strategies failed. The primary problem of having a
multitude of accounts was the correct combination of user-name and password, which is
a common pitfall of knowledge-based authentication [316]. Not only did they forget pass-
words, but also user names, which is just as severe because web sites generally do not inform
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Mental Space Task Tower Tasks
Creation & Selection Influential Factors Personal & Historical
Policies & Rules
Algorithmic Strategies
Account Context
Memorization
Support Tools Generate & Memorize
Use given Password
Generate & Digitally Store
Personal Algorithms Passphrases
Reuse Word Blocks
Base-Password with Modifications
Website Influence
Use Reduced Alphabet
Handle Failures Trial and Error
Lookup Password
Show Entered Password in Plain Text
Reset Password
Log-In Manual Tasks Copy & Paste password
Lookup hints and cues
Recall from memory
Simplify Stay logged-in
Cross-device support
Autofill forms
Rely on manager
Organize and Commit Share Passwords Secure sharing with colleagues or friends
Write down password
Reset after sharing
Use Aid Password Manager
Word/Digital Document
Handwritten Notes
Memorize Passwords Algorithmic
Website Cues
Mental Drawer
Base Password and Modifications
Protect Passwords Modify Passwords
Unlock access with Master Password
Hide or Encrypt File/Notes
Automation Reset Multiple Passwords
Autosave Credentials
Autofill Username and Password
Warnings when websites are compromised
Build Password Categories Security
Importance
Frequency
Policies & Rules
Mental Drawer
Table 8.1: Mental Model of Authentication and Password Management, adapted from Martin
Prinz [256]
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Figure 8.2: Participants were asked to visualize their methods to create passwords, if they
had a specific strategy. (A) participant who categorizes and remembers passwords by the time
they were created (context factors). (B) participant uses words and cued positions to recall the
constellation. (C) participant who uses a fixed set of characters and algorithm to “calculate” the
correct constellation.
users which was the error source to thwart attacks. Participants reportedly use a trial-and-
error approach to go through their portfolio and ultimately use self-serviced password resets
as a convenient solution. Interviewees expected that websites offer this kind of fallback
scheme, because two of them do this on a regular basis.
Password Manager Impact
Overall, the novices and actives did not behave differently in their selection and coping
strategies at first sight. However, we found that actives did in fact change some habits
when they had started using a password manager. First, although they were initially exposed
to PWMs at work, actives started using them in private shortly afterwards. This interac-
tion and experience with the tool led to their migrating passwords into the manager step by
step. One participant mentioned that it helps him stay organized where there was “chaos”
before (see Figure 8.2 C). Others were somewhat ashamed of their weak practices before
using this kind of software. Password sharing with other users was the central advantage
for four interviewees, especially at work. It facilitates secure collaboration with colleagues
and clients. Participants do not memorize these passwords, because they often use built-in
password generators. They realized that shared passwords are short-lived because colleagues
leave or contracts with clients end, upon which passwords are invalidated. One interviewee
fully embraced generated passwords even for private purposes and only memorizes his mas-
ter password. Interestingly, however, for their most important accounts, most actives kept
on manually crafting passwords and refrained from putting them into the PWM. Having
used the tool and become aware of their own weak behavior in the past, they had gained
confidence in selecting stronger passwords. This gain of mastery left them with a positive
experience of password managers. As a contrast, novices were all comfortable with how
they managed their passwords and did not show that sense of insecurity.
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Figure 8.3: Drawings to the question “What does a password manager do, and how?” from
three novice users. (A) only shows a profile on facebook. (B) emphasizes that the PWM is a
central hub and acts as the user’s “brain” for different entities. (C) shows a table-like structure
that holds all username-password tuples.
Drawing Tasks
Participants were asked to sketch their thoughts whenever this was appropriate. We encour-
aged them to sketch as much as possible. All participants mentioned that it was challenging
to communicate their understanding this way. Already for basic functionality and purpose
of passwords, we asked to create sketches. This task was still relatively easy for all intervie-
wees. Padlocks and keys were two of the most commonly drawn elements. It also helped
to communicate individual elaborate selection strategies (see Figure 8.2). However, the dif-
ficulty rapidly changed for the workings of a password manager. Here, especially novices
struggled with the task and could not proceed without further explanation, telling us that
it is hard to frame an unfamiliar concept with a sketch. Their drawings were more vague
than those of actives, which might also be due to the different professional background and
expertise in creating concepts. The drawn elements and metaphors differed among the two
groups:
Novices had a vague model of how such a password manager might work and found it
especially difficult to sketch this. The benefits and system architecture of the software were
unclear to them. One interesting drawing depicted a password manager as a virtual “brain”
that acts as a central hub to make the user’s life easier (Figure 8.3 B). Another participant,
who reportedly used a Word document to keep track of his accounts, imagined a password
manager to behave the same way (Figure 8.3 C). The only expected difference would be that
accessing the list of passwords would be protected by a password, which is indicated by the
keyhole and an arrow that points to it. This represents novices’ understanding on a more
general level, as they explained a password manager as a special way to manage a secure
list of passwords that helps find the right ones. Five said that it facilitates logins by allowing
them to copy-and-paste passwords from the manager into the webpage.
Actives Since all active users were also visual communicators, it was somewhat easier for
them to sketch the workings of a password manager. They clearly focused on the interaction
between users and the system and highlighted the benefits in their drawings. Having expe-
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Figure 8.4: Drawings to the question “What does a password manager do, and how?” from
six active users. Common components are UI elements that link to other entities, therefore the
interplay between user, PWM and website is clearer.
rienced the advantages, they strove to convey these visually and came up with more details
(cf. Figure 8.4). Instead of a password-table, we can see workflows that show the interplay
between user, database and website. Common components are UI elements like input fields
or buttons that link to other screens or entities. Only one interviewee from the active group
refrained from UI elements and instead sketched a flow-chart.
8.3 Mental Model
From the behavioral, attitudinal, and experiential data, we created a mental model schema
in the style of Young [385] (see Table 8.1). We tried to stay close to the data as possible,
but a few points are enhanced by knowledge from related work. We briefly elaborate on the
mental spaces to allow the reader to delve into task-towers and tasks.
Password Creation and Selection First, users have a variety of particular needs when
they are challenged to create a password. This task tower describes both the constraints,
prior experiences and strategies to accomplish the task. Our participants often mentioned
highly individual selection strategies that allow for both secure and memorable secrets. From
a support tool, they expected guidance and feedback. Password generators that simplify this
task can aid here.
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Log In Most prominently, authentication still involves both manual and automatic tasks.
Interviewees expected to copy and paste passwords from the manager to their browser, or at
least provide a way to retrieve password hints. On the other hand, participants expected that
support tools are deeply integrated into the browser by automatically filling password fields
in a highly reliable manner. If possible, the solution should work across multiple devices.
Organize and Commit The third mental space resembles the “Commit to password” and
“Live with password” stages of the Password Life Cycle [316]. Each participant mentioned
some way of organization strategy that allowed them to live without password managers to
some degree. However, these were not always deliberate choices, but rather have formed
over the years. Especially novice users made sense of password managers by their capability
of protecting passwords, i.e. encrypting a list of passwords rather than just storing them in a
Word document. Active users were already aware of the sharing capabilities and appreciate
a simple process to reset passwords when they need to be invalidated for security reasons.
8.4 Opportunities and Challenges
Having fine-grained insights into the mental models of password authentication sub-tasks
lets us explore novel ways to support users in many challenges through simplification. In
the following, we highlight key opportunities for future work on password managers and
persuasive password support in general.
8.4.1 Leveraging and improving novices’ mental models
There were two important preconceptions about password mangers on the novices side: sim-
ple password lists and copy-paste interactions. Future password managers can leverage these
models to persuasively communicate functionality. The value proposition should thus ensure
that potential users understand that PWMs are not only a secure list of user-names and pass-
words, but also help them select passwords – a benefit that actives had realized in retrospect.
The password list metaphor is also useful to communicate automation features: explicitly
showing new users that they do not have to search through the list, nor copy and paste
passwords from the list to the website might help them understand the simplicity of the in-
teraction paradigm. This can happen during an onboarding user journey, e.g. with an image
showing the steps saved by the PWM (cf. Figure 8.5).
8.4.2 Increasing Sense of Agency
While automation simplifies processes and thus improves usability, staying in control of
security-related interactions is important to users. Novices were confident in their current
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Figure 8.5: Visualizing users’ previous behavior might help communicate how the password
manager can simplify authentication tasks. This can create a better mental model of their work-
ings.
behavior. Actives had realized that their past behavior was sub-optimal, but they had gained
confidence to create passwords and handle authentication for their most important accounts
on their own. As a consequence, a password manager needs to stay flexible enough to respect
user preferences for different account categories, e.g. unimportant vs. important accounts. A
PWM could learn which types of websites the user prefers to handle on their own and refrain
from asking to store the credentials at similar sites in the future. Moreover, reassuring users
that handling such situations on their own is reasonable can inspire trust in the system. A
PWM could automatically detect when it is appropriate to offer help. Current managers only
provide the opportunity to decide whether the password should be saved, maybe saved later,
or never be saved for a particular site. Such decisions can be automated once enough training
data has been provided by the user.
8.4.3 Leveraging Context
Context factors can be leveraged by PWMs to adapt to different situations. For example,
usage-context informs future interactions. If the user sets up the system at work, this is an
indicator about how passwords are going to be categorized, how often they will be reset, and
how likely they are going to be shared with others. Adapting the interface to such scenarios
can simplify interactions and the formation of mental models of the benefits. Moreover,
automated generation of passwords is also context-dependent. As we have shown in Chapter
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6, password policies in the wild impose varying restrictions on the use of characters. To
avoid user frustration arising from rejected passwords, e.g. because they contain forbidden
characters, the generator can ensure the random password meets the website’s composition
policy.
8.4.4 Customization and Personalization
It is evident that current password managers work fundamentally differently compared to
how users normally cope with passwords. Our participants reused passwords with differ-
ent strategies and relied on digital documents, paper notes, and highly individual password
creation or memorization techniques. Beside the document-metaphor discussed above, the
other strategies are not reproduced by password managers. However, a general philosophy
in user-centered design is the aim to “fix the system” rather than to “fix the user” and ac-
knowledge that people prefer maintaining existing strategies, e.g., to make ensure being able
to log in even without assistance. A PWM can hence make a user’s creation experience
more convenient by leveraging existing strategies. For instance, it could let the user spec-
ify a creation technique: if they usually modify a base-password depending on the context,
the PWM could offer to generate passwords like this in future scenarios, i.e., automate the
modification strategy. While this approach would not necessarily improve security, it could
save the user time and remove critical pain points. Besides, the user stays independent of
the tool, because they can reproduce their personal system and authenticate on other devices
even without the support.
8.5 Conclusion
To understand additional psychological context factors of persuasive password support, we
explored the mental models of authentication tasks and password managers with a quali-
tative approach. Both participants experienced with password managers and inexperienced
novices shared their insights, attitudes and behaviors during short interviews. Fourteen inter-
viewees provided us detailed descriptions of their password selection and coping strategies,
and how they make sense of supporting tools. We contribute evidence that (a) individual
coping strategies persist even after adopting a password manager for important accounts, (b)
work environments serve as onboarding triggers even for private use (RQ2), and (c) novices
were mostly unaware of functionality and the ramifications of adopting password managers
(RQ1). These findings show that the value proposition should be communicated concisely.
One potential solution could compare the benefits of using a PWM to inefficient and inse-
cure password practices. At the same time, future solutions should respect highly individual
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coping strategies to match user behavior better. Ultimately, this could increase adoption and,
more importantly, retention rates.
Take Aways
• Password managers appear to be a “black box” for people
who have never used one. They suspect that such tools are
a slightly more secure version of text files to write down lists
of username-password-combinations.
• The mental model of password authentication and managers is
mostly divided into the mental spaces “Select password”, “Log
in”, and “Organize”. There seem to be discrepancies between
current user behavior and current password managers.
• Making password managers adapt to context and individuals
seems a promising direction for future systems.
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Exploring Needs in Persuasive Feedback
The overall goal of this thesis is to support users in how they interact with passwords. As
a sub-goal, we wanted to help those users who want to handle password management on
their own, i.e. without a password manager. We set out to achieve this goal by studying
the design space of password feedback mechanisms like password meters, i.e., the various
dimensions, choices and outcomes of a design challenge. There have been many proposals
and numerous evaluations already for such feedback systems. However, the design space
appears rather narrow if we only look at existing solutions, and many have not supported
users well enough. Therefore, we posit that the design space needs to be opened up in more
breadth. To get there, studying the requirements of password feedback is a necessary first
step. Previous solutions have seldom reported a structured requirement elicitation based
on user research. Thus, before designing and implementing support strategies outside of
the usual spectrum, we first aimed to understand the needs and expectations that users may
have about password feedback. We tried to learn from feature requests and co-designed
proposals as a starting point for generating novel ideas about actionable password feedback.
In particular, we posed the following broad research questions:
RQ1 What do users expect from password support tools during account creation (explicit)
and what do they really need (implicit)?
RQ2 How can we design password feedback in novel ways outside the usual spectrum of
visual password meters and verbal real-time feedback?
RQ3 How can we leverage the interplay between feed-forward and feedback?
This chapter reports on a requirements- and design-exploration for password feedback,
where we wanted to involve users early in the process. The project was a collaboration
between myself and Caroline Olsienkiewicz, respectively Katharina Schwarz, who wrote
their bachelor theses on specific aspects of the exploration [248, 284].
9.1 Background and Context
The design space of persuasive interventions in authentication was put into a framework by
Forget et al. [124]. They established high-level strategies to steer users away from risky
actions. However, while their Persuasive Authentication Framework described how hypo-
thetical design solutions could be categorized, it did not tell us much about the specific user
needs in feedback systems. The same goes for more generic persuasive models like Cial-
dini’s “six weapons” [57], or Fogg’s Behavior Model [119]. The latter provides hints to user
requirements in system design, but those are not specific enough for password authentica-
tion.
On the other hand, there exists a wide range of designs for persuasive password support
that have been empirically evaluated, too. For instance, Ur et al. studied feedback with
numerous solutions [341, 343, 344]. Egelman et al. also explored novel designs for password
meters [99]. Moreover, Shay et al. continued Forget’s exploration of real-time feedback and
suggestions [126, 300]. Beyond real time feedback and meters, Komanduri et al. [199] and
Yee [384] showed an approach to make predictability of passwords graspable. All these
publications report on solutions and corresponding usability evaluations, but they often do
not talk about the needs that users have regarding the support.
Thus, our project focused on eliciting these needs and provide a holistic view on password
feedback and support systems. Ultimately, understanding the needs might help us broaden
the design space further and find more effective and actionable password support. To get
there, we chose a “put the user first” lens and conducted two studies that focused on dif-
ferent levels of user needs (see Figure 9.1). In the first study (Section 9.2) we wanted to
learn explicit and observable needs, i.e. the things that users say they need or that can be
understood by observing how they interact with a solution. The second study (Section 9.3)
was more involved with tacit and latent needs. These are hard to observe and require more
engagement with users, to understand what they actually know and feel when they interact
with a password support system.
9.2 Explicit and Observable Needs
After the literature review (see Part I), there were still open questions about user expec-
tations regarding password strength feedback. Most studies went ahead to test new so-
lutions quantitatively and rarely focused on the intrinsic needs to derive requirements for
feedback. In other words, users were often involved late in the design process, although an
earlier involvement could have led to different design decisions. Our goal in the first step
of the co-designing process was gathering early insights to learn about the requirements of
persuasive interventions in the realm of password authentication. To narrow down the fo-
cus of the requirements, it was important to consider a realistic use-case where the burden
of password authentication is relatively high. From related work, we know that password
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Figure 9.1: Characteristics of user needs and how they show (adapted from [16]). We explored
explicit and observable needs with an online survey, and used a participatory design approach to
learn from what users make.
changes are more frequent in work environments, because expiration-policies are still com-
mon there [172]. Frequent password changes lead to weaker practices, which might be mit-
igated by effective password feedback. To find out how we might improve such feedback,
we used a lightweight, rapid survey with a large portion of open questions. In the following,
we briefly describe the method and findings.
9.2.1 Method
We opted for an online survey to inform our requirement elicitation for the above described
reasons and straightforward data collection. Our questionnaire was centered around the
following core research questions:
• What do users expect from password feedback?
• What do they miss in current solutions / interventions?
• How would they improve existing feedback?
Prototype
To ensure that participants have a shared understanding of password feedback mechanisms,
we created a small website featuring only a password field and textual feedback beneath.
The underlying strength estimation and feedback phrases were based on the zxcvbn library.
Warnings and suggestions that come with zxcvbn were translated to German and shown as
the users typed inside the password field. The 26 warnings included statements like “Names
and surnames by themselves are easy to guess” or “Avoid repeated words and characters”.
We tried to simplify the page as much as possible to minimize priming effects, although
this was hard to achieve. In particular, we did not show any form of visual feedback to
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explore whether this is a need that participants mentioned often. Instead, we showed a
password score in the form “strength: 2/5”. The page introduced the scenario (old password
at work has expired) and asked participants to create a new password that would fulfill the
composition policy of the participant’s current employer. The composition policy, however,
was not enforced, but we probed it in the questionnaire. We did not log the passwords
whatsoever, since this was not the focus of this study. This was disclosed to participants, and
they could decide to drop out of the study if they were still uncomfortable with providing a
new password.
Questionnaire
The survey questionnaire included 37 questions, many of which are quick single- and
multiple-selection items to collect context information (e.g. demographics, semantic dif-
ferentials, social desirability scale). This information would help us assess the value and
relative importance of qualitative statements that followed. The core of the questionnaire is
formed by eleven items about password feedback, six of which were open questions, e.g.
what would need to be changed to make the feedback more comprehensible and how pass-
word creation could be facilitated. Moreover, we inquired coping strategies at work and
personal password behaviors to derive further requirements. During this part of the ques-
tionnaire, we added an instructional manipulation check, i.e. an attention check, to filter out
participants that were only trying to complete the survey as fast as possible to receive the
incentive [249]. This is a well-known issue with crowd-sourced survey data, and the atten-
tion checks can effectively reduce the risk of low-quality data. The items were randomized
where necessary, but the overall structure was the same for all participants, i.e. there were
no independent variables.
Sample
We recruited participants via Prolific1 which provided similar crowd-sourcing features as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk but has a stronger focus on research surveys. Since mTurk
does not allow German users to sign up, Prolific is one of the best alternatives because
of its large user panel. We screened for German language proficiency via Prolific’s internal
screening tool. The survey also required participants to be employed and using alphanumeric
passwords in their work environment on a regular basis. From the 87 users who started the
survey, we had to eliminate 47 responses based on previously defined exclusion criteria:
incomplete or mechanically translated; incomprehensible answers; failure to complete the
instructional manipulation check [249]; and fourth-quartile scores on the social desirability
scale. The remaining 40 respondents had a diverse educational and professional background,
but the largest part (n=15, 37.5%) held positions in IT or online media. Sixteen were female
(40%) and 24 male (60%). They were aged between 20 and 53 (M = 32,SD = 7). As an
incentive, participants received 1.50C for approximately 15 minutes worth their time, which
meets Prolific’s work ethics guidelines.
1 https://prolific.ac (last accessed 06.03.2018)
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Analysis Approach
We performed structured, iterative thematic analysis of the qualitative data. This approach is
inspired by Grounded Theory and useful for exploring sentiment and mental models early in
the design process [321]. It consisted of three distinct parts: open coding, axial coding and a
final selective coding stage. In the first stage, the data is labeled with an unlimited number of
fitting codes. Next, the codes are grouped and abstracted. A second coder independently put
the codes into the groups. Differences were discussed until a common solution was found.
Finally, the number of code-groups are reduced to the essential themes that best describe the
thinking processes, or as in our case, the requirements.
9.2.2 Overall Results and Central Themes
Overall participants were positive about receiving support during password selection, often
because “any kind of help is good help”. Some stated they were convinced that feedback
is helpful to create stronger passwords. The primary benefits they mentioned were reduced
frustration and simplification, because it gives reassurance. The latter is a direct lead to the
Persuasive Authentication Framework [124]. If participants were negative about password
feedback (n=4), their primary qualm was that they were convinced to achieve strong pass-
words without external help. In the following, we present the central themes in participants’
statements. Multiple coding stages, discussions, and the selection tasks helped us identify
overarching needs: Show, Explain, Help, Empower. To keep the narrative coherent, we
omit all corollary results that did not guide further research steps. These are reported in
higher detail in C. Olsienkiewicz’ thesis [248].
Show
“Show” appears to be the most important category because at least one answer from each
participant could be put into this code. Unsurprisingly, participants preferred visual feed-
back over verbal feedback. Our prototype refrained from graphical elements entirely, but
participants wanted a visual representation of strength. Most notably, a “horizontal bar” was
mentioned, i.e. a simple password meter. Some participants felt that verbal strength cate-
gories are patronizing. “Colors” and “steps” were commonly mentioned. This theme echoes
Ur et al.’s quantitative findings [341].
At the same time, the “Show” theme encompasses that participants would like the password
reset form to show what it expects from the user. If digits or symbols are expected, the
feedback should show their impact on the users’ security or show the risks that are taken
by not including symbols and digits. P4 mentioned that if old passwords are disallowed,
then these passwords should be shown when creating a new one to know what is going to
be forbidden. Hence, “show” does not only include feedback, but also feedforward to align
expectations. Therefore, compliance is a mutual contract, and the theme again highlights
Sasse and Flechais’ argumentation that authentication schemes are socio-technical systems
[277].
177
Explain
When asked what advice they would have expected from the feedback, answers clearly indi-
cated that participants had a fixed notion of what makes a strong password. Verbal feedback,
in their view, should point out that digits, symbols, uppercase letters, randomness, and pass-
word length are beneficial for password strength. Most of this is in line with findings from
previous chapters and related work. It is interesting, though, that this consensus also shows
us that the feedback would not be necessary at all. Responses from participants who un-
expectedly received a low strength rating and feedback highlighted an important aspect: If
feedback stands in stark contrast to how the user perceives their password’s strength, ex-
planations are both welcome and necessary: “Why is the password rated only with two out
of five stars?” (P7) – “How precisely is the strength and feedback determined?” (P34,P28).
The desire to understand the rating is hence the key to correct mental models, but needs to
be cued by lower-than-anticipated strength ratings. Potentially, past study results pointed
towards the inefficacy of password meters, because they were not accompanied by explana-
tions in case the rating contradicted user beliefs.
The theme sometimes overlaps with “show”, because once a feedback system shows the
risks, participants suggested explaining them in detail, i.e. explain the consequences of
weak passwords. At the same time, a good comprehensible explanation was mentioned to
convey the notion that service providers “know what they are talking about” (P1). Thus,
nuanced “explanation-design” is essential for those users eager to learn more. Realistically,
though, experience tells us that not many people actively seek explanations, but our analysis
hints at opportunities to explain the details when strength feedback breaks mental models.
Help
The “Help” theme informs design decisions around suggestions. Eleven participants noted
that specific guidance towards a stronger or memorable password might help them. The well-
known repertoire of tips, examples, “formulas” (P4), generators, mnemonics, etc. was the
center of attention. Showing users examples was mentioned by two participants to help them
understand what makes a “perfect” password and is therefore an overlap with the “Show”
theme. Another two participants had the idea to show “best practices” from other users of
the service. At the same time, one participant was skeptical about the use of help, because
the outcome might be too predictable: “The feedback is helpful, but [if everybody takes the
advice,] won’t that mean that all passwords become too similar?” (P12). In some way,
she was right, because example-passwords can persuade users to mimick the given example
and become more vulnerable than before, so the design should respect this concern. One
participant hinted at solving this problem by suggesting modifications based on the currently
entered password, or give personalized suggestions. This is basically Forget et al.’s earliest
approach to persuade users towards stronger passwords, which was later studied intensively
by Shay et al. [300] and Ur et al. [341]. Thus, the participants’ expectations are reflected in
this line of research.
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Empower
The three aforementioned themes flow into the final one: empowering users to be creative,
put suggestions into practice, and to be confident in their choice. Most notably, the concept
of restricting characters and limiting password strength was a primary concern. Although
we initially would not have considered composition policies as “feedback”, the participants
made a fair point: rejecting a password due to a composition policy is a feedback mechanism.
However, rejection can easily be perceived as destructive feedback, which manifested in the
mentioned negative experiences. Instead, combining “Show”, “Explain”, and “Help” can
become a full-fledged creativity support tool: Show what can be improved, explain why, and
help by demonstrating alternative ways.
Limitations
The insights should be implemented with the study’s limitations in mind. Overall, the themes
we found are a small snapshot of user needs and need further consolidation for production-
level solutions.
First, we were surprised that so many English-speaking users from the Prolific panel were
able to make it through the platform’s screening process. Therefore, we had to discard many
responses where we were unsure about the participant’s language skills. Ideally, we should
have introduced a small passage of prose to which the participants answers 2-3 comprehen-
sion questions. However, we failed to anticipate this until the data was in and also did not
plan the budget for the study accordingly. For the remaining participants, however, we en-
sured the qualitative responses were solid. Also, it would have been feasible to be able to ask
follow up questions, which was a caveat of the online study method. The sample we would
have been able to recruit for in-person interviews, however, would not have been diverse
enough, so we were limited in the choice of methods. The number of open questions and
the resulting answers were still sufficient to perform in-depth analyses and led to interesting
findings.
Intermediate Summary
With an online survey, we explored what users explicitly expect from password support.
The most important take-away was that support is especially important and potentially most
effective when feedback contradicts users’ mental models about their own password prac-
tices. We were able to derive a new perspective on password support. We will call it the
show-explain-help-empower paradigm in the remainder of this thesis.
9.3 Tacit and Latent Needs
As second step of the co-creation project, we aimed to learn from specific user-generated
designs and solutions. Therefore, we took to the participatory design methodology. In its
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essence, it is a technique that constitutes a “shift in attitude from designing for users to one
of designing with users” [16]. Therefore, having identified a research question, users from
the targeted segment are involved from the beginning in design explorations and create their
own solutions (“Make” in Figure 9.1). Moreover, a tight feedback loop makes sure that all
designs are created under a shared ownership. In our case, we were eager to find out what
a novel password support system could look like. In particular, unusual and exciting ideas
beyond simple password meters were the center of attention. The overarching goal was to
identify what users require from password feedback systems, which would help us design
them in more persuasive ways.
9.3.1 Method
We used the participatory design approach to learn new requirements for persuasive feed-
back. The methodology included a co-design session with various exercises, an exploration
and refinement of the initial ideas, a feedback loop on the progress of the concepts, and the
creation of a final interactive digital prototype.
Procedure of the Co-Design Session
The 60-minute co-design session started with a briefing about the goals and informed consent
to record the session on video. Afterwards, we sensitized participants for the topic with two
ball-bearing exercises. For this, participants were divided into two groups and those faced
each other in a circle. Each person interviewed another on a specific question of password
behavior for one minute. The outer circle moved to the next interviewer until they had talked
to all people from the inner circle. In the first round, interviewers were given questions on
personal password selection and coping strategies. The second round focused on recommen-
dations to different user groups. The interviewers then summarized their insights and shared
them with the group. The exercise was helpful to learn other people’s password strategies
and broaden the participants’ horizon. They said it was interesting to reflect about obsta-
cles in acting more securely. In summary, participants showed typical selection strategies
based on word-digit-symbol patterns and would recommend personal, memorable events as
starting points for password selection.
What followed were straightforward brainstorming exercises in two groups. The question
they tried to answer was “How would a registration form of an email provider need to be
designed to help you create a secure password?” The facilitator encouraged participants to
think out of the box and contribute unusual ideas. After five minutes, half of each group
moved to the other group. In total, participants produced 17 distinct ideas and presented
them on a whiteboard. Everyone received two votes for their favorite ideas. Participants
then formed groups of two or three to create paper prototypes for the three ideas that had the
most votes. The facilitator made sure to explain the process and the expected fidelity of the
outcome. Once the prototypes were ready, the groups presented them to the entire crowd.
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Participants We recruited seven participants through postings in public groups on social
networks. Six of them were female. Three were studying philology, while one each were
studying pedagogy, media informatics and business studies. The only male participant was
an employed product designer. The average age was 23, ranging from 19 to 29. As an
incentive, we offered a 10C shopping voucher that was handed out after the brainstorming
session. We had tried to recruit a more diverse sample, but we did not receive additional
responses meeting these requirements.
10 plus 10 Method and Iterative Improvement
Based on the participants’ paper prototypes, we designed ten variations of each idea, i.e.
30 concept candidates. This procedure was inspired by the 10 plus 10 method to explore
the design space2. Afterwards, we discussed the feasibility of each solution and identified
six candidates that were presented to the study participants. Their feedback informed the
decision on the final prototype. After it was implemented with standard web-technologies,
participants provided a final round of qualitative feedback and a reflection on the process.
Participation thus occurred in each step of the design process.
9.3.2 Concepts and Prototype
The paper prototypes of the brainstorming session showed three central components: re-
wards, analogies and compliance, and playfulness. After the 10 plus 10 method, we had
six candidates that made it to the final feedback round, two of each category. Please note
that we tried to stay as close to the participants’ original ideas as possible and maintained
concepts that were unrealistic.
Rewards The “beautify” concept removed all color from the website and faded it back
in as the entered password increases in strength. The “friends” concept would provide a
password meter that uses pictures of the user’s friends instead of color to reward stronger
passwords and add a personal touch.
Analogies and Compliance Concepts in this category tried to nudge users by making
strength more graspable and salient. The “songs” concept shows the number of songs that
one can listen to until an attacker would have cracked the password. The “fruits” concept
(see Figure 9.2a) draws from a healthy-eating analogy and represents each character type
with a fruit. While the user types, fruits are “plucked” from a character patch and moved to
the password field. If a password only contains lowercase letters, the lack of complexity is
immediately visible because only one type of fruit would have been plucked.
2 http://sketchbook.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/wp-content/uploads/Chapter-1.4-10Plus10Method.
ppt (last accessed 24.04.2018)
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(a) Fruitsalad: Each character class is repre-
sented by a fruit and the user sees a lack of di-
versity, e.g. if their password only contains low-
ercase letters.
(b) Bubbles: Floating bubbles on the screen that
the user pops as they type the password. Symbols
are placed in bigger bubbles to be more salient.
Figure 9.2: Two out of the six concepts that made it to the final feedback iteration.
Playfulness The “slotmachine” idea lets the user first enter a password. Then they pull the
lever of a virtual slotmachine. When it stops, it displays four random characters that would
make the password stronger. The user can then claim the win by adding the random charac-
ters to their password. Finally, the “bubbles” concept lets the user burst bubbles floating on
the screen (see Figure 9.2b). Inside each bubble, there is either a letter, digit, or symbol. The
user can click on them directly to transfer the corresponding character to the password field,
or burst bubbles by typing on the keyboard. The longer the password, the fewer bubbles
remain. Also, less common character classes are shown in bigger bubbles to persuade users
to burst those and hereby increase complexity.
“Bubbles” Prototype
Participants provided feedback on the six concepts and generally considered the “bubbles”
concept the best solution to motivate themselves to add more symbols or digits and also
make the password longer to watch more bubbles burst. Therefore, we implemented it as an
HTML5-based prototype. To add a more game-like feel, we put a score on each character
class, and show the currently achieved total score in the GUI. The bubbles move slowly
enough to trace them and their bursts.
Five of the participants provided a final round of feedback. On the positive side, they felt it
intriguing to burst the bubbles. They understood the purpose of the bubbles and the different
sizes and colors right away or after typing the first character. Two participants noted that
it fosters creativity. All said that a system like this would catch their eye and might impact
their selection behavior. They also mentioned a number of improvements. For instance, two
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.3: We made the “bubbles” concept into an interactive prototype and gathered a final
round of feedback on the outcome and the process.
participants fount the page chaotic and wanted it simplified. The scoring was not transparent
either, and three said the bursting animation should be more obtrusive.
9.3.3 Process Reflection
Participants were also asked to provide feedback about their experiences along the way.
Generally, they were positive and felt involved generating a new design. They reported
that the final prototype reflected the entire process well and that elements from the idea
generation stages were visible. In particular, they liked to think about finding solutions to a
problem that they had not thought about in depth. Three of them said that they would have
still liked more involvement so that they can shape the outcome even more. One participant,
on the other hand, said that s/he disliked that most ideas were far-fetched and too unrealistic.
S/he would have liked a more product-centric development process.
9.3.4 Lessons about Persuasive Password Interventions
Discussions among participants and their continuous feedback throughout the design process
helped us understand various user needs. We heard that the group had not given the topic
much thought before joining the brainstorming session. Many of their ideas went beyond
typical password meters, which we highly encouraged. In particular, the concepts show a
tendency to visual elements (beautify, pictures, bubbles, fruits) to catch the user’s attention.
This corresponds to the show theme of the requirement-elicitation. The help theme was
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visible especially in the compliance-centered concepts: The “fruit-salad” supports people in
recognizing a potential lack of character diversity. While the “songs” analogy is a kind of
explanation of password strength because it gives background information, the ideas did not
contain many attempts to explain additional aspects. Perhaps, participants equated strength
with complexity – a mental model that we found in Chapter 5 – and their ideas confirmed this
thinking model. Finally, the “bubbles” concept aimed to boost creativity and thus showed
elements of the help and empower themes.
9.4 Discussion
The insights from two rapid methods allow us to derive requirements for persuasive pass-
word support, which we put into the context of existing frameworks.
9.4.1 Requirements
Although the first study was focused on explicit and observable needs, the qualitative anal-
ysis even brought about more profound needs. Similarly, the second study also helped us
understand explicit user needs. Therefore, it was hard to classify the needs, because they
were very nuanced. Nonetheless, we show the central characteristics of the requirements in
Table 9.1.
# Requirement Type Study
The persuasive tactic needs to ...
(1) Visually indicate current password issues Explicit S1 & S2
(2) Offer specific help to diversify passwords Explicit S1 & S2
(3) Be personal Explicit S1
(4) Provide background information, especially if feedback discounts
mental model
Explicit/Observable S1
(5) Stay trustworthy Observable S1 & S2
(6) Empower users to act differently Tacit S1 & S2
(7) Be straight-forward, easy, and streamlined Tacit S1
(8) Catch attention, be engaging, foster curiosity Latent S2
(9) Open eyes and broaden horizons, e.g. through making unknown
coping strategies salient
Latent S2
(10) Avoid habituation effects through surprise and delight Latent S2
Table 9.1: High-level requirements to satisfy different levels of user needs in persuasive pass-
word feedback.
Opportunities Password meters and real-time feedback are the de facto paragon of per-
suasion in the wild. Most commonly, they fulfill requirements (1), (2), (4), and (5). For
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Figure 9.4: Google’s Password Selection Support UI (March 2018)
instance, Google’s password meter visually encodes password strength with color and bar-
size, suggests not using a pet’s name, offers extensive background information with a clear
call-to-action, and does not jeopardize trustworthiness with extravagant design. On the other
hand, it does not necessarily empower users to break habits, is not personalized (what if the
user does not have a pet?), and does not account for other “obvious” strategies. Academia
has produced alternative designs that fulfill requirements (7), (8), and (9), although unusual
concepts (like in [343]) were rarely adopted in practice. Empowerment, personalization,
and breaking habituation effects have been underexplored, and thus might be worthwhile
opportunities for future studies.
9.4.2 Relation to Current Frameworks
Most of the themes and requirements show strong links to various persuasion frameworks.
In the first study, the qualitative analysis resulted in four essential themes: show, explain,
help, empower. Interestingly, there are parallels to teaching. Teachers show something new,
and then explain it in more detail. They help students understand it. Often students can then
exercise and explore ways to apply their knowledge, i.e. the process empowers students to
achieve something they could not do before. Forget et al., who contributed one of the early
works on persuasion in cybersecurity, promoted their Persuasive Authentication Framework
as a tool to educate users. All the elements of our qualitative analysis are thus visible in
their framework. The requirements in Table 9.1 represent the themes on a more fine-grained
level. Only requirements (8) and (10) are hard to put into the PAF, hence they extend the
framework. Requirement (8) states that a password support tool should be noticeable and
foster curiosity. Generating curiosity can be done in numerous ways, but in this context it
relates to Cialdini’s scarcity principle. The number of “good” passwords is much smaller
than the number of “bad” ones, hence they are a scarce resource. The requirement states that
users should realize this and become motivated to access the limited resource.
9.5 Conclusion
Our goal was to understand the requirements of persuasive password support, especially user
needs and expectations. We triangulated methods to rapidly derive feasible requirements that
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guide future designs of interventions. The survey yielded explicit and idealistic needs, like
having one’s own mental model confirmed by the feedback system. On the other hand, the
participatory approach of the second study helped us identify latent needs that would not
be detectable in a survey. The results, however, fit together well and solidify the overarch-
ing themes “show”, “explain”, “help”, and “empower”. Here, we found that participants’
expectations of password feedback were nuanced and can thus only be met by combining
both verbal and visual support. Feedback was not the only component, because partici-
pants showed a need for more guidance in the form of feedforward. The requirements might
have been partially predictable even without conducting user research, but tacit and latent
needs are uncommonly discussed in related research. Especially the thinking processes and
participants’ design approaches in the participatory sessions revealed much of what they en-
visioned in a successful intervention. Applying the requirements to gauge existing solutions,
we identified opportunities for future work in personalization, empowerment, and preventing
habituation effects from repeated exposure to the same intervention. These are addressed in
the following chapters.
Take Aways
• Triangulation of study methods helped us identify different
levels of user needs. Especially the tacit and latent needs are
harder to elicit, but participatory design methods were feasible
to enhance survey data.
• We observed that participants wanted to have their mental
models confirmed with password feedback. They become
skeptical if the feedback shows unexpected strength results.
• Password support systems should meet four essential user
needs: Show the current behavior and its consequences visu-
ally, explain things that contradict usual mental models, help
resolve such dissonances and empower users to act differently.
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Password Selection and the Decoy Effect
As laid out in Part II, one dimension of the problem space is that users pick weak passwords.
In many situations, e.g. for unimportant accounts, this is acceptable. However, with rising
importance, the need for a stronger password becomes salient. In these situations, mental
models of password strength (see Chapter 5) play a vital role, because they influence the
choice of the password. There is increasing evidence that mental models about strength are
often sub-par: many users overestimate the strength increase by adding digits and symbols or
substituting letters with them [289, 342, 345]. Thus, our goal is to avoid risky practices orig-
inating from flawed mental models. In this research project, we try to steer users away from
weak passwords by providing more secure alternatives. Since it is hard to compete against
a user’s preferred password choice, we try to leverage persuasive strategies from marketing
to “sell” the stronger alternative. This strategy is the so-called decoy effect. Given a range
of products, vendors use this technique to make the one item stand out that is best for them
(and often for the client). A decoy choice architecture includes one item that is “unattractive
by design” to make a superior option salient. In numerous studies, it successfully shifted
prospective buyers’ reference point and achieved its intentions. Thus, we aimed to translate
it to the decision-making problem of selecting passwords. In essence, we can craft pass-
word suggestions in such a way that one of the suggestions is more attractive in terms of its
strength and usability benefits.
We thus aimed to answer the following research questions:
RQ1 How can we translate the decoy choice architecture to password selection?
RQ2 Does the decoy effect make users select stronger passwords?
RQ3 What are the opportunities and pitfalls in this approach?
To that end, we conducted an online experiment where different groups of participants re-
ceived variations of password suggestions. This chapter reports on the design and evaluation
of a novel persuasive strategy and discusses the implications for its future application areas.
Publication Statement
The results of this project have been published at EuroUSEC 2016 together with Ste-
fanie Meitner, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, and Heinrich Hussmann as co-authors [291].
The data reported here is identical to the paper. The chapter puts the insights into the
context of the thesis and adds two significant aspects that go beyond the original publi-
cation:
• We explain the choice architecture and design rationales in much higher detail.
• We present additional fine-grained analyses about the effectiveness of the nudge and
discuss those in context.
10.1 Background and Context
Our project is positioned in a line of work that tries to nudge users towards strong passwords
(see Section 3.4). We approach this problem through two main components: suggestions
and choice architecture. We briefly provide context on these two elements.
10.1.1 Suggestions
Suggesting passwords was at the heart of the first work on persuasion for stronger pass-
words [126]. We can identify three common patterns here: (I) trying to get users to accept
a suggested password verbatim [347]; (II) suggesting alterations or insertions based on their
own password [126, 285, 300]; or (III) suggesting a random password that merely serves
as a basis for the user’s password [170]. All password generators fall into the first category
because they encourage users to make sure the string is completely random. The second
approach is the most common and most evaluated of the three and has seen mixed results
overall. Approach (III) seems promising in environments with critical security levels re-
quiring more stringent policies. Moreover, suggestions are sometimes included in real-time
feedback where they can act as feed-forward (opposed to feedback) [341]. In summary, sug-
gestions are an essential part of the persuasive toolkit and offer a wide range of new design
opportunities.
10.1.2 The Decoy Effect
The decoy effect was discovered through research in consumer psychology. Buying a prod-
uct usually involves deciding between different alternatives. On a high level, products are
easily comparable by their quality and price, so customers heavily rely on these two metrics.
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These two dimensions also build the foundation of the decoy effect. In one of the first exper-
iments on “asymmetric dominance”, Huber et al. illustrate decision-making processes with
a simple example to decide between six-packs of beer that differ in price and quality [167,
slightly adapted for simplicity]:
Option Price Quality rating
(A) $4 50 /100
(B) $6 70 /100
While option (A) is cheaper than (B), it is also lower in quality. Spending $2 more, the buyer
will get a higher-quality beer (B). With the information available at this point, it is hard to
decide. Buyers may have a general preference for either lower price, or higher quality if
all other factors are excluded. Imagine the vendor wants to sell more of beer (A) because
margins are higher for that product. To achieve this, Huber et al. explored different ways of
adding a third option:
Option Price Quality rating
(A) $4 50 /100
(B) $6 70 /100
(C) $4 40 /100
Product (C) is as expensive as (A) but falls behind in quality. Thus, buyers will make a
“better deal” if they choose option (A) by comparison with (C). Options (B) and (C) are
more difficult to compare because both dimensions (price and quality) are higher in (B) and
make it appear like an outlier. Option (C) is thus called the decoy that is dominated by
option (A) (target). Option (B) (the competitor) also beats the decoy, but the comparability
between the target and the decoy boosts the favorability of the target. This is exactly what
Huber et al. found, and which was later confirmed numerous times in different decision-
making scenarios [14]. Adding the decoy has the potential to reverse existing preferences,
making it a powerful tool for marketing and sales. The decoy itself often serves the sole
purpose of making another item stand out, i.e. the vendor does not intend to sell the decoy
item. Thus, the underlying persuasion principles are salience and framing. Constructing the
dimensions in a certain way is referred to as choice architecture [333], and is an important
persuasive design strategy.
Huber et al. stated that there is a specific combination of attributes to position the decoy
(see Figure 10.1a). Depending on the target, the decoy acts as range increasing (R, R*), fre-
quency increasing (F), or both (RF). By extending the range on the dimension on which the
competitor is superior, the fixed difference between all items on that dimension is weighed
less. Figure 10.1b illustrates this type of decoy placement for the sixpack example. The
range of the quality is clearer after the decoy is added: before, the span was 50-70, and af-
terward 40-70. The superiority of the competitor appears less significant. Hence, the higher
price can appear unjustified.
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Figure 10.1: General choice architecture overview to generate asymmetric dominance. C =
competitor, T = Target. The decoy can be placed at different positions in the spectrum but needs
to be dominated by the target (gray area). Placement strategies for the decoy to increase the
target’s dominance: R = Range, R* = extreme range, F = frequency, RF = range and frequency.
Example: Decoy Effects in the Real World
Huber et al.’s example has often been adapted and used in the design of user interfaces. The
vendor, i.e. a service provider, tries to steer users towards a particular direction that they
see as favorable. For instance, location settings on an Android device show signs of a decoy
pattern (see Figure 10.2). From bottom to top, the “device only” mode activates the GPS
module to determine the device’s location. It is thus highly accurate outside of buildings
but does not work well inside. On the other hand, the “battery saving mode” works in both
environments by using Google’s online location services based on triangulation between
network cells and surrounding WiFis. In urban areas and even inside buildings, it can achieve
great accuracy, while it only roughly estimates locations in rural areas. The two accuracy-
levels are thus comparable, but the “battery saving mode” does not require powering up
additional antennae and modules, giving it a graspable advantage. The “high accuracy”
mode combines both approaches and is thus the most battery consuming, but also the most
versatile option. “Battery saving” can be seen as the target, because it provides the best
trade-off in most situations. The “device only” mode is the decoy because it uses more
battery, while the “high accuracy” mode is the competitor. Google requires the user to allow
the collection of technical sensor data for the “high accuracy” and “battery saving” mode.
Battery consumption is likely more important to users than location accuracy, which further
suggests that the “battery saving” mode is indeed the targeted setting.
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Figure 10.2: Location settings in Android show signs of a decoy pattern. The “battery sav-
ing” mode is targeted because it does not activate the GPS module and can achieve comparable
accuracy. Google benefits from collecting information on WiFi hotspots and network cells to
improve their location service.
10.1.3 Choice Architecture in Security and Privacy
The USEC community has started to investigate the feasibility of behavioral economics prin-
ciples in the design of security and privacy mitigations. Egelman et al. showed that choice
architecture is highly relevant for privacy settings on mobile devices [93]. They explored
how users value privacy-respecting apps and how they make decisions from a list of appli-
cations. To measure preferences, they put monetary values and discounts on permissions
like accessing the Internet or using device location. Participants in their study showed clear
decision-making patterns that were influenced by the price and type of permission. There-
fore, Egelman et al. concluded that a certain choice architecture can guide users towards a
more “rational behavior”.
Knijnenburg et al. [196] explored the choice proliferation phenomenon in location-privacy
settings. The principle indicates that people become choice averse with an increasing number
of options. In their study, they observed that participants were strongly influenced by the
number of available options to share their location. Without specifically mentioning it, they
also used a decoy option that was extremely unfavorable but triggered a change in preference.
In another study, Korff and Böhme showed that the granularity of privacy settings on a
business social network can have similar effects: participants in their study tended to stick
with default settings and were also less satisfied with their choices if there were too many
options [201]. Acquisiti et al. showed that such architectures can nudge users towards certain
settings [1].
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Figure 10.3: Choice architecture and decoy placement as evaluated in the online experiment.
Regarding passwords, only a few publications mention the use of choice architectures. Re-
naud et al. evaluated a wide range of nudges to make users of a university platform pick
a stronger password. They concluded that the tested architectures were fairly ineffective in
achieving this goal, but there might have been other more effective solutions beyond their
designs. Before our investigation, no study that we are aware of has explored the decoy
paradigm for passwords.
10.2 Designing Password Choice Architecture
We aimed to craft a nudge that persuades users to create stronger passwords. Respecting
the principle of the opportune moment, we opted for account creation contexts. To emulate
a situation that is comparable to buying one out of several product alternatives, we show
suggestions beneath the password field where the user enters their choice (see Figure 10.3).
We ended up with this design after identifying opportunities for strength feedback on the
user’s password and on the suggestions (i.e. feed-forward). To that end, we had created
several prototypical choice architectures and rapidly evaluated them in the lab and online
(see technical report [286]). The final architecture implements the propositions in Huber et
al.’s framework (see Figure 10.3b).
The key to password choice architecture is the user’s own password. It has to be seen as the
competitor. Service providers will want to accept the user’s own password to make sure
users sign up. On the other hand, they want to avoid attacks on user accounts, which is why
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they likely encourage using a stronger password. This is the target. In our design, we opted
for a passphrase as the target for several reasons: only a few users create secure passphrases
as their primary credentials [345]; passphrases provide usability and memorability benefits
[189]; self-selected passphrases often do not provide the desired security benefits [37], which
can be mitigated by supplying users with a combination of random words [297].
To make the passphrase preferable over the competitor, a decoy needs to be carefully posi-
tioned along the two dimensions such that it is closer to the target than to the competitor.
Moreover, it needs to be dominated at least in one dimension by the target. To achieve this,
we identified “ease of use” and “security benefits” as two feasible dimensions of the choice
architecture. We opted for a range-frequency decoy (see Figure 10.1a) where the target dom-
inates the decoy in both dimensions because effects are more likely to be detected this way.
A typical-length mangled password fulfills the criteria. The richer character set includes
symbols that require the Shift/Alt keys to enter them. Thus, the ease of creation is lower
than that of a passphrase (dimension 1). At the same time, typical mangling strategies only
slightly contribute to password strength, which we confirmed in Chapter 5. Passphrases are
considered stronger by several estimators. Consequently, mangled passwords are dominated
by passphrases regarding strength (dimension 2). Figure 10.3b illustrates the positioning
along the two dimensions.
10.3 Quantitative Evaluation
We ran an online experiment to evaluate the efficacy of our decoy choice architecture for
passwords. We formed the following hypotheses about the outcome:
H0 Participants’ self-selected passwords are comparable in strength and memorability, re-
gardless of the presence of a password suggestion (Null hypothesis).
H1 The presence of a single password suggestion will lead to slightly stronger passwords.
H2 The presence of two suggested passwords that follow a decoy choice architecture re-
garding strength and ease of use will lead to stronger passwords that resemble the
target suggestion.
10.3.1 Method
The study implemented a between groups design. The main task was creating a new pass-
word under one of four treatments. “Suggestion architecture” served as the independent
variable with three levels: Passphrase, Mangled, and Decoy. Each level was tested with a
separate participant group. In the Passphrase condition, participants were suggested a single
passphrase consisting of four words. Analogously, a higher-complexity password is dis-
played in the Mangled condition. The Decoy group received both the target passphrase and
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the complex decoy password as alternative suggestions to their own password. Including
study conditions with single suggestions allowed us to compare different choice architec-
tures and measure the impact of the decoy effect. All suggestions are accompanied by visual
and textual representations of zxcvbn scores (see Figure 10.3b). The labels for the different
strength scores were very weak, weak, ok, strong, very strong. To obtain a baseline for com-
parison, there were no password suggestions for the Control group. However, participants
in this group also received the same kind of strength feedback, so we could isolate the impact
of adding suggestions, i.e. feedforward.
We did not collect plaintext passwords to ethically deal with participants disclosing their real
passwords. Instead, we modified the zxcvbn library by stripping all sensitive information1,
and analyzed participants’ passwords on the fly. These meta statistics served as dependent
variables and were saved to a database. Most notably, they describe the password topology
(length, number of upper-/lowercase, digits, symbols, and chunks), estimated guess numbers
and the zxcvbn score. Scores range from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong), while guess number esti-
mates are open-end. Another dependent variable was memorability which was measured by
a successful authentication three days after password selection. To achieve this, we hashed
passwords with a secure one-way function (PHP’s password_hash()) and compared hashes
afterward. If they matched, the password was correct. Thus, this is a binary metric.
Prototype
For the study, we implemented the concept as web-prototype based on HTML and
JavaScript. As a foundation for generating passwords in all conditions, we relied on the
Diceware dictionary2 consisting of 5823 words. It provides a good spectrum of common and
uncommon words of varying length. To generate the passphrase (target), four words were
randomly combined, and each word was capitalized. As shown in Chapter 5, zxcbvn rates
four-word passwords with its highest score. The randomness of generated passwords allows
us to calculate their entropy. Each word has an estimated entropy of (log2(5823)≈ 12 bits.
Combining four words randomly thus results in a total entropy of approximately (212)4 = 48
bits for passphrases.
For the decoy and the mangled password condition, the prototype modifies a randomly se-
lected word from a smaller subset of the Diceware list. The subset only includes words
longer than eight characters, giving a total of 687 candidates. The first letter of the word and
a second randomly chosen character are capitalized. Two letters are substituted by similarly-
looking digits to inspire a l33t character. For instance, the letter “o” was replaced with the
digit “0”. Finally, a random symbol and digit are appended to the word. The resulting decoy
password consists of four different character classes (LUDS).
1 https://gist.github.com/TobiasSeitz/e27a867535b82f6cf9a6ae6140da8b81 (last accessed
06.03.2018)
2 http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.wordlist.asc (last accessed 06.03.2018)
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We anticipated that the generated passwords are exceptionally unattractive in some
cases, e.g. if passphrases include uncommon, hardly memorable words, e.g.
GirthInflixThineAegis. To make them more appealing, the prototype provides a shuffle
button that creates a new combination of different words (see Figure 10.3a). The mangled
password can also be re-generated. Another feature to lower the barriers to take one of the
suggested passwords was the opportunity to transfer it to the password field with a single
click. However, to facilitate memorization, participants needed to manually type the pass-
word into the confirmation field.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts that were carried out on separate days. The initial
step included the password selection task and usability assessment among other qualitative
metrics. Participants were invited to return for the second part of the study three days later.
This follow-up step included memorability assessment and further qualitative feedback to
help us interpret the data.
The first part started with a thorough briefing about the collected data and asked for consent.
The same web-page introduced the scenario for the task: Participants were asked to imagine
creating a new password for their already existing email account under a basic8 policy. The
page displayed the password fields and suggestions. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the four treatment groups, so the type and number of suggestions depended on this
assignment. Once the password was successfully confirmed, participants were asked to fill
out a brief questionnaire mostly consisting of 5-point scale items on attitudes and password
behaviors. At the end of the first part, the web-page displayed a confirmation code that
participants had to copy over to the prolific platform to mark the survey as done.
Three days later, we invited the participants to return and complete the second part. They
were asked to provide the password they had remembered, but if they failed, they could
continue anyhow.
Recruitment and Sample
Following best practices in password research, we leveraged crowd-sourcing tools to elicit
the data. Recruitment took place through the research platform Prolific3, which is compara-
ble to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk solution. Participants were screened for age (older than
18 years), and they had to be located in either the UK or in the USA. The region restriction
was introduced because Prolific has a larger user base in those countries. To ensure the qual-
ity of the data, we required a past survey completion rate of at least 95%. Such rates are a
common metric for the reliability of a crowd-worker [271].
From the 106 respondents who started the experiment, we had to reject seven because the
study completion code was wrong or missing, because the questionnaire was insufficiently
filled out, or completion times were outliers (> 3 ∗ SD). The remaining 99 participants
3 https://prolific.ac (last accessed 06.03.2018)
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Figure 10.4: Nudge efficacy in treatment groups (n=65)
received invitations to return, which 97 people did. There were another fourteen incomplete
responses or wrong study codes. Hence, the resulting N of our data set is N = 83 valid,
complete responses in both parts. Group sizes were n= 18 in Control, n= 24 in Passphrase,
n = 21 in Mangled, and n = 20 in Decoy. On average, participants were 30 years old (SD =
10). 42% were female. The majority (78%) was employed, 12% were students, 10% were
unemployed. Participants reportedly possessed nine online accounts that they regularly use
(SD = 5.6). Thus, the sample provides a sufficient degree of diversity.
10.3.2 Results
Through statistical tests, we found significant differences across the groups. Although the
decoy effect did not work as intended, there were notable side-effects. In the following,
we break down the findings. For non-parametric continuous data, we used Kruskal-Wallis
and Mann-Whitney tests, whereas frequencies were analyzed with chi-squared tests. Sig-
nificance levels were set to α = 0.05 unless multiple comparisons required a Bonferroni
correction.
Efficacy of Suggestions
Across all treatment groups, nine respondents out of 65 (≈ 14%) accepted a suggested pass-
word verbatim – four in the Passphrase group, two in the Mangled group, and three in the
Decoy group (two targets, one decoy). Suggestions were thus effective for one in ten par-
ticipants. From the remaining 56 self-selected passwords, 18 (27.7%) were weaker than the
suggestions. In other words, the nudge was ineffective for roughly a third of participants
judged by their choice to pick a password that was weaker than the suggestion. For the
remaining 38 participants (58.4%), the nudge could have influenced them to create pass-
words that are as strong as the suggestions, but we lack data to investigate this. Figure 10.4
visualizes the efficacy of suggesting passwords.
Impact on Password Strength
Table 10.1 lists descriptive statistics on password strength metrics. Taking the entire sample
into account, omnibus tests did not show significant differences between the four groups.
However, we plotted the confidence intervals of all metrics to examine the data visually.
Here, it is visible that guess numbers did notably differ between the groups: the Passphrase
treatment led to the strongest passwords overall (see Figure 10.5a). If we remove the samples
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Table 10.1: Summaries of password metrics from the online experiment. Arranged by group
(columns) and metric (rows)
Control Mangled Passphrase Decoy
M SD M SD M SD M SD
length 11.33 3.53 11.8 2.74 13.87 3.8 11.9 2.69
score 2.88 1.02 2.9 0.76 3.29 0.9 2.95 0.88
guesseslog10 8.84 2.41 8.86 2.15 13.48 7.63 10.12 4.85
digits 2.61 2.06 2.28 1.27 2.16 2.18 2.6 2.34
special 0.22 0.64 0.52 1.16 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.57
uppercase 1.77 0.8 1.42 0.59 2.45 2.35 1.75 1.11
lowercase 6.55 3.91 7.38 3.21 8.91 4.09 6.95 3.42
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(a) Confidence intervals of estimated guess-
numbers (log 10) for all participants (N=83).
On average, the Passphrase group created sig-
nificantly stronger passwords than the Con-
trol and Mangled group.
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(b) Confidence intervals of estimated guess-
numbers (log 10) for self-selected passwords
(N=74). Although the difference between the
Passphrase group and the others is not as big
as in the overall sample, the average guess
numbers are still ≈ two orders of magnitude
apart.
Figure 10.5: Arithmetic mean of guess numbers (log 10) and 95% confidence intervals.
where a suggestion was accepted, the differences become smaller (see Figure 10.5b). Since
guess numbers are shown on a logarithmic scale, the difference might appear smaller than
it actually is: guess numbers in the passphrases group were about 50 times higher than in
the control and mangled groups. This is also visible in Figure 10.6, where the percentage
of cracked passwords is consistently smaller than in the other groups. Fitting a smoothed
generalized additive model to the cracked percentages confirms that passwords are less likely
to be cracked after any given number of guesses if they were created in the Passphrase
condition (intercept =Control,B = −7.9%, p < 0.001. R2ad j = 0.99). The rise in strength
most likely is due to increased password length in the Passphrase group, see Figure 10.7.
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Figure 10.6: Estimated guessability of user-selected passwords across the four conditions.
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Figure 10.7: Average password length of self-selected passwords and 95% confidence intervals
Table 10.2: Policy fulfillment of submitted passwords. Most participants used at least three
character classes.
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12
ba
sic
16
Control 2 9 4 0 1 1 1
Mangled 6 7 3 3 1 1 0
Passphrase 4 5 4 2 1 1 7
Decoy 5 7 3 1 1 1 2
Σ 17 28 14 6 4 4 10
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Password Composition and Policy Adherence
It is possible to sort participants’ self-selected passwords into “policy buckets”, i.e. the most
stringent policy they would fulfill, which makes the effort to create a stronger password
visible. Table 10.2 shows the distribution of this analysis in commonly used policy taxonomy
[299]. A chi-squared test showed no significant differences across the groups (χ2(18) =
16.93, p > 0.5). Yet, it is interesting that even though only a basic8 policy was enforced,
all participants formed passwords with at least two character classes. The majority (78%)
even used three character classes. Participants in the Mangled condition were about twice as
likely to adhere to one of the complex policies (comp8, 3class12, 3class16) than the Control
group. On average, the length requirement was exceeded by ≈ 4 characters.
Memorability
Roughly 40% (n= 34) of participants succeeded to provide their password from the first part
of the study. A chi-squared test on group differences was not significant (χ2(3) = 3.84, p >
0.05). Among the participants whose passwords matched three days later, 76% (n = 26)
reported to have memorized it, while the rest had their browser store it (2), or put it into a
digital file (5), or wrote it down on paper (1). Participants who had opted for a suggestion
were mostly unable to authenticate. The one respondent in the Decoy group who correctly
entered the mangled password in the second part did so reportedly from memory.
Qualitative Findings & Feedback
A thematic co-analysis of the qualitative data from the exit questionnaires showed that there
were no observable differences across groups. Therefore, we do not report group-specific
details but rather the general picture.
In the three treatment groups, we elicited data on the subjective perceptions of the sugges-
tions. Participants were shown adjectives from which they could select multiple items and
provide additional text. The most common reactions were “neutral” (n = 25), “surprised”
(n = 23) and “pleased” (n = 11). There was no observable tendency as to perceived secu-
rity improvements for email accounts by the suggestions. 20 participants (24%) might be
annoyed if their main email provider implemented a sign-up form like the one in the study,
but they did not clarify this further. 30 respondents (36%) acknowledged that suggestions
could facilitate email account creation. The main reason to decline the suggestions was the
need for passwords with personal meanings (43% agreement rate). Besides, P81 said that
“the main reason I don’t use generated passwords, is that if a hacker finds out how they’re
generated, they’ve basically figured everyone’s passwords out. Then its only a matter of
time before they brute force into accounts using the same method the system uses to gen-
erate them.” This quote highlights the distrust regarding password generators, while at the
same time assuming attackers are incapable of predicting human behavior. Finally, there
were interesting qualitative statements about the memorability of passwords (all sic): “sorry,
i would have written it down if i knew there was a second part to the study. thats what i do
for passwords that i will use again, until i memorize it, then i throw away the paper i write
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it on.” (P33, sic) “I’m not sure if it was because I don’t type this password I used here often
or if it [is] because I used one of my lesser very weak passwords that I failed to remember
it quickly. Regardless, I need a few better habits. ” (P26) “I forgot my password as I didn’t
think I’d need it again. Had I known I would likely have tried harder to remember it.” (P47).
From these statements, we take away three important points: a) Some participants were
unaware that they would need the password in the future although they received according
instructions, b) they rely on their own memorization techniques, and c) they feel guilty of
bad password habits which echoes the results in Chapter 8. In summary, those factors had
contributed to the low memorability rates of the study passwords.
10.3.3 Limitations
There are a few important aspects to consider in the interpretability of our study findings.
The sampling method, although state of the art, still targets users who are open-minded
enough to participate in studies. Only those crowd-workers with a successful track record
were screened in, thus the sample might not be representative for the entire population.
However, rough trends can be seen in any case. In terms of sample size, we had initially
hoped for a larger data set, but had to omit a significant proportion due to low quality of
the data. This reduced the achievable statistical power, which prevented us to narrow down
confidence intervals and accordingly find significant effects. This limitation is aggravated by
the fact that many study participants chose passwords that were much stronger than what is
to be expected from real-world passwords [226]. Such behavior reduces ecological validity
and shrinks potential effect sizes induced by different nudges. Despite these limitations, it is
astonishing to still detect notable differences across groups. Finally, we relied on the zxcvbn
strength metric, as in many other studies throughout this thesis. We could have collected
plain-text passwords and used a more robust approach like PGS [346]. However, this would
have been too risky, because participants might have disclosed their real email passwords in
the scenario, which we regard as unethical. Therefore, the zxcvbn metrics are one of the best
solutions to work around this issue while providing sufficient robustness.
10.4 Discussion
In the following, implications and opportunities from using persuasive suggestions are high-
lighted.
10.4.1 The Ineffectiveness of the Decoy Effect
The data did not provide any indication that the presence of an additional decoy-suggestion
influenced participants. Therefore, we reject H2 and conclude that the decoy choice archi-
tecture was not effective. There are several explanations about the failure of the architecture.
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First, in order to induce a decoy effect, the two preferability dimensions (cf. Figure 10.1a)
need to be salient and clear, e.g. the price and quality of an item. In our case, the dimen-
sions were ease of password creation and strength. While strength was perhaps effectively
conveyed, the user interface did not explicitly highlight the usability of the password. Ad-
vantages in typing speed and memorability over the mangled password were probably to
vague or unclear. The persuasive strategy failed to trigger deliberate thought processes (cf.
System 2), and intuitive thinking (System 1) might be responsible for participants’ prefer-
ence to stick to their self-selected passwords.
Moreover, Huber et al. measured the decoy effect in a different study design. They relied on
repeated measures to understand preferential shifts induced by the presence – or absence –
of the decoy. For password studies, repeated measures are only seldom a good fit, because
users are unlikely to show different behaviors if they create passwords multiple times in a
row. To get closer to the original study design, a real-world field test is conceivable. When
users create an account, the decoy might be present and it is missing when they reset the
password at any later point in time. As a caveat, this approach vastly increases the duration
of the study.
Finally, the participants’ self-selected passwords were unexpectedly strong. This did not pro-
vide enough room to nudge them towards an even stronger alternative, because the “price”
that it entails is unreasonably high. As a consequence, the target group for future studies
in password suggestions should be narrowed down to people who are less likely to create
a strong password. For instance, we know that the passwords that users select as teenagers
tend to be weak [354]. At the same time, these are reused very often and are in use for many
years. Thus, teenagers make for an interesting target user group to investigate the efficacy
and design of nudges.
10.4.2 Framing the Goal Effectively
Although the decoy effect did not prevail, we observed that participants who were suggested
a single passphrase as an alternative to their own passwords ended up creating longer and
stronger passwords – even if they rejected the suggestion. Thus, H1 is supported. What
makes this finding particularly interesting is the fact that a mangled password failed to pro-
duce a notable impact on password strength.
This is a potential consequence of latent mental models. As we have seen in Chapter 5,
users have a rather robust mental model of a strong password. There is much evidence that
users see the addition of digits and symbols as highly advantageous for password strength.
In this study, the mangled password, however, did not receive the best strength rating but
was only “second best”. The yellow color of the strength meter might have added to the dis-
couragement because it is not on the positively connoted “green” spectrum. This might have
already influenced participants’ mental model about mangling strategies, so they proceeded
with what they intended to pick in the first place. On the contrary, the passphrase did receive
the best rating and its strength bar was colored green. Thus, the group who saw only this
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••••••••Password:
Try this:
Expires in 30 days.
Correct! horse batteries.
Expires never.
Figure 10.8: Suggestion accompanied by a graspable benefit.
type of suggestion might have realized that it is easy to achieve the highest rating simply by
making passwords longer, or that it is possible even without digits and symbols. Put simply,
the passphrase seemed to encourage participants to “go higher” because the goal was within
reach. Goal gradient effects, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, support this argument. Putting
both suggestions side-by-side obviously negated these effects. The cognitive load might just
be too high in that case.
10.4.3 Application Areas and Prospective Designs
Participants in our study indicated that their preferred way to handle passwords is memo-
rization, echoing many other larger studies, e.g. [64, 247]. Thus, users cannot be expected
to create a unique strong password for every account. Using a persuasive suggestion is thus
only reasonable in a limited number of situations. For instance, users often categorize pass-
words by their importance (see Chapter 8, [316, 363]). For important accounts they are
willing to pick stronger passwords, so providing a good alternative like in our study could
proof helpful. To make the strength benefits even more graspable, the service could reward
complying behavior with longer expiration intervals (in case there are sufficient reasons to
use such measures). For instance, a suggestion can illustrate that stronger passwords do
not expire (see Figure 10.8). We put this idea forward in [291] and it was very recently
evaluated by Renaud and Zimmermann in a longitudinal study [266]. Their findings conclu-
sively show that making benefits graspable is the primary key to effectively nudge users
towards stronger passwords. A special application area for graspable benefits is password
managers. Users easily recognize that a master password for password managers need
to meet higher strength standards because it constitutes a single point of failure in protect-
ing many accounts. The benefit is therefore graspable and can be made salient very easily.
Thus, creating a master password is an opportune moment in which users are probably more
receptive to recommendations.
10.5 Conclusion
We set out to nudge users towards a password that is stronger than the first choice from
their “comfort zone”. From theories in behavioral economics, we carefully derived a choice
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architecture that translates marketing strategies to “password advertisement”. This direct
translation, however, did not produce the envisioned decoy effects in our online study with
83 participants. Instead, we found that encouraging people through an easily achievable goal
fostered a positive outcome: If participants saw that a passphrase containing no digits and
symbols could be “very strong” they managed to create stronger passwords on average. We
conclude that simplifying the sub-task to compare one’s own performance to a suggested
alternative is a key to successfully nudging users in this direction. To avoid that such nudges
wear off over time, they should only be used in situations where the benefit of choosing a
stronger password is graspable and evident to users.
Although the decoy effect did not show, this does not mean it does not exist for passwords.
It could simply mean that the direct adaptation of choice architectures in other fields is
insufficient and needs more fine-tuning. In a different UI design, where the dimensions are
more clearly framed for the users, the hypothesized preferential shift might be induced. A
possible direction towards this is to refrain from generating completely new passwords and
instead nudge users towards a modified version that significantly increases strength. Ur et al.
have already provided first positive results about suggesting password alterations. It would
be interesting to find out if an additional alteration that is “unattractive by design” could
boost adoption rates of the target suggestion. We see many opportunities to further explore
persuasive password suggestions, especially if they remove usability pain points of trying to
create a memorable yet strong secret.
Take Aways
• The decoy effect was not visible when participants received
two password suggestions. They proceeded with creating their
own passwords. The most plausible explanation is that the
benefits of the target over the decoy were too vague to over-
come the inertia to follow the recommendation.
• Demonstrating that strong passwords do not have to be overly
complicated by suggesting a passphrase made our participants
select stronger passwords. Using feed-forward in conjunction
with feedback appears to encourage people to come up with a
better secret.
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Extending the Password Space with Emojis
Our previous efforts to support users focused on suggestions, feedback, and feed-forward
to help users create stronger passwords. We now continue to explore a different dimension
of persuasive design that was supposed to make it easier for users to create both strong
and highly memorable passwords. To that end, we looked at emojis as possible solution,
since we have found positive attitudes towards using them inside passwords (see Chapter
7). Emojis are pictographs used to express emotions or communicate words with pictures.
The Unicode consortium has made them part of the de-facto digital encoding standard1,
which led to widespread adoption very quickly. In 2015, the “face with tears of joy” emoji
( ) became the Oxford dictionary’s word of the year2, which shows the cultural impact of
these colorful symbols. A recent report claims that roughly three quarters of Internet users
communicate with emojis on a regular basis [100]. While image-based passwords were
proposed decades ago (see Section 2.5.1), the recent success of emojis has given graphical
authentication new momentum.
Emojis are an opportunity to increase security, because they can add more complexity to
passwords. Adding an emoji to a weak password like iloveyou could already make it less
predictable, e.g. iloveyou . We have also seen that users’ mental models are built around
complexity, and not necessarily around length. Thus, an emoji-password like Corr3ct
might be perceived as more secure than the original passphrase. Past studies have also shown
that graphical authentication can benefit from the picture superiority effect. Hence, using
emojis inside passwords might have usability advantages, and we also see them as an en-
abling technology that empowers users to pick more creative and memorable secrets, i.e.,
a persuasive design strategy. At the same time, existing authentication back-ends do not
require significant changes to make emoji-passwords work. Since emojis are encoded as
regular characters, the only potential change is to use a different version of UTF. Theoret-
ically, 90% of web-pages are compatible with emojis in password fields already now (see
1 http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr51/(last accessed 10.03.2018)
2 http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2015/11/word-of-the-year-2015-emoji/ (last ac-
cessed 10.03.2018)
Apple Google Microsoft Samsung LG HTC WhatsApp Facebook Twitter Mozilla
Figure 11.1: Although the “bird” emoji is encoded with the same unicode character (U+1F426),
its visual representation differs strongly across platforms and vendors. This has specific ramifi-
cations on the use of emojis inside passwords, which we address in this project.
Footnote 1). Consequently, some service providers have started to allow emojis as part of
user-chosen passwords also on the back-end. Twitter, Slack and StackOverflow are among
these pioneers.
However, the adoption comes with certain risks. Emojis are primarily used on mobile de-
vices [100]. Hence, adding emojis to passwords on a smartphone is easy, but there might
be problems when the user tries to enter their emoji-password on a desktop: Typical input
solutions possible with software keyboards get left out on the desktop. Some applications
have enabled indirect emoji input through the mouse in a graphical user interface, so it is
not impossible to enter an emoji-password across different platforms. On the other hand, the
specific images used to render emojis are platform-dependent: a bird emoji on a native iOS
soft-keyboard looks different on Android (see Figure 11.1). This fragmentation3 introduces
new issues not typically found with other graphical authentication schemes, where there
is more control over the images. Thus, we wanted to understand the usability factors and
constraints of emoji-passwords to gauge the feasibility of this authentication mechanism.
In this chapter we explore pragmatic and hedonic qualities of emoji-passwords. We aim to
answer the following research questions:
RQ1 Do emojis in passwords help users create more memorable passwords?
RQ2 How do platform-dependent renderings (fragmentation) affect memorability?
RQ3 What is the most feasible user interface to enter emoji-passwords?
RQ4 What are users’ password selection strategies and behaviors?
RQ5 What are users’ general attitudes towards using emojis inside passwords?
This chapter reports on a mixed-method experiment carried out to investigate the usability of
alphanumeric passwords that contain emojis. In the following, we put the design space for
emoji-passwords into context, describe an empirical research study, and derive implications
on the effective use of emoji-passwords.
3 https://blog.emojipedia.org/2018-the-year-of-emoji-convergence/ (last accessed
16.02.2018)
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Publication Statement
Beside myself, Florian Mathis and Heinrich Hussmann made contributions to the
project. The results of the study were published at OzCHI 2017 [290]. The chapter
elaborates on the results of that paper and provides significant additional analyses:
• We show a detailed quantitative breakdown of selection strategies, in particular re-
garding the position of the emojis and relations to the passwords.
• We take a deep-dive into successful and unsuccessful authentication events in the
second part of the study.
• We provide new thoughts on the ramifications of using emojis inside alphanumeric
passwords.
11.1 Background and Context
11.1.1 Emojis
Literally translated from Japanese, emojis4 are “picture words” [325]. They are primar-
ily used in mobile messaging applications like WhatsApp, iMessage, and alike, to express
emotions and add subtext in messages. Before emojis arrived, this has been possible with
emoticons, i.e. combinations of regular characters that convey emotions like :-) <3 and
:-O. However, emojis are visually richer and much more versatile. The current version of
the Unicode standard lists around 2800 emojis (see Footnote 7) categorized by topics, and
roughly 150 are added each year. In 2015, emojis saw a stark increase in usage numbers.
Both iOS and Android added special software keyboards that allowed users to easily enter
emojis through direct touch input. Often, users replace entire words or blocks of text with
emojis. Although emojis are useful to overcome language barriers, their meaning is not
always clear [234, 335]. Researchers have started to investigate misinterpretation in many
ways, and have proposed solutions like a “disambiguation API” [375].
11.1.2 Emojis in Authentication
The growing adoption rates of emojis in various application areas has not gone unnoticed by
the USEC community, who started trying to improve authentication schemes with emojis.
4 The plural form for “emoji” is both “emoji” (Japanese) and “emojis” (adopted to English). For clarity
reasons the chapter sticks to “emojis”.
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One of the first solutions was presented by Intelligent Environments5. Their emoji-passcode
system would allow customers to select four emojis from a 9x5 grid to log into mobile
banking apps. However, the concept has not been widely adopted. Golla et al., respectively
Kraus et al., proposed a similar system that was targeted at screen-locks for mobiles [136,
203]. In essence, their EmojiAuth system replaces each digit on a PIN-pad with an emoji. In
two user studies, they evaluated the concept and showed that both security and usability of
unlock mechanisms can be improved this way. On the other hand, we were able to find only
one publication about using emojis as part of an alphanumeric password [9]. Al-Husainy
and Mali focused on user-account passwords on desktop computers but did not present an
empirical evaluation of the concept. We believe web pages and mobile applications are the
primary use case for emoji-based authentication. This application area is still underexplored.
11.1.3 Research Opportunities
The combination of emojis and alphanumeric characters generates a wide range of research
questions, and we can only answer a small subset of them. In particular, we explore pass-
word selection strategies that may hint at potentially risky behavior. It is likely that emoji-
passwords share some traits of alphanumeric passwords. For instance, the topology of a
password is an important metric to gauge its guessability. Therefore, we would expect to
observe some topologies reported by Weir et al. [365], Ur et al. [345], and Kuo et al. [206].
The latter indicated that some users had already used emoticons inside passwords in 2005.
Although we cannot realistically measure guessability of emoji-passwords at this time, we
can explore emerging patterns. For instance, we can elicit where users put their emoji and
how they choose it. Emoji-passwords are a hybrid between knowledge- and recognition-
based authentication, so they demand effort from both the lexical and visual memory [265].
Therefore, this approach could turn out to be either a memorability advantage or disadvan-
tage. Since the answer to this question is very open, we refrain from generating hypotheses
altogether.
11.2 User Study
The goal of our project was to understand the human factors and usability constraints of
emoji-passwords, which can be used to evaluate the idea of empowering users as persuasive
strategy. To achieve this goal, we created a prototype that allowed entering emojis inside
password-fields and evaluated it with a mixed-methods user study to cover a large spectrum
of opportunities and caveats. The first part took place in a controlled lab environment, while
the second was carried out remotely without moderation. To explore different dimensions
of usability and to follow common practice, password selection and recall were spread out
5 https://www.intelligentenvironments.com/now-you-can-log-into-your-bank-using-
emoji/ (last accessed 10.03.2018)
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(a) Two-step point-and-click interface in
WhatsApp.
(b) Telegram shows the picker after the user
hovers the emoji button. Moreover, recently
used emojis are shown beneath the text-field.
Figure 11.2: Examples for point-and-click interfaces (“emoji picker”). Progressive disclosure is
used to access the list of available emojis: The user first needs to interact with a control element
(emoji button) or start typing a special character (mostly “:”), before an emoji can be selected
by clicking or auto-completion of the shortcode. The emoji is then inserted into the text field.
across different days. In the following we describe the prototype, the procedure of the two
methods, the corresponding variables, and the sample of our study.
11.2.1 Prototype
The project focused on using emoji-passwords on web sites, therefore we built a web-based
prototype with standard technologies (PHP, HTML5, JavaScript). We identified two solu-
tions to enter emojis on a desktop computer: via a point-and-click interface, and “short-
codes”. Most web-versions of messenger applications, e.g. WhatsApp Web, Telegram Web,
Hangouts, etc., use the point-and-click approach (see Figure 11.2). A few communication
tools also allow entering a predefined word that is then translated into an emoji. This short-
code often needs to be put into braces, e.g. (smile) on Skype, or stand between two colons,
e.g. :smile: on Slack (see Figure 11.3). We implemented a prototype based on point-and-
click selection and Slack-style shortcodes. However, shortcodes were not auto-completed,
which is generally discouraged for passwords [232] and there was no “recent emoji” feature.
After clicking an emoji, the prototype did not use the unicode character inside the password
field for technical reasons6. Instead, the shortcode was automatically inserted and masked.
To allow checking the entered password, it was displayed in plain text beneath the input
fields (see Figure 11.4b).
6 emojis typically break the masking of password fields, because their encoding differs in byte-size
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While Unicode v11.0 contained 2789 emojis7, we reduced the number of available emojis
to 50 for several reasons. First, we found through iterative testing that there was a selection
bias, if the full range of emojis was offered; testers mostly included emojis from the first
page. Second, Golla et al. used a similar approach for their EmojiAuth system [136, 203].
Last, reducing the number very likely facilitates recognition and potentially increases the
memorability of the emoji-password.
The 50 emojis were selected with particular features in mind. To evaluate issues arising from
similarity, around a third of emojis should mutually resemble each other. Fragmentation is-
sues during authentication can only be seen for emojis whose appearance strongly differs on
other platforms. Moreover, the emojis should appeal to users, e.g. because they are familiar
with them. To achieve this, different emoji-categories should be considered. We identified
50 suitable candidates from the most-used8 emojis on Twitter from multiple categories: smi-
leys & people (14), animals & nature (7), food and drink (6), activities (5), objects (6), and
symbols (7). We opted to include more smileys, because this roughly 50% of Unicode emoji
characters fall into this category. Our emoji-picker randomly arranged the emojis in a 10x5
grid to isolate selection-by-position effects.
The prototype allowed to switch between two versions of emojis. The default version was
based on the emojis from iOS 9.3 (see Figure 11.4a). This default was chosen, because
WhatsApp used the same emoji-style across all platforms at the time of the study. Thus, we
could expect participants to be familiar with them. The second style was based on Android
7.0 (“blob emojis”9).
11.2.2 Password Selection in the Lab
For the first part, participants were invited to a lab at the media informatics research group.
The primary task was to create a password that participants could remember well. There
was no independent variable for the password selection task, thus participants all received
the same study instructions.
Metrics
We logged the chosen emojis and their positions inside the passwords. Moreover, we an-
alyzed password characteristics with zxcvbn and stored this to the database along with the
hashed password. As an indicator for usability of either the picker or the shortcodes, we
measured the time taken to select the password. Here, we used the “focus” and “blur” events
as start and end points.
7 https://unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html(last accessed 08.03.2018)
8 http://emojitracker.com/ (last accessed 08.06.2018)
9 https://medium.com/google-design/redesigning-android-emoji-cb22e3b51cc6 (last ac-
cessed 08.03.2018)
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(a) The picker shows the short-code of the emoji
for future use.
(b) The user can guess the shortcode. Slack of-
fers matching emojis.
Figure 11.3: Slack allows the user to utilize both a point-and-click interface and shortcodes to
enter emoijs.
On the qualitative side, we used ordinal five-point scales to collect attitudinal data about us-
ing emojis inside passwords, the picker, and shortcodes. Demographic data and self-reported
password behavior helped us put measurements into context. Everything that participants
said during the study was protocolled.
Procedure
After an in-depth briefing on the purpose of the study and data collection practices, an ex-
perimenter explained each step of the study. We provided a standard desktop PC to complete
the tasks, which were mostly self-guided. First, participants created a user ID. Since they
were going to need this ID later on to allow us matching the lab and field data, we provided a
simple algorithm to create an ID. Participants were asked to take the first letter of both their
parents’ first names and their own birth place, appended by the digit of their birth month (e.g.
“IKP10”). This algorithm, albeit not perfectly random, was sufficient to protect personally
identifiable information.
This was followed by a questionnaire on demographic data, password coping strategies and
attitudes towards emojis in passwords, e.g. “how likely would you consider using emojis in
a password?” At this point of the study, participants had not yet created an emoji-password,
so their attitudes were not biased by the tasks that followed. We also briefed them about the
difference between “emojis” and “emoticons” to avoid misinterpretation.
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(a) Point and click interface. It is opened by
clicking on the button. The order of emojis
is randomized. Upon selecting an emoji, it
automatically closes.
(b) Screenshot of the user study. The selected
password needed to be re-created. Addition-
ally, participants need to tick a check-box to
confirm that they had memorized their pass-
word.
Figure 11.4: Prototype as used in the study.
Afterwards, participants completed the password selection task using the prototype. A sig-
nificant part of the screen was dedicated to list all emojis and their short codes. To provide
sufficient background information and introduce a realistic risk [205], the task included a
scenario. It asked participants to imagine that they had used WhatsApp for some time and
now a new security precaution is introduced. As a safety measure, they were now required
to prove their identity with a password upon activating WhatsApp on a new device. The
password needed to consist of at least eight alphanumeric characters and at least one emoji.
Participants then had to repeat the selected password, and tick a box to confirm that they had
memorized it (see Figure 11.4b). This was followed-up through a reflective self-assessment
of their behavior during the study (cf. [103]), and a structured questionnaire on their selec-
tion strategies.
The study concluded with an interpretation task of two given emojis, namely the “informa-
tion desk person” ( ) and “folded hands” ( ). Those were not available during password
selection, and we intended to assess their suitability for future inclusion. In total, the whole
session duration was below 15 minutes.
11.2.3 Unmoderated Remote Memorability Study
Exactly one week after completing the first study part in the lab, participants were invited to
return for the second round of tasks on-line. It primarily focused on memorability metrics
and a reassessment of attitudes.
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Independent Variable
To gauge the influence of emoji fragmentation, we used one independent variable “render-
ing” with two levels. For the control group, emojis in the picker were rendered as before. In
the experimental group, we replaced the iOS emojis with the Android 7.0 version. No other
variations were made.
Dependent Variables
We measured the number of attempts participants needed to log in. If they failed to log
in on the first try, we counted this as an error. Moreover, we collected memorization and
recall techniques. Finally, subjective usability ratings on the overall concept and qualitative
feedback were gathered. This part of the study took about five minutes.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental groups. We emailed the
corresponding link to the online study and requested completion within two days. The web
page instructed them to recreate their user ID, providing the same algorithm as in the first
part. Afterwards, participants were asked to log-in via their previously selected password.
After three unsuccessful attempts, the log-in counted as failed and the study proceeded au-
tomatically. However, as a memory support tool, we displayed the list of short codes after
the first failed attempts. The study concluded with an attitudinal questionnaire about the
perceived usability of the concept.
11.2.4 Recruiting and Demography
We spread a registration link for a “study on emojis” via social networks and an official
university newsletter. A 5C shopping voucher served as incentive. The study was announced
to take around 15 minutes. 40 people were screened in and all showed up to their study
appointment. All of them were students at the LMU, and aged between 19 and 44 (M = 23).
Users in this age rage are most likely to use emojis on a regular basis [100]. 39 participants
returned for the second study part on-line. The control group was formed by 20 participants,
and the experimental group by 19.
11.3 Results
In the following, we explain participants’ sentiment regarding the usage of emoji-passwords
before we report empirical observations and qualitative analyses.
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Figure 11.5: Histogram of the chosen emojis and their categories. Patterns emerge already in
our sample with 40 participants, which hints at potential security problems.
11.3.1 Sentiment
Sentiments were assessed with agreement levels to five-point scale items (1 = strongly dis-
agree, 5 = strongly agree). Before participants selected an emoji-password for the first time,
they were already reserved towards the statement “I would consider adding an emoji to a
password” (M = 2.7,SD = 1.4,Md = 2). They did not regard emojis as a way to make
passwords more memorable, either (M = 2.8,SD = 1.3,Md = 3). After completing the
first part, the statement “I liked adding an emoji to my password” was rated slightly more
positively with an average of 3.6 (SD = 1.19,Md = 4). Having fulfilled all tasks, par-
ticipants saw general benefits to add emojis in passwords (M = 3.5,SD = 1.2,Md = 4).
Eleven found the enforced emoji-policy annoying. Hence, attitudes towards using emojis
for their personal passwords in the future were rather negative (M = 2.6,SD= 1.3,Md = 2),
although they were slightly more positive about potential memorability benefits than before
(M = 3.1,SD = 1.3,Md = 3). In summary, participants were reserved towards adopting
emoji-passwords, but their sentiment covered the full spectrum.
11.3.2 Emoji Selection
Statistics
Our 40 participants chose a total of 22 different emojis. Most commonly, participants chose
the camel (:camel: , n=5), penguin (:penguin: , n=5), grinning face (:grin: , n=3), tea
(:tea: , n=3), dog (:dog: , n=3), diamond (:diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside: , n=3),
and cherry blossom (:cherry_blossom: , n=3). The remaining 15 emojis were chosen less
than three times each. Six participants added two emojis to their password though this was
not required. On average, password fields had focus for 52.9 seconds (SD = 55.00).
Before passwords were hashed, we determined the position of the emojis. The majority of
participants who only selected one emoji put it at the end (n = 19), while seven started with
it and eight put it somewhere in the middle. Adding the emoji there is the most cumbersome
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Figure 11.6: Histogram of absolute positions of emojis inside passwords. The prefix (1:, 2:)
denotes the total number of emojis in the corresponding password. Most participants either
started or finished their password with the emoji.
approach due to the double modality switch between mouse and keyboard if the picker is
used. The six participants who picked two emojis either put both at the start (n = 1), as the
first and last characters (n = 2), only in the middle as two consecutive characters (n = 1), or
as middle and last character (n = 2). Figure 11.6 shows a detailed breakdown of the chosen
positions.
Self-Reported Selection Strategies
Apart from the emoji, our participants mostly claimed to have created a password like they
normally would (M = 3.4,SD= 1.45,Md = 4). We elicited selection strategies in two ways:
a list of probable strategies that we identified in pre-tests, and an open question where par-
ticipants were asked to describe their method in detail. Half of the participants indicated that
they used an emoji that fits the alphanumeric part of the password. Four said that they pre-
ferred an emoji that they frequently use, while another four chose an emoji at random. The
remaining participants either associated the picture to a life event (n = 3) or hobby (n = 1).
Eight participants elaborated on their tactics in high detail, and their strategies were more
individual than the predefined categories.
Through collaborative thematic analysis, a method similar to affinity diagramming, we iden-
tified themes in all qualitative statements and the think-aloud protocol. After the first round
of coding, there were 42 codes that were further reduced in an axial coding step. The result-
ing overall themes were:
• Internal consistency: The emoji semantically matches the alphanumeric part of the pass-
word, e.g. putting a camel emoji after the Greek word for “heat” (P26).
• Context cues: The password contains a hint to the participant’s location or to its purpose.
For instance, participants used the computer emoji because they created the password on
a PC (P34). Another participant picked the check mark because it stands for completing
the study (P38).
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• Replacement: The emoji replaces either a letter or an entire word. For instance, P17
replaced the letter “p” in their password with a penguin because both words begin with
the same letter.
• Appeal: The emoji visually or emotionally appealed to the participants (mentioned twice
for the flower emoji )
• Liking: Participants had an affection or personal connection to the emoji, e.g. penguins
.
• Usability and Security: An emoji that serves to increase usability or security of the
password. Usability could be improved either with a particularly easy-to-type shortcode
(:grin:), or by choosing emojis that “stand out from the rest, because they look too sim-
ilar” (P32, chose the penguin). Security was achieved through perceived randomness or
unpredictability (mentioned twice for the diamond ).
Within those six themes, we can see a common story line: The selection strategies can be
read as an attempt to improve memorability of the password. Most participants intuitively
focused on creating a password that they could easily recall. None of them mentioned the
option to write down the emoji-password or store it externally. The selected emojis thus
matched individual memorization approaches.
11.3.3 Input Methods
The majority (n = 32) intuitively turned to the point-and-click interface to enter their emoji.
Five participants used the short-codes and three tried both modalities. Both the picker and
the short codes received positive usability ratings from the respective participants (Mpicker) =
3.8,SDpicker = 1.1,Mshort = 4.2,SDshort = 1.3), Thus, it was easy for participants to enter
emojis on a desktop computer in both modalities. Interestingly, the three participants who
tried both methods started with the picker and then continued to use the short codes, because
they found it more convenient.
Through a qualitative analysis of the think aloud protocol we found that participants con-
sidered the advantages and disadvantages of both input methods. The picker was perceived
as easy and fast to use, while being less prone to typing errors. Often, participants men-
tioned that they were already familiar with this entry method (e.g. from WhatsApp web), so
they did not have to learn anything new. On the other hand, they described the progressive
disclosure paradigm as potential problem, because the button that triggers the picker could
be overlooked. Also, some mentioned that it is cumbersome to switch between mouse and
keyboard. Those who used the shortcodes appreciated the speed of entry and low effort to
add the emoji to the password. However, learning and memorizing the corresponding codes
were seen as the main drawbacks. The sentiments did not significantly change in the second
part of the study (M = 3.5,SD = 1.2,Md = 4, overall happiness ratings). In summary, we
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can conclude that participants made a deliberate choice about the chosen input method and
they were happy with it.
11.3.4 Memorability and Recognition
Success Rates
Login success rates in the second session did not significantly differ between the two study
groups. In the control group, who saw the identical emoji set, five participants failed to log in
after a week and 15 succeeded. The experimental group, who received the Android version
of the emojis, counted six log-in failures, while 13 participants were able to authenticate
despite the change of rendering. This difference was not statistically significant (χ2(1) =
0.21, p > 0.5). From those who succeeded, 12 participants authenticated on the first try
in the control group, whereas this number was slightly lower in the experimental group
(n = 8). Again, the change was not statistically significant (χ2(1) = 1.25, p > 0.1), which
is probably owed to the sample size. The medians of failed attempts, which are potentially
more descriptive in this situation, did differ: the control group’s median was 0, while it was 1
in the experimental group. Figure 11.7 visualizes successful and unsuccessful login attempts
in high detail. There, we can trace back the emoji that were included in incorrectly entered
passwords. Success and failure rates in the “Animals & Nature” category were balanced in
both groups. However, participants were twice as likely to fail in the experimental group,
if their password contained an emoji from the “Smileys & People” category. Figure 11.8
shows that emojis differing strongly from the iOS version were more associated with login
failures. “Symbols” were the category with the highest failure rate across both groups.
Textual Feedback
To assess the influence of the rendering modification, we asked whether participants had no-
ticed any differences in the appearance of the emoji. Although the emojis remained identical
in the control group, 7 out of the 20 participants indicated that they had noticed a change.
This is hard to interpret, but we assume that they meant the order of the emoji inside the
10x5 grid. In the experimental group, where emojis did in fact look different, 16 out of 19
participants (84%) talked about this change in the response field. Eight of them did not per-
ceive the alteration as troublesome, while another eight felt that identifying the right emoji
was challenging. For three participants, the change of emoji-type was insurmountable: One
participant was very sure to have selected the correct emoji, because she picked a “happy
face” to express herself. However, she reported to have failed because she was unable to
pick the correct emoji in the second study session. Another participant, who successfully
authenticated with his emoji-password, indicated that he could only find the right emoji after
a Google search. Finally, one participant mentioned that he was troubled by the different
versions of the check mark, so he used a trial and error approach until he succeeded.
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Figure 11.7: Detailed overview of the emojis inside passwords. Columns represent emoji cate-
gory. The top half shows the control group’s attempts while the bottom depicts the experimental
group who had to log in with a different emoji style. Successful logins appear on the positive
side of the y-axis, and erroneous login attempts on the negative side. Smileys & People are error
prone in the experimental group. Symbols generally led to more errors.
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Figure 11.8: Effective emoji-set of the experimental group. Error-prone emojis are highlighted
with a pink outline. We can see that these differ strongly from the iOS version from session 1.
We take this as evidence for the usability problems caused by fragmentation.
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11.3.5 Memorization Techniques
The emoji-picker and the number of emojis was helpful to recognize and recall the password
for 18 participants. The short codes did not achieve this, because only one person reportedly
used the code as a cue to the password. A priori agreement levels to the statement “Using
emojis in a password makes it more memorable” were neutral with a tendency to disagree-
ment (M = 2.8,SD = 1.4,Md = 2). In the exit survey, we again probed this sentiment and
noticed a small, statistically insignificant upward trend (M = 3.1,SD = 1.3,Md =3).
11.3.6 Interpretation Task
The final task in the lab-session was to provide two word associations for two emojis ( ,
). Thematic analyses showed a wide range of themes for the “service person” emoji. A
total of 14 distinct themes were visible, each mentioned by at least two participants. Most
often, this emoji was associated with “female” (n = 6) and “pointing” (n = 5). The emoji
depicts a bell-hop’s “tipping gesture”, which was interpreted as “sassy” (n = 2) or “bossy”
(n= 4), too. Regarding the “praying hands” emoji, participants reached higher consensus on
its meaning. Seven themes emerged from the word associations. Most commonly, the par-
ticipants mentioned “pray” (n = 19) and “beg” (n = 9). These anecdotal examples highlight
the problems produced by unclear meanings of emojis. For passwords, on the other hand, a
bigger range of interpretations opens up more opportunities to create a story with emojis.
11.3.7 Limitations
The results presented above need to be interpreted in the light of a few important limitations.
First, the sample size was not large enough to bring about statistically significant test results.
Naturally, the null hypotheses (e.g. fragmentation does not affect recall) could be true, but
with 40 participants, we lack some statistical power to draw conclusive inferences, espe-
cially with a frequentist approach (which emoji was chosen how often). Nevertheless, we
saw emerging patterns that can be followed up with a quantitative user study. Our primary
goal was the exploration of fragmentation and input issues, as well as attitudes. Our partici-
pants belonged to the user group who would be most likely to try out emoji-passwords. This
makes us confident the trends at least point into the right direction. To explore additional di-
mensions of the problem space around emoji-passwords, considering a more diverse sample
is going to be useful in the future.
Moreover, much of the elicited data is attitudinal, potentially affecting ecological validity of
the study. However, we tried to mitigate issues by providing a realistic scenario and had them
gauge their behavior. Here, most claimed they acted like they normally would, which has
been shown to be a useful indicator as to the trustworthiness of the data [103]. Nonetheless,
emoji-passwords constituted an unfamiliar paradigm for all participants, despite their famil-
iarity with both emojis and passwords separately. Therefore, novelty effects are possible in
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that participants might have spent more time to explore the possibilities than they normally
would. However, subjective usability assessments on the feasibility of emoji-passwords were
reserved nonetheless. This indicates that respondents critically balanced the pros and cons
and did not only focus on the benefits.
11.4 Discussion
In the following, the results are put into context. We derive data-driven assessments about
the feasibility of emoji-passwords.
11.4.1 Selection Strategies and Their Implications
It was evident that participants were keen on creating a memorable password. So although
people were enabled to select a richer and more diverse password, we observed well-known
reactions. The selection strategies were a direct translation of their usual patterns. Many of
them noted that they were able to easily include emojis in their long-established strategies
and coping behavior. As a consequence, we observed predictable patterns in selection strate-
gies leading to simple attack vectors: participants favored items that helped them maintain
their existing selection strategies, which can be exploited to adapt cracking techniques. We
can read this as a bad sign, because emojis do not appear to break existing behavior, and only
increase the theoretical space of creation strategies. At this point it is difficult to gauge prac-
tical security advantages entailed by enlarging the character set. Learning from past roll-outs
of new authentication schemes, password strength is unlikely to increase drastically by the
use of emojis. On the other hand, user-selected passwords have always shown predictable
patterns and adding emojis probably will not aggravate the situation further. Therefore, the
only major advantage of allowing users to pick emoji-passwords can be an improvement in
how password authentication is perceived. In other words, it might help the user experience
(UX). Our data is helpful to identify the pitfalls that need to be considered to achieve good
UX of emoji-passwords.
11.4.2 Factors in Good UX of Emoji Passwords
Improving the UX of a technology is a strategy to drive its persuasiveness [121]. Therefore,
we can address a number of aspects to foster a positive user experience of emoji-passwords.
Freedom to choose Good UX starts with respect and empathy. Users should not be forced
to use emojis in their passwords. Our data discourages the use of a policy that mandates
emojis, which a quarter of participants found annoying. Our first study on personality factors
showed a large variety of thinking styles about policies (cf. Section 7.2). Therefore, we argue
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in favor of autonomy and leaving it up to users to decide whether they want to use an emoji
as part of their password(s). So, users are empowered to change their behavior and might be
persuaded to do so.
Learning Curve Once users understand that they have the freedom to use emoji-
passwords, the learning curve for this task looks fairly gentle. Our sample consisted of
users who were already familiar with entering emojis on the desktop and therefore immedi-
ately knew what to do. Less experienced user groups should be offered assistance in case
they decide to experiment with emoji-passwords. We also found that the short codes were
mainly used by participants who aimed for efficiency. Thus, there is nothing wrong with
enabling short codes for input, but it should be tailored to an advanced user group.
Pragmatic Constraints for Passwords Although our sample came from a population of
young adults who are highly experienced with emojis, some participants clearly struggled
to identify the correct emoji after we exchanged the renderings. Therefore, inconsistencies
across platforms could become a show-stopper. At the moment, there are a few problems
that contribute to creating inconsistent experiences. First, although emojis are standardized
Unicode code-points, vendors usually need to create custom emoji-pictures for legal rea-
sons. Sets under a public domain or nonrestrictive licenses do exist, but many vendors prefer
shipping custom on-brand experiences with a shared design language across their products.
On the other hand, it could be useful to form alliances like the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) to standardize graphical assets of emojis specifically for password-fields. Software
keyboards on mobiles would also need to match this hypothetical “password-emoji stan-
dard”. As of now, emojis offered by built-in software keyboards often look different to those
of certain apps (see Figure 11.9). To solve this inconsistency, a native keyboard could offer
an interface that lets the app inject a consistent set of emojis.
After settling on a shared visual representation of emojis, distinctiveness is another critical
factor. Some emoji-tuples that look very similar to each other can be troublesome. One
of our participants mentioned this issue already in his selection strategy, because he was
looking for an emoji that “stands out” and did not “look like the others”. To avoid login
failures from confusion, there needs to be a whitelist of emojis that only contains the highly
distinctive ones. We can first derive a candidate list based on geometric parameters like
shape and color, and then proceed to evaluate them through quantitative user research with
a diverse sample.
A final challenge pertaining to the constraints of emoji-passwords are hard usability met-
rics like efficiency. Higher degree of freedom and creativity support are ineffective if users
need to browse through large lists of emojis only to find the correct item. Reducing the
emoji-space to a subset emerges as a useful approach to speed up recognition and efficiency.
At the same time, it is conceivable that vendors stick to a limited, static subset that is ran-
domly selected from the whitelist of distinct emojis. Distinct subsets, i.e. a different random
permutation per vendor, can also mitigate password reuse.
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Figure 11.9: Screenshots of entering emojis on WhatsApp. While the software provides a set of
emojis that is consistent across all platforms supported by WhatsApp (left), users can still turn
to the native software keyboard of their OS (right). In this case, the renderings, number, and
order are inconsistent.
11.5 Conclusion
In this project, we empirically evaluated the usage of emojis in regular alphanumeric pass-
words to gauge their suitability as persuasive alternative to existing passwords. Our mixed-
model user study with forty participants focused on attitudinal and usability aspects. From
the selection behavior, memorability results and qualitative feedback we can conclude that
emojis do not necessarily lead to memorable passwords (RQ1). Participants wanted to trans-
late their usual password selection behavior to the new paradigm and at least tried to create
memorable passwords (RQ4). When participants failed to log in, this could be partially
traced back to fragmentation, i.e. differences in the visual representation of the same emoji
characters (RQ2). Our sample population was experienced with emojis, but still struggled to
match Android emojis to a previously selected iOS emoji. Their personal experience allowed
them to easily understand how to enter emoji-passwords on desktops through a graphical
point-and-click interface (RQ3). Nevertheless, our prototype made potential usability prob-
lems salient for participants and thus their attitudes towards adopting emoji-passwords in the
future were reserved (RQ5). Thus, the persuasive power of emoji-passwords was limited,
which we attribute to the user experience of the study setting.
Some vendors and service providers have already enabled emoji support for passwords. For
instance, Twitter10 allows users to take advantage of this rich character set. The issues we
explored in our study thus affect a growing number of users already now. Roadmaps to
address fragmentation and input issues do not exist at this point. However, more and more
users are going to find out about the capabilities, perhaps because the feature is presented
in blog- and news articles [69]. Therefore, the HCI community should act quick to create
a better authentication experience to scale solutions before problems are going to scale.
Realistically, the propositions and requirements discussed in Section 11.4.2 would require
intensive negotiation substantiated with much more user testing data. It is unclear whether
vendors are willing to make this investment. We argue that a standardized emoji-password-
10 https://www.twitter.com (last accessed 10.03.2018)
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picker with a random sub-set of white-listed, distinctive emojis is a desirable goal. The
“longer term solutions” that are part of the Unicode standard (see Footnote 1) embrace “em-
bedded graphics”, which paves the way to mitigate fragmentation issues. Since leading tech
companies have worked together on the standardization of emojis in the past, it would be
fruitful to collaborate on authentication issues of emojis, too.
Future Work Our prototype did not deliver the best possible user experience. This caveat
was partially owed to isolating confounding factors. For instance, a finished solution would
not shuffle the order of emojis as we did. Future studies on emoji-passwords need to in-
tensely study different dimensions of user experience issues and potentials. To better un-
derstand the current state of emoji-passwords, a diary study might be worthwhile. It would
be possible to answer interesting questions on how this novel kind of authentication influ-
ences well-established coping strategies. For instance, is it possible to write down emoji-
passwords, and share them with somebody else? Can password managers already handle
them? Do users take more care to protect emoji-passwords from shoulder surfers? Such
questions can further help judge the feasibility of this approach and identify important pain
points.
At the same time, we saw how existing coping strategies might lead to weak emoji-
passwords. Therefore, as a next step, the security benefits should be quantified. Perhaps,
this is relatively easy to do with an mTurk study. If our hunch about weak selection strate-
gies is confirmed, persuasive strength feedback for emoji-passwords is an important future
research direction. Real-time password meters, particularly those based on zxcvbn, are cur-
rently unable to realistically gauge the strength of emoji-passwords. Therefore, further work
on modeling strength is necessary. Neural networks, as shown by Melicher et al., could
respect the predictability of user-chosen emojis in guess-number estimates [233]. All in
all, some more work is going to be necessary to reach the high persuasive power of emoji-
passwords that we had hoped for. Our work has laid the foundations for such studies on the
quantitative side.
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Take Aways
• Users’ intuitive reaction to creating an emoji-password was re-
sorting to established strategies with memorability in mind.
This is early evidence that the envisioned security benefits
might come off very small.
• Emojis did not significantly improve password memorability.
• Simulating log-ins on a different platform than where the
emoji-password was selected resulted in notable usability is-
sues, because users fail to recognize the previously selected
emojis.
• A point-and-click interface works for emoji-passwords, but
emojis must be reduced to a small sample and must not look
very similar to each other.
• Most participants were not eager to adapt emoji-passwords.
The current user experience reduced the persuasive effects of
empowering users to become more creative.
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12
Persuasive Design for Password Support
Having reviewed the literature (Part I), and explored both contextual factors (Part II) and
novel designs (Part III), we can now take a step back and synthesize common streams, re-
sults, and lessons learned. As a result, this chapter presents a new framework for researchers
and designers to find and evaluate persuasive strategies that support users in any task that
involves passwords. We can find numerous research papers that evaluate a specific aspect
without much context information or covariates. For instance, many types of password me-
ters have been designed and evaluated, but most focused on measuring impact in the form
of resulting password strength and usability metrics alone. However, aspects like user’s
preexisting mental models of password strength or the deployment environment were often
untouched. At the same time, it is important to focus on the users and choose the support
strategy that works best for them under a given configuration of environmental variables.
Moreover, we find that many persuasive strategies stay below their potentials [267], or show
unexpected effects (see Chapter 10). Therefore, I establish a design process to avoid past
shortcomings in nudging effects and to aid strategic decision-making for persuasive design.
The Persuasive Design for Password Support (P4P) framework broadens the view on
exploring and designing support systems (see Figure 12.1). It is divided into two “lenses”
for the task. The “research lens” covers the ever-changing, heterogeneous environmental
factors in usable password authentication and how to elicit them. It helps explain why users
act in certain ways and can provide pointers as to why we should try to change the current
state. The “design lens” assesses the status quo of password authentication and helps find
solutions of different obtrusiveness levels (first stage), i.e. what should be the focus of a new
persuasive strategy. The second stage defines a user-centered process to implement once the
required level of support has been decided. It aids in finding out how the persuasive strategy
should look. In the following, I explain these elements and show a design exercise where I
apply the framework to create a novel approach for a password manager.
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Figure 12.1: Persuasive Design for Password Support (P4P) is a specialized design framework
for strategic intervention development.
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12.1 Research Lens
The first step to create a novel persuasive support strategy is to elicit a number of factors
that are involved in usable password authentication. Some of them have been addressed
in previous research, e.g. coping strategies, while others are a direct consequence of the
findings presented in this thesis (e.g. mental models or personality). Researchers can try to
answer the following questions to obtain an overview of the status quo of risky and secure
factors:
Question P4P Element
What are current mental models, e.g. of password strength or support tools? Mental Models
How do different user groups cope with passwords? Coping Strategies
What are users primarily trying to achieve when they authenticate? Goals
What are the dimensions of user needs in this context, also in regard to support? Needs
How does demographic background impact password attitudes and behavior? Background
How much is personality visible in attitudes and behavior regarding authentication? Personality
What is the broader context of the authentication task, e.g. personal vs. work environment? Context
What (sub-)tasks does the user need to perform to reach their goals? Tasks
What are the challenges that different users face in the task? Challenges
What risks are there if the user acts insufficiently secure? Risks
Some of these questions already hint at the dynamics of certain factors. For instance, users’
mental models about threats might adapt over time, e.g. after falling prey to a phishing scam.
Adoption rates of password managers are also volatile and the percentage of people relying
on them certainly affects the type of novel support strategies one can implement. Although
many questions and aspects can be answered by desk research methods, the dynamic evolu-
tion of the factors requires ongoing elicitation. Thus, traditional empirical research methods
can be used to observe behavior and problems, measure interactions, explicitly ask users
about certain aspects, immerse in the context of different user groups, and learn from all
these activities. The result of this exploration is a detailed picture of the status quo.
Status Quo
The status quo is a snapshot of the levels and relative importance of the factors that contribute
to usable password authentication. Although the data elicitation should be generalizable and
objective, the judgment of the result is not. It is up to researchers to collaboratively assess the
risk level of a certain user group in various contexts. Here, the framework posits that some
aspects that have traditionally been considered “risky” behavior need to be seen in a different
light as attacks and countermeasures evolve. This follows the argumentation of Florêncio,
Herley, Bonneau, and Van Oorshot among others [34, 117, 165, 389]. For instance, not all
passwords need to withstand offline attacks. Therefore, it is unnecessary to nudge users to
create passwords that would withstand them, because the usability drawbacks are unbearable
for many users in most situations. The status quo thus informs the level of intervention in
the subsequent design phase.
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12.2 Design Lens
The second half of the framework consist of two distinct stages: 1) Identifying the right level
of support and 2) creating novel persuasive solutions. The first stage is strongly influenced
by the results of the status-quo analysis, while the second deals with the specific questions
during the implementation of a persuasive strategy.
Cues to Pick the Right Support Strategy
The interventions in Figure 12.1 are ordered by their level of justifiable obtrusiveness. On the
left, very risky behavior should be tried to counteract. The risk-level assessment is context
dependent and can be read from the status quo analysis, where context is one dimension. We
can read the elements like “if X then Y” in vertical direction. In particular, the framework
follows this pattern:
If <user group>, who are <list of factors>, do <specific action>, then this can be
seen as <risky or secure> and justifies <intervention level>.
For example, the framework suggests that if users of online web-services show clear patterns
of inconsistent reuse, i.e. reusing a password from a high-value account on a low-value
website, then this is risky behavior and should be counteracted with obtrusive strategies.
The same goes for mismatches of account value and password strength. Other aspects can
be resolved with less user-involvement and obtrusion. For instance, if status quo analysis
shows that current password policies in companies are too complex, they should thus be
replaced by simpler versions. Decisions under uncertainty, e.g. when a user needs to assess
how valuable an account is, can be resolved with different persuasive patterns, too. Users
can be guided in password selection, memorization, and reset tasks, as well as fulfilling a
given policy. Moreover, it might be reasonable to correct users’ mental models of password
strength, respectively threats, to empower them to behave more consistently in the long term.
Finally, there are a number of aspects that are generally beneficial in terms of security, e.g.
using strong and unique passwords, activating multi-factor authentication (MFA), or relying
on support tools like password managers. If these are part of the status quo for a given user
group, there is no need to change that behavior for the time being. Rather, a support strategy
should then positively reinforce these actions.
Implementation Process
Once the correct level of support has been identified, the P4P framework helps with imple-
menting it. First, it is feasible to define the envisioned outcome of the strategy, e.g. “stronger
passwords” or “changing novices’ mental models of password managers”. Moreover, the
general context and roadmap for the implementations are defined at this point. Afterwards,
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the designer chooses a number of parameters for the strategies. Most notably, the nudging
strategy to achieve the target outcome should be chosen and matched to the required level
of user support. At the same time, the target user group should be narrowed down, e.g.
with personas as shown in Section 7.5.1. The different dimensions of user needs are already
addressed at this stage, i.e. “show”, “explain”, “help”, “empower”, because they guide sub-
sequent design stages. When the parameters have been fixed, it is important to consider a
number of pitfalls in persuasion strategies. For instance, how quickly would users become
habituated to the nudge and how can one counteract that? What are the constraints in differ-
ent contexts, e.g. deploying the strategy at a company versus a consumer-oriented website
for mobile devices? Users also often resent attempts to be persuaded, thus the design needs
to be more empathetic and ethical at the same time. Moreover, people prefer sticking to cur-
rent behaviors although they theoretically want to act differently. This discrepancy results in
a certain level of inertia that a persuasive strategy needs to overcome to be effective. The list
of considerations is not exhaustive but covers the most important aspects. If these limtations
are too strong, it might be necessary to return to the previous step in the process to resolve
them.
Once there is reason to assume that the overall nudging strategy might be feasible, it needs
to be substantiated with different designs. Here, password interventions have four degrees
of freedom: visual or verbal nudges (e.g. in password meters), and feedforward or feedback
techniques (e.g. password suggestions vs. strength assessment of the current password). It
is important to consider different versions of the nudge in each of these dimensions to better
exhaust the design space. Moreover, it allows for more nuanced options to evaluate the over-
all strategy. Typically, the effect or impact of the nudge are compared to a control group, or
between different configurations, e.g. the resulting password strength with various feedback
mechanisms. The usability and subjective perception can be evaluated both quantitatively
and qualitatively. Finally, it should be investigated how the nudge impacts the password life
cycle as a whole.
Outcome
When the process has been completed in full, we are able to judge the feasibility of the
strategy and may or may not recommend adopting it. If it is adopted, the status quo is likely
to change after a given amount of time. This warrants exploring further opportunities and
updating the factors in the “research lens”. Thus, the framework needs to be seen as an
iterative process, but it is flexible enough to take shortcuts and start at a later stage. In the
following, I discuss an application of the P4P Framework to shed more light on its feasibility.
12.3 A Design Exercise with the P4P Framework
Dealing with a multitude accounts, users mostly resort to password reuse. Although some
reuse behavior involves considerable risk, Florêncio et al. indicated that it is a neces-
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sary strategy if users refrain from using password managers [116]. Consequently, Zhang-
Kennedy et al. updated common recommendations on reuse [389]. In essence, they rec-
ommend to “strategically reuse passwords”. Moreover, Wash et al. stated that “defining
appropriate categories of websites for re-use of passwords of varying strengths is an open
area of research;” [363]. We used this as a starting point for a design exercise with the
P4P framework. The section is partially based on a Bachelor thesis by Magdalena Sifer-
linger [306] and a Master thesis by Martin Prinz [256]. I provided the ideas, supervised both
students, and guided them through their projects.
12.3.1 Phase 1: Research Lens
The goal of the first phase to get a full picture of the status quo. This involves desk research,
as well as empirical research methods.
Users: Mental models and Strategies
One of the missing puzzle pieces are the specific categories that form reuse strategies. Al-
though related work mentioned distinct exemplary categories, we wanted to narrow down
the theoretical space. For this purpose, we planned and executed a mixed-method study to
elicit re-use strategies. 35 people completed an online survey that was distributed on social
networks. Five passers-by were interviewed in a public location in Munich. The question-
naire was identical in both methods, but the interviews allowed us to ask follow-up questions.
Apart from demographics, we mainly inquired the number of accounts, password coping and
reuse strategies, and the biggest challenges that respondents face in them. To elicit selec-
tion strategies, we provided four scenarios that involved creating accounts for email, social
networking, banking, and a news page.
Unsurprisingly, most respondents reported that they reuse passwords either directly or with
modifications (77.2%). The remainder relied on a password manager to generate new ran-
dom passwords. Mangling strategies were predictable (swapping letters for digits, varying
appended symbols, and capitalizing letters). More importantly, a thematic analysis of the
statements about reuse strategies revealed the following nine themes: Account type (e.g.
email accounts), importance (e.g. very important, “throw-away”), strength (e.g. one or two
strong and a few weak passwords that are used depending on the perceived threat), time of
creation (e.g. the year), frequency of reuse (e.g. a go-to password and a few less frequently
typed ones), purpose (e.g. all accounts that were created for a project), base-password plus
mangling algorithm, policy-driven (e.g. if the go-to password is rejected, a more complex
password is reused), or generating completely new one depending on certain cues. These
themes contribute to the status quo of password reuse in this design exercise.
Password Managers
Other respondents mentioned using password managers, but there are different types of man-
agers: they can be classified as either retrieval-based or generative. Retrieval-based pass-
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word managers store the user’s passwords securely and allow, e.g., to automatically fill out
log-in forms on behalf of the user. Once a password is in the user’s manager, they can choose
to never type it again. Most commercial solutions work this way. On the downside, users
do not “practice” their password as much and might not remember it in situations where the
password manager is unavailable or too risky to use, e.g. at public computer at an airport.
The generative password manager approach solves this problem, because no passwords are
stored [228]: it provides the user with an algorithm to re-produce unique passwords (e.g.
PwdHash1)
Table 12.1: Popular password managers: Comparison of features beyond password storage
and retrieval. 3 = available (3) = available with restrictions, (8) = with workaround, 8 = not
available
Category Feature Dashlane LastPass 1Password KeePassX
Automation form-detection 3 3 3 (8)
autofill passwords 3 3 3 (8)
autofill personal info 3 3 3 8
autofill payment info 3 3 3 8
facilitate password reset (3) (3) 8 8
auto-update password reset 3 (3) (3) 8
Organization grouping / tags / folders 3 3 3 8
default groups 3 8 8 8
memorization support (3) (3) (3) 8
password hints (3) 8 8 3
cross device synchronization 3 3 3 (8)
personal info wallet 3 3 3 8
Security Audit strength feedback (ad hoc / in client) 3 3 3 8
overall score 3 3 (3) 8
ad hoc guidance 3 3 3 8
security alert 3 3 3 8
negative feedback on reuse 3 3 8 8
warn about inconsistent reuse (8) 8 8 (8)
Password Generation ad hoc random password 3 3 3 3
context aware (policy constraints) 8 8 8 8
Integrations Desktop 3 3 3 3
Browser 3 3 3 (3)
Smartphone 3 3 3 (3)
Collaboration Grant others access (3) 3 (3) 8
Pricing Free Version 3 3 8 3
Open Source 8 8 8 3
In Chapter 8, we have already presented an exploration of the mental models of password
managers. The most important take-away was that only those who have started using one
actually know the benefits, while non-users see password managers as a black box. In chap-
ter 7, we found that using a password manager was associated with demographic factors
and some personality traits: Older participants and those with an IT background were more
likely to rely on one, while people scoring high on “openness” were slightly less likely. To
1 https://pwdhash.github.io/website/ (last accessed 23.03.2018)
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understand the status quo, we can compare real-world PWMs by their features (see Table
12.1). Additional aspects were part of a recent coverage in the c’t magazine2.
Relying on data from previous chapters, related work, and an additional small-scale empiri-
cal evaluation, we can frame the status quo like this:
Status Quo of Password Reuse and Password Managers
Mental Models. Users have very vague mental models about password managers.
Coping Strategies. Although more people are starting to rely on password man-
agers, the foremost coping strategy is reuse. Here, users often categorize accounts
with varying granularity. We have identified nine distinct reuse strategies. Goals.
Reusing facilitates recall. Some users are aware of the security risks of reuse and try
to mitigate them by strategically reusing passwords. Current password managers
try to steer users away from reuse altogether. Needs. Users need to be able to re-
call their most important passwords, while the rest could be handled by a password
manager. Background. Older users appear to be more likely to reuse passwords,
but also more willing to use a password manager. Having an IT background also
often goes along with using PWMs to be able to handle a multitude of strong, more
random passwords. Context. If users encounter PWMs at work, they are likely
to continue using it in private. Tasks. Password managers can follow either a
generative or a retrieval-based approach which differ in the tasks that the user has
to complete. Retrieval-based managers require less cognitive effort. Strategically
reusing passwords might include a deliberate strategy, but is more likely developed
intuitively. Challenges. Users are challenged with picking the “right” password
manager, switching from one manager to another, and learning how to use them
best. Reuse does not challenge users strongly, but recalling the correct category is
sometimes troublesome. Risks. Reusing a password too often increases the risk of
the “domino effect” if one account is successfully attacked. Forgetting the master-
password of a password manager, e.g. after a long period of inactivity, can lock
users out of all their online accounts at once.
12.3.2 Phase 2: Design Lens
With the status quo as starting point, we put on the design lens and pick the focus areas
in which to support users with password managers. Particularly, we identified that current
PWMs try to “fix the user” by giving negative feedback on reused passwords in case they
analyze all saved credentials and display a security score. Thus, there is an opportunity to
“fix the system” and better support users in strategic reuse. Hence, our idea is a “Password
Reuse Manager” (PWRM).
2 https://heise.de/-3992417 (last accessed 22.03.2018)
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First Stage
We can address the following cues to figure out what to support: Inconsistent reuse should
be counteracted by the PWRM, while consistent reuse is acceptable. The PWRM can offer
default categories to reduce complexity and aid in the decision whether to reuse or generate
a new password. If a new password is recommendable, the PWRM can guide selection,
memorization, and policy fulfillment. If the users realize the benefits, this can reinforce
their choice to adopt a password manager in the first place. It is evident that a password
manager is capable of addressing multiple support strategies at once (counteract, resolve,
guide, and reinforce), because it is able to interact with the user at multiple touch points of
password authentication. At this point, changing the users’ mental models is not the PWRMs
responsibility, but it might happen along the way.
Second Stage
In the second stage of the Design Lens, we try to create a concrete implementation of the
support strategies.
Define. The envisioned outcome is a password manager that better represents the user’s
current coping strategies and therefore facilitates adoption. The design should be iteratively
improved until all common coping strategies are supported (Roadmap).
Choose. We can choose nudges for each support strategy. Counteracting inconsistent
reuse should be done fairly obtrusively, because this kind of behavior generates the greatest
risk, respectively the highest amount of effort in recovering from an attack. The “commit-
ment and consistency” principle by Cialdini is perhaps the most promising candidate [57].
Resolving uncertainty and complexity can be addressed with suggestive nudges, that facili-
tate decision-making. The “salience” effect falls into this category [61]. Also, having good
default categories is a powerful nudge [62]. Similarly, users can be guided by simplifying the
password selection process (simplification principle [124]). Finally, using a password man-
ager can be reinforced by offering the service for free and providing a good user experience
overall.
In our case, we target users who prefer reusing passwords but also appreciate help in this
task. Thus, the target user group consists of novices who have developed their own reuse
strategies and prefer maintaining these, but in a simpler way. The “Eliot Elis” persona from
Chapter 7 represents this user group well. Therefore, the strategy should fulfill the “show”
and “help” dimensions of user needs: Showing problems with inconsistencies and helping
with finding alternatives are the foremost requirements we can address with the PWRM. At
the same time, the PWRM should empower users to maintain their strategy, and to decide
not to store certain passwords but only the user-names or a hint.
Consider. If the users stick to the PWRM, habituation is actually beneficial, because they
learn how to leverage the tool to work for them. In terms of constraints, the PWRM is a
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piece of software that would need to pass security audits in company environments. Giving
a lot of feedback and interventions might be perceived as authoritative and thus users could
resent these strategies. At the same time, the mere presence of the above mentioned nudges
might not overcome inertia, so the efficacy needs to be evaluated in multiple steps.
Design. In the design phase, we iteratively flesh out the specific information architecture
and visuals of the PWRM. In multiple design sessions and evaluations we moved from a
paper prototype to clickable wireframes, to a working prototype in the form of a browser
extension. Figure 12.2 shows the central page of the PWRM browser extension. The user
can put passwords into categories that share the same password. During onboarding, a few
default categories based on past reuse strategies are automatically created. They user may
also decide to save only a hint for a specific category (see Figure 12.3). This aims to avoid
that the user worries about the security of the PWRM – they can simply put the accounts that
they do not want managed into one category. In that case, the PWRM still supports them by
helping them recall the password, because the category acts as a hint.
Figure 12.2: Different stages of the design iterations. Left: wireframing stage. Right: The
main page of the PWRM groups reused passwords into different categories, which makes it
easy to indicate that a password has been reused too often. Nudges: simplification (through
organization), defaults (default categories during onboarding)
It is also possible to flag passwords as “unique”, i.e. that they do not belong to a group
of accounts that share the same password. Figure 12.4 shows the page that also visually
indicates the strength of the passwords. The PWRM browser extension detects “submit”
events from forms that contain password fields. It opens a small pop-up window to let the
user store the password (see Figure 12.5). Here, they can decide whether it should be put
into one of the reuse-categories or become a “unique” password, that is not shared with other
accounts. Further features and design decisions are indicated in the captions of Figures 12.2,
12.3, 12.4, and 12.5.
Evaluate. We iteratively evaluated the concept and the design in a user-centered approach.
Table 12.2 shows the four evaluation methods at different stages of the process. In a first
wizard-of-oz study, participants found that the categorization feature of the paper prototype
was still too complex, although they liked the idea of grouping accounts by passwords. In the
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Figure 12.3: The PWRM mitigates trust issues by allowing the user to store password hints or
categories instead of the passwords themselves. Nudges: consistency (stay within the category),
salience (suggesting categories, visual framing)
Figure 12.4: The PWRM holds a separate page of unique passwords. For the user, this reduces
uncertainty about the security state of different accounts. Nudges: commitment (user should
not reuse these passwords.)
second evaluation, the need for more explanation about the potential risks of password reuse
became evident. The first usability test with a preliminary implementation of the browser
extension showed that participants were able to fulfill all tasks. However, they desired more
automation features to speed up the interactions. Finally, we created a beta version of the
PWRM extension and recruited 12 participants to test it for ten days. After the ten days, it
was clear that the participants only rarely opened the browser with the extension, so we could
not conclusively evaluate the solution. The qualitative feedback indicated that participants
were browsing the web on their mobiles and also used other browsers during that time.
Hence, as a caveat, the effects of the nudges and the impact on the password life cycle
would only become visible in a longitudinal, large-scale study, with more careful screening.
Unfortunately, this was outside of the scope of this design exercise, and we need to leave
this to future work.
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Figure 12.5: The PWRM browser extension allows the user to save passwords to different
categories. Nudges: Defaults, simplification
Stage Focus N (m/f) Key Result
Paper Prototype Concept 5 (4/1) Clarify categorization feature
Clickable Wireframes Information architecture 7 (5/2) Explain reuse risks
Usability Test Task success, problems 6 (4/2) Provide more, automated support
Field Study Usage patterns 12 (6/6) Smoother integration necessary
Table 12.2: Evaluation iterations of the concept.
12.4 Summary
This chapter contributes “P4P” - a framework for persuasive design for password support.
Its elements are based on numerous research studies both from related and original work.
Other persuasion frameworks for authentication, e.g. the Persuasive Authentication Frame-
work [124], focused on the design space, whereas P4P tries to structure the investigation
of the problem (the why), design-heuristics (the what), and the implementation process (the
how). So, although it might be seen as an approach to provide a “holistic” view on pass-
word support design, I intentionally avoided this term. The elements exhaust much of the
research and design space, but there might be other latent factors or different configurations
that need more attention in future explorations. Nevertheless, depending on the amount of
status-quo information, the structure of the framework allows researchers and designers to
start at a later point and follow a structured process. I showed how to use the P4P framework
to tackle research questions and explore new opportunities in password support: It led to
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the creation of a “Password Reuse Manager” that is now under an open-source license to
facilitate distributed development3. The design exercise was fairly comprehensive and en-
compassed a multitude of strategies. However, the framework is also applicable for smaller
tasks, e.g. the design of password meters. In the future, P4P can help derive novel solutions
outside the current design space of password support.
Take Aways
• The Persuasive Design for Password Support (P4P) framework
structures exploration and design of new solutions to support
users in any password-related task.
• It can be applied to big design projects (like a full-blown pass-
word manager in our case), but also to smaller aspects (like
the design of password meters, help pages, onboarding wiz-
ards etc.)
3 https://github.com/mimuc/pwrm/ (last accessed 23.03.2018)
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Summary
This thesis analyzed a multitude of aspects that need to be considered when we try to support
users in password authentication with persuasive design. Hereby, the following research
questions were addressed:
RQ1 What is the role of psychological factors and mental models for password selection
and coping strategies?
RQ2 How can password authentication be simplified for users?
RQ3 How can we design persuasive strategies to support users in any password-related
tasks?
Since password authentication has been under investigation for several decades, we first
delimited the landscape of related work in Part I. This helped us find pointers to all three
research questions and identify open topics that had still been underexplored (see Chapter
4). In Parts II and III, we reported on a number of empirical experiments and explorative
research studies to investigate both human factors and environmental constraints of password
authentication. RQ1 was mainly investigated with online studies in the wild and with survey
methods. We explored the mental models of password strength by innovating a research
method to inexpensively collect data in the wild. Moreover, we conducted multiple surveys
to explore associations between personality and attitudes and behaviors in authentication.
We tried to answer RQ2 with mixed methods, both on the qualitative and the quantitative
side. Here, we explored the needs users have in persuasive feedback with a survey and
participatory design approach, and derived a solution based on the Decoy effect and emojis
inside text-based passwords. Finally, to answer RQ3, we discussed a framework to guide the
design of persuasive strategies in Chapter 12, which we then also applied to create a novel
password-manager. The following sections discuss the central insights and show how they
are connected.
13.1 Central Contributions and Insights
Psychological Factors and Mental Models in Authentication
In Chapter 3, we found that most related work describes coping strategies. Only sometimes
the contributing factors like educational background, psychographics, or mental models that
foster certain coping strategies are addressed.
We filled this gap in several ways. First, we investigated the mental models of password
strength, because these are believed to be highly influential on actual password choice. For
these purposes, we innovated on research methods to understand latent password strength
perceptions: PASDJO, the password game, helped in showing that passphrases are often
underestimated by users, although NIST has started to propagate them in favor of highly
complex passwords (see Chapter 5). The long-standing belief that strong passwords must
include a wide range of characters was clearly visible in the data collected during one year
of public deployment. However, users were by and large capable of judging the quality of
passwords. We take this as evidence that users are most likely aware of their actions when
they select either strong and weak passwords for different purposes. This insight gives rise
to a shift in the way we support users in password selection: In many cases it is unnecessary
to provide feedback on strength, because users can already estimate it well. Therefore, we
can tackle other risky behaviors. In fact, password strength is often a secondary risk factor, if
users reuse passwords too carelessly. To investigate the real-world constraints for password
reuse, we audited the composition policies of the 83 most visited web-sites in Germany (see
Chapter 6). We were able to show that it is easy for users to reuse a single password on most
sites: it only has to be nine or ten characters long and consist of lower- and uppercase letters
and digits. Hence, this finding is another indication that password policies have shaped the
mental model that at least three different character classes are absolutely required to form a
strong password – and that reuse is less critical, because it is not prevented. Moreover, users
do not need a password manager if their go-to passwords are accepted by most websites.
However, as soon as they add symbols in the belief that doing so fosters password strength
even more, the success rate to reuse the resulting password drops significantly. So, in that
case, rejecting passwords based on certain symbols might leave users wondering why these
do not boost password strength. The result is a cognitive dissonance in the users’ mental
models. To resolve this, websites could provide some kind of explanation as to their policy
choice, but most fail to do this. Besides, it is unlikely that they disallow certain symbols
to hamper password reuse. As a take-away, service providers need to start accepting Uni-
code passwords without arbitrary length restrictions to avoid confusing users. This allows
automatically generating unique passwords of all kinds, which can drive the adoption of
password managers. At the same time, Unicode passwords have more ramifications on the
use of emojis, which we discuss in a moment.
Real-world constraints like composition policies shape mental models and coping strategies.
On the other hand, there is a spectrum of password coping strategies that cannot be explained
by environmental factors alone. We hypothesized that a user’s personality might play a role
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in password selection and coping behavior. In three studies (see Chapter 7), we examined
how personality might be associated with different password tasks. We found that personal-
ity was a weak, but non-negligible factor in predicting how different user groups deal with
policies, perceive strength, or choose passwords. The data allowed us to create user seg-
ments in the form of personas that can be used in the development of authentication schemes
and support strategies. As a side effect, we observed that people with a background in an
IT-related field were more likely to adopt a password manager. Looking at the generally
low adoption rates of such software, we explored how users perceive password managers
in Chapter 8. We contributed the observation that users appreciate this kind of tool once
they were first exposed to the technology, e.g. at work. If they had never used a password
manager before, they were unable to anticipate how it might help them. We distinguished
important themes that shape mental models about password managers. However, we found
that these models were currently not fully matched by commercial software. Consequently,
there are novel opportunities to re-design password-managers to better support users.
In summary, we have to understand additional dimensions of the factors that contribute to
mental models, because if we do not, we will fail to help users avoid risky password prac-
tices. Environmental constraints like password policies probably have the largest influence.
Much traditional advice on how to form “good passwords” has led to a skewed mental model
of password strength. Second, professional and educational factors are associated in how
well users deal with password tasks. Finally, personality also contributes to the shaping of
mental models, and warrants further research in this direction.
Simplification Strategies
Our exploration of mental models and other psychological factors in password authentica-
tion revealed that users meet complex tasks with their individual simplification strategies.
Especially if a website implements a complex password policy, users often try to get away
with as little effort as they can, which results in predictable secrets. To prevent this and of-
fer alternative simplification strategies, researchers have tried numerous approaches. One of
them is based on real time feedback during password selection that shows how well the pass-
word meets the policy and how strong it is. Many different variations of feedback have been
proposed (e.g., [99, 146, 300, 343, 347]), but the designs have mostly been based on assump-
tions about the users’ needs in simple password feedback. We took a different approach and
first tried to validate our assumptions and identify aspects that fell short in the related litera-
ture. Through a mixed methods approach (see Chapter 9) we specified user needs and found
four central dimensions of password selection support: showing current problems, explain-
ing the implications, helping with improvement, and empowering to become creative. These
dimensions can be used to facilitate password selection trough feedback and feedforward in
future solutions.
Moreover, to address the users’ needs and to simplify password selection, we explored two
persuasive strategies. The first was based on showing current problems and helping with im-
provement. We introduced a choice architecture for password selection based on the Decoy
effect (see Chapter 10). Through an online experiment, we observed that the Decoy choice
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architecture did not influence participants as expected. However, displaying a passphrase and
making its benefits more visible and easily comparable did result in stronger and longer pass-
words. Thus, we believe that such a combination of feedback and feedforward is the key to
simplifying selection strategies for stronger passwords. Although it is not necessary to pick a
strong password for every single account, it is very recommendable to reduce guessability of
master-passwords for password managers. The second strategy we explored aimed to sim-
plify memorization of passwords and empower users to become creative in their selection. To
that end, we evaluated the usability of using emojis inside text-based passwords in two study
sessions (see Chapter 11). We created a prototype to enter emoji-passwords that allowed
us to measure selection patterns and issues arising from different visual representations of
the same set of emojis across platforms (fragmentation). For our participants, the concept
brought about the intrinsic desire to create more memorable passwords than what is usually
possible, thus the simplification approach went in the right direction. However, once par-
ticipants faced trouble recognizing the right emojis because their visual style had changed,
this fragmentation lowered memorability and participants were reserved towards adopting
emoji-passwords in the future. So, although the concept generated interest at first, usability
troubles outweighed the anticipated benefits. In one of the personality studies (Chapter 7),
we had found that certain user groups were more inclined to adopt emoji-passwords than
others: they were more acceptable for participants who strongly showed the Neuroticism
trait. Hence, it is very likely that those users will try to create emoji-passwords in the near
future, because some services like Twitter and Slack already support them. Therefore, the
usability issues that we identified need to be addressed soon to avoid user frustration due
to account lock-outs and inefficient input. Only then will emoji-passwords become a true
simplification strategy, because right now they miss this target. In conclusion, the task of
password creation can be simplified for users through careful tuning of the password policy,
feedback, feedforward, and empowerment.
Guiding Persuasive Designs
One interesting aspect of the persuasive solutions presented in related work is that they rarely
explain the design process in forming them. Reading the literature gives the impression that
solutions are solely derived from isolated ideation and/or related work. Important iteration
stages of the human-centered design process are often underrepresented and it stays unclear
what led to different design choices. To identify new opportunities and exhaust the design
space, I argued to structure the process and activities specifically for the design of password
support solutions.
To that end, I developed a framework that takes all the insights from related and original
work into account. The Persuasive Design for Password Support (P4P) framework addresses
specific tasks and questions of password authentication, and guides through different stages
of the process. At the same time, it allows taking shortcuts and move directly to a later stage,
given that prior work paints a clear picture of the status quo (see Chapter 12). To illustrate
its usage and applicability, I demonstrated how it informed different stages of the design of
a novel password manager. It embraces the fact that many people desire to reuse passwords
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and “stay in charge” of their most treasured accounts. The password manager thus adapts to
the user’s coping strategies to make the transition smooth. As this is a large software project
in an early stage of its implementation, there is a lot of room for improvement and fine-
tuning. We contributed the minimum viable product (MVP) under an open-source license to
facilitate further development.
Eight Recommendations for the Future
The above summary allows us to give recommendations on service design and research
areas. Some bullets confirm prior work and listing them again should be seen as an emphasis.
1. Consider the evolution of mental models. Coping strategies adjust to the task load
generated by passwords, which fluctuates throughout the years. Users might see com-
plexity as the primary strength component, but this might change as service providers
adjust to the recommendations from empirical usability research.
2. Put less emphasis on password strength. Some researchers have demonstrated that
beyond the threshold for online attacks, the benefits of increased password strength
are limited. The most important scenarios that really require a strong (and usable!)
password are master-passwords and accounts holding particularly sensitive data, e.g.
a Dropbox that is full with health records or credit card details.
3. Remove restrictions, give autonomy. Service providers should eradicate unjusti-
fied complexity requirements, because they have strongly contributed to unreasonable
mental models in the past. Instead, foster password diversity through autonomy, i.e.
by empowering users to be creative and make informed decisions. We found that users
want to be reasonably secure, but often lack the creativity to come up with adequate
passwords. The show-explain-help-empower paradigm can overcome this creativity
barrier and act as an overall guideline for authentication even beyond passwords.
4. Prepare for more requests of password replacement schemes. More and more
people are willing to use biometrics as primary authentication method1. They will
expect this technology from products. However, companies often market biometrics
as panacea for usable and secure authentication, and fail to make users aware of the
ramifications. Therefore, passwords are going to be met with resistance, and we need
to reassure users that passwords have irrefutable benefits in certain situations.
5. Extend the method space. We can observe a strong tendency towards studies facili-
tated through mTurk. While the methodology is robust for eliciting quantitative data,
the results are only one side of the truth. MTurk studies answer what works best, but
often fail to explain why things work best. Therefore, resurrecting mixed-methods
approaches that address qualitative aspects is recommendable for future research in
Usable Security and Privacy (USEC).
1 https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/53646.wss (last accessed 26.03.2018)
245
6. Stay realistic. Nudges wear off over time, so we have to constantly create new persua-
sive strategies. Then again, users quickly resent paternalistic guidance and also prefer
things to stay as they are. We have to acknowledge that there is only so much we can
do. Persuasive support strategies will not work for all users in the same way, but if
they reach even a small target group and make their lives a little easier, I believe that
they are impactful enough.
7. Follow risky ideas. If we look at the current landscape of research on password
support, the design space appears narrow: most published research tackles password
meters in different facets. I argue that taking inspiration from other research areas, e.g.
behavioral economics, can generate ideas outside the usual spectrum. They might be
risky in terms of predictable effect size, but they certainly can counteract habituation
effects.
8. Give feedback. Researchers cannot expect that service providers read academic re-
search papers (let alone dissertations). Therefore, we as a community of user advo-
cates have to become active and point out where things go wrong. For instance, it is
important to report issues with password policies to service providers. I have engaged
in discussions with globally operating companies and was met with an open ear for
improvement areas. In the end, this might translate research into graspable impact.
Conclusion
This thesis has presented a new perspective on a well-known and perhaps unsolvable prob-
lem: coping with passwords is hard and annoying for most of us. Nonetheless, reducing the
frustration component stays a highly desirable goal. We contributed new insights into the
factors that shape coping strategies (mental models, personality) and how to design for the
users’ implicit and explicit needs (a structured process to fine-tune the mixture of feedback,
feedforward, and empowering technology).
13.2 Limitations
The findings should not be interpreted without context. Their main limitations arise from the
way data was collected and consequently how the findings apply to other contexts. In the
following, I will briefly discuss these aspects and shed light on potential risks of advancing
science with persuasion.
13.2.1 Generalizability
Although we tried to minimize sampling bias, we cannot fully rule it out in any of the
reported studies. In total, the fifteen empirical user studies elicited data from 883 people.
The surveys were geographically restricted to Germany, the UK, and the USA, because a) the
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recruitment tools included the largest user panels in these areas and b) we were only capable
to create questions in German and English. Similarly, we only recruited participants from the
Munich area for interviews and lab studies. So although we were careful to control for other
demographic factors, the samples were rather homogeneous. Also, 883 participants cannot
be representative for the entire population of Internet users, so we have to be very careful not
to draw specific conclusions about different demographic groups. Future studies will have to
solidify the findings for different contexts and user groups. On the upside, geographic factors
have not been a major influence on password-related problems and solutions [351, 359].
13.2.2 Study Designs and Analysis Methods
Since most of the studies had an exploratory character, there was little room for confirma-
tory methods. Hence, we mostly relied on correlations and associations between different
dependent variables. This type of research has the disadvantage that larger sample sizes are
required to minimize confidence intervals and to detect latent effects. We did not always
achieve optimal levels of statistical power, which is a caveat that needs to be addressed in
further research. Nevertheless, the findings help to inform future hypotheses and to run
confirmatory studies based on those. In case an independent variable was required to study
a phenomenon, we carefully weighed the benefits and shortcomings of various study de-
signs. For the decoy and the emoji-passwords studies (Chapters 10 and 11), we resorted to
between-groups settings that usually require a large sample size to achieve high statistical
power. On the plus side, they better show contrasting effects. Moreover, we used within-
groups designs in two out of the three personality studies (Chapter 7). This allowed for a
better understanding of individual preferences and was suitable for smaller sample sizes like
in our studies. Exploratory questions make it challenging to anticipate the outcome in either
setting, but additional resources might have enabled us to choose an alternative study design.
Since we were able to answer our research questions satisfactorily, the choice of our methods
was plausible, but future studies might need to reconsider them.
Moreover, we refrained from collecting plain-text passwords for ethical reasons. While
other researchers save passwords in clear text, they also need to provide a higher standard of
protective mechanisms, like locking access to the data and analyzing it off-line. Since we did
not have the resources for such procedures, we found it more reasonable to hash passwords
if they needed to be stored. This limits the available depth of post-hoc analyses, which is a
caveat. At the same time, the consistent usage of the zxcvbn estimator provided sufficient
and reliable details about passwords for the analyses we required. We did, however, have to
modify it in order to strip it from sensitive information.
13.2.3 Real-World Measurements
Apart from the log analysis of PASDJO, we could not collect data in the wild. The concepts
we evaluated in Part III were not yet mature enough to warrant production-level deployment
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of the nudges. We tried to increase ecological validity by following established practices in
password research (cf. Section 3.1). While these attempts let us assume that participants
immersed themselves in the tasks, there is always a small gap between study and real-world
contexts. Therefore, we have to leave deployments of our concepts, e.g. emoji-passwords
or feedforward techniques, to future work. Moreover, coming back to recommendation 5,
we might be able to assess the ecological validity of the existing data through ethnographic
methods, e.g. diary studies or contextual inquiry.
13.2.4 Ethics and Risks
Studying the users’ psyche, like cognitive biases and personality, to aid the design of persua-
sive interventions bears certain ethical risks. Often, we investigate unconscious phenomena,
for instance, how the decoy effect influences users’ decision-making. Therefore, we need to
always consider how findings in this area might be exploited. There was a recent episode
of questionable analysis of personality profiles: Cambridge Analytica, a British political
consulting firm, accessed millions of Facebook users’ data without their consent to target
political campaigns based on their personality and other factors2. Although studying users’
personality to support them in password authentication appears less critical than politically
motivated manipulation techniques, we still have to weigh the benefits against the risks. For
instance, if future research corroborates our findings about the associations between person-
ality and password selection, this might allow adversaries to target attacks more efficiently.
Thus, the P4P framework includes this important aspect in the hope of seeing more discus-
sions of ethical risks in the future.
2 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html (last accessed 27.03.2018)
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The End - Ideas and Final Remarks
In the last chapter of this thesis, I would like to present some ideas for future research in
persuasive password support. Although I would have loved to start working on these already
now, they go beyond the scope of this thesis and should be left to future work. As final
remarks, I want to share my views on current developments of password authentication,
where I see it in the near future, and how its future can be shaped more positively.
14.1 Ideas for Future Work
The recommendations in Section 13.1 touched on future work on a high level. However, one
recommendation was to follow up on ideas off the beaten path. Addressing this criterion, the
following sections provide more specific ideas to work on password support in the future.
14.1.1 Follow-Up Studies
First and foremost, it will be worthwhile to address the limitations of the studies we con-
ducted, or follow up on the leads from initial results. For instance, the PASDJO deployment
in the wild suffered from lack of demographic data to understand individual differences in
password perception. The second study on personality lacked more randomness of the avail-
able passwords and it would thus be a straightforward solution to integrate a short, optional
psychometric questionnaire into PASDJO. Alternatively, we could have crowd-workers fill
out a more elaborate psychometric survey before they play PASDJO and then fit regression
models on the data. In any case, by combining the two approaches we will overcome current
limitations of the two studies at once.
Furthermore, it will be vital to evaluate the Password Reuse Manager (PWRM, see Chapter
12) with a longitudinal study. At this point, we used a rapid iterative design method that was
focused on qualitative feedback on features. The next step will be to invite a larger audience
to test it for at least one month. To boost usage numbers during the field trial, the browser
extension can be made compatible with additional browsers with very little effort. It is
already built on the WebExtensions API, which is increasingly solid on all major browsers.
We had also identified specific research questions that can be answered with A/B testing.
One of the issues was that users kept their previous password managers activated and the
additional extension simply generated more effort. The follow-up study should therefore
screen for participants who do not use a password manager yet (group A), and another group
who will be required to move over to the PWRM as single management solution throughout
the entire study (group B). To extend the method space (see recommendation 5 in Section
13.1) and better understand how the support works for the users, the study should conclude
with the break up-/love-letter method1. Here, participants decide whether to write a love or
a break-up letter to the PWRM, which will allow us to understand the emotional component
of password support.
Finally, some of our other studies involved a password creation task (see Chapters 7,10, and
11). Although we followed guidelines to establish realistic scenarios, it would have been
desirable to study password selection in-situ. Thus, in the future, we should leverage existing
web-applications to test concepts when they are mature enough. Establishing collaborations
with industry partners is critical to carry out this research approach.
14.1.2 Personalizing Password Policies
Personalization is a current big trend in user experience design and persuasive technology2,
especially since the breakthrough in machine-learning capabilities. It was already an ele-
ment in the Persuasive Authentication Framework [124]. We have found that personality has
a notable influence on how users perceive password policies (see Chapter 7). Therefore, it is
conceivable to leverage state-of-the-art computing power to tailor password requirements to
individual users instead of relying on a one-fits-all approach. Hypothetically, if the system
could detect what policy will help the user in finding the best trade-off between password
strength and usability, its user experience of would not be degraded by password authentica-
tion (as it is now). I provided initial pointers about the benefits in a position paper adjunct to
PERSUASIVE’17 [287].
Tackling this challenge is possible with several focus areas, where the P4P framework can
guide design decisions. For instance, we could advance algorithms to detect re-used pass-
words more reliably at registration. Khern-am-nuai et al. have showed an initial proof-
of-concept that keystroke dynamics provide useful features [193], but they performed all
analyses post-hoc. Machine-learning can potentially enable reuse detection already at en-
rollment and allow us to tailor feedback more appropriately. For instance, we can design a
1 https://medialabamsterdam.com/toolkit/method-card/break-uplove-letter/ (last accessed
28.03.2018)
2 https://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/2017/05/13/recommended-just-for-you-the-
power-of-personalization/ (last accessed 28.03.2018)
250
The End - Ideas and Final Remarks
solution that makes alternatives to password reuse more salient, in case reuse practices be-
come too risky (the process is depicted in Figure 14.1). Similar approaches are conceivable
with different personality profiles. However, here it is much more likely to tailor personalize
support strategies during password reset, because the service potentially possesses more data
about the user at that point.
ML Model: Reuse
Show, Explain, Help
Accept Passwordreused
risky
unique
acceptable
*********
Password
Figure 14.1: Personalized intervention for password reuse. The keystrokes inside a password
field are analyzed by a machine learning model. If the password is unique, do not intervene. If
the password is reused, but there are no signs for overlaps between categories, we can accept
the password, too. However, if the password is reused across different categories, we use the
show-explain-help paradigm to empower users to make an informed decision. In any case, the
password is accepted to avoid being too restrictive.
14.1.3 Contextualizing Password Feedback
Beyond personalization, which can be described as context-sensitive adaptation to the user,
we should also consider tailoring password feedback to the system’s context. For instance,
we can create themed password meters to avoid habituation effects [344]. Kroeze and Olivier
proposed using an evolving Pokemon as metaphor for the “evolution state” of the password
[204]. This kind of meter should probably be deployed on a game-related service, or directly
for the registration page of Pokemon Go. As part of a design study, I created a themed
password meter that matches the deployment context: Figure 14.2 shows a password meter
that was originally created for a music-festival app. It is based on the share-explain-help
paradigm and is only one of many design options for this context. For instance, we could
also choose a personalized social nudge and say “only Justin Bieber fans use passwords like
that” – this could trigger in-/out-group biases and motivate some users to act differently.
Ideally, such feedback systems are evaluated in situ, but to make it easier, we can use a cover
story first, e.g. by creating a mock-website and recruit participants for usability tests thereof.
Moreover, to assess the advantages of contextualized feedback, there should be a control
group with neutral feedback.
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(a) Contextualized feedback and feedforward for a weak password.
(b) When the password is sufficiently strong, provide reinforcing feedback.
Figure 14.2: A password meter for users of music festival app that uses context-related imagery
to convey password strength. It is designed to drive curiosity. Feedback and feedforward follow
the show-explain-help paradigm.
14.1.4 Solving Password Breach Aftermath
Database breaches containing passwords occur frequently with different levels of severity
depending on security standards at the affected service. Users face an immediate risk, but
might be unaware of the situation, so they do not take swift measures to protect their account.
To mitigate this, service providers invalidate affected user accounts after they have detected
a breach. This action is necessary to reestablish a secure overall system state where attack-
ers cannot impersonate users on the platform. Usually, service providers inform users upon
this countermeasure and prompt them to reset their passwords via email campaigns [169].
While these countermeasures are unavoidable, they fall short of addressing the domino ef-
fect of reused passwords [173]. Many users do not understand the ramifications of a pass-
word breach and might only reset the password on the affected site. All other sites that
share the same credentials remain at risk. I propose that service providers constantly mon-
itor password leaks both on their own and on third party websites. In other words, while
they might use a blacklist during account creation, there is usually no check-up mecha-
nism that takes the updated risk-level into account. During this routine check-up, accounts
that share credentials with affected third parties can be invalidated. The implementation
should be straightforward with the aid of breach data freely available from different sources,
e.g. https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords. However, there are a few issues that we
need to solve in the future. First, freely available password lists rarely contain user-names
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to avoid targeted attacks. Second, if accounts are invalidated because a check-up has found
a breached set of credentials, users might misunderstand the reasons for the account lock-
down. Phishing attacks often exploit “your account was locked down for security reasons”
as a hook to obtain users’ real credentials. Sending out emails with reset prompts is thus
especially dangerous because they may raise suspicion, and it is hard for novice users to
verify if the prompt is legitimate.
Finally, it would be interesting to study how user behavior changes after a breach. So far,
there have been attempts to collect initial data [169], but there is far more that we have not
measured, yet. For instance, it will be interesting to find out if personality traits are associ-
ated with user behavior after a breach. While it would be fair to assume that conscientious
users change their passwords more quickly and consistently, we did not necessarily observe
such expected behavior in our own studies. Thus, there might be many opportunities for
surprising insights.
14.1.5 Re-locating Password Feedback
A final problem to address in future work is the fact that many users simply do not notice
password feedback and therefore cannot re-assess their choice. Many users look down on
their hands when typing passwords on regular hardware keyboards, because they have not
mastered touch typing. During password entry, on-screen feedback is then out of sight. This
could explain why password meters have smaller impact on password selection in the wild:
while study participants might take care to follow all on-screen instructions in an online
experiment, users are often less focused on the screen in real-world tasks. Therefore, we
should study the impact of password feedback if it is relocated closer to the hands. The
Touch Bar of current generations of the Apple MacBook Pro models is a visual output close
to the hardware keys. It could be leveraged as display for both visual and textual password
strength feedback. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been investigated, but might
be a feasible solution.
14.2 Final Thoughts
I believe that users are not the weakest link in the authentication chain. There are always
security mitigations on the system side that can take responsibility away from users. For in-
stance, if all services had infinite resources to invest into penetration tests and alike, the need
for exceptionally strong passwords vanishes. And although some user behavior is arguably
risky, people should not be blamed for faulty systems that permit risks. Commentaries on
the web and other media do the rest when they name and shame users for weak password
behavior (see Figure 14.3). Perhaps, their intentions are good, but the subtext is different:
Plenty of users are doing the same, so why would any one user act differently than the rest?
This is maladroit framing of normative messages at best [56].
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Figure 14.3: Some media are constantly shaming users for their “bad passwords”, arguably
as clickbait. However, the reports also act as reinforcement because of the implicit normative
message these headlines convey [56]: Many other people behave the same way, so it is fairly
normal.
Passwords annoy users for a good reason. Most of us will not grief, if passwords become
obsolete tomorrow. Probably, in the future, we will be able to make machines intelligent
enough to independently decide whether a user should be granted access or not, all without
explicit authentication. PCs and mobiles will automatically lock when the user is not in the
vicinity. Natural interactions will enable us to tell virtual assistants to temporarily grant ac-
cess to devices, e.g. by saying “Alexa, my daughter can use my iPad while we are driving
to Italy, but make sure that she can only browse safe websites”, all without the hassle of
sharing PINs or enrolling biometric features. Naturally, a few drawbacks will remain, be-
cause perfect security cannot be guaranteed, and this will raise trust issues. People want to
stay in charge and although passwords appear to be an inferior technology, they can achieve
a higher level of perceived control. Thus, there will not only be a need but also a demand
for knowledge-based authentication in the future. Drawing on an analogy, passwords are
perhaps the vinyl records in a world of ubiquitous music streaming: They are a bit clunky,
impractical, and can be damaged through careless handling. On the other hand, experts still
recommend them despite being an obsolete technology. People treasure them for years, of-
ten become collectors and try to find the rare, unique gems of long-lost quality. Once attacks
on password alternatives like multimodal biometrics become commonplace, there might be
a time when passwords see a revival in popularity like vinyl.
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Appendix
Policy Audit
TLD min max L U D S <> C
google.de 8 100 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic 3
youtube.com 8 100 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic 3
facebook.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
amazon.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 8 basic 8
google.com 8 100 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic
ebay.de 6 64 3 3 3 (8) 8 2class 3
bing.com 8 0 3 3 3 3 8 2class 3
wikipedia.org 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
web.de 8 40 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic 8
gmx.net 8 40 3 3 3 (8) (8) basic 8
t-online.de 8 16 3 3 3 (8) 8 2class 8
ebay-kleinanzeigen.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic
yahoo.com 9 32 3 3 3 3 8 basic 3
msn.com 8 0 3 3 3 (8) 8 2class 3
bild.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
spiegel.de 8 50 3 ! 3 (8) (8) 3class 8
live.com 8 0 3 3 3 (8) 8 2class 3
paypal.com 8 20 3 3 3 3 3 paypal 8
mobile.de 6 0 3 3 3 (8) 8 2class 8
xhamster.com 4 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
chip.de 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
twitter.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic
otto.de 6 12 3 3 3 3 8 basic 8
gutefrage.net 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
immobilienscout24.de 5 40 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
streamcloud.eu 4 32 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
bs.to 5 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
instagram.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 (8) basic 3
outbrain.com 8 144 ! ! ! 3 (8) outbrain 8
focus.de 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
pornhub.com 6 40 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic 3
bahn.de 6 40 3 3 3 3 3 bahn 8
bongacams.com 6 32 3 3 3 (8) (8) basic 3
microsoft.com 8 0 3 3 3 (8) 8 2class 3
xing.com 4 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
netflix.com 4 50 3 3 3 (8) (8) basic 8
1und1.de 8 0 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic 8
blogspot.de 8 100 3 3 3 (8) 8 basic 3
pinterest.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 8 basic 3
autoscout24.de 6 80 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
idealo.de 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 idealo 8
TLD min max L U D S <> C
chefkoch.de 4 32 3 3 3 (8) (8) basic 8
wetter.com 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
kicker.de 6 20 3 3 3 3 (8) basic 8
twitch.tv 8 40 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
tumblr.com 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
booking.com 8 100 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
welt.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
heise.de 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
zalando.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
txxx.com 5 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
wordpress.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
linkedin.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
youporn.com 4 20 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
sueddeutsche.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
leo.org 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
reddit.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
deutsche-bank.de 8 16 3 3 3 3 3 2class 8
arbeitsagentur.de 8 20 ! ! ! 3 3 3class 8
amazon.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
zeit.de 6 0 3 3 3 (8) (8) basic 8
wetteronline.de 6 12 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
ikea.com 7 10 ! 3 ! 3 3 2class 8
computerbild.de 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
tvnow.de 6 18 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
hclips.com 5 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
apple.com 8 32 ! ! ! 3 3 3class 8
sport1.de 7 12 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
faz.net 6 48 3 3 3 3 8 basic 8
imgur.com 6 0 ! 3 ! 3 3 2class 8
zdf.de 1 50 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
aol.com 8 16 3 3 3 3 3 basic 3
lidl.de 6 0 ! ! ! 3 3 lidl 8
immowelt.de 7 50 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
stackoverflow.com 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 2class 8
adobe.com 8 0 ! ! 3 3 3 3class 3
tchibo.de 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
mediamarkt.de 8 15 ! 3 3 3 3 mediamarkt 8
dropbox.com 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
hm.com 6 25 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
tagesschau.de 1 30 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
wetter.de 6 0 3 3 3 3 3 basic 8
Table 14.1: Reverse-Engineered Password Policies. Head Row: TLD = top level domain.
<> = supports unicode UTF8/16, C = complexity, = utilizes dictionary checks. Content:
L = lower case letters, U = upper case letters, D = digits, S = symbols, 3 = allowed/yes, ! =
mandatory,(8) = restricted usage, 8 = forbidden/no.
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1. test 
2. aaa 
3. 123456789a 
4. a123456789 
5. P@ssw0rd 
6. password with space 
7. 123456 
8. password 
9. 12345678 
10. qwerty 
11. 123456789 
12. password1 
13. qwertyuiQWERTYUI1234 
14. qwertyuiopasdQWERTYUIOPASD123456 
15. qwertyuiopasdfghQWERTYUIOPASDFGH12345678 
16. qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmQWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNM1234567890 
17. qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmQWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNM1234567890qwertyuiop 
18. qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmQWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNM1234567890qwertyuioqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmQWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZ
XCVBNM1234567890qwertyuio 
19. Aa1ÄöÜß!"#$%&'*+,-./ 
20. AaÄöÜß!"#$%&'*+,-./:;<=>?@|~\^_` 
21. AaÄöÜß! "#$%&'(*+,-./:;<=>?@{|}~[\]^_`01 
22. ÄäÖöÜüß!"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@{|}~[\]^_`01234567Aa 
23. ÄäÖöÜüß!"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ 
24. ÄäÖöÜüß! "#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ 
25. Aa1! "#$%&'()*+,-./: 
26. Aa1;<=>?@[\]^_`{|}~0 
27. Ab!"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@{|}~[\]^_`012567 
28. !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@{|}~[\]^_`0123456789ABCabc 
29. ! "#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@{|}~[\]^_`0123456789ABCabcd 
30. !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ 
31. ! "#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ 
32. ! "#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~! "#$%&'()*+,-
./0123456789:;<=>?@ 
33. ! "#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~! "#$%&'()*+,-
./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ 
34. Aa1€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ¡¢ 
35. Aa1£¤¥¦§¨©ª«¬®¯°±²³´µ¶·¸¹º»¼½¾¿À 
36. Aa1ÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ×ØÙÚÛÜÝ 
37. Aa1Þßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðñòóôõö÷øùú 
38. Aa1ûüýþÿ€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š› 
39. €‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—
˜™š›œžŸ¡¢£¤¥¦§¨©ª«¬®¯°±²³´µ¶·¸¹º»¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ×ØÙÚÛÜÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðñòóôõö÷øùúûüýþÿ 
40. €‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ¡¢£¤¥¦§¨©ª«¬ 
®¯°±²³´µ¶·¸¹º»¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ×ØÙÚÛÜÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðñòóôõö÷øùúûüýþÿ 
41. €‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ ¡¢£¤¥¦§¨©ª«¬ 
®¯°±²³´µ¶·¸¹º»¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ×ØÙÚÛÜÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðñòóôõö÷øùúûüýþÿ€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”•–—˜™š›œžŸ 
¡¢£¤¥¦§¨©ª«¬ ®¯°±²³´µ¶·¸¹º»¼½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÖ×ØÙÚÛÜÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðñòóôõö÷øùúûüýþÿ 
42. qwertyuiopZXCVBNM1234567890 §-=[]åß∂ƒ©˙∆˚¬…æ«ÅÍÎÏ˝ÓÔÒÚÆ»˜<>? 
43. §1234567890-=qwertyuiop[]åß∂ƒ©˙∆˚¬…æ«ÅÍÎÏ˝ÓÔ ÒÚÆ»˜ZXCVBNM<>? 
44. §1234567890-=qwertyuiop[]åß∂ƒ©˙∆˚¬…æ«ÅÍÎÏ˝ÓÔ ÒÚÆ»˜ZXCVBNM<>?ASDFGHJKL:"| 
45. §`1qAz2wsx3edc4rfv5tgb6yhn7ujm8ik,9ol.0p;/-
['=]\']œåΩ∑ß≈´∂ç®ƒ√†©∫¥˙˜¨∆µˆ˚≤ø¬≥π…÷“æ‘«’»”Æ∏Ú¿ØÒ˘ˆ ¯¨ÔÂÁÓ˜ˇ˝ı‰Ï◊´ÎÇ„Í˛ŒÅ¸ 
46. §1234567890-=qwertyuiop[]åß∂ƒ©˙∆˚¬…æ«ÅÍÎÏ˝ÓÔ ÒÚÆ»˜ZXCVBNM<>?ASDFGHJKL:"|§1234567890-
=qwertyuiop[]åß∂ƒ©˙∆˚¬…æ«ÅÍÎÏ˝ÓÔ ÒÚÆ»˜ZXCVBNM<>?ASDFGHJKL:" 
Figure 14.4: List of 46 passwords used to reverse-engineer password policies.
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Password Personality
emoji12 2word12 3class12
(Intercept) 9.99∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗ 6.26∗
(2.35) (0.75) (2.52)
Age 0.02 −0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
GenderFemale 0.91 1.35∗ −0.46
(0.58) (0.66) (0.61)
ITNo −0.10 0.60 0.21
(0.59) (0.66) (0.63)
Extraversion −0.05 −0.01
(0.08) (0.08)
Conscientiousness 0.01 0.08
(0.09) (0.10)
Neuroticism −0.22∗ 0.05
(0.09) (0.09)
emojiPos2 0.52
(0.65)
emojiPos3 0.23
(0.63)
twoWordPos2 −0.38
(0.74)
twoWordPos3 −0.07
(0.73)
threeClassPos2 1.19
(0.66)
threeClassPos3 0.77
(0.69)
AIC 591.89 615.92 604.37
Deviance 772.78 899.67 890.95
Deviance explained 0.15 0.21 0.10
R2 0.04 0.08 0.00
GCV score 8.47 10.44 9.36
Num. obs. 119 119 119
Num. smooth terms 2 6 2
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 14.2: GAM summary of difficulty to create a password in Personality study 1.
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emoji12 2word12 3class12
(Intercept) 123.77∗∗∗ 98.71∗∗ 159.83∗∗∗
(28.79) (34.57) (45.19)
Age 1.55 0.12
(0.95) (0.90)
GenderFemale 19.92∗ 29.00∗∗ 10.99
(9.87) (9.16) (10.57)
ITNo −6.83 14.37 15.64
(10.11) (9.58) (10.99)
Conscientiousness −3.58∗ −3.40∗ −2.09
(1.58) (1.49) (1.70)
emojiPos1 −37.24∗∗∗
(10.95)
emojiPos2 −51.03∗∗∗
(10.71)
EDF: s(Extraversion) 1.44
(1.76)
EDF: s(Agreeableness) 1.10 1.72
(1.20) (2.16)
EDF: s(Neuroticism) 2.84 3.30
(3.57) (4.13)
EDF: s(Openness) 1.22
(1.41)
Extraversion −0.42 −2.71
(1.22) (1.40)
Openness 0.86 −1.49
(1.21) (1.35)
twoWordPos1 −10.78
(10.57)
twoWordPos2 −33.43∗∗
(10.52)
Agreeableness 3.40∗
(1.64)
Neuroticism −3.33∗
(1.64)
threeClassPos1 −7.15
(11.52)
threeClassPos2 −41.44∗∗∗
(11.99)
EDF: s(Age) 2.76∗∗
(3.43)
AIC 1266.94 1252.46 1283.54
BIC 1307.51 1294.21 1321.78
Log Likelihood -618.87 -611.20 -628.01
Deviance 229220.93 201509.84 267271.98
Deviance explained 0.29 0.26 0.30
Dispersion 2174.73 1919.59 2515.74
R2 0.21 0.16 0.22
GCV score 2455.30 2176.04 2817.89
Num. obs. 119 119 119
Num. smooth terms 4 2 1
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 14.3: General Additive Models for Time to Create passwords in first personality study.
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A. parametric coefficients Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 62.2292 13.0463 4.7699 < 0.0001
B5_Extraversion -0.0239 0.1313 -0.1823 0.8557
B5_Agreeableness 0.3349 0.2140 1.5651 0.1211
B5_Neuroticism -0.0327 0.1630 -0.2003 0.8417
B5_Openness -0.3655 0.1526 -2.3951 0.0187**
D_Age -0.1144 0.1150 -0.9954 0.3222
D_GenderFemale 0.8796 2.1791 0.4037 0.6874
D_ComputerScienceBackgroundYes -2.9237 2.2227 -1.3154 0.1917
B. smooth terms edf Ref.df F-value p-value
s(B5_Conscientiousness) 1.8036 2.2885 0.4180 0.5944
Table 14.4: GAM fit for “overall strength ratings” with Big-Five trait scores as covariates.
Conscientiousness was smoothed, because it shows a non-linear association with overall strength
ratings.
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GLOSSARY
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
CHI ACM CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems.
Largest venue of research in Human-Computer Interaction
CMU Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA)
ESM Experience Sampling Method
GAM generalized additive model
HCI Human-Computer Interaction
HIT Human Intelligence Task
IRB Institutional Review Board
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LUDS lowercase, uppercase, digits, symbols
mTurk Amazon Mechanical Turk. Crowd-Sourcing platforms where workers
(“turkers”) complete micro tasks and receive a small payment.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
P4P Persuasive Design for Password Support
PAF Persuasive Authentication Framework
PANAS Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale
password manager Password Manager. Software that supports a user in the task of man-
aging credentials. Can be standalone or built into web browsers. Fa-
mous examples for standalone password managers: LastPass, 1Pass-
word, Dashlane, Keepass, RememBear
PCFG Probablisitic Context-Free Grammar. Statistical grammar model. In
password studies, PCFG algorithms can be adapted to measure the
guessability of a given password and calculate a guess number.
PD Persuasive Design
persona Fictional character that represents a market or user segment during a
user-centered design process
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PGS Password Guessing Service. Service that ‘estimates plaintext pass-
words’ guessability: how many guesses a particular password-cracking
algorithm with particular training data would take to guess a password.
https://pgs.ece.cmu.edu/
PII personally identifiable information
PIN personal identification number
PSM password strength meter
PWM password manager
REML Restricted maximum likelihood
SeBIS Security Behavior Intentions Scale
service provider Entity providing access to a resource through a specific service, e.g.
the operator of a news website.
SSO Single-Sign On
UI user interface
Unicode Standard to consistent encode, represent, and handle digital text
USEC Usable Security and Privacy
UX user experience
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
WPA WiFi Protected Access. Protocol used in access control for wireless
networks.
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